United States v. Brendan Paul Wagner

USCA11 Case: 22-11958 Document: 19-1 Date Filed: 04/26/2023 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11958
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
BRENDAN PAUL WAGNER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:05-cr-00227-RAL-MAP-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11958
Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and TJOFLAT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Brendan Paul Wagner, a former federal prisoner proceeding
pro se, appeals the District Court for the Middle District of Florida’s
May 2022 denial of his motion to clarify his 2005 criminal judgment
and grant him relief from the registration requirements of the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act (the “SORNA”), 34
U.S.C. § 20901, et seq. Wagner argues that the District Court erred
in denying his motion for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The
government, in turn, objects that we lack jurisdiction over Wag-
ner’s appeal in at least one respect. For the reasons discussed be-
low, we dismiss the appeal in part and affirm the District Court in
part.
I.
On June 1, 2005, Brendan Paul Wagner was charged in an
Information with one count of shipping child pornography in in-
terstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A(a)(1) and 2. 1
He pleaded guilty and, in exchange, the United States Attorney’s
Office for the Middle District of Florida agreed not to charge him
with any other criminal offenses related to the conduct giving rise
1 Typically, a defendant in a federal criminal case cannot “be held to answer
for [] capital, or otherwise infamous crime[s], unless on a presentment or in-
dictment of a Grand Jury.” U.S. Const. amend. V. In the matter before us,
Wagner waived his right to an indictment.
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22-11958 Opinion of the Court 3
to the plea agreement. Following a hearing, the District Court ac-
cepted Wagner’s guilty plea. The Court sentenced Wagner to 87
months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised re-
lease. As part of his supervised release, Wagner was required to
“register with the state sexual offender registration agency(s) in any
state where he resides, visits, is employed, carries on a vacation, or
is a student, as directed by the probation officer.” J., Doc. 15 at 4.
Wagner was released from federal prison on March 16, 2012. His
supervised release ended on March 16, 2015.
On March 21, 2022, Wagner, proceeding pro se, filed a mo-
tion in the District Court to terminate his duty to register as a sex
offender under the SORNA. He asserted that under the SORNA
he qualified as a Tier I sex offender and therefore had a sex offender
registration period of 15 years, which began to run when he was
released from custody on March 16, 2012. When a Tier 1 sex of-
fender maintains a “clean record” for ten years, the duration of the
duty to maintain a SORNA sex offender registration shall be re-
duced from 15 years to 10. Wagner stated that he completed the
statutory requirements for terminating his federal duty to register
as of March 16, 2022—ten years after being released from federal
custody.
The next day, the District Court issued an order (the “March
Order”) denying Wagner’s motion. That order stated: “The Court
agrees with the rationale of United States v. Studeny, 2019 WL
859271 (W.D. Wash. 2/22/2019) and Wiggins v. United States,
2019 WL 5079557 (S.D. Ind. 10/10/2019) that the Court lacks
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11958
jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by the motion.”2 Order,
Doc. 18.
Wagner, still proceeding pro se, did not immediately appeal
the March Order, choosing instead to file a motion citing both Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 and Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 60. Wagner requested that the Court “correct, reconsider,
or clarify its final judgment” by identifying: (1) what tier classifica-
tion Wagner’s offense is under the SORNA; (2) how long he must
register as a sex offender under the SORNA; and (3) under what
circumstances, if any, his federal duty to register under the SORNA
can be reduced. Def. R. 36 Mot., Doc. 19 at 1.
Wagner argued that the District Court retained jurisdiction
to consider his federal duty to register until that part of the Court’s
judgment had been fully satisfied. The motion argued that Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 allowed a court to correct a clerical
error in a judgment or order at any time. It further stated that
while there were no federal rules authorizing motions for recon-
sideration, both this Court and the Supreme Court have permitted
such motions in criminal cases. Similarly, while no federal rules
authorize motions for clarification, several courts have interpreted
2 In Studeny and Wiggins, the District Courts for the Western District of
Washington and the Southern District of Indiana, respectively, held that the
SORNA did not create a private right of action and as such the district courts
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain motions brought under the
SORNA.
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22-11958 Opinion of the Court 5
such motions as being brought under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 60(b).
Wagner’s Rule 36 motion reiterated his earlier arguments
that he was a Tier I offender under the SORNA, that the SORNA
extended his full registration period to 15 years with a possibility
that it could be reduced by five years for having a “clean record,”
and that he qualified for such a reduction. The District Court en-
tered an order (the “May Order”) denying Wagner’s motion on
May 25, 2022. The Court stated:
The Court reiterates that it lacks jurisdiction in this
case based on the cases cited in the order denying De-
fendant's earlier motion, as well as the fact that De-
fendant has completed his terms of incarceration and
supervised release. The Court declines to answer the
questions posed by Defendant because the Court has
no authority to issue an advisory opinion.
Order, Doc. 20. Wagner filed a notice of appeal of the May Order
on June 8, 2022.
II.
A notice of appeal in a criminal case usually must be filed
within 14 days of the entry of judgment, or if the district court
makes a finding of excusable neglect or good cause, within an ex-
tended period of time. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A), (b)(4). However,
the time limits proscribed in the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure are not jurisdictional in a criminal case; therefore, if the gov-
ernment does not dispute the timeliness of the appeal, the appeal
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11958
may proceed. See United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1313–14
(11th Cir. 2009).
