United States v. Emanuel Beach

USCA11 Case: 22-11720 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 05/08/2023 Page: 1 of 9
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11720
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
EMANUEL BEACH,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 4:21-cr-00029-AW-MAF-1
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11720
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Emanuel Beach appeals his conviction and 360-month sen-
tence for possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(B)(viii). First, Beach contends that the district court
abused its discretion by denying his motion to withdraw his guilty
plea despite his repeated claims that his lawyer had promised a ten-
year sentence if he pled. Second, he says that the district court’s
sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Third,
Beach argues that the district court erred in classifying him as a ca-
reer drug offender and enhancing his sentence as a result.
The parties are acquainted with the facts, so we repeat them
here only as necessary to decide the case. After considering the
record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
I
We review the district court’s decision to deny a defendant’s
motion to withdraw a guilty plea for abuse of discretion. United
States v. McCarty, 99 F.3d 383, 385 (11th Cir. 1996). “The denial of a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea is not an abuse of discretion un-
less the denial was arbitrary or unreasonable.” United States v.
Izquierdo, 448 F.3d 1269, 1276 (11th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
omitted).
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22-11720 Opinion of the Court 3
The defendant may withdraw his guilty plea after the dis-
trict court accepts it but before sentencing if he “can show a fair
and just reason for requesting the withdrawal.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
11(d)(2)(B). But “[t]here is no absolute right to withdraw a guilty
plea.” United States v. Medlock, 12 F.3d 185, 187 (11th Cir. 1994).
The “good faith, credibility and weight” of the defendant’s repre-
sentations in support of the motion to withdraw are issues for the
trial court to decide. United States v. Buckles, 843 F.2d 469, 472 (11th
Cir. 1988). Furthermore, “[t]here is a strong presumption that the
statements made during the [plea] colloquy are true.” Medlock,
12 F.3d at 187. Thus, any post-colloquy withdrawals “bear[] a
heavy burden to show” that the statements made under oath were
false. United States v. Rogers, 848 F.2d 166, 168 (11th Cir. 1988).
To analyze the propriety of a defendant’s request to with-
draw his plea, we consider the totality of the circumstances, pay-
ing particular attention to the four Buckles factors: “(1) whether
close assistance of counsel was available; (2) whether the plea was
knowing and voluntary; (3) whether judicial resources would be
conserved; and (4) whether the government would be prejudiced
if the defendant were allowed to withdraw his plea.” Buckles, 843
F.2d at 472 (internal citation omitted). A defendant isn’t permitted
to use his guilty plea to gauge the potential sentence that he faces.
United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir. 1987).
Thus, the timing of the motion is relevant because it could point
to the defendant’s motivation for seeking to withdraw his guilty
plea. Id.USCA11 Case: 22-11720 Document: 45-1 Date Filed: 05/08/2023 Page: 4 of 9
4 Opinion of the Court 22-11720
The totality of the circumstances reveals that the district
court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying Beach’s motion to with-
draw his guilty plea. On the first Buckles factor, Beach confirmed
that he received close assistance of counsel. See Buckles, 843 F.2d at
472. During the change of plea hearing colloquy, Beach stated that
he had spoken with his counsel about his criminal charge and un-
derstood the penalties it carried. Beach stated that he was satisfied
with his counsel’s representation, denied having any complaints
about his counsel, and said that there was nothing that he thought
his counsel should have done differently. His sworn statements
indicate that he received close assistance of counsel.
As for the second Buckles factor, the transcript from Beach’s
plea colloquy shows that he entered the plea agreement knowingly
and voluntarily. See Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472. As for voluntariness,
Beach denied that the government had made any promises that
weren’t included in the plea documents or that anyone had threat-
ened him. United States v. Moriarty, 429 F.3d 1012, 1019 (11th Cir.
2005). He also confirmed that no one promised him what his sen-
tence would be. While Beach now asserts that his attorney made
him promises about his sentence, he marshals scant evidence to
overcome the strong presumption that his previous statements
during the plea colloquy were true. See Medlock, 12 F.3d at 187.
As to knowledge, the district court read aloud Beach’s
charge and the elements of that charge during the plea colloquy.
The transcript shows that he knew the factual basis and terms of
his plea agreement. Beach also stated that he understood how his
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22-11720 Opinion of the Court 5
conduct mapped onto the charge. When the district court asked if
he was planning to use all of the methamphetamine or if he
planned to distribute it to others, he replied, “[b]oth.” Beach then
confirmed that he intended to distribute and sell at least five grams
of methamphetamine. Finally, Beach stated that he understood the
consequences of his plea, including the effect of the government’s
notice of enhancement and the minimum and maximum statutory
sentence based on his prior convictions. He also acknowledged
that his actual sentence would be determined at a subsequent hear-
ing and could range up to life imprisonment. Likewise, he knew
that the length of his resulting sentence wouldn’t constitute a basis
to withdraw his guilty plea. Accordingly, Beach failed to show that
he didn’t enter into the guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. See
Buckles, 843 F.2d at 472.
What’s more, Beach brought the pertinent motion to with-
draw his guilty plea only after the district court announced that it
intended to sentence him to 360 months’ imprisonment. That sug-
gests that his motivation was due to dissatisfaction with his sen-
tence, which isn’t a valid basis for Beach to withdraw his guilty
plea. Gonzalez-Mercado, 808 F.2d at 801.
