Crandall Postell v. Crisp County School District

USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 1 of 14
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11826
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
MATTHEW WHITEST,
CURTIS LUCAS, JR.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
CRANDALL POSTELL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CRISP COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT,
BECKY PERKINS,
in her official capacity as Elections’ Supervisor
of the Crisp County Board of Elections and
Registration,
JUSTIN POSEY,
in his official capacity as a member of the
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 2 of 14
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11826
Crisp County Board of Education,
DR ELIZABETH MADDOX,
in her official capacity as a member of the
Crisp County Board of Education,
LELEE PHINNEY,
in her official capacity as a member of the
Board of Education of Crisp County, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:17-cv-00109-LAG
____________________
Before WILSON, JORDAN, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
On June 14, 2017, Crandall Postell and numerous co-plain-
tiffs, represented by Bryan L. Sells and ACLU-affiliated attorneys,
filed a lawsuit against the Crisp County School District and the
Crisp County Board of Elections and Registration (BOE) challeng-
ing the existing at-large election method as a violation of Section 2
of the Voting Rights Act 1965, 52 U.S.C. § 10301. Early in the liti-
gation, Plaintiffs found themselves at odds in their pursuit of an ap-
propriate remedy. This misalignment reached an impasse.
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 3 of 14
22-11826 Opinion of the Court 3
Because Plaintiffs could not resolve their disagreement, the
district court allowed Plaintiffs to split their efforts and pursue their
interests separately. The ACLU withdrew from representing Plain-
tiffs in their entirety and continued to represent two plaintiffs,
Mathew Whitest and Curtis Lucas Jr. (referred to as, Whitest Plain-
tiffs). Postell, on behalf of himself and four other plaintiffs, pro-
ceeded with the litigation pro se.
Postell now brings this consolidated appeal challenging nu-
merous district court orders. The first order devised a remedy to
the violation of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and re-
quired the Crisp County School District and BOE to adopt a legis-
latively enacted remedial plan. The remaining orders being chal-
lenged on appeal concern Plaintiffs’ disagreement and the granting
and denial of numerous motions filed throughout the course of the
litigation in an attempt to cure alleged harms resulting from the
split.
After careful review, we find that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in adopting the legislative remedy, nor did the
district court abuse its discretion in ruling on all challenged mo-
tions. We first address the Section 2 remedy, before turning to a
review of the various motions.
I. Voting Rights Act
In 2017, Plaintiffs brought a complaint alleging that the at-
large election system used by the BOE violated Section 2 of VRA
by diluting the voting strength of Black voters in Crisp County. At
the time, the system consisted of six at-large members. According
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 4 of 14
4 Opinion of the Court 22-11826
to Plaintiffs, the at-large system made it difficult for Black voters to
elect the candidates of their choosing.
In February 2018, the parties filed a consent motion to refer
the case to mediation, which the district court granted. Defendants
did not admit liability but proposed a remedy for the alleged viola-
tion. This remedy presented a plan with four single-member dis-
tricts and one at-large district. According to this plan, two of the
single-member districts would contain a Black majority. Whitest
Plaintiffs and their attorneys supported this plan, with modifica-
tions. Postell opposed this remedy and supported a six-member
district plan.
In February 2021, Whitest Plaintiffs and Defendants filed a
joint motion for entry of a consent order, recommending that the
court adopt the plan involving four single-member districts and
one at-large district. Whitest Plaintiffs moved for summary judg-
ment in July 2021, stating that Defendants did not contest liability.
Defendants stipulated to the preconditions for a vote-dilution claim
under Section 2 and stipulated that the at-large method lacked pro-
portionality. Whitest Plaintiffs then proposed a remedial plan that
included ordering Defendants to confer with Crisp County’s legis-
lative delegation to determine whether the Georgia General As-
sembly could address the issue in time for the 2022 elections. De-
fendants responded, seeking to join Whitest Plaintiffs in their mo-
tion for summary judgment.
In August 2021, the district court determined that there was
a clear Section 2 violation, finding that there was no genuine issue
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 5 of 14
22-11826 Opinion of the Court 5
of material fact as to whether Black voters in Crisp County had less
opportunity than white voters to elect candidates of their choice to
the Board of Education, and granted Whitest Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment.
The district court issued an order requesting that all parties
confer and file a joint report within two weeks of the order identi-
fying a date by which a remedy or interim remedy would need to
be in place for the 2022 election under the new plan.
