Darryl Stinski v. Warden GDCP

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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-12898
____________________
DARRYL SCOTT STINSKI,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
WARDEN, GEORGIA DIAGNOSTIC AND CLASSIFICATION
PRISON
Respondent-Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cv-00066-RSB
____________________
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2 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Petitioner Darryl Stinski was sentenced to death in Georgia
state court for the murders of Susan and Kimberly Pittman. He ap-
peals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted Stinski a certificate
of appealability (“COA”) on one issue.
After a thorough review of the record and with the benefit
of oral argument, we affirm the district court’s denial of Stinski’s
habeas petition.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts of Conviction
The Supreme Court of Georgia set forth the facts of the case
as follows:
The evidence at trial showed that Darryl
Stinski and Dorian O’Kelley engaged in a crime spree
that spanned April 10–12, 2002. On the night of April
10, two police officers observed two men dressed in
black clothing in a convenience store. Later, the offic-
ers responded to two separate calls regarding the
sounding of a burglar alarm at a nearby home and the
officers returned to the store after responding to each
call. Then, at approximately 5:00 a.m. on April 11, the
officers noticed while leaving the store that “the sky
was lit up.” The officers discovered the victims’ house
fully engulfed in flames. As one of the officers moved
the patrol vehicle to block traffic in preparation for
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22-12898 Opinion of the Court 3
the arrival of emergency vehicles, his headlights illu-
minated a wooded area where he observed the same
two men that he and his partner had observed earlier
in the convenience store. O’Kelley, as the neighbor
living across the street from the burned house, gave
an interview to a local television station. The officer
saw the interview on television and identified O’Kel-
ley as being one of the men he had seen in the con-
venience store and near the fire. The officer later
identified both Stinski and O’Kelley in court.
Stinski and O’Kelley left items they had stolen
with friends who lived nearby. The friends handed
those items over to the police. Testimony showed
that, before their arrest, O’Kelley had bragged about
raping a girl and keeping one of her teeth as a me-
mento and Stinski had laughed when he saw O’Kelley
being interviewed on the news in front of the victims’
house.
Stinski gave two videotaped interviews with
investigators after his arrest, the second of which was
suppressed on his motion. In the interview the jury
heard, Stinski confessed to participating in the crime
spree described below, which began with burglarizing
a home and leaving when a motion detector in this
first home set off an alarm. After their botched bur-
glary of the first home, Stinski and O’Kelley turned
off the electricity to the home of Susan Pittman and
her 13–year–old daughter, Kimberly Pittman, and en-
tered as both victims slept. O’Kelley took a walking
cane and began beating Susan Pittman, while Stinski
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4 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
held a large flashlight. Stinski beat Susan Pittman
with the flashlight and then left the room to subdue
Kimberly Pittman, who had awakened to her
mother’s screams. O’Kelley then beat Susan Pittman
with a lamp and kicked her. At some point, Susan
Pittman was also stabbed three to four times in the
chest and abdomen. Stinski took Kimberly Pittman
upstairs so she would not continue to hear her
mother’s screams. Susan Pittman eventually died
from her attack. Stinski and O’Kelley then brought
Kimberly Pittman back downstairs, drank beverages,
and discussed “tak[ing] care of ” her. Stinski took
Kimberly Pittman back upstairs and bound and
gagged her. As Stinski rummaged through the house
downstairs, O’Kelley raped Kimberly Pittman.
Stinski and O’Kelley then agreed that Stinski would
begin beating Kimberly Pittman with a baseball bat
when O’Kelley said a particular word. On cue, Stinski
hit Kimberly Pittman in the head with the bat as she
knelt on the floor, bloody from the rape and with her
hands bound. O’Kelley then slit Kimberly Pittman’s
throat with a knife but she remained alive. Stinski
went downstairs and came back upstairs when O’Kel-
ley called him. Stinski then hit Kimberly Pittman in
her knee with the bat as O’Kelley tried to suffocate
her. O’Kelley then took another knife and stabbed
her in the torso and legs. O’Kelley kicked her and
threw objects at her head, but her groans indicated
that she was still alive. Stinski and O’Kelley then set
fires throughout the house and went to O’Kelley’s
house across the street to watch the fire. Kimberly
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22-12898 Opinion of the Court 5
Pittman died of smoke inhalation before the fire fully
consumed the house. Later, in the early morning
hours of April 12, Stinski and O’Kelley broke into nu-
merous vehicles in the neighborhood.
