Candice Hagan v. Georgia Department of Corrections

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12180
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
CANDICE HAGAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS,
PULASKI SP WARDEN,
GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12180
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00107-TES
____________________
Before WILSON, LUCK, and JULIE CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff appeals the district court’s order dismissing her 42
U.S.C. § 1983 and state negligence claims pursuant to Federal Rule
12(c). Additionally, Plaintiff appeals the district court’s failure to
sua sponte grant leave for her to amend the complaint before dis-
missing her claims and entering judgment for Defendants. After a
careful review of the record and the briefing submitted by the par-
ties, we find that the district court did not err when it dismissed
Plaintiff’s claims and did not abuse its discretion when it declined
sua sponte to give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Therefore,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND
This case arises from injuries Plaintiff sustained while she
was incarcerated in the Bleckley County Residential Substance
Abuse Treatment (“RSAT”) Center. At the time of Plaintiff’s inju-
ries, Defendant Mickens was the warden of Pulaski State Prison,
the facility that operates the RSAT Center, and Defendant Ward
was the Commissioner of Defendant Georgia Department of Cor-
rections (“GDC”), the agency in charge of the prison and the RSAT.
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22-12180 Opinion of the Court 3
While incarcerated in February 2020, Plaintiff slipped on liq-
uid left on the concrete floor of a common area in the RSAT Cen-
ter. As a result of her fall, Plaintiff sustained injuries to her right
shoulder, forearm, and wrist. A correctional officer arrived shortly
after Plaintiff’s fall and questioned her about the fall and her inju-
ries. After telling the officer she was experiencing pain in her right
shoulder, forearm, and wrist, Plaintiff was placed in a wheelchair
and taken to the RSAT Center’s nursing station. An initial exami-
nation revealed pain in Plaintiff’s shoulder and visible swelling and
injury to her forearm and wrist.
Plaintiff subsequently was transported to a local emergency
room (“ER”) and evaluated by an ER physician, who diagnosed
Plaintiff with a severe fracture to her right forearm and wrist. The
physician determined that Plaintiff’s injuries required immediate
surgery, which was arranged to take place at Coliseum Medical
Center (“Coliseum”) in Macon, Georgia. Plaintiff traveled to Coli-
seum with a correctional officer that same day, and she was seen
by an orthopedic surgeon there who concurred in her need for sur-
gery. The surgery was scheduled for the following morning, but
the correctional officer told Plaintiff she could not stay overnight
at Coliseum and needed to return to the RSAT Center, which she
did.
The next morning, Plaintiff awoke with severe pain and
swelling in her right forearm and wrist and asked the RSAT Center
nurse for her prescribed medication. The nurse allegedly advised
Plaintiff that she would not be given any medication and that she
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12180
was not being taken for her scheduled surgery at Coliseum. Over
the following week, Plaintiff repeatedly asked for her prescribed
medication and to be transported for her surgery. These requests
were denied.
A week after her initial injury, Plaintiff, still experiencing se-
vere pain and swelling in her right forearm in wrist, was taken to a
surgeon in Eastman, Georgia for additional treatment. The sur-
geon examined Plaintiff, noted severe swelling and deformities in
her right forearm and wrist, and immediately took her into sur-
gery. Plaintiff claims she suffered permanent injury to her forearm
and wrist—including paresthesia, numbness, and loss of feeling and
dexterity in her right hand—that was caused by the delay in treat-
ment and could have been avoided if Defendants had allowed her
to receive the initially scheduled surgery.
Represented by counsel, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit in Febru-
ary 2022 against Defendant GDC, Defendant Mickens, and Defend-
ant Ward in the Superior Court of Pulaski County, Georgia, assert-
ing claims under state law and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff broadly
alleged in her complaint that Defendants violated state and federal
law governing the medical treatment of an individual who is in-
jured while in the GDC’s care, causing her to incur compensable
damages and attorney’s fees. In support of her right to recover un-
der state law, Plaintiff claimed Defendants were negligent in their
execution of various duties they owed to her, and that they were
liable under a respondeat superior theory for the actions of their
employees who also were negligent. As to her § 1983 claims,
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22-12180 Opinion of the Court 5
Plaintiff asserted that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
her serious medical needs and that their actions were “cruel and
unusual in violation of” her constitutional rights.
