Robert A. Sweetapple v. Asset Enhancement, Inc.

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[PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11389
____________________
In re: ASSET ENHANCEMENT, INC.,
Debtor.
___________________________________________________
ROBERT A. SWEETAPPLE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ASSET ENHANCEMENT, INC.,
Defendant - Appellee.
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-11389
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 0:21-cv-60777-RS,
Bkcy No. 0:20-bk-15782-PDR
____________________
Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judge:
Juliet was generally right that a rose by any other name
smells as sweet. 1 But Juliet’s observation does not apply here.
Depending on the name—or more specifically, the con-
text—an order that leaves nothing to be determined in a proceed-
ing but the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded may or may
not be a final, appealable order under our precedent. To be sure,
most orders that resolve everything but the amount of attorneys’
fees to be awarded qualify as final, appealable orders. But we’ve
said that a contempt order that contemplates imposing attorneys’
fees as a sanction for contempt but does not specify the amount of
any such award is not a final, appealable order. Rather, the final
order in that situation is the later order that awards the specific
amount of fees. The earlier order that awards fees generally with-
out indicating the amount awarded then merges into the later or-
der, and they both become appealable.
1 See William Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet act 2, sc. 2.
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22-11389 Opinion of the Court 3
When we apply that rule here, we conclude that Plaintiff-
Appellant Robert A. Sweetapple timely appealed the bankruptcy
court’s order finding him in contempt—even though the bank-
ruptcy court entered that order more than fourteen days before
Sweetapple appealed. Sweetapple’s appeal was timely because he
filed it within the fourteen-day period following the bankruptcy
court’s entry of its order sanctioning Sweetapple with a specific
amount of attorneys’ fees for the contempt the bankruptcy court
found in its earlier order. Because the district court reached the
opposite conclusion, we vacate the district court’s dismissal of this
aspect of Sweetapple’s appeal and remand for the district court to
consider the appeal in the first instance.
I. BACKGROUND
This case has a somewhat long and messy history. It origi-
nates out of a Florida Public Records Act request that Asset En-
hancement made to the Town of Gulfstream. After the Town of
Gulfstream responded to that request in what Asset Enhancement
deemed an incomplete and delayed way, in 2014, Asset Enhance-
ment filed an action in Palm Beach Circuit Court against Gulf-
stream. Because of Gulfstream’s alleged delay, Asset Enhancement
argued, it was entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and reasonable
costs associated with enforcement of the record request.
Gulfstream and Asset Enhancement eventually settled the
matter with final judgment entered against Gulfstream. But the
parties left the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs for the state
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11389
court to determine. The state court held an evidentiary hearing on
that matter and set final argument for May 28, 2020.
A day before final argument occurred, though, Asset En-
hancement filed its Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition. It then noti-
fied the state court of its bankruptcy filing and asked the state court
to confirm that the May 28 hearing would not proceed because of
the automatic stay. 2 Gulfstream’s counsel emailed a legal memo-
randum to the state court, arguing that the automatic stay did not
apply. After hearing arguments from both Gulfstream and Asset
Enhancement, the state court concluded that Asset Enhancement’s
filing of its bankruptcy petition did not stay the attorneys’ fees pro-
ceeding because Asset Enhancement, as the Debtor, initiated the
action. So the state court held the May 28 hearing on the issue of
attorneys’ fees.
Gulfstream, through its attorney (and now-Plaintiff-Appel-
lant) Robert A. Sweetapple, argued that Asset Enhancement was
not entitled to attorneys’ fees for two reasons: (1) its fees resulted
from an orchestrated scheme to abuse Florida’s Public Records Act,
and (2) in any case, its fees were unreasonable. Instead, Sweetapple
asserted, the state court should sanction Asset Enhancement for its
actions and reduce any attorneys’ fees award to basically $0.
2 “The automatic stay is a fundamental protection” that the Bankruptcy Code
“provide[s] to debtors upon the filing of a bankruptcy case in most instances.
It works to give debtors a breathing spell to attempt to reorganize or simply
be relieved of the financial pressures that led to the bankruptcy.” In re Cole,
552 B.R. 903, 911 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2016).
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Despite its decision to proceed with arguments, the state court de-
cided to wait to rule on the issue of attorneys’ fees until the con-
clusion of the bankruptcy proceedings.