In December 2021, the district court directed the parties to
prepare and submit proposed remedial plans. Postell submitted a
plan with six single-member districts. Whitest Plaintiffs submitted
draft legislation—House Bill 956 and House Bill 1430—that mir-
rored Defendants’ previously suggested remedy, outlining a four-
one plan whereby there would be four single-member districts and
one at-large member. The Georgia General Assembly passed HB
1430 and the bill was signed into law in March 2022.
Following the bill’s passage, the district court issued an order
in which it recognized HB 1430 as an appropriate remedy for the
existing Section 2 violation. The district court held that the bill
would be adopted, subject to approval from Crisp County voters.
In doing so, the district court rejected Postell’s six-member plan,
finding that he had not provided the requisite information ensuring
that his proposal would remedy the Section 2 violation.
a. Standard of Review
Mootness is a question of law we review de novo. Hall v.
Sec’y, Ala., 902 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th Cir. 2018). A case is rendered
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 6 of 14
6 Opinion of the Court 22-11826
moot and must be dismissed if and where events occur during liti-
gation that deprive the court of its ability to provide meaningful
relief. United States v. Georgia, 778 F.3d 1202, 1204 (11th Cir. 2015).
Prior to adopting a remedial plan intended to cure a Section
2 violation, it is important for courts to inquire as to whether the
plan at issue “completely remedies the prior dilution of minority
voting strength and fully provides equal opportunity for minority
citizens to participate and to elect candidates of their choice.”
United States v. Dall. Cnty. Comm’n, 850 F.2d 1433, 1438 (11th Cir.
1988) (quoting S. Rep. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 31, reprinted in
1982 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm.News 177, 208).
In the presence of an alleged Section 2 violation, “[p]rinci-
ples of federalism and common sense mandate deference to a plan
which has been legislatively enacted.” Tallahassee Branch of NAACP
v. Leon Cnty., 827 F.2d 1436, 1438 (11th Cir. 1987). District courts
should “afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet
constitutional requirements” while devising its own substitute
plan. Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978). Still, deference to
the legislature does not equate to blanket approval. In adopting
any remedy—even a plan proposed and enacted by the state—
courts must ensure that the new plan is also valid under Section 2.
Dall. Cnty. Comm’n, 850 F.2d at 1437–38.
b. Discussion
The district court did not abuse its discretion in adopting HB
1430, a legislatively enacted plan. In deciding whether to adopt the
legislative remedy at issue, the district court clearly explained that
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 7 of 14
22-11826 Opinion of the Court 7
HB 1430 was an appropriate remedy because it provides Black vot-
ers an equal opportunity to participate in elections and elect their
candidates of choice. 1 See Wise, 437 U.S. at 540 (explaining that dis-
trict courts are entitled to adopt a legislative plan as its remedy of
choice in the presence of a Section 2 violation). Nothing in the rec-
ord supported a finding that HB 1430 violated the Constitution or
the VRA.
Our finding that the district court did not abuse its discretion
also leads us to conclude that Postell’s appeal is not moot. Postell
appropriately challenged the district court’s chosen remedy, which
so happened to be a legislatively enacted plan. The legislative rem-
edy did not deprive the district court of devising meaningful relief;
the legislative remedy was adopted as the meaningful relief. See
Georgia, 778 F.3d at 1204.
II. Motions
On appeal, Postell also challenges numerous district court
rulings on motions filed throughout the course of litigation. All
challenged motions stemmed from tensions that emerged between
Postell and his co-plaintiffs during the initial mediation with De-
fendants. The timeline and events concerning all motions follows.
When Judge Gardner first referred this case to mediation,
she required the parties to issue a status report on the results within
1 Courts should exert caution when reviewing multi-member or at-large vot-
ing schemes because they may “operate to minimize or cancel” the voting
strength of racial minorities. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986) (quot-
ing Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966)).
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 8 of 14
8 Opinion of the Court 22-11826
fourteen days of the mediation. Once issued, the status report
noted that Postell refused to engage in meaningful mediation,
which prevented the remaining plaintiffs from exploring a mutu-
ally agreeable remedy with Defendants. After repeated efforts to
resolve their differences, attorneys for Whitest Plaintiffs moved to
withdraw as counsel for Postell, citing a “fundamental disagree-
ment” between Postell and Whitest Plaintiffs. In response, Postell
filed a motion for sanctions against former counsel. The motion
for sanctions was based in part on Postell’s belief that counsel knew
of Postell’s positions on all case-related issues and disclosed said po-
sitions in the joint status report, in violation of the Georgia Rules
of Professional Conduct.
