United States v. Narendrakumar P. Patel

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-13425 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar MARCH 30, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:08-cr-00210-WKW-CSC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
NARENDRAKUMAR P. PATEL,
a.k.a. Narendrakumas Patel,
a.k.a. Narendra Patel,
lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(March 30, 2011)
Before BARKETT, MARCUS and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Narendrakumar Patel appeals his conviction for knowingly possessing a
firearm as an illegal alien. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5)(A). Patel challenges the denial
of his motions to suppress the contents of a black binder and a statement that he
provided to an immigration officer. We affirm.
Patel argues that documents about his immigration status, which were stored
in a black binder, were seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, but we
disagree. The documents in the binder were admissible under the plain view
doctrine. The agents had obtained a warrant to search for “records of tax returns,
documents listing personal information including DOB and SSN records, . . .
documents associated with tax returns and refunds, . . . records, [and] books”
containing evidence that Patel had profited from cashing tax refund checks which
had been obtained fraudulently, and the agents were entitled to examine the
documents in the binder to determine if they fell within the scope of the warrant.
See United States v. Slocum, 708 F.2d 587, 604–05 (11th Cir. 1983). After the
agents reviewed the documents, which included invoices charging Patel for filing
several immigration applications and documents informing Patel that he had been
admitted to the United States temporarily as an alien worker, the agents were
entitled to seize the documents as evidence that Patel was in the United States
illegally. See id. at 605. The district court did not err by denying Patel’s motion
to suppress the contents of the binder.
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Patel also argues that his statements to immigration agents should have been
suppressed as fruits of the unlawful search and seizure of the documents in the
binder, but this argument fails. To be excluded as fruit of the poisonous tree, the
evidence had to have been seized as a direct result of a constitutional violation.
See United States v. Lopez-Garcia, 565 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2009). Patel’s
“argument plainly collapses” because “as we have just explained, his Fourth
Amendment rights were never violated.” Id. The district court did not err by
denying Patel’s motion to suppress his statement.
Patel argues alternatively that his statements should have been suppressed
because the federal agents failed to provide him warnings about his rights, see
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), but this argument fails
too. A suspect is entitled to be warned of his constitutional rights if he is
interrogated while in the custody of an officer. United States v. Lall, 607 F.3d
1277, 1284 (11th Cir. 2010). To be in custody, a suspect must have undergone a
“‘formal arrest or restraint on [his] freedom of movement of the degree associated
with a formal arrest.’” Id. (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662,
124 S. Ct. 2140, 2148 (2004)). Patel agreed to accompany federal agents to their
office, where Patel spoke with Agent Blake Diamond at Diamond’s desk. Patel
was not threatened or restrained during the interview, and “Miranda warnings are
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not required ‘simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or
because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect.’” California v.
Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S. Ct. 3517, 3520 (1983) (quoting Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714 (1977)). Patel complains about
not being “informed that he did not have to answer . . . questions or that he was
free to go,” but Patel never asked to terminate the interview or to leave nor does he
argue that he was coerced or that agents made any show of force that led him to
believe that his requests would be denied. See United States v. Phillips, 812 F.2d
1355, 1360–62 (11th Cir. 1987). Because Patel was not in custody when he gave a
statement to Agent Diamond, Patel was not entitled to be told about his Miranda
rights. The district court did not err by denying Patel’s motion to suppress based
on a violation of Miranda.
Patel’s conviction is AFFIRMED.
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