Defendants removed Plaintiff’s complaint to the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia and filed a
motion for judgment on the pleadings under Federal Rule 12(c). In
support of the motion, Defendants argued that sovereign immun-
ity, the Eleventh Amendment, and the text of § 1983 barred Plain-
tiff’s federal constitutional claim against Defendant GDC. As to
Ward and Mickens, Defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to
properly state a § 1983 claim against those Defendants individually
because she did not allege (1) any facts suggesting that either Ward
or Mickens was personally involved in the conduct underlying her
claim or (2) a plausible basis for imposing supervisory liability. Fi-
nally, Defendants argued that Plaintiff’s state negligence claim was
barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity and the Georgia Tort
Claims Act (“GTCA”).
The district court granted the Rule 12(c) motion and dis-
missed Plaintiff’s complaint in its entirety. Specifically, the court
held that sovereign immunity and a plain reading of § 1983 barred
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim against Defendant GDC. As to Defendants
Ward and Mickens, the court concluded that Plaintiff’s § 1983
claims against them failed because she did not plausibly allege that
either of these Defendants was responsible for the misconduct al-
leged in her complaint. Regarding Plaintiff’s state claims, the court
held that Defendants Ward and Mickens were immune from
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-12180
liability under the GTCA and that Defendant GDC was the proper
defendant for Plaintiff’s state negligence claim pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 50-21-25(b). Nevertheless, the court held that a negli-
gence claim asserted against GDC still failed because of the discre-
tionary function exception to Georgia’s limited waiver of immun-
ity in the GTCA.
Plaintiff appeals, arguing that (1) she was held to a higher
pleading standard than required, (2) the district court erroneously
failed to convert the motion for judgment on the pleadings to a
motion for summary judgment because the court did not expressly
exclude extrinsic documents, and (3) the court should have sua
sponte offered her an opportunity to amend her complaint before
dismissing it. Plaintiff does not address in her appellate briefing the
district court’s rulings that (1) sovereign immunity and a plain read-
ing of § 1983 barred her federal claim against Defendant GDC and
(2) the GTCA barred her state negligence claims against all Defend-
ants. Those claims are thus abandoned, and we do not consider
them here. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678,
680 (11th Cir. 2014) (“When an appellant fails to challenge properly
on appeal one of the grounds on which the district court based its
judgment, he is deemed to have abandoned any challenge of that
ground, and it follows that the judgment is due to be affirmed.”).
As for Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Ward and Mickens individu-
ally, we are unpersuaded by her arguments on appeal and thus af-
firm the district court’s order dismissing those claims as well as its
decision not to sua sponte offer an opportunity for Plaintiff to
amend her complaint before dismissing it.
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DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
We review de novo the district court’s order granting judg-
ment on the pleadings. See Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp., 57
F.4th 916, 928 (11th Cir. 2023). “Judgment on the pleadings is ap-
propriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the mov-
ing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cannon v. City
of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). “In deter-
mining whether a party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings,
we accept as true all material facts alleged in the non-moving
party’s pleading, and we view those facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329,
1335 (11th Cir. 2014). We likewise review de novo whether a dis-
trict court was required to convert a motion to dismiss into a mo-
tion for summary judgment. See SFM Holdings, Ltd. v. Banc of Am.
Secs., LLC, 600 F.3d 1334, 1336–37 (11th Cir. 2010). We review for
abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint without sua sponte offering her an opportunity to
amend it. See Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Ed., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291
(11th Cir. 2018).
II. Dismissal of Claims as Insufficiently Pled
Plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court erred by
holding her complaint to a higher pleading standard than required
when it dismissed her § 1983 claims against Defendants Ward and
Mickens. Plaintiff argues further that the district court improperly
failed to consider Defendant GDC’s policies and procedures, which
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12180
she attached in opposition to the motion for judgment on the
pleadings, under the incorporation by reference doctrine. We are
unpersuaded by either argument.
As to the applicable pleading standard, a plaintiff is required
to provide in her complaint “a short and plain statement” of her
claim showing she “is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This pleading standard “does not require ‘detailed factual allega-
tions,’ but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-un-
lawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
As such, a complaint that only provides “labels and conclusions or
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” is not
adequate to survive a motion to dismiss. Chaparro v. Carnival Corp.,
693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Rather, the complaint “must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible
on its face.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). A claim is
plausible on its face when it is supported by “factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defend-
ant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
“[T]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action and con-
clusory statements are insufficient” to meet this standard. New-
bauer v. Carnival Corp., 26 F.4th 931, 934 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation
and quotation marks omitted)).
We apply a two-step framework to determine whether a
complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. At the first
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step, we “eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely
legal conclusions.” Id. At the second step, we “assume the veracity
of the well-pleaded factual allegations and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 934–35
(citation and quotation marks omitted)).
