United States v. Martin Dejesus, aka Martin Dejesus Perez

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-12985 JULY 28, 2011
________________________ JOHN LEY
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 2:09-cr-00022-WKW-TFM-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MARTIN DEJESUS,
a.k.a. Martin Dejesus Perez,
lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
________________________
(July 28, 2011)
Before DUBINA, Chief Judge, CARNES, Circuit Judge, and FORRESTER,*
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:
*
Honorable J. Owen Forrester, United States District Judge for the Northern District of
Georgia, sitting by designation.
Martin DeJesus appeals his conviction for possessing with the intent to
distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine powder in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1). DeJesus entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the cocaine that was found in
his vehicle. DeJesus contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress because: (1) the traffic stop of his minivan was not based on a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity; (2) his detention following the traffic stop was
unreasonably extended absent reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; (3) his
consent to search his minivan was not freely given; and (4) the search of his
vehicle exceeded the scope of any consent he may have given.
I.
On the morning of February 13, 2009, Alabama State Trooper Charlton
Martin was patrolling the northbound side of I-65 in Montgomery County,
Alabama, when he observed a white minivan with a temporary license plate
traveling in the right-hand lane. Trooper Martin could only make out some of the
numbers on the temporary tag, and he was unable to see whether it listed a state of
origin or date of expiration. Because the minivan had a temporary paper license
plate that was “just a piece of paper that you could print out . . . with your personal
computer” and because he could not identify its state of origin, Martin initiated a
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traffic stop of the vehicle in order to determine whether the temporary tag was
being displayed in accordance with Alabama law.
As Martin approached the passenger side of the minivan, he noticed that the
words “Texas Buyer” appeared on the temporary license plate in small print above
the large-print license plate numbers. Once he arrived at the passenger-side
window he met DeJesus, the driver and sole occupant of the vehicle. Martin asked
DeJesus for his driver’s license, informed him that he had been pulled over
because he was not displaying a valid state license plate, and asked for paperwork
to support the minivan’s temporary tag. While DeJesus was retrieving the
requested paperwork, Martin observed that DeJesus’ hand was “visibly shaking.”
Martin, who was on the passenger side of the vehicle, also noticed that when he
asked DeJesus for his driver’s license he “shifted his body up against the driver’s
door, . . . creating distance between . . . law enforcement and himself.”
From DeJesus’ paperwork it appeared to Martin that the temporary license
plate was valid and that it matched the minivan. While DeJesus was gathering the
paperwork for the van and as Martin reviewed it, the two also engaged in
conversation. Martin asked where DeJesus was headed, and DeJesus responded
that he was traveling from Houston to Atlanta. Martin asked if he was going to
Atlanta for work, and DeJesus responded that he was going to Atlanta “to live
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there” and later explained that there was “no more work to do” in Texas so he was
“moving to Atlanta” to work at a Cajun restaurant. During the course of that
conversation, Martin interpreted DeJesus’ apparent confusion in response to his
questions about whether DeJesus was going to “move” to Atlanta and “live” there
as an indication that DeJesus’ “understanding of the English language was . . .
selective” since DeJesus had already used those English words himself during the
conversation.
Before returning to his patrol vehicle to further review DeJesus’ paperwork,
Trooper Martin looked inside the minivan and observed that the contents of the
vehicle — a single suitcase, a duffel bag, a television, and a box of dishes — were
in his opinion inconsistent with a permanent move to a new location. Once he was
back in his patrol vehicle, Trooper Martin more closely scrutinized DeJesus’
paperwork because in his experience there had been an increase in fraud as the
technology used to produce fraudulent documents had become more widely
available. Upon closer examination, Martin learned from the paperwork that
DeJesus had purchased the minivan nine days earlier for just under $4000 in cash.
Martin found it suspicious that DeJesus had very recently paid for the minivan in
cash despite the fact that he was moving to Atlanta because he could no longer
find work in Houston.
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While in his patrol vehicle Martin also telephoned EPIC, the El Paso
Intelligence Center, to inquire whether DeJesus had any outstanding warrants, any
immigration issues, or whether he was involved in or wanted in connection with
any open investigations. After a few minutes, Martin learned from EPIC that
DeJesus was a possible suspect in an open drug trafficking investigation into an
organization suspected of trafficking drugs from Houston to Boston. While
Martin waited a few more minutes to learn if DeJesus was wanted in that or any
other investigation, he typed out a warning citation for DeJesus’ failure to plainly
and visibly display a proper license plate. Once Martin learned that DeJesus was
not wanted in the Houston drug trafficking investigation, he returned to the
passenger side of DeJesus’ minivan and leaned in through the window to return
his driver’s license and paperwork and to issue the warning citation.
