United States v. Lahans Fitzgerald Cooper

USCA11 Case: 22-12534 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/29/2023 Page: 1 of 3
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12534
Non-Argument Calendar
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
LAHANS FITZGERALD COOPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cr-00367-AMM-SGC-1
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-12534 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/29/2023 Page: 2 of 3
2 Opinion of the Court 22-12534
Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Lahans Cooper appeals his total sentence of 180 months’ im-
prisonment for drug trafficking and gun crimes. Cooper argues
that the district court erred in failing to pronounce at sentencing
certain discretionary conditions of his supervised release that were
included in the written judgment. The government agrees and
states that remand is warranted for a limited resentencing.
Generally, challenges to the conditions of a defendant’s su-
pervised release raised for the first time on appeal are subject to
plain-error review. United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1087 (11th
Cir. 2003). But we review de novo where the defendant “had no
opportunity to object at sentencing to the discretionary conditions
of supervised release because they were included for the first time
in the written judgment.” United States v. Rodriguez, 75 F.4th 1231,
1246 n.5 (11th Cir. 2023).
Section 3583 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code imposes several
mandatory conditions of supervised release and provides that the
court may order further conditions. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). The Sen-
tencing Guidelines provide for thirteen standard conditions that
are generally recommended, as well as several special conditions.
U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(c), (d).
In Rodriguez, we concluded that “due process principles gen-
erally require district courts to pronounce at the sentencing hear-
ing discretionary, but not mandatory, conditions of supervised
USCA11 Case: 22-12534 Document: 35-1 Date Filed: 12/29/2023 Page: 3 of 3
22-12534 Opinion of the Court 3
release.” 75 F.4th at 1247. A defendant must be given “an oppor-
tunity to be heard on the discretionary condition[s].” Id. at 1248.
Courts may satisfy this requirement by referencing a written list of
supervised-release conditions. Id. at 1247. But a court violates due
process if it imposes a discretionary condition that was never iden-
tified at the sentencing hearing, whether by expressly referencing
an applicable “administrative order or otherwise indicat[ing] that
the court was adopting conditions of supervised release beyond
those mandated by statute.” Id. at 1248–49. When a court errs in
this way, we will “vacate the conditions and remand for resentenc-
ing,” so that the court “may, after giving [the defendant] an oppor-
tunity to be heard, reconsider whether to impose each of the dis-
cretionary conditions.” Id. at 1249.
Here, the parties agree that the district court erred by failing
to identify or pronounce at sentencing discretionary conditions of
supervised release that were imposed in the written judgment. Ac-
cording to the government, the written judgment included at least
sixteen discretionary conditions of supervised release that were not
identified in the presentence investigation report or at sentencing.
Because the record shows that Cooper lacked a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard on those discretionary conditions, we vacate the
conditions and remand for resentencing in accordance with Rodri-
guez. See id. at 1249–50.
VACATED AND REMANDED.