A. Bankruptcy Court Proceedings
Meanwhile, back in the bankruptcy court, about six weeks
after the May 28 state-court hearing, Asset Enhancement filed its
Amended Motion for Contempt for Violation of the Automatic
Stay and For Sanctions (“Motion for Contempt”). According to As-
set Enhancement, Gulfstream and Sweetapple violated the auto-
matic stay by (1) convincing the state court to proceed with the
May 28 hearing and (2) requesting sanctions against Asset Enhance-
ment. As relief, Asset Enhancement sought damages for Gulf-
stream and Sweetapple’s alleged willful violation of the automatic
stay:
[Asset Enhancement] respectfully requests that this
Court: (1) grant the Motion; (2) find that [Gulfstream]
and Sweetapple knowingly and willfully violated the
automatic stay in pursuing the sanctions claim and
the setoff of the sanctions claim; (3) compel [Gulf-
stream] and Sweetapple to file with the trial court a
complete waiver of any sanctions claim; (4) enter a
monetary sanction against [Gulfstream] and
Sweetapple for reasonable costs associated with filing
and prosecuting this Motion; (5) enter an award of pu-
nitive damages against them joint and several; and (6)
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11389
grant any further or additional relief as this Court
deems necessary or appropriate.
Mot. for Contempt 8, Bankr. ECF No. 32.
The bankruptcy court granted Asset Enhancement’s motion
in part (“Contempt Order”).
First, the bankruptcy court determined that the automatic
stay applied to the state-court action even though Asset Enhance-
ment instituted the action. That was so, the bankruptcy court rea-
soned, because Gulfstream sought offensive relief when it argued
in support of sanctions against Asset Enhancement. Based on Gulf-
stream’s efforts to obtain that relief in the state court, the bank-
ruptcy court held that Gulfstream violated the automatic stay. And
the bankruptcy court found Sweetapple, as Gulfstream’s counsel,
personally liable for violating the stay.
Then, the bankruptcy court addressed the remedies for the
violation of the automatic stay. The court explained that because
Asset Enhancement was a corporation, 11 U.S.C. § 105, which gen-
erally covers reorganizations involving corporations and partner-
ships and creates a statutory contempt power in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings, supplied the bankruptcy court’s authority to award dam-
ages.
Next, the bankruptcy court considered each form of dam-
ages that Asset Enhancement requested. In so doing, the bank-
ruptcy court held that Asset Enhancement was not entitled to com-
pensatory damages because it did not put forth any evidence to
support such damages. The bankruptcy court also declined to
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award injunctive relief, reasoning that the automatic stay, at bot-
tom, is an injunction, so injunctive relief is neither necessary nor
appropriate to protect the property of the estate. And as for puni-
tive damages, the court concluded that Asset Enhancement wasn’t
entitled to them because the record indicated no type of egregious
or malicious misconduct nor significant and foreseeable harm. But
the bankruptcy court did award Asset Enhancement reasonable at-
torneys’ fees and costs for the filing and prosecution of its Motion
for Contempt.
Sweetapple timely moved for reconsideration of the bank-
ruptcy court’s Contempt Order. The bankruptcy court denied the
motion (“Reconsideration Order”).
Consistent with the Contempt Order, Asset Enhancement
timely moved for specific attorneys’ fees. And after the parties
agreed to the amount of attorneys’ fees, the bankruptcy court en-
tered an order awarding Asset Enhancement $12,931.50 for attor-
neys’ fees and costs incurred in connection with the Motion for
Contempt (“Fee Order”).
Sweetapple and Gulfstream consented to the Fee Order on
the amount of attorneys’ fees and costs Asset Enhancement sought
“solely” “to avoid the necessity of a contested hearing.” Fee Order
2, Bankr. ECF No. 120. The Fee Order clarified that Sweetapple’s
consent to the order did not “constitute a waiver or admission as to
any aspect of the Contempt Order and/or Order Denying Recon-
sideration. [The] Order [was] expressly entered without prejudice
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-11389
to [ ] Sweetapple’s right to appeal any aspect of the Contempt Or-
der and/or the Order Denying Reconsideration.” Id.After the bankruptcy court entered the Fee Order, Gulf-
stream paid Asset Enhancement’s attorneys’ fees.
B. District Court Proceedings
Sweetapple then filed his Notice of Appeal in the district
court. In it, he challenged the Contempt Order, the Reconsidera-
tion Order, and the Fee Order. Asset Enhancement moved to dis-
miss Sweetapple’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The district court agreed and dismissed Sweetapple’s appeal.