After Martin explained to DeJesus that the warning citation was not a ticket
and told him that the traffic stop was over, DeJesus thanked him. Immediately
thereafter, Martin asked DeJesus, “May I, may I search your vehicle? You’re not
carrying anything illegal, are you?” DeJesus quickly responded “okay.”
Unconvinced that DeJesus had understood the question, Trooper Martin again
asked for consent to search, this time in Spanish. DeJesus again responded,
“okay.” Before initiating the search, however, Trooper Martin asked DeJesus a
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series of questions. First he asked, in Spanish, whether DeJesus had anything
illegal in the van. DeJesus said “no” and laughed. Next Martin asked, in Spanish,
whether DeJesus had any weapons. DeJesus said “no” several times but did not
laugh. Then Martin asked, in Spanish, whether DeJesus had “mucho dinero” in
the van. DeJesus again said “no” but did not laugh. Finally, Martin asked
DeJesus, in Spanish, if he had any nails in the car.
Martin asked whether DeJesus had any nails in the car because in his
experience “clavos,” the Spanish word for nails, is a slang term for concealed
compartments used to store contraband. Trooper Martin asked this question to
gauge DeJesus’ familiarity with the slang term. As Martin explained at the
hearing on DeJesus’ motion to suppress, “if I ask somebody if they have any nails
in their car and they have no idea what the slang is and they’re not a construction
worker, I should get a puzzled look from them. But if they are familiar with the
term, I will get a reaction that would indicate they are familiar with the term.”
When Martin asked DeJesus, “¿Tiene clavos en el carro?,” DeJesus responded
“Oh, no,” followed by an extended laugh.
Following that exchange, Martin asked DeJesus once again, in Spanish, for
consent to search his vehicle. When DeJesus again consented, Martin asked him
to exit his vehicle and presented him with a consent-to-search form written in
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Spanish. Martin pointed out various parts of the form to DeJesus, including both
of their names, the signature line, and that the form covered both his car and his
luggage. DeJesus signed the Spanish consent form, and Martin instructed him to
wait in the patrol vehicle while the minivan was searched.
Martin began by searching for hidden compartments under the driver’s seat.
Finding none, he inspected the back of the minivan and looked inside the single
piece of luggage and the box of dishes. Martin then checked the undercarriage of
the minivan where he noticed a sliver of Bondo, a puddy-like material used in auto
body repair, attached to “an aftermarket piece of sheet metal” that was connected
to the minivan’s rocker panel, an area running along the side of the vehicle from
wheel well to wheel well. Recognizing the rocker panel as a place where
contraband could be concealed, Martin opened the minivan’s door and removed a
piece of plastic from the area above the rocker panel, which allowed him to see
inside the hidden compartment that had been formed by the sheet metal. Peering
inside the compartment through some factory-made vent holes, Martin was able to
see a piece of rope and some white packages.
Martin recognized the white packages as cocaine, alerted his fellow officers,
and returned to his patrol vehicle where he read DeJesus his Miranda rights and
placed him under arrest. After placing DeJesus under arrest, Martin and the other
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troopers transported the minivan to the Department of Public Safety. Along the
way, however, the officers’ caravan stopped in the parking lot of the Montgomery
Zoo where Martin allowed drug dogs to walk in and around the vehicle. Martin
then used a portable video camera to show the hidden compartment as he had seen
it during his roadside inspection. When the officers finally removed the
contraband at the Department of Public Safety, they found five kilo-sized
packages, which field-tested positive for cocaine.
II.
When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress evidence, we review the
district court’s findings of fact only for clear error and we review de novo its
application of law to those facts. United States v. Ramirez, 476 F.3d 1231, 1235
(11th Cir. 2007). In addition, “all facts are construed in the light most favorable to
the party prevailing in the district court — in this case, the government.” Id. at
1235–36.
DeJesus contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to
suppress the cocaine because the search of his minivan was tainted by an unlawful
traffic stop. He argues that Trooper Martin’s decision to stop his vehicle was
premised on a mistake of law, which cannot form the basis of a legal traffic stop.
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It is well-settled that “the police may stop and briefly detain a person to
investigate a reasonable suspicion that he is involved in criminal activity, even
though probable cause is lacking.” United States v. Williams, 876 F.2d 1521,
1523 (11th Cir. 1989). Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to believe that
criminal activity is afoot is to be “determined from the totality of the
circumstances . . . and from the collective knowledge of the officers involved in
the stop.” United States v. Pruitt, 174 F.3d 1215, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). Furthermore, a “traffic stop based on an officer’s
incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth
Amendment.” United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir.
2003). A mistake of law, on the other hand, “no matter how reasonable or
understandable, . . . cannot provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
justify a traffic stop.” Id. at 1279.
