United States v. Willie James Smith

USCA11 Case: 22-11830 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 12/14/2023 Page: 1 of 7
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-11830
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
WILLIE JAMES SMITH,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 7:17-cr-00011-HL-TQL-4
____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11830 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 12/14/2023 Page: 2 of 7
2 Opinion of the Court 22-11830
Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Willie Smith appeals his upward-variance sentence of 60
months’ imprisonment following his guilty plea for conspiracy to
steal mail and possess stolen mail. On appeal, Smith argues that
the district court committed procedural error in imposing his sen-
tence when it failed to provide adequate justification for the up-
ward variance and took into account facts already considered in
calculating his guideline range. Smith also argues that his sentence
is substantively unreasonable because the district court placed im-
proper emphasis on his criminal history in formulating its sentence.
After careful consideration of the parties’ arguments, we affirm.
We review de novo whether the district court stated a spe-
cific reason for imposing a sentence outside the guideline range, as
required by § 3553(c)(2). United States v. Parks, 823 F.3d 990, 996
(11th Cir. 2016). We review the reasonableness of a sentence for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Green, 981 F.3d 945, 953 (11th
Cir. 2020). We first determine whether the district court commit-
ted a “significant procedural error,” and second whether the sen-
tence was “substantively reasonable under the totality of the cir-
cumstances.” United States v. Overstreet, 713 F.3d 627, 636 (11th Cir.
2013) (citation omitted). The party challenging a sentence bears
the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of
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22-11830 Opinion of the Court 3
the record and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Wil-
liams, 526 F.3d 1312, 1322 (11th Cir. 2008).
A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to con-
sider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives sig-
nificant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits
a clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors. United
States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc). In re-
viewing whether the district court abused its discretion, we will not
reverse a sentence solely because we could reasonably conclude
that a different sentence was more appropriate. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Rather, we will vacate a sentence “if,
but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that
the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing
the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the
range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of the case.”
Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190 (quotation marks omitted).
The Supreme Court has explained that a district court com-
mits procedural error if it improperly calculates the guideline
range, treats the guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the ap-
propriate statutory factors, bases the sentence on clearly erroneous
facts, or fails to adequately explain its reasoning. Gall, 552 U.S. at
51. The relevant § 3553(a) factors include the nature and circum-
stances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the de-
fendant; the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punish-
ment for the offense; to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-11830
conduct; to protect the public from the defendant’s further crimes;
the kinds of sentences available and the sentencing range; and the
need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among defend-
ants with similar records convicted of similar conduct. 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(6); see Gall, 552
U.S. at 50 n.6. The district court must “state in open court the rea-
sons for its imposition of the particular sentence” that it selects, and
if that sentence is outside the guideline range, it must articulate the
specific reasons for the imposition of an upward variance sentence,
which must also be stated in a Statement of Reasons form. 18
U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).
While a district court must consider the § 3553(a) factors in
determining a sentence, it is not required to state on the record that
it has explicitly considered each of the factors or to discuss each of
the factors. United States v. Ortiz-Delgado, 451 F.3d 752, 758 (11th
Cir. 2006). An acknowledgment by the district court that it has
considered the § 3553(a) factors is sufficient. United States v. Turner,
474 F.3d 1265, 1281 (11th Cir. 2007). The sentencing judge is under
no duty to explain the sentence in “great detail or in any detail for
that matter.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1195. The adequacy of any further
explanation varies from case to case, and “[t]he appropriateness of
brevity or length, conciseness or detail, . . . depends upon circum-
stances.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007). Ultimately,
the district court must explain the chosen sentence with enough
detail to satisfy the appellate court that it has considered the argu-
ments of the parties and has a reasoned basis for its decision. Id.USCA11 Case: 22-11830 Document: 49-1 Date Filed: 12/14/2023 Page: 5 of 7
22-11830 Opinion of the Court 5
In imposing a variance, the sentencing court can contem-
plate conduct already considered when calculating the advisory
guideline range. United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610, 619 (11th
Cir. 2015). The court may impose a variance if it concludes that
the guideline range understated a defendant’s criminal history.