First, the district court determined that it lacked jurisdiction to hear
Sweetapple’s appeal of the Contempt and Reconsideration Orders
because the appeal was untimely. In support of that conclusion,
the district court reasoned that these orders were final orders and
were therefore immediately appealable, even though they left the
amount of attorneys’ fees unresolved. In reaching this conclusion,
the court relied on Supreme Court precedent holding that the issue
of attorneys’ fees is collateral to the merits, and a decision on the
merits is immediately appealable even if an issue as to the attor-
neys’ fees remains unresolved.
And because the Bankruptcy Rules provide fourteen days to
appeal from the entry of a final decision or order, and Sweetapple
failed to appeal within that fourteen-day window from the entry
of the Contempt and Reconsideration Orders, the district court
ruled his appeal untimely. As a result, the district court concluded
it lacked jurisdiction and dismissed the appeal.
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Second, the district court concluded that Sweetapple lacked
standing to challenge the Fee Order. Though Sweetapple had
timely filed the appeal of the Fee Order, the district court reasoned,
he had consented to the entry of the Fee Order, so he could not,
on appeal, challenge the fees awarded. The district court did iden-
tify one possible basis for an appeal of the Fee Order, though: if
the award deviated from the parties’ agreement. But Sweetapple
did not allege that to be the case. So the district court dismissed
Sweetapple’s appeal of the Fee Order.
Sweetapple now appeals to us the dismissal of his appeal to
the district court of his challenges to the Contempt and Reconsid-
eration Orders. 3
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In the bankruptcy context, we sit as a “second court of re-
view.” In re Issac Leaseco, Inc., 389 F.3d 1205, 1209 (11th Cir. 2004)
(quoting In re Club Assoc., 951 F.2d 1223, 1228 (11th Cir. 1992)). That
3 Sweetapple’s Notice of Appeal also appeals the dismissal of the Fee Order.
Sweetapple’s briefing includes no argument challenging the district court’s dis-
missal of his appeal of the Fee Order, though. As a result, Sweetapple has
abandoned any challenge to the Fee Order. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins.
Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir. 2014). But even had Sweetapple not forfeited
this issue, we would have affirmed. That’s so because Sweetapple, through
his consent to the Fee Order, waived any objection he otherwise may have
had to the amount of fees that order awarded. So the district court correctly
dismissed that appeal. See Hofmann v. De Marchena Kaluche & Asociados, 657
F.3d 1184, 1187 (11th Cir. 2011) (“As a general rule, a party has no standing to
appeal an order or judgment to which he consented.”).
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role requires us to “examine[] independently the factual and legal
determinations of the bankruptcy court and employ[] the same
standards of review as the district court.” Id. Generally, we review
de novo legal conclusions by either the bankruptcy court or the
district court. In re Fin. Federated Title & Tr., Inc., 309 F.3d 1325,
1328–29 (11th Cir. 2002). As for the bankruptcy court’s findings of
fact, we review those for clear error. In re Optical Techs., Inc., 425
F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2005).
III. The district court had jurisdiction over Sweetapple’s ap-
peal of the contempt order.
The district court, sitting as the first court of review, con-
cluded Sweetapple filed his appeal of the Contempt Order too late,
so it lacked jurisdiction to consider the appeal. We review de novo
the district court’s determination that it lacked jurisdiction. If the
district court lacked jurisdiction, so do we. And we must dismiss
an appeal in those circumstances. After all, “we are a court of lim-
ited jurisdiction, [and] adjudicating an appeal without jurisdiction
would ‘offend[ ] fundamental principles of separation of powers.’”
Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020) (alter-
ation in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523
U.S. 83, 94 (1998)).
In bankruptcy cases, we have jurisdiction to hear appeals of
“final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees[.]” 4 28 U.S.C.
4 The rules about what qualifies as “final” are more flexible in bankruptcy be-
cause a bankruptcy case is “‘an aggregation of individual controversies,’ many
of which would exist as stand-alone lawsuits but for the bankrupt status of the
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§ 158(d)(1). As relevant here, a “final decision” is one “by which a
district court disassociates itself from a case.” Bullard v. Blue Hills
Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (citation omitted). “Final decisions”
“end[] the litigation on the merits and leave[] nothing for the court
to do but execute the judgment.” Budinich v. Becton Dickinson &
Co., 486 U.S. 196, 199 (1988) (citation omitted). The final-decision
rule prevents “piecemeal, prejudgment appeals that would under-
mine efficient judicial administration and encroach upon the pre-
rogatives of [trial] judges.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC,
140 S. Ct. 582, 586 (2020) (cleaned up).
That said, the Supreme Court has held that, for purposes of
determining whether an order is a “final decision” under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (the statute endowing courts of appeals with jurisdiction of
appeals from all “final decisions of the district courts”), an out-
standing attorneys’ fees issue does not preclude an otherwise-final
decision from being a “final decision.” Budinich, 486 U.S. at 202. In
reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court expressly considered
whether this rule should be different if the attorneys’ fee issue
might be considered part of the merits of the case. See id.debtor.” Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 501 (2015) (citation omitted).