DeJesus argues that he was unlawfully stopped based on Trooper Martin’s
mistake of law regarding the requirements for the display of temporary license
plates in Alabama. Section 32-6-51 of the Alabama Code provides that “[e]very
motor vehicle operator who operates a motor vehicle . . . in this state shall at all
times keep attached and plainly visible on the rear end of such motor vehicle a
license tag or license plate as prescribed and furnished by the Department of
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Revenue . . . .” Ala. Code § 32-6-51. DeJesus argues that Trooper Martin’s
mistake of law was pulling him over based on the mistaken belief that he was in
violation of Alabama law despite the fact that § 32-6-51 requires only that a
license plate be “plainly visible” and not that the state of origin be legible from a
distance or that the car’s registration be immediately verifiable.
However, § 32-6-51 also requires a vehicle to display a “plainly visible . . .
license plate as prescribed and furnished by the Department of Revenue.” Ala.
Code. § 32-6-51 (emphasis added). As Trooper Martin testified at the suppression
hearing, he was unable to tell from a distance whether DeJesus’ temporary license
plate was in compliance with § 32-6-51 because he could not make out all of the
information on the license plate and because temporary tags such as the one on
DeJesus’ minivan look like “a piece of paper that you could print out . . . with your
personal computer.” And if DeJesus had in fact fabricated his own temporary
license plate using a personal computer, such an invalid tag would have
constituted a traffic violation under Alabama law. Therefore, based on the
totality of the circumstances including his training and experience, Trooper Martin
had a reasonable suspicion that DeJesus was in violation of § 32-6-51 for failure to
display a “plainly visible . . . license plate as prescribed and furnished by the
Department of Revenue.”
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Although DeJesus points out that his temporary license plate was valid
under Alabama and Texas law based on reciprocity agreements concerning the use
and display of temporary tags, Trooper Martin’s mistaken belief about DeJesus’
compliance with the law was ultimately a mistake of fact. And because Martin’s
mistaken belief that DeJesus was driving with an invalid temporary license plate
was reasonable, the mistake of fact did not make the initial stop improper.
III.
DeJesus contends that even if the initial stop was proper, the cocaine
nevertheless should have been suppressed because the search of his minivan was
tainted by the fact that Trooper Martin extended his roadside detention longer than
was necessary to complete the traffic stop.
Generally, a traffic stop must last “no longer than is necessary to effectuate
the purpose of the stop,” and “the scope of the detention must be carefully tailored
to its underlying justification.” Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1220 (quotation marks and
alteration omitted). Even so, an officer may lawfully ask questions unrelated to
the traffic stop, examine a driver’s license, or perform computer checks of a
driver’s license and vehicle registration so long as the officer does not
unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop. United States v. Hernandez, 418
F.3d 1206, 1209 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005). “Ordinarily, when a citation or warning has
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been issued and all record checks have been completed and come back clean, the
legitimate investigative purpose of the traffic stop is fulfilled.” United States v.
Simms, 385 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2004). However, a traffic stop may last
longer than the purpose of the stop would ordinarily permit if an officer, based on
specific facts and rational inferences drawn from those facts in light of his training
and experience, has an objectively reasonable and articulable suspicion that illegal
activity has occurred or is occurring. Pruitt, 174 F.3d at 1220; United States v.
Tapia, 912 F.2d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1990).
DeJesus argues that he was unreasonably detained because even if the
traffic stop was lawful it should have terminated once Trooper Martin learned that
his tag was valid. DeJesus asserts that Martin had decided to search his vehicle
almost as soon as he pulled him over and then unreasonably detained him without
justification. We disagree.
Once Martin executed a valid traffic stop based on his reasonable suspicion
that DeJesus’ temporary tag was not in compliance with Alabama law, it was not
unreasonable for him to detain DeJesus for the next 15 – 20 minutes to verify that
the temporary tag was leigitmate. While doing so, Martin permissibly inquired
about DeJesus’ destination and the purpose of his trip, verified his vehicle’s
registration, and returned to his patrol car to more closely review the paperwork
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relating to the tag. The legitimate investigative purpose of the stop was not
completed until Martin returned to DeJesus’ vehicle with a warning citation and
informed him that the traffic stop was over.