Stinski v. State, 286 Ga. 839, 840–41 (2010).
B. Procedural History
1. Pre-Trial Preparation
In June 2002, Stinski was indicted by a grand jury on two
counts of malice murder and related charges, and the prosecutors
sought the death penalty. 1 Id. at n.1. Three attorneys were ap-
pointed to represent Stinski. Stinski v. Warden, No. 2011-V-942, at 6
(Super. Ct. Butts Cnty. Ga. Jan. 15, 2017). Trial counsel’s mitigation
strategy involved showing that Stinski “[got] caught up” in the
crime due to his immaturity, troubled background, and O’Kelley’s
influence. State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 171:6–17, ECF No. 13-15.
Counsel retained two experts for the mitigation phase of
trial: Dale Davis, a social worker and mitigation specialist, and Dr.
Jane Weilenman, a clinical psychologist. Id. at 147:16–148:24,
159:22–161:5.
To prepare for her testimony, Davis met with Stinski “many
times,” interviewed forty people, and prepared an “extensive” so-
cial history on Stinski, billing over 400 hours to the case. Stinski,
1 O’Kelley was tried separately and convicted on two counts of malice murder
and related charges. O’Kelley v. State, 284 Ga. 758, 758 n.* (2008). He also
received a death sentence for the murders. Id.USCA11 Case: 22-12898 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/20/2023 Page: 6 of 26
6 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
No. 2011-V-942, at 31–35; State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 262, 73150–51,
ECF No. 24-8 (“Persons Interviewed” Mem.); State Habeas Hr’g Tr.
vol. 319, 90071–84, ECF No. 26-17 (Davis’s billing records).
Dr. Weilenman conducted a psychological evaluation of
Stinski to determine his mental-health status and social history.
State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 321, 90813, ECF No. 26-19 (Weilenman
Psychological Evaluation). To prepare her report and testimony,
Dr. Weilenman met with Stinski at least four times, corresponded
with him in writing, reviewed background documents, and con-
ducted interviews of mitigation witnesses. Id.; State Habeas Hr’g
Tr. vol. 254, 70690–97, ECF No. 23-21 (written correspondence);
Hr’g Tr. vol 1, 197:22–198:1, ECF No. 13-15. Dr. Weilenman did
not conduct any psychological testing, and counsel testified that
she never recommended testing by additional experts, either.
Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 38; Hr’g Tr. vol 1, 100:23–101:5, ECF No.
13-15; State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 2, 299:1–13, ECF No. 13-16.
According to Stinski, though, several times before trial (in-
cluding in a December 2004 email, a January 2005 defense-team
meeting, and another meeting sometime in 2007 just before trial),
Davis raised the issue of retaining additional experts besides herself
and Dr. Weilenman. State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 146, 38346–47,
ECF No. 19-9 (emails between Davis and counsel); State Habeas
Hr’g Tr. vol. 5, 835:7–36:22, ECF No. 13-19; Hr’g Tr. vol. 1, 158:12–
59:21, ECF No. 13-15.
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2. Trial
Trial began in May 2007. On June 8, 2007, at the conclusion
of the guilt-innocence phase of trial, the jury found Stinski guilty
on all counts, including two lesser-included counts of felony mur-
der. Verdict Form, 34–37, ECF No. 7-11.
During the sentencing phase, trial counsel presented exten-
sive mitigation evidence, calling twenty-six witnesses to testify, in-
cluding Davis and Dr. Weilenman. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 42–
68. Many witnesses testified about Stinski’s childhood and back-
ground, including his frequent moves, his parents’ divorce, his ex-
periences of abuse and neglect, and his family’s history of alcohol-
ism and mental-health issues. Id. Several of his former classmates
and a teacher testified to Stinski’s nature as a “follower” and his at-
tempts to fit in with others. Id. at 49–50, 56. And several also tes-
tified about O’Kelley and his potential influence on Stinski. Id. at
43.
Besides these witnesses, trial counsel called the two retained
experts, Davis and Dr. Weilenman, to testify during the sentencing
phase. Through Davis, the mitigation specialist, “several volumes
of records” and a social history on Stinski were introduced into the
record. Id. at 45; Trial Tr. vol. 11, 2350–455, ECF No. 10-9.
