United States v. Corii Bussey

USCA11 Case: 23-11032 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/20/2023 Page: 1 of 5
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11032
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CORII ARKEEM BUSSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
D.C. Docket No. 1:22-cr-00073-DHB-BKE-2
____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11032 Document: 39-1 Date Filed: 12/20/2023 Page: 2 of 5
2 Opinion of the Court 23-11032
Before WILSON, LUCK, and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Corii Bussey appeals from the district court’s im-
position, after varying upward from the guideline range, of a sen-
tence of 48 months’ imprisonment with 3 years of supervised re-
lease for his conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1), (b), as-
saulting, resisting, or impeding a federal employee. Bussey argues
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a substan-
tively unreasonable sentence because it failed to give significant
weight to the mitigating circumstances he presented, and it failed
to consider his serious health problems. Bussey also argues that
the district court failed to properly consider his individual history
and characteristics when it imposed the same sentence as it im-
posed for Bussy’s co-defendant, whose conduct was not akin to his.
Having read the parties’ briefs and reviewed the record, we affirm
Bussey’s sentence.
I.
We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a defer-
ential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 41, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). The party challenging the sen-
tence bears the burden of showing that the sentence is unreasona-
ble considering the record, the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
and the substantial deference afforded sentencing courts. United
States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d 1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015).
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23-11032 Opinion of the Court 3
We examine whether a sentence is substantively reasonable
considering the totality of the circumstances. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51,
128 S. Ct. at 597. The district court must consider several sentenc-
ing factors, including the nature of the offense, the defendant’s
character and history, and the need for the sentence imposed to
reflect the seriousness of the offense, punish the defendant, and de-
ter crime. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). The weight to be accorded to any given
§ 3553(a) factor is a matter committed to the sound discretion of
the district court, and the court is permitted to attach great weight
to one factor over others. United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279
(11th Cir. 2021) (“That is what discretion in weighing factors is
about.”). A district court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to
consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives
an improper or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits
a clear error of judgment by balancing the proper factors unreason-
ably. United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1189 (11th Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
Further, if a sentence falls outside of the guideline range, we
may not apply a presumption of unreasonableness or disturb a sen-
tence simply because we might reasonably have concluded that a
different sentence was appropriate. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S. Ct.
at 597. Instead, in reviewing the substantive reasonableness of such
a sentence, we may take the degree of variance into account and
consider the extent of a deviation from the guidelines. Id. at 47, 128
S. Ct. at 595. We will vacate on substantive reasonableness
grounds only if we are left with the definite and firm conviction
that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11032
weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sentence that lies
outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated by the facts of
the case. Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190.
II.
The record demonstrates that Bussey’s sentence is substan-
tively reasonable. At the sentencing hearing, the district court in-
formed Bussey that it was considering an upward variance or de-
parture and allowed Bussey the opportunity to address the district
court’s concerns. After hearing from Bussey and the government,
the district court acknowledged that it considered Bussey’s mini-
mal criminal history, that it considered Bussey’s viewpoint of the
shooting incident, and that it reviewed the pre-sentence investiga-
tion reports submitted by the probation officer and the guidelines.
The district court also noted that it considered Bussey’s health con-
ditions, and it recommended that the Bureau of Prisons consider
Bussey’s heart condition when designating him to a correctional
facility.
However, the district court emphasized the seriousness of
the offense, noting that regardless which defendant initiated the
shooting, the video showed that both defendants were armed and
ready for a confrontation. In addition, noting that the postal
worker who was caught in the middle of the shooting stated that
she had a terrifying experience, the district court stated that it did
not think a sentence within the guidelines would reflect the seri-
ousness of the offense, promote respect for the law, and provide
just punishment for the offense. Contrary to Bussey’s contention,
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23-11032 Opinion of the Court 5
the district court had discretion to afford significant weight to the
seriousness of Bussey’s offense and the need to protect the public,
over his mitigating circumstances. Bussey’s real contention is that
the district court did not give more weight to his medical condi-
tions and minimal criminal history, but that does not prove that the
district court abused its discretion in weighing the § 3553(a) factors
and imposed a sentence outside the range of reasonableness. We
conclude that the sentence does not leave us with the definite and
firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of
judgment. See Irey, 612 F.3d at 1189-90.
Accordingly, based on the aforementioned reasons, we af-
firm Bussey’s sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment and three
years of supervised release.
AFFIRMED.