So an order in a bankruptcy case is “final” for purposes of § 158(d)(1) (and
therefore immediately appealable) if the order “finally dispose[s] of discrete
disputes within the larger case.” Id. (citation omitted). The added flexibility
in what constitutes a “final order” in bankruptcy (but not outside the bank-
ruptcy context) does not factor into the analysis here, so we do not further
discuss that flexibility.
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It decided the rule should not. Id. As the Court explained,
“[f ]or all practical purposes an appeal of merits-without-attor-
ney’s-fees when there is a statute deeming the attorney’s fees to be
part of the merits is no more harmful to the trial process than an
appeal of merits-without-attorney’s-fees when there is no such stat-
ute.” Id. Plus, the Court reasoned, having the time of appealability
depend on whether attorneys’ fees issues are viewed as part of the
merits of the dispute or not in each case is confusing for litigants.
See id. And because a wrong conclusion about whether an attor-
neys’ fees issue is a merits or non-merits issue could have jurisdic-
tional consequences, the Court concluded that “[c]ourts and liti-
gants are best served by the bright-line rule.” Id. So under Budinich,
“a decision on the merits is a ‘final decision’ for purposes of § 1291
whether or not there remains for adjudication a request for attor-
ney’s fees attributable to the case.” Id. at 202–03.
Several years later, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule
in a different context. Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs and Emps., 571 U.S. 177 (2014). Budi-
nich considered the issue in the statutory context. That is, Budinich
held that an outstanding attorneys’ fee issue didn’t prevent a deci-
sion from being final when that decision awarded a litigant employ-
ment compensation under Colorado law, which provided that the
judgment in such a suit “shall include a reasonable attorney fee in
favor of the winning party, to be taxed as part of the costs of the
action.” 486 U.S. at 197 (citation omitted).
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Ray Haluch, in contrast, considered the issue in the context
of contractual damages. 571 U.S. at 184. There, the Court held
that an unresolved attorneys’ fee issue did not prevent a decision
from being “final” even though attorneys’ fees were part of the
contract damages to be awarded. Id. at 184–85. As the Court em-
phasized, the rule was the same in both cases because the rule “did
not depend on whether the statutory or decisional law authorizing
a particular fee claim treated the fees as part of the merits.” Id. at
185. Rather, the rule was a “uniform rule.” Id.We can understand why the district court thought these
cases supported the conclusion that the Contempt Order was a “fi-
nal decision.” After all, the Contempt Order left only the determi-
nation of attorneys’ fees, so a straight-forward application of the
“bright-line rule” from Budinich and Ray Haluch yields the conclu-
sion that the Contempt Order was a “final decision.” And, it might
seem, so does the “uniform rule” reasoning underlying the Su-
preme Court’s adoption of the Budinich/Ray Haluch rule.
But this is a contempt case. 5 And we have explained that a
contempt decision does not become “final” until the contempt pen-
alties imposed are no longer “conditional or subject to
5 Although we’ve recognized differences between the Bankruptcy Code’s au-
tomatic stay and a court-ordered injunction, we’ve described the automatic
stay as “essentially a court-ordered injunction.” Jove Eng’g, Inc. v. I.R.S., 92 F.3d
1539, 1546 (11th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). And we’ve noted that “any per-
son or entity who violates the stay may be found in contempt of court.” Id.(citation omitted); see also 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
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modification.” PlayNation Play Sys., Inc. v. Velex Corp., 939 F.3d 1205,
1212 (11th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). This rule aims to avoid
the “risk of disrupting a continuing, orderly course of proceedings
below.” Combs v. Ryan’s Coal Co., Inc., 785 F.2d 970, 976 (11th Cir.
1986) (citation omitted).
