Ricket Carter v. Columbus Consolidated Government

Case: 13-11945 Date Filed: 03/18/2014 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 13-11945
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket 4:12-cv-00048-CDL
RICKET CARTER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COLUMBUS CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT,
Defendant-Appellee.
___________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
____________________________
(March 18, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges.
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PER CURIAM:
Ricket Carter, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of
summary judgment in favor of the Columbus Consolidated Government (the
“City”) on his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Mr. Carter alleged that Officers
Robert Rives and Ben Schuler of the Columbus Police Department arrested him
without probable cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Seeking to hold the
City liable for the actions of these two officers, Mr. Carter filed a complaint
pursuant to § 1983, naming the City as the sole defendant. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the City after concluding that Mr. Carter
failed to introduce any evidence that the City had a custom or policy that might
have contributed to the alleged constitutional violation. After a review of the
record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Holloman v.
Mail-Well Corp., 443 F.3d 832, 836 (11th Cir. 2006). Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). See also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).
In order to establish a municipality’s liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must
demonstrate “a direct causal link between a municipal policy or custom and the
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alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385
(1989).1 On appeal, Mr. Carter argues that the City was the moving force behind
the claimed constitutional violation because Officer Rives had a history of failing
to abide by the City’s policies and procedures, and the City failed to take sufficient
corrective measures despite being aware of these performance deficiencies.
Because Mr. Carter does not purport to challenge any official policies or
customs of the City, he must show that the alleged violation of his constitutional
rights was caused by an unofficial practice or custom that is “persistent and wide-
spread.” Depew v. City of St. Marys, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). Under
this standard, the challenged practice or custom must be “so pervasive as to be the
functional equivalent of a formal policy.” Grech v. Clayton Cnty., 335 F.3d 1326,
1330 n.6 (11th Cir. 2003). In an attempt to satisfy this standard, Mr. Carter
introduced evidence showing that Officer Rives was disciplined for failure to
perform his duties and suspended for two days in 2009. In addition, in 2010,
Officer Rives received a letter of counsel and suspension for not preparing proper
reports. Finally, the officers failed to fill out an incident report or field interview
card with regard to Mr. Carter’s arrest. These facts, however, are not connected
with the practice of conducting arrests. Accordingly, these isolated incidents of
unrelated disciplinary or regulatory violations do not provide evidence of a
1
Respondeat superior or vicarious liability will not attach under § 1983. See Monell v. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
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“persistent and wide-spread practice” that could have contributed to Mr. Carter’s
allegedly unlawful arrest. See Depew, 787 F.2d at 1499.
Nor do these incidents provide a proper basis for liability under a failure to
train theory. The inadequacy of police training may serve as a basis for § 1983
liability “only where the failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the
rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.” Gold v. City of Miami,
151 F.3d 1346, 1350 (11th Cir. 1998). Mr. Carter maintains that the officers’
disciplinary records and evaluations demonstrate that the City knew of a need for
additional training and the City nonetheless made a deliberate choice not to take
any action. In order to establish a municipality’s deliberate indifference, however,
“a plaintiff must present some evidence that the municipality knew of a need to
train and/or supervise in a particular area and the municipality made a deliberate
choice not to take any action.” Id. (emphasis added). None of the officers’
disciplinary or regulatory violations involved arrests without probable cause, and
there is no other evidence in the record indicating that the City was aware of a
pattern of unconstitutional arrests such that the need for additional training was
obvious. Therefore, Mr. Carter failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a
genuine issue of fact regarding the City’s liability under a failure to train theory.2
2
Because the district court correctly determined that Mr. Carter failed to produce evidence of
any policy, practice, or custom sufficient to create a factual dispute as to the City’s liability under
§ 1983, we need not decide whether Mr. Carter’s constitutional rights were violated by the arrest.
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The district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
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