In September 2018, Postell filed a motion for an evidentiary
hearing on the motions to withdraw and his motion for sanctions.
The motions to withdraw were granted. The district court granted
an evidentiary hearing as to the motion for sanctions, which was
held in July 2019 and the motion was subsequently denied. In June
2019, shortly prior to the evidentiary hearing, Postell moved to
drop Whitest Plaintiffs from the suit while simultaneously moving
to disqualify their attorneys. This consolidated motion was denied
in August 2020.
In August 2021, Postell filed a motion for Judge Gardner to
recuse herself for illegal and discriminatory acts. He argued that
Judge Gardner was biased toward Whitest Plaintiffs, discriminated
against him because of his pro se status, and violated his due-pro-
cess rights based on its rulings. The alleged bias stemmed from the
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 9 of 14
22-11826 Opinion of the Court 9
fact that Judge Gardner’s sister is Stacey Abrams, a prominent
Georgia politician and voting rights activist who has collaborated
with the ACLU. Postell alleges that this connection manifested in
Judge Gardner’s desire to protect Abrams’s interests with the
ACLU. Postell filed a second motion for recusal in September 2021,
arguing that the district court failed to rule on his previous motion,
violating his constitutional right to due process.
In December 2021, Postell filed a third motion for recusal.
This third motion was filed alongside a Motion to Stay. In March
2022, the district court issued an order denying all of Postell’s mo-
tions for recusal and the motion to stay. 2 The following analysis
addresses all motions on appeal, in the order in which they were
filed.
a. Motions to Withdraw as Counsel
We review decisions regarding an attorney’s motion to
withdraw as counsel for abuse of discretion. See Mekdeci v. Merrell
Nat. Lab’ys, 711 F.2d 1510, 1521–22 (11th Cir. 1983). This court
gives significant deference to the district court’s interpretation and
application of local rules. Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291,
1302 (11th Cir. 2009). In doing so, this court will defer to the district
court’s grant of a motion to withdraw as counsel provided a show-
ing of good cause. Mekdeci, 711 F.2d at 1521–22.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
various motions to withdraw put forth by Postell’s former counsel.
2 The motion to stay is not challenged by Postell on appeal.
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 10 of 14
10 Opinion of the Court 22-11826
We rely on the district court’s well-reasoned explanation for grant-
ing the motions to withdraw as counsel. The district court relied
on Local Rule 83.1.4 of the Middle District of Georgia which states
that “an attorney may withdraw from representation if there is a
‘compelling reason to withdraw.’” M.D. Ga. L.R. 83.1.4. The dis-
trict court found that each motion at issue here was supported by
compelling reasons to withdraw. Postell’s former counsel moved
to withdraw in part because of the previously discussed disagree-
ment between Postell and his co-plaintiffs. The district court found
that continued representation of Postell would prevent counsel
from providing “sincere legal recommendations” to Whitest Plain-
tiffs.
A later motion was brought by another attorney who moved
to withdraw from this case because of a change of employment; a
separate motion was brought because the attorney filing had de-
cided to retire. Both reasons are wholly unrelated to the subject of
this lawsuit. We consequently cannot say that the district court
abused its discretion in granting the various motions to withdraw
as counsel.
b. Motions to Disqualify Counsel and
Motions for Sanctions 3
Decisions regarding motions to disqualify counsel fall within
the district court’s interpretation of the rules of ethics and are
3 While filed separately, the motions to disqualify counsel and the motions for
sanctions are reviewed together here as they both fall under a similar legal
standard.
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 11 of 14
22-11826 Opinion of the Court 11
reviewed de novo, while the applicable findings of fact are re-
viewed for clear error. Bayshore Ford Truck Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor
Co., 380 F.3d 1331, 1338 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Schlumberger Techs.,
Inc. v. Wiley, 113 F.3d 1553, 1557–58 (11th Cir. 1997). The party
bringing a motion to disqualify bears the burden of proving the
grounds for disqualification. In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d 941, 961
(11th Cir. 2003). The imposition of sanctions similarly fall within
the district court’s inherent power and are reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Johnson v. 27th Ave. Caraf, Inc., 9 F.4th 1300, 1310 (11th
Cir. 2021).
Rule 1.9 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct re-
quires courts to consider whether a lawyer’s interests in a case
would prove materially adverse to the interests of any of the in-
volved parties, particularly where former clients are involved. Ga.