Dr. Weilenman’s testimony built upon the records and his-
tory introduced by Davis and the other mitigation witnesses, ex-
plaining how Stinski’s entire background, not just the immediately
preceding events, led to the crime. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 61;
Trial Tr. vol. 13, 2766–845, ECF No. 10-11. Dr. Weilenman testified
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8 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
extensively about the general themes of instability, neglect, aban-
donment, and abuse in Stinski’s childhood. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942,
at 61; Trial Tr. vol. 13, 2771–827, ECF No. 10-11. Throughout her
testimony, Dr. Weilenman also noted Stinski’s various mental-
health diagnoses, including attention-deficit/hyperactivity disor-
der, “adjustment disorder with depressed features,” a potential
learning disability, and post-traumatic stress disorder. Trial Tr. vol.
13, 2817:3–20, ECF No. 10-11. In explaining Stinski’s diagnoses and
general immaturity, Dr. Weilenman discussed the development of
the frontal lobes and Stinski’s executive functioning, suggesting
that his impulse control and follower tendencies may have im-
proved with time, post-crimes. Id. at 2817:20–18:17, 2819:12–20:12,
2822:2–85:22.
At the end of the sentencing phase, on June 12, 2007, the
jury found that nine aggravating factors warranted the death sen-
tence for Stinski for the murders of the Pittmans:
[1] The offense of murder [of Susan Pittman] was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of a burglary. . . .
[2] The offense of murder [of Susan Pittman] was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
in that it involved depravity of mind of the defend-
ant[,] or
[3] The offense of murder [of Susan Pittman] was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim
before death. . . .
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22-12898 Opinion of the Court 9
[4] The offense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of another capital felony (the murder of
Susan Pittman)[.]
[5] The offense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of a burglary.
[6] The offense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
committed while the defendant was engaged in the
commission of arson in the first degree.
[7] The offense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
in that it involved torture to the victim before death[,]
or
[8] The offense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
in that it involved depravity of mind of the defend-
ant[,] or
[9] The offense of murder [of Kimberly Pittman] was
outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman
in that it involved an aggravated battery to the victim
before death.
Verdict Sentencing Form, 210–13, ECF No. 8-11. The trial court
denied Stinski’s motion for a new trial, Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at
2, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Stinski’s convictions
and death sentence, Stinski, 286 Ga. at 840, cert. denied, Stinski v.
Georgia, 562 U.S. 1011 (2010).
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3. State Court Habeas Proceedings
Stinski filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Su-
perior Court of Butts County on September 26, 2011, State Pet.
Writ Habeas, ECF No. 11-19, and amended his petition on March
21, 2013, State First Am. Pet. Writ Habeas, ECF No. 12-24. Stinski
argued, among other claims, that his trial counsel rendered ineffec-
tive assistance during the sentencing phase of trial. Id. at 9–24.
The state habeas court held an evidentiary hearing at which
twenty witnesses were called, Stinski v. Ford, No. 4:18-CV-66, 2021
WL 5921386, at *6 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 15, 2021); Stinski, No. 2011-V-942,
at 2, including three additional experts: Dr. Joette James, a clinical
neuropsychologist, State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1150–263, ECF No.
13-20; Dr. Peter Ash, a forensic psychiatrist, State Habeas Hr’g Tr.
vol. 3, 417–579, ECF No. 13-17; and Dr. James Garbarino, a devel-
opmental psychologist, State Habeas Hr’g Tr. vol. 7, 1322–445, ECF
No. 13-21. As a part of his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim,
Stinski argued that his trial counsel unreasonably neglected to pro-
cure and present expert mental-health mitigation evidence from
the three doctors. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 81.
The additional proposed expert testimony focused on defi-
ciencies or abnormalities in Stinski’s brain functioning, caused by
the psychological maltreatment he experienced in childhood, that
could have made him particularly vulnerable to outside influence
in a high-stress situation. The testimony thus implicated Stinski’s
culpability on the night of the crime. Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1220:10–21:8,
ECF No. 13-20; Hr’g Tr. vol. 3, 477:2–20, ECF No. 13-17; Hr’g Tr.
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vol. 7, 1411:6–16, ECF No. 13-21. Two experts, Dr. James and Dr.
