Althea Miley v. Deborah J. Burns

USCA11 Case: 22-11512 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11512
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
ALTHEA MILEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DEBORAH J. BURNS,
Individually as Corporate Executive and Employee of
TMST Home Mortgage Loans, Inc.,
f.k.a. Thornburg Mortgage Home Loans, Inc.,
as Mortgage Service Provider (MSP),
TMST HOME LOANS, INC.,
as Mortgage Service Provider (MSP)
f.k.a. Thornburg Mortgage Home Loans, Inc.,
USCA11 Case: 22-11512 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 2 of 6
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11512
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-00616-ELR
____________________
Before JILL PRYOR, ANDERSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Althea Miley, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her complaint that raised federal and state claims re-
lated to the foreclosure of her home. On appeal, Miley argues that
the district court improperly determined that she was not opposed
to Deborah Burns and TMST Home Mortgage Loans, Inc. motion
to dismiss and dismissed her complaint as a sanction for her failure
to respond timely to the motion to dismiss. Miley also argues that
the district court improperly determined that her complaint was
barred by res judicata. Finally, she argues that the district court had
jurisdiction over all her claims because she raised some federal
claims in her complaint; thus, it erroneously declined to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over her state law claims. Having read
the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record, we affirm the district
court’s order dismissing Miley’s complaint.
USCA11 Case: 22-11512 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 3 of 6
22-11512 Opinion of the Court 3
I.
We review res judicata determinations de novo because they
are pure questions of law. Maldonado v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 664 F.3d
1369, 1375 (11th Cir. 2011). We review de novo a district court’s
ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334, 1335
(11th Cir. 2003). The court views the complaint in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff and accepts all the plaintiff’s well-pleaded
facts as true. Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1057
(11th Cir. 2007). Further, “[i]n the case of a pro se action . . . the
court should construe the complaint more liberally than it would
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Powell v. Lennon, 914 F.2d
1459, 1463 (11th Cir. 1990).
II.
Res judicata is a judicially made doctrine created to provide
finality to parties who already litigated a claim and to promote ju-
dicial economy. Maldonado, 664 F.3d at 1375. However, a court is
permitted to stray from the rule when a mechanical application
would result in manifest injustice and undermine the rule’s general
effectiveness. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The doctrine of res
judicata bars filing claims that were raised or could have been raised
in a prior proceeding. Id. (quotation marks omitted). The appli-
cation of res judicata has four requirements: (1) a final judgment on
the merits (2) that was rendered by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion with (3) the same parties and (4) the same cause of action. Id.(quotation marks omitted). Two cases are generally considered to
involve the same cause of action if they arise out of “the same
USCA11 Case: 22-11512 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 4 of 6
4 Opinion of the Court 22-11512
nucleus of operative fact” or are “based upon the same factual pred-
icate.” Id. (quoting Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1239
(11th Cir. 1999)). Res judicata bars all legal theories and claims aris-
ing out of the same operative nucleus of fact unless a substantial
change in the underlying facts or law has transpired. Id. at 1376.
(quotation marks omitted). “[D]ismissal of a complaint with prej-
udice satisfies the requirement that there be a final judgment on
the merits.” Citibank, N.A. v. Data Lease Fin. Corp., 904 F.2d 1498,
1501 (11th Cir. 1990). A court may consider the defense of res judi-
cata in a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) when the
existence of the defense can be judged from the face of the com-
plaint. Starship Enter. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Coweta Cty., Ga., 708 F.3d
1243, 1252-53 n.13 (11th Cir. 2013). A court also may take judicial
notice of matters of public record when considering a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, at least where the truth of the statements in such records
is not at issue for purposes of the motion to dismiss. See Bryant v.
Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1278, 1280 & n. 15 (11th Cir.
1999).
A district court has supplemental jurisdiction over claims
that “form part of the same case or controversy” as the underlying
claims to which the court has original jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). However, the court may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim when it has dismissed all
claims over which it had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3).
USCA11 Case: 22-11512 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 5 of 6
22-11512 Opinion of the Court 5
III.
The record demonstrates that Miley failed to respond timely
to the motion to dismiss and the district court properly determined
that the motion to dismiss was unopposed. See N.D. Ga. Local
Rule 7.1(B) (providing that any party opposing a motion must file
a response within 14 days and failure to file a timely response will
indicate that there is no opposition to the motion). Further, the
record indicates that the district court did not dismiss Miley’s com-
plaint as a sanction for her failure to respond timely to the motion
to dismiss because the district court dismissed her complaint on the
merits.
We conclude, based on the record, that the district court
properly determined that Miley’s complaint was barred by res judi-
cata. Miley had previously filed a federal complaint against Burns
and TMST; the district court for that case adjudicated the case on
the merits; the district court for the prior federal case is a court of
competent jurisdiction; and the two federal actions arose out of the
same disputed foreclosure and sale of the property for which Miley
obtained a mortgage. Maldonado, 664 F.3d at 1375. We further
conclude that the district court properly declined to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction over Miley’s state law claims because it had
dismissed the claims over which it had original jurisdiction. Ac-
cordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we affirm the dis-
trict court’s order dismissing Miley’s complaint.
USCA11 Case: 22-11512 Document: 21-1 Date Filed: 07/11/2023 Page: 6 of 6
6 Opinion of the Court 22-11512
1
AFFIRMED.
1
We DENY the motion for sanctions filed by Burns and TMST Home Mort-
gage Loans.