Carlton Eugene Hooker, Jr. v. United States

USCA11 Case: 22-12820 Document: 17-1 Date Filed: 05/09/2023 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12820
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CARLTON EUGENE HOOKER, JR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:22-cv-00537-KKM-MRM
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12820
Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Carlton Hooker, Jr., appeals pro se the district court’s order
dismissing his pro se civil complaint that alleged damages under the
Federal Torts Claims Act based on the Department of Veterans Af-
fairs’ (VA) decision to ban him from Bay Pines Veterans Affairs
Healthcare System (Bay Pines) and alleging damages related to his
future employment opportunities. In a prior action, the district
court enjoined Hooker from “filing any new action, complaint, or
claim for relief against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs related to
his employment . . . without a signature from a member of the
Florida Bar who is admitted to practice in the Middle District of
Florida.” In the instant case, the district court dismissed the com-
plaint as violative of the pre-filing injunction and modified the
pre-filing injunction to enjoin Hooker from filing any additional
lawsuits against any agency of the United States related to his em-
ployment or the ban, unless signed by an attorney.
Hooker argues that the district court erred in dismissing his
complaint, as Judge Tom Barber, the judge who signed the order
in the instant case, was not the judge initially assigned to the case.
He further contends that the court erred in modifying his pre-filing
injunction to more comprehensively cover Hooker’s vexatious
claims based on the VA’s decision to ban him from Bay Pines. After
careful review of the record, we AFFIRM.
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22-12820 Opinion of the Court 3
I.
We review for abuse of discretion a dismissal, pursuant to
Rule 41(b), based on the violation of a court order. Gratton v. Great
Am. Commc’ns, 178 F.3d 1373, 1374 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam).
We review an injunction against litigants who abuse the court sys-
tem for an abuse of discretion. Harrelson v. United States, 613 F.2d
114, 116 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).1 In general, a legal claim or
argument not briefed on appeal is deemed forfeited, and its merits
will only be addressed in extraordinary circumstances. United
States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc).
Federal courts have the power to manage their own dockets.
Smith v. Psychiatric Solutions, Inc., 750 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir.
2014) (“District courts have unquestionable authority to control
their own dockets.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). That
power “includes broad discretion in deciding how best to manage
the cases before them.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ac-
cording to the Middle District of Florida Local Rules, judges may
transfer actions “at any time and for any reason” if the transferee
judge consents. M.D. Fla. R. 1.07(a)(2)(A).
In addition to the power to manage their dockets, district
courts possess the power to issue prefiling injunctions “to protect
against abusive and vexatious litigation.” Martin-Trigona v. Shaw,
1 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc),
we adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to October 1, 1981.
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12820
986 F.2d 1384, 1387 (11th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). We have ex-
plained that a court has “a responsibility to prevent single litigants
from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed
by others” and that a litigant “can be severely restricted as to what
he may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial
relief” as long as he is not “completely foreclosed from any access
to the court.” Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir.
1986) (en banc).
II.
Hooker identifies only one issue on appeal: “Plaintiff com-
plains of a violation of Canon 3(A)(2) of the Code of Conduct of the
United States Judges by the District Court . . . .” He does not brief
or address the merits of the district court’s decision to dismiss his
complaint as a violation of the pre-filing injunction. So as an initial
matter Hooker has abandoned any argument that we should find
reversible error in the district court’s decision.
However, to be crystal clear for Hooker, the district court
did not abuse its discretion. The original pre-filing injunction
barred Hooker from filing a “any new action, complaint, or claim
for relief against the Secretary of Veterans Affairs related to his em-
ployment . . . .” Though Hooker couched his complaint in terms
of the “ban” and medical services, the district court was not bound
to accept Hooker’s evasive pleading. Indeed, the district court was
within its discretion to judicially notice the long history of
Hooker’s complaints regarding Bay Pines and to notice that the
“ban” was imposed as a result of Hooker’s interactions with Bay
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22-12820 Opinion of the Court 5
Pines following the termination of his employment there. United
States v. Rey, 811 F.2d 1453, 1457 n.5 (11th Cir. 1987) (“A court may
take judicial notice of its own records and the records of inferior
courts.”). Here, the district discussed Hooker’s history of abusive
litigation and found no meaningful distinction between those prior
cases challenging the ban directly and this case seeking damages for
the enforcement of the ban. D.E. 16 at 2–3. Further, Hooker’s
complaint by its terms also sought damages for “denial of employ-
ment opportunities.” D.E. 1 ¶ 36. Thus, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in dismissing under the pre-filing injunction be-
cause Hooker’s complaint “related to his employment.”
Turning to Hooker’s allegations of violations of the judicial
Code of Conduct, his arguments are without merit. First, because
Judge Barber was not disqualified from this case, he cannot have
violated Canon 3(A)(2). Second, we find no reversible error in the
fact that Judge Barber signed the order dismissing Hooker’s com-
plaint rather than Judge Mizelle. “District judges may by rule, or-
der or consent transfer cases between themselves. Each judge of a
multi-district court has the same power and authority as each other
judge. Moreover, District Judges have the inherent power to trans-
fer cases from one to another for the expeditious administration of
justice.” United States v. Stone, 411 F.2d 597, 598 (5th Cir. 1969) (in-
ternal citations omitted). And the applicable local rules authorize
the district judges to transfer cases “at any time and for any reason.”
M.D. Fla. Local R. 1.07(a)(2)(A); see also Stone, 411 F.2d at 598(“[The] contention that a district judge cannot transfer his arraign-
ment calendar to another district judge without the consent of the
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12820
[parties] is patently frivolous.”). Accordingly, we find no error in
Judge Barber’s actions.
Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in mod-
ifying the pre-filing injunction. The district court amply recounted
Hooker’s history of abusive litigation, as well as his more recent
attempts to evade the pre-filing injunction by artful pleading. The
district court was within its discretion to modify the pre-filing in-
junction to better protect its jurisdiction. Martin-Trigona, 986 F.2d
at 1387. And the modification does not “completely foreclose[]”
Hooker from access to the courts. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074. The
modified injunction is limited solely to Hooker’s claims about his
employment and ban relating to Bay Pines, and Hooker may still
file these claims with an attorney’s signature. 2 Thus, the district
court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the injunction. Be-
cause we find no error in the district court’s actions, we AFFIRM.
AFFIRMED.
2 As Hooker is not incarcerated, this case is distinguishable from Procup where
we held a similar pre-filing injunction requiring attorney sign off for a pris-
oner’s pleadings was too onerous. Procup, 792 F.2d at 1071, 1074. Hooker has
a much greater ability to seek counsel to bring his claims than the prisoner in
Procup did.