Ash, conducted cognitive-function testing. Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1159–
61, ECF No. 13-20; Hr’g Tr. vol. 3, 463–67, 473, ECF No. 13-17. All
three experts reviewed Dr. Weilenman’s social history as a part of
their analysis. Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1258:17–20, ECF No. 13-20; Hr’g Tr.
vol. 3, 437:7–12, ECF No. 13-17; Hr’g Tr. vol. 7, 1411:19–20, ECF
No. 13-21.
The Georgia State Superior Court denied Stinski’s habeas
petition. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 1. In relevant part, the state
habeas court addressed both prongs of the Strickland test regarding
Stinski’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel-at-the-sentencing-stage
claim. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (defin-
ing the two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel as requir-
ing the defendant to show that (1) counsel’s performance was defi-
cient and (2) that deficient performance prejudiced the defense).
As to deficient performance, the court found that trial coun-
sel was “reasonable in retaining Dr. Weilenman and relying upon
her findings, which did not include any recommendation of further
testing” or additional experts. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 38.
“Where, as here, trial counsel presented substantial mitigation, but
did not employ the additional means of mitigation as urged by Pe-
titioner,” counsel was not ineffective for not pursing that line of
investigation, the court concluded. Id.As to the prejudice prong, the state habeas court found that
Stinski’s trial attorneys “effectively presented much of the same
factual evidence urged by Petitioner” and his chosen experts related
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12 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
to his life circumstances, immaturity, susceptibility to O’Kelley’s in-
fluence, and developmental issues. Id. at 5, 80–83 (“The fact that
Petitioner’s new expert witnesses may provide additional details re-
garding similar conclusions does not equate to a showing of preju-
dice.”). Because the subject matter raised by Stinski’s habeas wit-
nesses was “largely cumulative” of the testimony actually and ef-
fectively presented at trial, the court found, Stinski had not ade-
quately demonstrated prejudice. Id. at 5, 42, 80. And “[c]onsider-
ing the overwhelming evidence in aggravation,” the court con-
cluded that “new evidence of Petitioner’s subtle neurological im-
pairments” would not, “in reasonable probability,” have altered the
outcome of the sentencing phase.” Id. at 80. Accordingly, the court
denied Stinski’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Id. at 5.
On February 5, 2018, the Georgia Supreme Court denied
Stinski’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the
denial of his habeas petition. Stinski v. Warden, No. S17E1093 (Sup.
Ct. Ga. Feb. 5, 2018).
4. Federal Court Habeas Proceedings
Stinski timely filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia. As relevant for this appeal, Stinski
argued his trial counsel “unreasonably neglected to present availa-
ble expert mental health mitigation evidence, including testimo-
nies from experts such as Dr. James, Dr. Ash, and Dr. Garbarino.”
Stinski, 2021 WL 5921386, at *7.
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The district court denied Stinski’s claims. Id. at *1. It con-
cluded that Stinski failed to show that the state-court decision deny-
ing his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was based on an un-
reasonable determination of the facts under § 2254(d)(2). The dis-
trict court also found that the state habeas court reasonably deter-
mined that Stinski had failed to satisfy both Strickland prongs, id. at
*10–16. As to the ineffectiveness prong, the district court con-
cluded that “the state court reasonably determined that trial coun-
sel’s decision not to retain additional experts was supported by ‘rea-
sonable professional judgments.’” Id. at *13 (quoting Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690–91). The district court found that the record “at
best” revealed contradictory evidence about whether Dr. Weilen-
man discussed the need to retain additional experts, and Dr.
Weilenman never recommended additional testing. So the district
court thought the record lacked enough evidence to overcome the
presumption of correctness afforded to a factual determination
made by the state court. Id. (stating that overcoming such a pre-
sumption requires “clear and convincing evidence”).
As to the prejudice prong, the district court reiterated the
state court’s findings that Stinski’s new proposed evidence was
largely cumulative or duplicative of that presented at trial because
it covered the same social history and themes of abuse, instability,
abandonment, trauma, and neglect provided by Dr. Weilenman in
the sentencing phase. Id. The district court also echoed the state
court’s finding that the evidence against Stinski was “highly aggra-
vating,” and that “it is hard to imagine that any amount of mitigat-
ing evidence could have outweighed it.” Id. at *15–16.
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On January 14, 2022, Stinski moved under Rule 59(e), FED.
R. CIV. P., to alter or amend the judgment. Among other issues,
Stinski argued that he was entitled to a certificate of appealability
regarding his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim because, at the
time the district-court opinion was issued, a circuit split existed on
the correct application of Sections 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), and the
Eleventh Circuit had no binding precedent on the issue.