R. Prof. Conduct 1.9(a)–(b). Meanwhile under Rule 1.6, “[a] law-
yer shall maintain in confidence all information gained in the pro-
fessional relationship with a client, including information which
the client has requested to be held inviolate or the disclosure of
which would be embarrassing or would likely be detrimental to the
client, unless the client gives informed consent, except for disclo-
sures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the repre-
sentation, or are required by these rules or other law, or by order
of the court.” Ga. R. Prof. Conduct 1.6(a).
Here, the district court did not err in applying the Georgia
Rules of Professional Conduct, nor in denying Postell’s motion to
disqualify Whitest Plaintiffs’ attorneys. Although the attorneys
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 12 of 14
12 Opinion of the Court 22-11826
formerly represented Postell, the district court found that the inter-
ests of both parties were not “materially adverse.” See Ga R. Prof
Conduct 1.9(a). While Postell and Whitest Plaintiffs did disagree
as to what would be the most effective and appropriate remedy,
both parties agreed that Defendants were in violation of Section 2.
The district court found the disagreement pertaining to the appro-
priate remedy neither materially adverse to Postell’s underlying in-
terests nor compelling enough to override Whitest Plaintiffs’ coun-
sel of choice, which we have stated should only be done sparingly.
See In re Bellsouth Corp., 334 F.3d at 961.
Further, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Postell’s motion to sanction his former counsel because,
as the district court properly found, the attorneys did not violate
any ethical obligations owed to Postell. The information at issue
here was disclosed in a status report pursuant to a district court or-
der—conduct that explicitly falls under an exception carved out by
Rule 1.6 of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct. To the ex-
tent that Postell could argue that the attorneys divulged too much
information in this status report, the disclosure did not rise to a
level where sanctions would be appropriate, nor did it rise to a level
where we could confidently overrule the district court and find an
abuse of discretion in denying the motion. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial of sanctions.
c. Motion to Drop Whitest Plaintiffs
We review the district court’s decision on a motion to dis-
miss a party for an abuse of discretion. Fritz v. Am. Home Shield
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 13 of 14
22-11826 Opinion of the Court 13
Corp., 751 F.2d 1152, 1154 (11th Cir. 1985). We find that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in denying Postell’s motion to
drop Whitest Plaintiffs. The district court clearly explained that
dropping the parties was not appropriate here because all plaintiffs
shared the same claim. Keeping the suit together was found to pro-
mote judicial economy and prevented Postell, Whitest Plaintiffs,
and Defendants from litigating the matter in separate actions. We
therefore affirm the district court on this issue as well.
d. Motions for Recusal
This court reviews decisions concerning recusals for an
abuse of discretion. United States v. Curtin, 78 F.4th 1299, 1309 (11th
Cir. 2023). A party may move to disqualify a judge where that
judge has a personal bias or prejudice against said party or in favor
of any adverse party. 28 U.S.C. § 144. Meanwhile, § 455(a) states
that “[a]ny justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States
shall disqualify [themselves] in any proceeding in which [] impar-
tiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 U.S.C. § 455(a); see also
United States v. Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004). The
identified impartiality must also generally stem from extrajudicial
sources; any conduct stemming from the judicial context must
demonstrate pervasive bias. See Thomas v. Tenneco Packaging Co.,
293 F.3d 1306, 1329 (11th Cir. 2002).
Additionally, because ex parte communications are gener-
ally not tolerated while adjudicating the merits of a case, this court
may consider the presence of ex parte communications when as-
certaining a judge’s impartiality. Vining v. Runyon, 99 F.3d 1056,
USCA11 Case: 22-11826 Document: 59-1 Date Filed: 12/13/2023 Page: 14 of 14
14 Opinion of the Court 22-11826
1057 (11th Cir. 1996). In contrast, “a judge’s rulings in the same or
a related case may not serve as the basis for a recusal motion.”
McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990).
Here, we are unable to find that the district court abused its
discretion in denying Postell’s various motions for recusal given
that the district court clearly articulated how Postell failed to meet
the requirements of §§ 144 and 455, as detailed in its March 3, 2022,
order denying all three motions for recusal. As the district court
explained, Postell did not allege facts that demonstrated impartial-
ity that rose to a level of concern as required under statute, nor did
the facts demonstrate pervasive bias as required by circuit prece-
dent. Mere disagreement with the district court’s rulings and man-
agement of the case is insufficient to warrant recusal. See Tenneco
Packaging Co., 293 F.3d at 1329. Accordingly, we affirm the district
court here as well.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s
well-reasoned decisions as to all orders on appeal.
AFFIRMED.