DeJesus’ roadside detention was not unreasonably prolonged by the fact
that Martin telephoned EPIC to find out if DeJesus was wanted in Texas. After
the lawful traffic stop, Martin through his training and experience as a law
enforcement officer had developed a reasonable suspicion that DeJesus could be
involved in drug trafficking. In the short time that DeJesus was detained on the
side of the road, Martin had observed that (1) DeJesus appeared more nervous than
the average subject of a traffic stop; (2) he was traveling from Houston to Atlanta,
a major drug-trafficking corridor; (3) his paperwork indicated that he had
purchased the minivan for almost $4,000 in cash just nine days before the traffic
stop, but he said that he was moving because he had been unable to find work; and
(4) the items in his vehicle were inconsistent with someone making a permanent
move to a new location. These facts, taken together, provided Martin with
reasonable suspicion that DeJesus was involved in illegal conduct, justifying more
detention to investigate the presence of contraband. See United States v. Bautista-
Silva, 567 F.3d 1266, 1272 (11th Cir. 2009) (providing that police officers may
draw on their experiences and specialized training to make inferences and
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deductions that might elude an untrained person); United States v. Lee, 68 F.3d
1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 1995) (providing that none of a defendant’s actions need to
be criminal on their face in order to justify a prolonged detention so long as all of
his actions taken together could give rise to reasonable suspicion in the mind of a
trained officer).
IV.
DeJesus also contends that even if the initial stop was lawful, and even if
his longer detention was justified, the cocaine still should have been suppressed
because he did not voluntarily consent to the search of his minivan. He argues
that he was subjected to coercive conditions, including accusations of wrongdoing
and the officers’ show of authority, which rendered his consent to search
involuntary.
“One of the well-established exceptions to the [Fourth Amendment’s]
probable cause and warrant requirements is a search which is conducted pursuant
to voluntary consent.” United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 360 (11th Cir.
1989). Courts look to several factors in order to determine whether a defendant’s
consent to search was voluntary, “including the presence of coercive police
procedures, the extent of the defendant’s cooperation with the officer, the
defendant’s awareness of his right to refuse consent, the defendant’s education and
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intelligence, and the defendant’s belief that no incriminating evidence will be
found.” Purcell, 236 F.3d at 1281. We review a district court’s finding that
consent was voluntary only for clear error. United States v. Simms, 385 F.3d
1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2004).
DeJesus argues that a reasonable person would not have felt free to drive
away because because Trooper Martin was leaning into the passenger-side
window of his minivan. Despite DeJesus’s contention, there is no indication that
his consent was coerced. Martin leaned into the passenger-side window of
DeJesus’ minivan to return his paperwork and issue the warning citation. At that
time, he informed DeJesus that the traffic stop was over and immediately asked for
his consent to search the vehicle. While two other officers and two police dogs
were also on the side of the road at the time that DeJesus consented to the search,
their presence did not constitute a show of force that would render his consent
involuntary. Lest there be any doubt, Martin confirmed DeJesus’ consent by
asking in English, then in Spanish, then again in Spanish following a series of
questions, and finally by asking him to sign a Spanish-language consent form,
which also informed DeJesus that he could freely refuse his consent. Every time,
DeJesus consented.
It is undisputed that Trooper Martin had returned DeJesus’s paperwork,
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issued him a warning, and told him the traffic stop was over before asking him if
he had anything illegal in the car. At that point, DeJesus’ roadside detention
turned into a consensual encounter that a reasonable person would have felt free to
terminate. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the district court did not
clearly err in determining that DeJesus voluntarily consented to the search of his
vehicle.
V.
DeJesus also contends that the search was invalid because the scope of it
exceeded his consent. “A consensual search is manifestly reasonable so long as it
remains within the scope of the consent,” United States v. Martinez, 949 F.2d
1117, 1119 (11th Cir. 1992), and whether any limitations were placed on the scope
of consent is determined by the totality of the circumstances, United States v.
Blake, 888 F.2d 795, 798 (11th Cir. 1989). Where no limits are placed on the
scope of consent, a search is constrained only “by the bounds of reasonableness.”
United States v. Harris, 928 F.2d 1113, 1117 (11th Cir. 1991). Furthermore, “[a]
general consent to search for specific items includes consent to search any
compartment or container that might reasonably contain those items.” Zapata,180
F.3d at 1243.
The district court correctly determined that the search did not exceed the
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scope of the consent to search. Because there is no evidence that DeJesus limited
his consent in any way, the permissible scope of the search was limited only by the
“bounds of reasonableness,” Harris, 928 F.2d at 1117, and it was reasonable for
Trooper Martin to search any compartment within the vehicle where narcotics
might be found, Zapata,180 F.3d at 1243. When Martin discovered the three
white packages tied with rope behind the minivan’s rocker panels, he had probable
cause to seize, relocate, and conduct further searches of the vehicle. See United
States v. Virden, 488 F.3d 1317, 1321 (11th Cir. 2007) (providing that police may
lawfully seize a vehicle if probable cause exists to believe the vehicle contains
contraband). The district court correctly denied DeJesus’ motion to suppress.
AFFIRMED.1
1
This case was originally docketed for oral argument, but the panel unanimously
determined to decide it based on the briefs. See 11th Cir. R. 34–3(f).
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