The district court granted a COA on just one issue:
“whether the Court properly applied Sections 2254(d)(2) and
2254(e)(1) of the AEDPA in the Habeas Order when evaluating Pe-
titioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim.” Order, 35, ECF
No. 75. In other words, the district court explained, it granted
Stinski a COA on the issue of whether it was proper for the district
court “to apply Section 2254(d)(2)’s deference to the state habeas
court’s decision but apply Section 2254(e)(1)’s deference to the state
habeas court’s individual findings of fact.” Id. at 31 (emphasis in orig-
inal). Invoking the certificate of appeal that the district court
granted, Stinski filed notice of this appeal on August 30, 2022.
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22-12898 Opinion of the Court 15
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
This Court reviews “de novo a district court’s denial of ha-
beas relief on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, which pre-
sents a mixed question of law and fact.” Pye v. Warden, 50 F.4th
1025, 1034 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc). But AEDPA governs our re-
view of federal habeas petitions. AEDPA prescribes a highly defer-
ential framework for evaluating issues previously decided in state
court. Id. Under AEDPA, a federal court may not grant habeas
relief on claims that were “adjudicated on the merits in [s]tate
court” unless the state court’s decision (1) “was contrary to, or in-
volved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or
(2) “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Regarding § 2254(d)(2), we must defer to a state court’s de-
termination of the facts unless the state-court decision “was based
on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evi-
dence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” Id. § 2254(d)(2).
Section 2254(d)(2) requires us to give state courts “substantial def-
erence.” Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314 (2015). “We may not
characterize . . . state-court factual determinations as unreasonable
‘merely because [we] would have reached a different conclusion in
the first instance.’” Id. at 313–14 (quoting Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S.
290, 301 (2010)). “If ‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record
might disagree about’ the state court factfinding in question, ‘on
habeas review that does not suffice to supersede’ the state court’s
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16 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
factual determination.” Daniel v. Comm’r, 822 F.3d 1248, 1259 (11th
Cir. 2016) (quoting Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2006)). Re-
garding § 2254(e)(1), we presume that the state court’s factual de-
terminations are correct, absent clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. Pye, 50 F.4th at 1035.
On each claimed basis for relief, we review “the last state-
court adjudication on the merits.” See Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34,
40 (2011). In this case, where the Georgia Supreme Court’s final
decision “doesn’t come with reasons,” we must “‘look through’ the
unexplained decision to the last related state-court decision that
does provide a relevant rationale and presume that the unexplained
decision adopted the same reasoning.” Pye, 50 F.4th at 1034 (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct.
1188, 1192 (2018)).
In sum, AEDPA sets “a difficult to meet and highly deferen-
tial standard for evaluating state-court rulings, which demands that
state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Cullen v.
Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
As we’ve noted, the district court certified the following
question on appeal: “whether the Court properly applied Sections
2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) of the AEDPA [in the Habeas Order]
when evaluating Petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.” Order, 12, 31, 35, ECF No. 75. That is, “whether it was
proper for the [c]ourt to apply Section 2254(d)(2)’s deference to the
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22-12898 Opinion of the Court 17
state habeas court’s decision but apply Section 2254(e)(1)’s defer-
ence to the state habeas court’s individual findings of fact.” Id. at 31(emphasis in original). Our review is limited to this issue. Murray
v. United States, 145 F.3d 1249, 1251 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[I]n an appeal
brought by an unsuccessful habeas petitioner, appellate review is
limited to the issues specified in the COA.”).
After careful review of the record and with the benefit of
oral argument, we conclude that the district court properly applied
§§ 2254(d)(2) and 2254(e)(1) when evaluating the state habeas
court’s decision and factual determinations. Under § 2254(d)(2), a
federal court may not grant habeas relief on claims that were “ad-
judicated on the merits in [s]tate court” unless the state court’s de-
cision was, among other potential exceptions, “based on an unrea-
sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
sented in the [s]tate court proceeding.” Section 2254(e)(1) further
mandates that a state court’s findings of fact “shall be presumed to
be correct,” unless rebutted “by clear and convincing evidence.”
While the Supreme Court has not yet defined the precise relation-
ship between these two provisions, Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18
(2013), since the district court granted its COA, our binding prece-
dent has definitively answered the question certified for appeal in
this case.