United States v. Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d 1282, 1288 (11th Cir. 2016).
District courts have “broad leeway in deciding how much weight
to give to prior crimes the defendant has committed.” United States
v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1261 (11th Cir. 2015). A major var-
iance, however, should be supported by a more significant justifi-
cation than a minor variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 50.
Here, the district court committed no procedural error. Its
explanation contained a sufficient analysis of the relevant § 3553(a)
factors and was explained in open court pursuant to § 3553(c)(2).
At Smith’s sentencing hearing, the district court stated that it had
“considered the advisory sentencing range and the sentencing fac-
tors found at” § 3553(a) and “made an individualized assessment
based on the facts presented,” which indicates a reasoned consider-
ation of these factors. See Turner, 474 F.3d at 1281. The district
court also discussed Smith’s criminal history—which is lengthy and
includes homicide, assault, and numerous financial crimes—before
stating that it was going to vary upward “based on the criminal rec-
ord of the offense and the criminal record of the defendant.” The
district court stated that Smith’s own description of his criminal
record as “bad” was “a charitable characterization,” and that it be-
lieved the sentencing guidelines “fail[ed] to consider” Smith’s “very
long record.”
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6 Opinion of the Court 22-11830
This explanation was sufficiently detailed to meet proce-
dural requirements because the district court was under no duty to
explain the sentence in “great detail or in any detail for that mat-
ter.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1195. Rather, the district court was required
only to provide a justification for its chosen sentence indicating to
this Court that it had considered the arguments of the parties and
had a reasoned basis for its decision. The district court was not
required to state on the record that it explicitly considered each of
the § 3553(a) factors or to discuss each of the factors. See Ortiz-
Delgado, 451 F.3d at 758. We hold that the district court committed
no procedural error. See Rita, 551 U.S. at 356.
Additionally, Smith’s sentence was substantively reasonable
because it was based on a reasoned weighing of the relevant
§ 3553(a) factors by the district court. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing an upward variance of 23 months
from the top end of the guideline range because the § 3553(a) fac-
tors adequately justified its decision. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. The
district court found that Smith’s guidelines calculation was “inac-
curate” based on Smith’s criminal history, such that it was permit-
ted to impose an upward variance. See Osorio-Moreno, 814 F.3d at
1288. The explanation offered on the record indicates that the dis-
trict court focused on several of the § 3553(a) factors implicated by
Smith’s extensive criminal conduct, such as promoting respect for
the law, providing just punishment for the offense, affording ade-
quate deterrence to criminal conduct, and protecting the public
from Smith’s further crimes. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A),
(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C).
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22-11830 Opinion of the Court 7
The district court exercised its “broad leeway” to give
greater weight to Smith’s criminal history which includes convic-
tions for homicide, burglary, aggravated assault, escape, theft, and
other financial offenses. See Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d at 1261. The
23-month upward variance was proportionate to the nature and
circumstances of the offense conduct at issue which involved a loss
amount of more than $40,000 and less than $95,000, and possession
of more than 50 pieces of stolen mail, including at least one fraud-
ulently altered check. Furthermore, the district court considered
that Smith had a pattern of significant recidivism, a criminal history
category of VI, and previous convictions for other financial crimes.
See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Thus, the district court’s sentence was ad-
equately supported by the § 3553(a) factors and was not so extreme
as to fall “outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the
facts of the case.” Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
We hold that the district court committed no procedural er-
ror because its explanation contained a sufficient analysis of the rel-
evant § 3553(a) factors and was explained in open court pursuant
to § 3553(c)(2), as well as accompanied by the required Statement
of Reasons form. We also hold that Smith’s sentence was substan-
tively reasonable because the district court was permitted to weigh
his criminal history more heavily than other § 3553(a) factors in im-
posing an upward-variance sentence.
AFFIRMED.