Rachel Pinkston v. University of South Florida Board of Trustees

Case: 17-13644 Date Filed: 09/28/2018 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 17-13644
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 8:15-cv-01724-VMC-TBM
RACHEL PINKSTON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTH FLORIDA BOARD
OF TRUSTEES,
RANDY LARSEN,
DAVID MERKLER,
MATTHEW BATTISTINI,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
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(September 28, 2018)
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Before NEWSOM, FAY, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In July 2017, Rachel Pinkston (“Plaintiff”), a former student at the
University of South Florida, filed a complaint against the University of South
Florida Board of Trustees, Chemistry Department Chair Randy Larsen, Professor
David Merkler, and Teaching Assistant Matthew Battistini (“Defendants”) alleging
that Defendants had violated Title IX, 20 U.S.C § 1681 et seq. The district court
struck the complaint because it had been filed in a closed docket for a previously
filed lawsuit that the district court had dismissed a year before. The district court
also denied Plaintiff’s subsequent motions for reconsideration and recusal.
Plaintiff now appeals the court’s orders striking her complaint and denying her
motions. After careful consideration, we conclude that the district court erred in
striking Plaintiff’s complaint but correctly denied Plaintiff’s motions for recusal.
According, we reverse in part and affirm in part.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2015, Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants. Her first amended complaint
alleged that Defendants had discriminated against her in violation of Title IX, 42
U.S.C. § 1981, the Constitution, and Florida law. Defendants filed a motion to
dismiss five counts of the complaint, and the district court granted the motion,
dismissing those counts without prejudice while giving Plaintiff leave to amend.
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Plaintiff then filed a second amended complaint that Defendants promptly moved
to dismiss. The district court dismissed all but one of Plaintiff’s claims, but gave
Plaintiff leave to amend her Title IX claim alleging gender discrimination. Instead
of amending her complaint, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss her remaining
claim without prejudice. The district court granted Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff
then filed an appeal.
While that appeal was pending, the district court issued an order taxing costs
and sanctioning Plaintiff for her discovery abuses. Plaintiff filed a separate appeal
of the court’s order.
We then dismissed Plaintiff’s first appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the
district court’s order granting Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss her
remaining claim was not a final, appealable order. Pinkston v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd.
of Trs., No. 16-15065-CC, 2017 WL 3393292 (11th Cir. Jan. 4, 2017)
(unpublished).
While Plaintiff’s second appeal regarding the district court’s order taxing
costs and imposing sanctions was still pending,1 Plaintiff, now proceeding pro se,
filed a new complaint in the district court re-alleging her Title IX claim against
Defendants. The district court, acting on its own motion, struck Plaintiff’s
1
We have since affirmed the district court’s order taxing costs and imposing sanctions.
Pinkston v. Univ. of S. Fla. Bd. of Trs., No. 16-16929, 2017 WL 4680729 (11th Cir. Oct. 18,
2017) (unpublished).
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complaint for being improperly filed in a closed docket. Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the district court’s order was ambiguous and lacked
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The district court denied Plaintiff’s
motion.
Plaintiff then moved for the district judge to recuse herself. The district
court denied Plaintiff’s motion. Plaintiff filed an amended motion for recusal
raising the same arguments, and the district court denied it again.
Plaintiff filed this appeal, arguing that the district court abused its discretion
in denying Plaintiff’s complaint, motion for reconsideration, and motions for
recusal.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
As an exercise of the district court’s “inherent authority to manage its own
docket,” we review for abuse of discretion a court’s decision to strike a pleading.
See Equity Lifestyle Props., Inc. v. Fla. Mowing and Landscape Serv., Inc., 556
F.3d 1232, 1240 & n.14 (11th Cir. 2009); see also State Exch. Bank v. Hartline,
693 F.2d 1350, 1352 (11th Cir. 1982). We also review for abuse of discretion the
denial of a motion for reconsideration, Rodriguez v. City of Doral, 863 F.3d 1343,
1349 (11th Cir. 2017), and the denial of a motion for recusal, Christo v. Padgett,
223 F.3d 1324, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000).
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III. DISCUSSION
A. Order Striking Plaintiff’s Complaint
Plaintiff argues that the district court abused its discretion in striking her
complaint because the complaint’s allegations stated a prima facie case of Title IX
retaliation. But the adequacy of the complaint was not the reason the district court
struck it. The district court indicated that it struck the complaint because Plaintiff
had filed it in a closed action in which the district court lacked jurisdiction over the
only live issue.
The problem with the district court’s ruling is that Plaintiff never filed her
new complaint alleging a Title IX claim in the docket of the closed original action.
As noted, Plaintiff had earlier moved to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice her
Title IX claim in the original action. That motion was granted, meaning that
Plaintiff was free to refile her claim in a new complaint. She did so. Our review
of the district court record does not indicate that Plaintiff filed her complaint in the
closed docket of the original action. As any litigant filing a new action would, she
simply filed a complaint showing no case number, with the number to be filled in
by the Clerk. She also filed an unnumbered civil cover sheet indicating in the
appropriate space that the closed case was related to her new action, not that it was
the same action. Finally, she filed an affidavit of indigency requesting that she be
allowed to proceed without prepaying fees or costs—another indication that she
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was filing a new action. Accordingly, because Plaintiff did not actually file her
complaint in a closed docket, we conclude that the district court abused its
discretion in striking Plaintiff’s present complaint. On remand, Plaintiff should be
allowed to proceed on her new complaint.2
B. Orders Denying Recusal Motions
Plaintiff also argues that the district judge should have granted Plaintiff’s
recusal motions because the judge has connections to, and is allegedly biased in
favor of, universities and Jacksonville, Florida—the city where Defendants’
lawyers are from. For example, the district court judge is a member of the Board
of Governors for Georgetown University, received royalties from the University of
Florida for a book she published, and at one point had worked in Jacksonville.
Plaintiff also contends that the judge’s remarks during a hearing, along with her
rulings against Plaintiff, demonstrated the judge’s bias.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Plaintiff’s motions
because the standards for recusal were not met. We therefore affirm the district
court’s denial of Plaintiff’s recusal motion. “To warrant recusal under [28 U.S.C.]
§ 144, the moving party must allege facts that would convince a reasonable person
that bias actually exists.” Christo, 223 F.3d at 1333. And to determine whether
2
In doing so, we do not address whether Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed in forma
pauperis or whether she has satisfied the conditions imposed by the district court when it granted
Plaintiff’s motion to voluntarily dismiss her first action.
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recusal is necessary under 28 U.S.C. § 455, “the standard is whether an objective,
fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about the judge’s
impartiality.” Id. “[A] judge, having been assigned to a case, should not recuse
himself on unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation.” United States v.
Greenough, 782 F.2d 1556, 1558 (11th Cir. 1986).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege—or provide any evidence even suggesting—
that the district judge had any actual connection to Defendants or Defendants’
lawyers. That the judge was affiliated with other colleges, ruled against Plaintiff,
made remarks stressing the importance of Plaintiff’s compliance with her
discovery obligations, and had once worked out of Jacksonville would not
convince a reasonable person that bias actually exists or cause an informed lay
observer to have significant doubt about the judge’s impartiality. See Christo, 223
F.3d at 1333; see, e.g., United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1569–70 (11th Cir.
1994) (holding that a judge was not required to recuse himself from a case in
which he previously engaged in business dealings with a potential defense
witness); Hamm v. Members of Bd. of Regents of State of Fla., 708 F.2d 647, 651
(11th Cir. 1983) (holding that a judge did not have to recuse himself even though
he made “intemperate and impatient” remarks against a party).
REVERSED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART.
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