If an appellant doesn’t satisfy the first two Buckles factors, it
isn’t necessary to thoroughly analyze the remaining two. See id.(affirming a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty
plea based on the first two factors but declining to give “considera-
ble weight” to the third factor or “particular attention” to the pos-
sibility of prejudice to the government). Because Beach failed the
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11720
first two Buckles factors, we conclude that the district court didn’t
err in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See id.II
In reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence, we first con-
sider whether the district court committed a procedural error, such
as improperly calculating the Guidelines range, selecting the sen-
tence based on clearly erroneous facts, inadequately explaining the
chosen sentence, or failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Gall v.
United States, 522 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We review the procedural rea-
sonableness of a sentence for abuse of discretion, the interpreta-
tion and application of the Guidelines de novo, and the factual find-
ings for clear error. United States v. Barrington, 648 F.3d 1178, 1194
(11th Cir. 2011).
The district court didn’t impose a procedurally unreasonable
sentence in Beach’s case. It properly calculated his adjusted offense
level of 37 and Guidelines range of 360 months to life imprison-
ment, and it correctly noted that the minimum term of imprison-
ment was 10 years with the maximum being life. U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1,
3C1, 4B1.1(b)(1); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(viii). Additionally, in fash-
ioning Beach’s sentence, the district court considered the statutory
purposes of sentencing, the advisory guidelines, the § 3553(a) fac-
tors, and the parties’ arguments. Finally, there is no indication in
the record that the district court selected the sentence based on
clearly erroneous facts or failed to adequately explain the chosen
sentence. See Gall, 522 U.S. at 51.
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22-11720 Opinion of the Court 7
After reviewing for procedural error, we consider the sub-
stantive reasonableness of a sentence under an abuse-of-discretion
standard. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. On substantive reasonableness re-
view, we may vacate the sentence only if we are left with the defi-
nite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear
error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors to arrive at an
unreasonable sentence based on the facts of the case. United States
v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). Although we
don’t “automatically presume a sentence” falling within the Guide-
lines range is reasonable, we ordinarily expect such a sentence to
be so. United States v. Hunt, 526 F.3d 739, 746 (11th Cir. 2008). A
sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an-
other indication of reasonableness. United States v. Gonzalez,
550 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2008).
Beach contends that his sentence is substantively unreason-
able because the district court improperly considered testimony
from government cooperators about unconnected drug transac-
tions that occurred a year before Beach was ultimately arrested for
the present violation. There are no limitations on the information
a sentencing court may receive and consider “concerning the back-
ground, character, and conduct of the person convicted of an of-
fense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3661. For instance, the sentencing court may
consider uncharged and acquitted conduct when determining the
appropriate sentence. United States v. Maitre, 898 F.3d 1151, 1160
n.6 (11th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316,
1336 (11th Cir. 2006)). Even if a defendant’s conduct is completely
unrelated to his offense of conviction, it may be considered as part
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11720
of his history and characteristics under § 3553(a). United States v.
Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 638 n.14 (11th Cir. 2013).
The district court here explicitly stated that it considered the
additional drug quantity that the cooperators attributed to Beach
only to inform Beach’s history, background, character, and con-
duct under § 3553(a), not to calculate his Guidelines range. Thus,
it didn’t err in considering their testimony. Maitre, 898 F.3d at 1160
n.6. Furthermore, Beach’s 360-month sentence is at the bottom of
the Guidelines range and well below the maximum penalty of life
imprisonment, which further indicates that his sentence is reason-
able. Hunt, 526 F.3d at 746; Gonzalez, 550 F.3d at 1324. Accord-
ingly, Beach’s 360-month sentence is both procedurally and sub-
stantively reasonable. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
III
Finally, Beach contends that the district court improperly el-
evated his total offense level from 34 to 37 based on its determina-
tion that two prior Florida drug-related convictions required apply-
ing the career-offender enhancement. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a),
(b)(1). We disagree with Beach on two bases.
First, the district court didn’t err in its determination that
Beach qualified for the career-offender enhancement. This Court
has held that drug convictions under Fla. Stat. § 893.13—the statute
under which Beach was previously convicted—are controlled sub-
stance offenses under § 4B1.2(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines.
United States v. Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1268 (11th Cir. 2014). Beach
was, therefore, correctly designated as a career offender.
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22-11720 Opinion of the Court 9
And second, even if that determination were error, Beach
invited it when he conceded at sentencing that he, indeed, qualified
as a career offender. The invited-error doctrine is the cardinal rule
of appellate review that a party may not challenge a ruling or other
trial proceeding that he invited. United States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154,
1157 (11th Cir. 2006). The doctrine’s rationale is the commonsense
view that when a party invited the sentencing court to commit er-
ror, he “cannot later cry foul on appeal”; no litigant should benefit
from introducing error in the district court hoping to create
grounds for appeal. United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1306
(11th Cir. 2009). The doctrine applies when a defendant induced
the district court’s error or expressly agreed that the district court
should make the erroneous ruling. United States v. Feldman, 931 F.3d
1245, 1260 (11th Cir. 2019).
In United States v. Haynes, we held that a defendant had in-
vited the very error that he contested on appeal—that he was im-
permissibly sentenced as a career offender—when he requested a
sentence that “incorporated the career-offender enhancement.”
764 F.3d 1304, 1310 (11th Cir. 2014). Beach’s concession that he was
a career offender amounts to the same invitation of error.
AFFIRMED.