Applying the above analysis to Plaintiff’s complaint, most of
the allegations underlying her § 1983 claim against Ward and Mick-
ens fail at the first step because they are simply legal conclusions
that track the elements of a deliberate indifference claim. How-
ever, two of Plaintiff’s factual allegations do satisfy the framework’s
first step. First, Plaintiff’s claims regarding the severity of her inju-
ries are detailed and sufficiently pled. Second, the RSAT Center
nurse’s alleged statement that Defendants would not give any med-
ication to Plaintiff or transport her for surgery also provides some
factual basis. Accordingly, we consider below whether these two
allegations “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief” by Plain-
tiff on her § 1983 claims asserted against Ward and Mickens indi-
vidually.
Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Ward and Mickens are based
on a deliberate indifference theory. To prevail on such a theory, “a
plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and a subjective inquiry.”
Hoffer v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 973 F.3d 1263, 1270 (11th Cir.
2020). The objective prong of the inquiry requires a plaintiff to
demonstrate “an objectively serious medical need”—that is, a need
“that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
. . . that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize
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the necessity for a doctor’s attention” and that “if left unattended,
poses a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. As for the subjective
prong, the plaintiff must show that the defendant “(1) had subjec-
tive knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregarded that risk;
and (3) acted with more than gross negligence.” Harper v. Lawrence
Cnty., 592 F.3d 1227, 1234 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Burnette v. Tay-
lor, 533 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2008)). Assuming both require-
ments are met, the plaintiff must then establish a causal link “be-
tween the defendant’s indifference and [her] injury.” Roy v. Ivy, 53
F.4th 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2022).
Plaintiff sufficiently pled an objectively serious medical
need: a severe fracture following her fall. Further, citing the con-
firmation by the Coliseum surgeon, Plaintiff adequately alleged her
need to promptly receive surgery. Turning next to the subjective
prong, Plaintiff’s only allegation relevant to that inquiry is the
RSAT Center nurse’s statement that she would not be given any
medication or transported for surgery. Even assuming the nurse’s
statement is true and drawing all inferences from it in favor of
Plaintiff, the statement does not provide a factual basis to suggest
that either Ward or Mickens was subjectively aware of Plaintiff’s
injuries, nor does Plaintiff allege such subjective awareness else-
where in her complaint. In comparison, the correctional officer
who transported Plaintiff to and from the emergency room and the
RSAT Center nurse who responded to Plaintiff’s request for medi-
cation were perhaps aware of Plaintiff’s objectively serious medical
need. However, Plaintiff did not assert claims against either of
those individuals or even name them in her complaint. Instead,
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she asserted claims only against Defendant Ward, the commis-
sioner of the Georgia correctional system, and Defendant Mickens,
the warden of a prison that operates the rehabilitation facility
where Plaintiff was housed when she was injured.
Presumably because of the lack of personal participation—
or even alleged awareness—by Ward or Mickens of her injury,
Plaintiff focuses in her complaint on a theory of supervisory liabil-
ity. Supervisory liability under § 1983 “must be based on some-
thing more than the theory of respondeat superior.” Myrick v. Ful-
ton Cnty., Ga., 69 F.4th 1277, 1297 (11th Cir. 2023) (noting that “the
standard by which a supervisor is held liable in his . . . individual
capacity for the actions of a subordinate is extremely rigorous”
(quotation marks omitted)). Instead, a plaintiff must allege either
that “the supervisor personally participate[d] in the alleged uncon-
stitutional conduct” or that “there is a causal connection between
the actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional
deprivation.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Relevant to our anal-
ysis here, a causal connection can be established “when a supervi-
sor’s custom or policy . . . result[s] in deliberate indifference to con-
stitutional rights or when facts support an inference that the super-
visor directed the subordinates to act unlawfully or knew that the
subordinates would act unlawfully and failed to stop them from
doing so.” Harper, 592 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Cottone v. Jenne, 326
F.3d 1352, 1360–61 (11th Cir. 2003)).