In Pye v. Warden, we held, in an en banc opinion, that (1) a
petitioner must meet § 2254(e)(1)’s “clear and convincing evi-
dence” burden to overcome the presumption of correctness ap-
plied to state-court factual determinations, and (2) even if a
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18 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
petitioner successfully meets that burden, he has not necessarily
met his burden under § 2254(d)(2). 50 F.4th at 1035. That is, “that
decision might still be reasonable even if some of the state court’s
individual factual findings were erroneous—so long as the decision,
taken as a whole, doesn’t constitute an unreasonable determination
of the facts and isn’t based on any such determination.” Id. (quo-
tation marks omitted). Pye makes clear that Sections 2254(e)(1) and
2254(d)(2) are independent hurdles to relief. Id. (citing Miller-El v.
Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 341 (2003) (noting that subsections (e)(1) and
(d)(2) are “independent requirements”)).
Pye also analyzed the reasonableness of the state court’s de-
terminations there “with respect to each alleged deficiency, and
with respect to the deficiencies cumulatively.” Id. at 1042. For each
alleged deficiency, the court first resolved challenges to the state
habeas court’s factual determinations, finding that even where the
state court’s assessment “might have been debatable,” its factual
findings were not “clearly and convincingly erroneous.” Id. at 1043(cleaned up). Then the court determined that each individual defi-
ciency was reasonably found nonprejudicial by the state habeas
court. Id. at 1043–1055 (finding the weight that the state court gave
to each factor in its prejudice analysis was not unreasonable in light
of the factual record); id. at 1049 (“None of [the state habeas
court’s] choices individually resulted in a decision that . . . was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts.”).
Finally, the court looked at the deficiencies cumulatively and
the reasonableness of the state habeas court’s ultimate conclusion:
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22-12898 Opinion of the Court 19
“Even if the state court’s prejudice determination as to each
ground of allegedly deficient performance was reasonable, we
must still decide whether its conclusion as to the cumulative preju-
dice constituted an unreasonable application of Strickland.” Id. at
1055. Ultimately, the Pye court concluded that, “[g]iven the reason-
ableness of the state court’s weighing of the evidence and the lack
of contrary precedent, AEDPA requires us to defer to that court’s
cumulative-prejudice conclusion because it wasn’t . . . based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts.” Id. at 1056 (citing
§ 2254(d)).
Although the district court decided Stinski’s habeas claim
before we issued Pye, the district court was spot on in its analysis.
Indeed, the district court articulated the same standard and fol-
lowed the same application as we did in Pye.
In particular, the district court stated that § 2254(e)(1)’s bur-
den applied to state-court findings of fact, Stinski, 2021 WL
5921386, at *8 (“The Court ‘presume[s] findings of fact made by
state courts are correct, unless a petitioner rebuts that presumption
by clear and convincing evidence.’”), and that § 2254(d)(2) set the
standard for reviewing state-court decisions, id. (“Regarding Sec-
tion 2254(d)(2), the Court must ‘evaluat[e] whether a state court’s
decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts
in light of the evidence presented in the [s]tate court proceeding.’”
(quotation marks omitted)). The district court then applied
§ 2254(e)(1)’s presumption of correctness to state-court factual
findings, asking whether Stinski had carried his burden to rebut
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20 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
that presumption. See id. at *13 (finding that Stinski did not over-
come the “presumption of correctness” afforded to the state
court’s determination that Dr. Weilenman did not recommend fur-
ther testing and additional experts). Then, under § 2254(d)(2), the
district court asked whether the state court’s overall determination
was reasonable, given the evidence presented. See id. (holding that
the state court “reasonably determined that trial counsel’s decision
not to retain additional experts was supported by ‘reasonable pro-
fessional judgments[,]’” and that “the state habeas court reasonably
determined that Petitioner failed to establish prejudice for [any al-
leged] deficiency”). The district court followed this analysis for
both the deficient-performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland.
See id. at *9–15. Therefore, the district court properly articulated
the rules and applied them in Stinski’s case.
Stinski’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Stinski
first asserts that, in violation of Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 341, the district
court impermissibly combined the two standards under § 2254,
claiming that the district court required that the petitioner prove
by clear and convincing evidence that the state-court decision, as
opposed to an individual finding of fact, was objectively unreasona-
ble. Miller-El stands for the proposition that “AEDPA does not re-
quire petitioner to prove that a decision is objectively unreasonable
by clear and convincing evidence.” 537 U.S. at 341.
