Tamiko Peele v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company

USCA11 Case: 22-14235 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2023 Page: 1 of 6
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-14235
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
TAMIKO N. PEELE,
Individually on Behalf of Themselves,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,
A Division of State Farm, Through Its Claim No. 59-33N5-00H
and Claim No. 59-33N5-4L, in their Official and Individual Capac-
ity,
C/O Chief Financial Officer,
ST. LUCIE MEDICAL CENTER URGENT CARE,
A Division of HCA Florida St. Lucie Hospital,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.,
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-14235
Through Its United States Postal Service Inc., Its Postmaster Gen-
eral Louis Dejoy, Matthew Celona, Mail Handlers, and Mail Carri-
ers for 4001 SW Melbourne Street, Port Saint Lucie, FL 34953,
and Does 1-3 Inclusive in their Individual Capacity,
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, INC.,
Through its United States Postal Service, Inc., Its Postmaster Gen-
eral Louis Dejoy, Michael V. Vechitto, Mail Handlers and Mail
Carriers for P.O. Box 8106, Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33310 Does 1-
3 Inclusive in their Individual Capacity,
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 2:22-cv-14386-AMC
____________________
Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Tamiko Peele, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of her complaint without prejudice as a shotgun pleading,
its order denying her motion to remand and recuse the district
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22-14235 Opinion of the Court 3
court judge, and its order denying her motion to certify an inter-
locutory appeal. The United States and St. Lucie Medical Center
Urgent Care (“St. Lucie Medical Center”) respond by moving for
summary affirmance of the district court’s orders, arguing that
Peele abandoned her challenges to the orders by failing to raise
them in her initial brief and that the orders were correct on the
merits.
Summary disposition is appropriate either where time is of
the essence, such as “situations where important public policy is-
sues are involved or those where rights delayed are rights denied,”
or where “the position of one of the parties is clearly right as a
matter of law so that there can be no substantial question as to the
outcome of the case, or where, as is more frequently the case, the
appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158,
1162 (5th Cir. 1969). A motion for summary affirmance postpones
the due date for the filing of any remaining brief until we rule on
the motion. 11th Cir. R. 31-1(c).
We review the dismissal of a shotgun pleading on Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2) or 10(b) grounds for abuse of discretion. Weiland v.
Palm Beach Cnty. Sherriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
The denial of a motion for recusal is also reviewed for abuse of
discretion. In re Walker, 532 F.3d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 2008). Under
the abuse-of-discretion standard, we must affirm unless we find
that the district court made a clear error of judgment or applied
the wrong legal standard. Rance v. Rocksolid Granit USA, Inc., 583
F.3d 1284, 1286 (11th Cir. 2009). The denial of a motion to remand
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-14235
to state court is reviewed de novo. Henderson v. Washington Nat’l Ins.
Co., 454 F.3d 1278, 1281 (11th Cir. 2006).
Although we construe pleadings filed by pro se parties liber-
ally, pro se litigants are still required to conform to procedural rules.
Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007). A pro se ap-
pellant abandons a claim when she fails to raise it in her initial brief,
makes only passing references to it, or raises it in a perfunctory
manner without supporting arguments and authority. Sapuppo v.
Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680-81, 683 (11th Cir. 2014).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(a)(2). Further, claims should be stated “in numbered para-
graphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set of circum-
stances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b).
We have identified four categories of shotgun pleadings—
complaints that: (1) contain multiple counts where each count
adopts the allegations of all preceding counts; (2) are “replete with
conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not obviously connected
to any particular cause of action”; (3) do not separate each cause of
action or claim for relief into separate counts; or (4) assert multiple
claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the
defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of
the defendants the claim is brought against. Weiland, 792 F.3d at
1321-23. The unifying characteristic of all types of shotgun plead-
ings is that they fail to one degree or another “to give the
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22-14235 Opinion of the Court 5
defendants adequate notice of the claims against them and the
grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
A district court can dismiss a complaint on shotgun pleading
grounds under its “inherent authority to control its docket and en-
sure the prompt resolution of lawsuits.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Sha-
banets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omit-
ted). In such cases, we have required the district court to allow the
litigant one chance to remedy the deficiency before dismissing the
case with prejudice. Id. at 1296.
Section 1442(a)(1) permits the “United States or any agency
thereof ” to remove a civil action against it that is commenced in
state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). A judge has a duty to disqualify
herself “in any proceeding in which [her] impartiality might rea-
sonably be questioned.” Id. § 455(a). This includes when she has a
bias regarding a party. Id. § 455(b).
Summary affirmance is warranted here because Peele aban-
doned her challenges to all three orders by failing to adequately
raise them in her initial brief. Peele clearly abandoned any chal-
lenge to the order denying certification of an interlocutory appeal,
as she makes no argument about that order in her initial brief or
her response. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680-81, 683. She also abandoned
the challenges to the orders dismissing her complaint and denying
her motion for remand and recusal because she did not argue that
her complaint was not a shotgun pleading until her response to the
motions for summary affirmance and made only passing references
to the orders for remand and recusal, which was insufficient. Id.USCA11 Case: 22-14235 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 08/04/2023 Page: 6 of 6
6 Opinion of the Court 22-14235
Even if she has not abandoned challenges to the orders dis-
missing her complaint and denying her motion for remand and
recusal, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing
her complaint without prejudice because it was a shotgun pleading
that incorporated allegations from preceding counts. Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1321-23. It also did not abuse its discretion in denying the
motion to recuse because it was unclear as to which judge and on
what grounds Peele requested recusal, so the district court did not
make a clear error of judgment in denying the motion. Rance, 583
F.3d at 1286. And the district court did not err in denying the mo-
tion to remand because a U.S. agency is allowed to remove a case
to federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
As for Peele’s motion for fees and costs, we deny it because
Peele did not show that the appellees acted in bad faith.
Accordingly, because the United States’s and St. Lucie Med-
ical Center’s position is clearly correct as a matter of law, we
GRANT the motions for summary affirmance and DENY Peele’s
motion for fees and costs. Groendyke Transp., Inc., 406 F.2d at 1162.
AFFIRMED.