As discussed above, Plaintiff did not allege that either Ward
or Mickens personally participated in or was even aware of the
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conduct underlying her complaint. We therefore turn our focus to
determine if Plaintiff otherwise alleged the necessary causal con-
nection to establish supervisory liability. See Harper, 592 F.3d at
1236 (“Here, because there are no allegations in the Complaint re-
garding the supervisors’ personal participation in the denial of . . .
rights, we look to whether Plaintiff has alleged a ‘causal connec-
tion.’”). Again, such a connection can be asserted by alleging
(1) that a supervisor’s custom or policy resulted in the deliberate
indifference or (2) facts supporting an inference that the supervisor
directed subordinates to act unlawfully or knew subordinates
would act unlawfully but failed to stop them. Id. Plaintiff has done
neither.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff did not allege that any custom
or policy instituted by Ward or Mickens caused her harm. On the
contrary, Plaintiff claimed the failure of prison officials to act in
conformity with governing GDC policy caused her harm rather
than any defective custom or policy. Likewise, Plaintiff did not al-
lege that Ward or Mickens “directed . . . subordinates to act unlaw-
fully or knew that the subordinates would act unlawfully and failed
to stop them from doing so.” 592 F.3d at 1236 (quoting Cottone,
326 F.3d at 1360–61). The only potentially relevant allegation to
this issue is the RSAT nurse’s statement suggesting Plaintiff was
denied pain medication and immediate transport for surgery. As-
suming the nurse’s statement is true and viewing it in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff, the statement does not suggest—and is
insufficient in and of itself to allow one to infer—that Ward or
Mickens had ordered their subordinates to deny medication or
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22-12180 Opinion of the Court 13
treatment for Plaintiff’s injuries or that they knew their subordi-
nates would deny such care and failed to stop them. Nor does
Plaintiff allege any facts to suggest that Ward or Mickens had notice
of a “persistent pattern” of similar violations that might have made
them aware of a likelihood that their subordinates would be delib-
erately indifferent to an inmate’s serious medical needs. See Goebert
v. Lee Cnty., 510 F.3d 1312, 1332 (11th Cir. 2007).
In short, Plaintiff did not allege in her complaint a viable ba-
sis for holding either Ward or Mickens individually liable for her
injuries under § 1983. Although Plaintiff argues the district court
erred by “applying a higher pleading standard” to her complaint
and “wrongly exclude[d] facts” for being conclusory, she does not
point to—and we have not found in our independent review of the
complaint—any specific factual allegations that were wrongly ex-
cluded. As such, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claims asserted against Defendants Ward and Mickens in
their individual capacity. See McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324,
1334 (11th Cir. 2018) (dismissing as conclusory allegations that gov-
ernment officials created and implemented unlawful policies in
“[t]he absence of allegations about any individual acts of the [gov-
ernment officials]”).
III. Consideration of Matters Outside the Pleadings
Plaintiff argues in the alternative that the district court erred
by not converting the motion for judgment on the pleadings into a
motion for summary judgment because the court did not expressly
exclude certain GDC policies that she attached to her response. As
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discussed below, this argument is foreclosed by binding circuit
precedent.
On a Rule 12(b)(6) or 12(c) motion, if “matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the mo-
tion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56”
and the parties must be given “a reasonable opportunity to present
all the material that is pertinent to the motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(d). “[I]t is within the district court’s discretion whether to accept
extra-pleading matter on a motion for judgment on the pleadings
and treat it as one for summary judgment or to reject it and main-
tain the character of the motion as one under Rule 12(c).” 5C Ar-
thur R. Miller & A. Benjamin Spencer, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1371 (3d ed. & April 2023 update). “A statement in a pleading
may be adopted by reference elsewhere in the same pleading or in
any other pleading or motion. A copy of a written instrument that
is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c). “Because Rule 10(c) incorporates into the
pleadings all exhibits attached thereto, the district court can con-
sider those documents in deciding a Rule 12(c) motion without
converting it into a Rule 56 summary judgment motion.” 5C Mil-
ler & Spencer, supra, § 1371. “Furthermore, when the plaintiff fails
to attach a pertinent document, it has been held that the defendant
can attach that document to a motion for judgment on the plead-
ings without converting the motion into one for summary judg-
ment.” Id.
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Applying the above rules in Harper, this Court held that “[a]
judge need not convert a motion to dismiss into a motion for sum-
mary judgment as long as he or she does not consider matters out-
side the pleadings” and “‘not considering’ such matters is the func-
tional equivalent of ‘excluding’ them—there is no more formal step
required.” 592 F.3d at 1232 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument “that
it was not enough for the court to have declined to consider the
outside documents in ruling on the motion to dismiss—rather, it
should have excluded them pursuant to Rule 12(d)”). See also Ware
v. Assoc. Milk Producers, Inc., 614 F.2d 413, 414 (5th Cir. 1980) (not-
ing the “express wording” of the district court’s order indicating
that materials outside the pleading were not considered). 1 In con-
trast, this Court has held that a district court ordering discovery
and relying on the documents produced in discovery to flesh out
claims is an example of the record demonstrating outside materials
were considered by the district court in deciding a motion. See
Orion Marine Constr., Inc. v. Carroll, 918 F.3d 1323, 1330 (11th Cir.