But the district court did no such thing. It did not apply a
clear-and-convincing-evidence burden to § 2254(d)(2)’s unreasona-
ble-decision review. As the district court stated in its order granting
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22-12898 Opinion of the Court 21
the COA and demonstrated in the underlying order itself, the dis-
trict court applied § 2254(e)(1) to state-court factual findings and
§ 2254(d)(2) to state-court decisions—as Miller-El requires. Stinski,
2021 WL 5921386, at *8.
And to the extent that Stinski argues that the district court
treated §§ 2254(e)(1) and 2254(d)(2) as compounding barriers to re-
lief—such that an erroneous factual finding under § 2254(e)(1) was
necessary to find an unreasonable determination of fact under
§ 2254(d)(2)—the district court did not do this, either. It merely
asked, where the petitioner attempted to rebut a state-court factual
finding, whether he had done so with clear and convincing evi-
dence. See Stinski, 2021 WL 5921386, at *13. Then, it looked at the
evidence presented before the state court and asked if its ultimate
determination was reasonable. See id. So the district court relied
on the state court’s undisturbed factual findings to hold that the
state court’s ultimate conclusion was not based on an unreasonable
determination of fact. That is not the same thing as using
§ 2254(e)(1) as a prerequisite to applying § 2254(d)(2).
Nor does Stinski offer specific examples of where he believes
the district court improperly “merged” the standards or treated
§ 2254(e)(1) as a prerequisite in its application of the rule. Instead,
Stinski advocates for an entirely new rule.
Stinski argues that § 2254(e)(1)’s burden applies to only new
evidence presented to the district court, not evidence that was also
presented to the state court. In so arguing, he implies that we
should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s (former) approach to § 2254: first,
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22 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
resolve “intrinsic” challenges to the state court’s decision under
§ 2254(d)(2)’s “unreasonable determination” standard; then, if the
state court’s fact-finding process survives, or if no intrinsic chal-
lenge is raised, look to any new or “extrinsic” evidence presented
for the first time in federal court and see if it survives § 2254(e)(1)’s
clear-and-convincing-evidence standard. Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d
992, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2004), overruled by Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 185;
Hayes v. Sec’y, 10 F.4th 1203, 1223 (11th Cir. 2021) (Newsom, J., con-
curring) (stating that the Ninth Circuit alone has held that
“§ 2254(e)(1)’s presumption applies only when a habeas petitioner
presents new evidence in federal court”). Stinski contends that be-
cause he presented no “new” evidence to the district court,
§ 2254(e)(1)’s clear-and-convincing-evidence burden should not
have been applied to his challenge.
But we rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Pye, where
we articulated and applied a contrary standard. 50 F.4th at 1052–
53 (applying § 2254(e)(1)’s “clear and convincing” evidence stand-
ard where the petitioner presented no new evidence to rebut a state
habeas court finding). We also noted previous cases in our Circuit
that declined to follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Taylor. Id.
at 1040 n.9 (citing Landers v. Warden, 776 F.3d 1288, 1298 (11th Cir.
2015)); see also Prevatte v. French, 547 F.3d 1300, 1304 n.1 (11th Cir.
2008) (noting that “the plain language of § 2254 does not provide
the basis” for petitioner’s argument that § 2254(d)(2) is applicable
and § 2254(e)(1) is inapplicable where no new evidence is presented
to the federal court).
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22-12898 Opinion of the Court 23
Besides that, even the Ninth Circuit no longer follows the
approach Stinski argues for. The Supreme Court’s decision in Cul-
len v. Pinholster “eliminated the relevance of ‘extrinsic’ challenges
when we are reviewing state-court decisions under
AEDPA, . . . because it held that petitioners may introduce new ev-
idence in federal court only for claims that we review de
novo. . . . Thus Taylor’s suggestion that an ‘extrinsic’ challenge may
occur ‘once the state court’s fact-findings survive any intrinsic chal-
lenge’ under § 2254(d)(2) is no longer applicable.” Murray v. Schriro,
745 F.3d 984, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Pinholster, 563 U.S. at
185).
