Thresa Lynn Williams v. Talladega Community Action Agency

Case: 12-14021 Date Filed: 09/03/2013 Page: 1 of 4
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 12-14021
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 1:12-cv-01920-KOB
THRESA LYNN WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
TALLADEGA COMMUNITY ACTION AGENCY,
BANK OF AMERICA, et al.,
Defendants - Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
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(September 3, 2013)
Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Thresa Lynn Williams, proceeding pro se, sued several defendants,
including banks, lawyers, and a non-profit agency who were opponents from
previous lawsuits, as well as judges who ruled against her in the previous
proceedings. In her complaint, Williams asserted several civil claims and alleged
crimes, arguing that the defendants conspired to extort her, among other things.
Two defendants filed motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In
consideration of these motions, the district court outlined the various deficiencies
with Williams’s complaint. However, given Williams’s pro se status, the district
court ordered that the motions be administratively terminated, without prejudice,
so that Williams could re-file her complaint in compliance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. The district court ordered that Williams re-file her complaint
in conformity with the governing rules on or before June 21, 2012, and warned that
failure to do so would result in dismissal against all defendants. Williams did not
re-file her complaint, and on July 2, 2012, the district court dismissed Williams’s
complaint with prejudice. Williams appeals the dismissal, arguing her case should
not have been dismissed because there was no need for her to file an amended
complaint.
I.
Under Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a court has the
authority to dismiss actions for failure to obey court orders. See Goforth v. Owens,
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766 F.2d 1533, 1535 (11th Cir. 1985). We review a district court’s dismissal for
failure to comply with the rules of the court for abuse of discretion. Betty K
Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V MONADA, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2005). While
we liberally construe pleadings from pro se litigants, we still require that they
follow procedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
Dismissal with prejudice is “an extreme sanction that may be properly
imposed only when: (1) a party engages in a clear pattern of delay or willful
contempt (contumacious conduct); and (2) the district court specifically finds that
lesser sanctions would not suffice.” Betty K Agencies, 432 F.3d at 1338(quotation marks omitted). When the record shows that lesser sanctions would not
serve the interests of justice, the district court may implicitly find that lesser
sanctions would be insufficient. See Goforth, 766 F.2d at 1535.
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the case
with prejudice when Williams did not comply with the order to re-file her
complaint. See Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989) (“While
dismissal is an extraordinary remedy, dismissal upon disregard of an order,
especially where the litigant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of
discretion.”); Friedlander v. Nims, 755 F.2d 810, 813 (11th Cir. 1985) (“Although
[a dismissal] is a severe sanction, its imposition is justified when a party chooses to
disregard the sound and proper directions of the district court.”). It is true the
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district court did not make an explicit finding that lesser sanctions would be
inadequate. However, the dismissal was precipitated by Williams’s refusal to
correct her shotgun pleading, which disregarded a court order and made it difficult
for defendants to discern the factual and legal allegations against them. This
record “supports an implicit finding that any lesser sanction than dismissal would
not have served the interests of justice.” Goforth, 766 F.2d at 1535. While the
district court could have been more direct in explaining why lesser sanctions would
not suffice, the court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Williams’s
complaint with prejudice.
II.
For these reasons, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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