2019) (“Because the district court considered materials outside the
pleadings in deciding the [motion to dismiss], though—and indeed,
affirmatively directed discovery—that motion may properly be
converted into a motion for summary judgment.”).
Here, Plaintiff concedes the district court did not reference
or rely on the GDC policies she attached to her response in ruling
1 Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit rendered prior to October 1, 1981,
constitute binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit. Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-12180
on the motion for judgment on the pleadings. Indeed, Plaintiff ar-
gues in her appellate brief that the district court erred by not con-
sidering those policies. Because the district court was not obligated
to consider an extrinsic document attached to Plaintiff’s response,
nor was it required to expressly state that it did not consider the
document, the court did not err by reviewing the motion for judg-
ment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) instead of Rule 56.
IV. Amendment of Plaintiff’s Complaint
Finally, Plaintiff argues on appeal that the district court erred
by dismissing her complaint without sua sponte giving her an op-
portunity to amend. “A district court’s discretion to deny leave
to amend a complaint is severely restricted by [Federal Rule 15],
which stresses that courts should freely give leave to amend when
justice so requires.” Woldeab, 885 F.3d at 1291. Pursuant to Rule
15, “[w]here a more carefully drafted complaint might state a
claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
complaint before the district court dismisses the action with preju-
dice.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, a district court
need not allow an amendment that would be futile. See Garcia v.
Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 48 F.4th 1202, 1220 (11th Cir. 2022). Fur-
ther, “our precedent is clear that ‘[a] district court is not required
to grant a plaintiff leave to amend [her] complaint sua sponte when
the plaintiff, who is represented by counsel, never filed a motion to
amend nor requested leave to amend before the district court.’”
Newbauer, 26 F.4th at 936 (alteration in original) (quoting Wagner v.
Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 (11th Cir. 2002)
(en banc)).
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22-12180 Opinion of the Court 17
Plaintiff was represented by counsel. Yet, before the district
court, she never moved to amend her complaint—either during
the pendency of Defendants’ motion to dismiss or after the district
court had dismissed the complaint. Instead, Plaintiff raises the
amendment issue for the first time on appeal. Thus, under our
precedent, the district court was not required sua sponte to grant
Plaintiff leave to amend in this situation unless it dismissed Plain-
tiff’s complaint on shotgun pleading grounds. See Vibe Micro, Inc. v.
Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1296 (11th Cir. 2018) (“When a litigant
files a shotgun pleading, is represented by counsel, and fails to re-
quest leave to amend, a district court must sua sponte give him one
chance to replead before dismissing his case with prejudice on non-
merits shotgun pleading grounds.”). Here, the district court ex-
pressly chose not to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint on shotgun plead-
ing grounds, and instead ruled on the merits.
We likewise decline to characterize Plaintiff’s complaint as a
shotgun pleading. Shotgun pleadings come in four categories, one
of which is “asserting multiple claims against multiple defendants
without specifying which of the defendants are responsible for
which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants the claim is
brought against.” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d
1313, 1323 (11th Cir. 2015). However, what unifies all categories
of shotgun pleadings “is that they fail to one degree or another, and
in one way or another, to give the defendants adequate notice of
the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
rests.” Id. In choosing to rule on the merits, the district court found
that despite Plaintiff’s complaint exhibiting some characteristics of
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-12180
a shotgun pleading, the complaint provided sufficient notice to De-
fendants of the claims asserted against them and the grounds upon
which the claims rested.
We agree with the district court’s assessment. Plaintiff’s
complaint made clear that she was asserting § 1983 deliberate indif-
ference claims against both Ward and Mickens in their individual
capacities to recover for injuries she suffered as a result of her de-
layed treatment following a fall at the RSAT facility where she was
incarcerated at the time. The complaint failed to allege any viable
basis for imposing individual liability on Ward or Mickens, but it
did not fail to give either of those defendants “adequate notice of
the claims against them and the grounds upon which each claim
rests.” Id. As such, the complaint was not a shotgun pleading and,
given that Plaintiff was represented by an attorney, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by failing sua sponte to give her
an opportunity to amend before dismissing her claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we find no error in the district
court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint and we likewise hold
that the court did not abuse its discretion by failing sua sponte to
give Plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Therefore, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.