And it finds its origins in Fox v. Capital Co., 299 U.S. 105(1936). In Fox, the district court found Fox in contempt and entered
an order that fined Fox (1) $235,082.03 for his contempt and (2) an
additional $10,000 in attorneys’ fees and costs. Id. at 106. Under
the order, payment of the $235,082.03—but not the $10,000 in
fees—would be remitted if Fox purged himself of his contempt. Id.at 106–07. Fox sought to appeal the entry of the $10,000 fine, not-
ing that it was not conditional. See id. at 108. But the Supreme
Court held that the order in which the $10,000 fine was set was not
a final one. Id. at 109. That was so because when the district court
issued the order, Fox could still purge his contempt and avoid pay-
ing the $235,082.03. Id. at 108-09. In other words, the district court
still had work to do in the case even after it issued the order. And
the Court held that the controversy could not be “split” to render
the $10,000 fine its own final decision. See id.Relying on our Fox-based precedent, in PlayNation, we con-
sidered a case in which the district court found parties in contempt
and ordered them to pay attorneys’ fees and expenses, without
specifying the amount. 939 F.3d at 1209–10. In a later order, the
district court established the amount of the award for fees and
costs. Id. at 1210. We held that “there was no final decree until the
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amount of attorneys’ fees and costs awarded as part of the [earlier]
contempt order was set in the [later] order.” Id. at 1212. When that
happened, we explained, “the order containing the finding of con-
tempt merged into the judgment and became subject to review on
appeal.” Id. (cleaned up). In other words, we effectively concluded
that the contempt decision was “conditional or subject to modifi-
cation” until the district court determined the amount of fees to be
awarded. 6 Id.
Factually, Sweetapple’s case is materially indistinguishable
from PlayNation. 7 In both cases, the court entered an order finding
litigants in contempt and awarding attorneys’ fees generally as a
contempt sanction. Then, the court in each case waited to fix the
amount of attorneys’ fees to be paid until it issued a later order for
that purpose. Because we held that the court’s contempt decision
6 Nothing in the factual recitation in PlayNation suggests that the district
court’s decision to award fees itself was conditional or subject to modification,
which might make the contempt order there seem like a “final” one if we were
applying Budinich’s bright-line rule. But treating the contempt order as though
it is not “final” when the only question left is the amount of fees to be awarded
does promote “uniformity,” or a “bright-line rule,” in the context of contempt
proceedings—even if that bright-line rule is the opposite of the one Budinich
and its progeny espouse. And in any case, as we note above, we are bound by
PlayNation, regardless.
7 In PlayNation, we considered whether the order there was “final” under §
1291, while here, we evaluate whether the order is “final” under § 158 because
the contempt order at issue is a bankruptcy order. But that is a distinction
without a difference in this case. After all, it is the nature of contempt, and
not of bankruptcy, that drives the outcome here.
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in PlayNation did not become final until the court issued its later
order setting the amount of attorneys’ fees to be awarded, we must
conclude the same thing here, on the same facts.
Our prior-precedent rule requires this result. Under our
prior-precedent rule, we must comply with our precedent unless
the en banc court or the Supreme Court abrogates it. Sabal Trail
Transmission, LLC v. 18.27 Acres of Land in Levy Cnty., 59 F.4th 1158,
1164 (11th Cir. 2023). For a Supreme Court opinion to overrule our
precedent, it must be “clearly on point” and “actually abrogate or
directly conflict with, as opposed to merely weaken, the holding of
the prior panel.” Id. (citations omitted). Even if a later panel “is
convinced the prior one reached the wrong result—for whatever
reason,” we must follow the prior precedent. Id. (citation omitted).
And here, we issued PlayNation after the Supreme Court issued its
decisions in Budinich and Ray Haluch. That means PlayNation con-
trols.
So long story, short: we hold that the Contempt Order did
not become a final and appealable order until the bankruptcy court
issued the Fee Order. Because Sweetapple filed his appeal within
fourteen days of the bankruptcy court’s issuance of the Fee Order,
see Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(1) (“[A] notice of appeal must be filed
with the bankruptcy clerk within 14 days after entry of the judg-
ment, order, or decree being appealed.”), Sweetapple’s appeal of
the Contempt Order was timely. And the district court had juris-
diction over the appeal.
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We therefore vacate the district court’s dismissal of
Sweetapple’s appeal and remand for the district court in the first
instance to consider the merits of Sweetapple’s appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION
We vacate the district court’s dismissal of Sweetapple’s ap-
peal of the Contempt Order as untimely because Sweetapple
timely filed his appeal within fourteen days of the bankruptcy
court’s entry of the Fee Order, which rendered the Contempt Or-
der final. And we remand Sweetapple’s challenge to the bank-
ruptcy court’s Contempt Order to the district court for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion.
VACATED AND REMANDED.