Moreover, a notice of appeal must “designate the judg-
ment—or the appealable order—from which the appeal is taken.”
Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1)(B). We may look to the record, including
the parties’ briefs, to determine the orders or parts thereof an ap-
pellant intended to appeal. Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726,
731 (11th Cir. 2016).
Here, to the extent that Wagner is attempting to appeal the
March Order, we lack jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, as his
notice of appeal explicitly designates only the May Order. Regard-
less, Wagner filed the notice of appeal on June 8, 2022, 79 days after
the District Court issued its March Order, which renders it un-
timely as to that order. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). Therefore, our
jurisdiction is limited to review of the May Order denying Wag-
ner’s second motion, and we dismiss his appeal to the extent it chal-
lenges the March Order.
III.
We review questions regarding subject-matter jurisdiction
de novo. See Stovall v. City of Cocoa, 117 F.3d 1238, 1240 (11th
Cir. 1997). “[I]t it is well settled that a federal court is obligated to
inquire into subject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may
be lacking.” Bochese v. Town of Ponce Inlet, 405 F.3d 964, 975
(11th Cir. 2005) (quotations omitted). When appropriate, we will
review de novo the correction of a written judgment under Federal
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22-11958 Opinion of the Court 7
Rule of Criminal Procedure 36. United States v. Portillo, 363 F.3d
1161, 1164 (11th Cir. 2004). We also “may affirm for any reason
supported by the record, even if not relied upon by the district
court.” United States v. Al-Arian, 514 F.3d 1184, 1189 (11th Cir.
2008).
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction and possess only the
power authorized by Congress or the Constitution. Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673,
1675 (1994). We presume that “federal courts lack jurisdiction un-
less the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.” Renne v.
Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316, 111 S. Ct. 2331, 2336 (1991) (quotations
omitted). The burden of overcoming this presumption rests upon
the party asserting jurisdiction. Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377, 114 S.
Ct. at 1675. District courts lack the inherent authority to modify a
defendant's sentence and “may do so only when authorized by a
statute or rule.” United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597, 606 (11th
Cir. 2015).
As a rule, if a district court concludes that it lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over a case, the court must dismiss that case.
Cf. Cani v. United States, 331 F.3d 1210, 1216 (11th Cir. 2003) (con-
struing a dismissal as a denial because the district court possessed
subject matter jurisdiction and should have denied the defendant's
motion on the merits); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (civil cases).
We “may affirm, modify, vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment,
decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for review.”
28 U.S.C. § 2106.
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11958
Procedurally, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36 per-
mits a district court to correct, at any time, a clerical error in a judg-
ment, order, or other part of the record, or correct an error in the
record arising from oversight or omission. Fed. R. Crim. P. 36.
Rule 36 may not be used to make a substantive alteration to a crim-
inal sentence, however. Portillo, 363 F.3d at 1164. In determining
the terms of a sentence, it is the intent of the sentencing judge
which controls, and that intent is to be determined by reference to
the record. United States v. Purcell, 715 F.2d 561, 563 (11th Cir.
1983).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) allows a party to seek
relief or reopen his case in certain limited circumstances. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b). However, “Rule 60(b) simply does not provide for
relief from judgment in a criminal case.” United States v. Mosavi,
138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998) (finding that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction necessary to provide Rule 60(b)
relief where defendant's Rule 60(b) motion challenged criminal for-
feitures); see also United States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2003).
Moreover, federal courts are “not in the business of issuing
advisory opinions that do not affect the rights of litigants in the case
before [them].” See Gagliardi v. TJCV Land Tr., 889 F.3d 728, 733
(11th Cir. 2018) (civil suit ultimately deemed moot and no longer
justiciable).
Here, the District Court correctly found that it lacked juris-
diction to grant Wagner’s motion under either Fed. R. Crim. P. 36
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22-11958 Opinion of the Court 9
or Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). First, while a pro se litigant’s motion
should be construed liberally, Wagner’s motion explicitly sought a
modification of the original 2005 judgment in his criminal case un-
der the aforementioned rules. Wagner asked the District Court to
add to his original judgment a determination of his SORNA Tier,
the length of time he was required to register, and any possible re-
ductions to said requirement. These substantive determinations
clearly fall outside of the “minor and mechanical” clerical errors
covered under Rule 36. Portillo, 363 F.3d 1164–65. Additionally, it
is unclear, and Wagner has not demonstrated, how the failure to
include information concerning the SORNA in a judgment issued
before the passage of the SORNA could have been an error caused
by oversight or omission.
Additionally, the Court properly rejected Wagner’s second
proposed route for alteration, under Rule 60(b), because that pro-
vision is only applicable in civil cases, not criminal proceedings like
Wagner’s. See e.g., Mosavi, 138 F.3d at 1366. Further, to the extent
Wagner sought answers to certain questions which might have al-
lowed him to file a claim for relief in the future, the District Court
correctly declined to provide answers, because—even if jurisdic-
tion otherwise existed—it could not issue what would constitute,
in essence, an “advisory opinion.” See Gagliardi, 889 F.3d at 733.
Finally, we note that, where a district court concludes that it
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a case, it must dismiss it. Cf.
Cani, 331 F.3d at 1216. Therefore, we will construe the District
Court’s order denying Wagner’s order for lack of subject-matter
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10 Opinion of the Court 22-11958
jurisdiction as a dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.;
28 U.S.C. § 2106. As such, we affirm.
DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART