United States v. John W. Rudolph

Case: 13-14916 Date Filed: 07/02/2014 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 13-14916
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:13-cr-00052-LC-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
JOHN W. RUDOLPH,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
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(July 2, 2014)
Before HULL, MARCUS, and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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John Rudolph appeals his 290-month sentence, which the district court
imposed after Rudolph pleaded guilty to knowingly and intentionally possessing
with intent to distribute cocaine and marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §
841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C) (“Count 1”), possession of a firearm in furtherance of a
drug trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i) (“Count 2”),
and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e) (“Count 3”). On appeal, Rudolph contends that
the district court erred in determining that he qualified as a career offender and as
an armed career criminal. He also contends that his sentence, which was derived
from the career offender guideline of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, was both procedurally and
substantively unreasonable.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
affirm.
I.
Rudolph’s objection to the district court’s decision to classify him as a
career offender is raised for the first time on appeal. When an objection is raised
for the first time on appeal, we review the district court’s determination for plain
error. United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 842 (11th Cir. 2009). Under plain
error review, the defendant must establish that “(1) there is an error; (2) that is
plain or obvious; (3) affecting [his] substantial rights in that it was prejudicial and
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not harmless; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations omitted).
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen
years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2)
the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). 1
Rudolph contends that he lacked the requisite number of prior qualifying
convictions because one of his two predicate convictions—his prior conviction for
violating Florida Statute § 893.13—does not qualify as a conviction for a
controlled substance offense under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Under Florida law, “it is
unlawful for any person to sell, manufacture, or deliver, or possess with intent to
sell, manufacture, or deliver, a controlled substance.” Fla. Stat. § 893.13(1)(a) . A
violation of § 893.13 involving cocaine or cannabis is a felony. Id.; Fla. Stat.
§§ 893.03(1)(c), 2(a)(4).
To determine if a prior conviction is a controlled substance offense under
§ 4B1.2(b), we look at the elements of the offense, and not the conduct underlying
1
A “controlled substance offense” is “an offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment of a term exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export,
distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) or the possession
of a controlled substance (or a counterfeit substance) with intent to manufacture, import, export,
distribute, or dispense.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).
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the conviction. United States v. Lipsey, 40 F.3d 1200, 1201 (11th Cir. 1994). And
looking at the elements of § 893.13, the district court did not plainly err by
determining that Rudolph’s violation of the statue was a controlled substance
offense. In fact, the elements of Florida Statute § 893.13 nearly track the language
defining a controlled substance in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b).2
II.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard. United States v. Thompson, 702 F.3d 604, 606-07 (11th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2826 (2013). We review the reasonableness of a
sentence using two steps: First, we ensure that the sentence was procedurally
reasonable. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We
ensure that the district court considered the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and
adequately explained its chosen sentence. Id. The district court need only have set
forth enough information for us to ensure that it considered the parties’ arguments
and had a reasoned basis for imposing its chosen sentence. Rita v. United States,
551 U.S. 338, 356, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007). Here, the district court
determined the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) was accurate and
considered its findings at sentencing. Hearing arguments from both sides, the
2
We do not address Rudolph’s contention that the district court erred by classifying him as an
armed career criminal since the district court imposed its sentence based on Rudolph’s status as a
career offender.
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court sentenced Rudolph after it reviewed the § 3553(a) factors and the advisory
sentencing guidelines. The court explained that the sentence met the general goals
of punishment and “hopefully [would] act as a deterrent to anyone else who might
consider similar criminal conduct.” The court’s statement of reasons, though brief,
was legally sufficient. Rita, 551 U.S. at 356, 127 S.Ct. at 2468. The court said
enough to satisfy us that it considered the parties’ arguments and had a reasoned
basis for exercising its legal decision-making authority. Id.
Once we have determined that the sentence was procedurally reasonable, we
next examine whether the sentence was substantively reasonable in light of the
totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. at 597. Although we
do not automatically presume a sentence falling within the guideline range to be
reasonable, we would expect a sentence within the guideline range to be
reasonable. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 347, 127 S. Ct. at 2463. Furthermore, Rudolph’s
290-month sentence was within his advisory guideline range of 262 to 327 months.
Rudolph’s sentence was substantively reasonable. Given his history of
recidivism, even after significant terms of incarceration, and his criminal history,
which includes a conviction of second degree murder, Rudolph’s sentence was not
outside the range of reasonable sentences. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its
discretion.
AFFIRMED.
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