The upshot of this is that Stinski’s proposed application of
§ 2254(e)(1) does not comport with the law of this Circuit and is no
longer even enthusiastically endorsed by the Ninth. See also id. at
1001 (“[O]ur panel decisions appear to be in a state of confusion as
to whether § 2254(d)(2) or (e)(1), or both, applies to AEDPA review
of state-court factual findings. . . . We believe any tension between
Taylor and our cases or between Taylor and limited statements by
the Supreme Court will have to be resolved by our court en banc,
or by the Supreme Court.”).2
Finally, to the extent that Stinski’s remaining arguments can
be construed as a challenge under § 2254(d)(2), asserting that the
2 To the extent that Stinski asks for clarity on the order in which a reviewing
court must approach challenges to state-court decisions versus individual find-
ings of fact, we decline to reach this issue, as it is not necessary to adopt a rigid
approach to our system of review in order to resolve the issue on appeal.
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24 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
state court’s decision was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented, these arguments are
also unavailing.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the
right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
As we’ve noted, to succeed on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim, a movant must show that (1) his attorney’s performance was
deficient, and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense.
Id. at 687. A court need not address both prongs if a defendant has
made an insufficient showing of one. Id. at 697. But when both
Strickland and AEDPA apply, “the question is not whether counsel’s
actions were reasonable” or there was prejudice; “[t]he question is
whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied
Strickland’s deferential standard” or that the errors were not preju-
dicial. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011) (emphasis
added).
In this case, trial counsel presented substantial mitigation ev-
idence, and the new habeas evidence was “largely cumulative” of
that presented at trial. Stinski, No. 2011-V-942, at 37–39, 80–83.
Trial counsel presented testimony from twenty-six witnesses dur-
ing the sentencing phase at trial, including two experts. Id. at 80.
These witnesses gave an “extensive and detailed” account of
Stinski’s background, including the abuse and neglect he was sub-
jected to as a child, giving the jury an explanation for Stinski’s par-
ticipation in the crime. Id.USCA11 Case: 22-12898 Document: 41-1 Date Filed: 12/20/2023 Page: 25 of 26
22-12898 Opinion of the Court 25
As for the new expert testimony Stinski proffered in the state
habeas proceeding, it merely “provide[d] additional details regard-
ing similar conclusions” as the experts presented at trial. Id. at 82;
Holsey v. Warden, 694 F.3d 1230, 1260–61 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating
that postconviction proceeding evidence is largely cumulative of
that presented at trial “when it tells a more detailed version of the
same story told at trial or provides more or better examples or am-
plifies the themes presented to the jury”). The new experts covered
the same themes as Dr. Weilenman’s testimony: the instability, ne-
glect, abandonment, and abuse Stinski experienced as a child; his
“follower” tendencies and susceptibility to peer pressure; and his
emotional immaturity, characterized by his impulsivity and inabil-
ity to consider consequences. Compare Trial Tr. vol. 13, 2811–25,
ECF No. 10-11, with Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1191–93, 1214, ECF No. 13-20,
Hr’g Tr. vol. 3, 477–78, 491–95, 543–45, 554–55, ECF No. 13-17, and
Hr’g Tr. vol. 7, 1339–44, 1360–81, 1396–97, ECF No. 13-21.
And the new experts offered similar bottom-line conclusions
as those Dr. Weilenman testified to: that Stinski’s background
made him more impulsive and more easily influenced, such that a
jury could infer that his background affected his behavior on the
night of the crime. Compare Trial Tr. vol. 13, 2823–24, ECF No.10-
11, with Hr’g Tr. vol. 6, 1220–21, ECF No. 13-20, Hr’g Tr. vol. 3,
491–93, ECF No. 13-17, and Hr’g Tr. vol. 7, 1411:6–16, ECF No. 13-
21. That the additional experts further explained scientific terms
and concepts that Dr. Weilenman had already introduced—such as
executive functioning, or frontal lobe anatomy—“does not alter
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26 Opinion of the Court 22-12898
the cumulative nature of the rest of the additional evidence.” Hol-
sey, 694 F.3d at 1264.
Ultimately, when we weigh this mitigation evidence against
the nine aggravating factors that the jury found, we can’t say that
no reasonable jurist would have reached the same decision denying
Stinski relief that the state habeas court did.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the district court correctly articu-
lated and applied the standards from §§ 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1), as
clarified in this Court’s decision in Pye. We therefore affirm the
district court’s denial of Stinski’s habeas petition.
AFFIRMED.