Stephan Jay Lawrence v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
September 19, 2005
No. 04-15131 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-20573-CV-ASG
STEPHAN JAY LAWRENCE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT,
Defendant,
ALAN L. GOLDBERG, Trustee,
Trustee-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 19, 2005)
Before HULL, WILSON and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Stephen Jay Lawrence appeals the dismissal of his petition for a writ of
mandamus or prohibition to the bankruptcy court. He also appeals an order closing
his case and directing that no further filings from Lawrence be docketed with the
district court. We affirm both the dismissal of his petition and the order closing the
case.
I. BACKGROUND
Lawrence is currently incarcerated for civil contempt based on his failure to
comply with an order of the bankruptcy court to turn over the res of an inter vivos
trust to the trustee. See In re Lawrence, 279 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2002). Lawrence
may be held in custody until the sanctions “lose their coercive effect.” Id. at 1300.
Lawrence moved in the bankruptcy court to determine whether his incarceration
continued to have coercive effect, and in June 2003 the bankruptcy court held a
hearing on the motion.
In March 2004, before the bankruptcy court ruled on the motion, Lawrence
filed a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The petition raised a variety
of constitutional and statutory claims that sought to invalidate the underlying civil
contempt order. The district court stayed the petition until resolution of
Lawrence’s June 2003 motion in the bankruptcy court. In June 2004, the
bankruptcy court held that Lawrence’s incarceration continued to have a coercive
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effect and denied the motion. The district court then dismissed Lawrence’s
petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition and ordered the case closed.
After his petition was dismissed, Lawrence filed duplicate motions for stay
and reconsideration. The district court denied those motions. The court further
directed the Clerk of Courts “not to docket any further filings from petitioner
Stephan Jay Lawrence.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo the dismissal of a petition for a writ of
mandamus or prohibition. Lifestar Ambulance Serv., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health and
Human Servs., 365 F.3d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 2004). The order prohibiting
further filings by Lawrence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Chudasama v.
Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1366 (11th Cir. 1997).
III. DISCUSSION
Lawrence raises two issues on appeal. First, Lawrence argues that his
petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition was erroneously dismissed. Second,
he argues that that the order that closed his case violates his fundamental right of
access to the courts.
A. Petition for a Writ of Mandamus or Prohibition
In his petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, Lawrence contended
that the bankruptcy court denied him due process and violated several of his civil
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rights, but we need not reach the merits of these arguments. Lawrence’s petition,
on its face, failed to satisfy the elements for either of these extraordinary writs. We
address each writ in turn.
1. Writ of Mandamus
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it is “appropriate
only where (1) the defendant owes a clear nondiscretionary duty to the plaintiff,
and (2) the plaintiff has exhausted all other avenues of relief.” Lifestar Ambulance
Serv., 365 F.3d at 1295; see also 28 U.S.C. §1361; Heckler v. Ringer, 466 U.S.
602, 616-17, 104 S. Ct. 2013, 2022 (1984). The first part of this test can be
satisfied only when the plaintiff seeks to confine the lower court to its jurisdiction
or to compel it to perform ministerial functions. In re BellSouth Corp., 334 F.3d
941, 953 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing In re Evans, 524 F.2d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir.
1975)). The second part requires a showing that the plaintiff has no alternate
avenue of relief. Lifestar Ambulance Serv., 365 F.3d at 1295.
Lawrence’s petition failed to establish either of these two elements for
mandamus relief. First, because Lawrence’s release from custody is dependent on
a finding by the bankruptcy court that his incarceration has lost its coercive effect,
the responsibility of the bankruptcy court is discretionary, not ministerial. See
CFTC v. Wellington Precious Metals, Inc., 950 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir. 1992).
Second, Lawrence had an alternate avenue of relief: a direct appeal of the ruling of
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the bankruptcy court. The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s petition for
a writ of mandamus.
2. Writ of Prohibition
The requirements for a writ of prohibition are similar to those for
mandamus. A court may issue a writ of prohibition where a lower court has
“assum[ed] jurisdiction of a matter beyond its legal cognizance.” Smith v.
Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 176, 6 S. Ct. 570, 574 (1886). The writ should not be
issued when the plaintiff has an adequate alternative remedy. See In re
Centrotextil, 620 F.2d 690, 691 (8th Cir. 1980). The writ of prohibition, like the
writ of mandamus, is an extraordinary writ, and the power to issue it should be
“sparingly exercised.” See Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520, 76 S. Ct. 912,
916 (1956).
Lawrence failed to establish either of the requirements for a writ of
prohibition. The bankruptcy court did not exceed its jurisdiction, and the
opportunity for direct appeal of the order of the bankruptcy court provided
Lawrence with an adequate alternative remedy. The district court properly
dismissed the petition for a writ of prohibition.
B. Order Closing Case
The order closing Lawrence’s case and directing that further filings not be
docketed with the district court did not violate his constitutional rights. “[D]istrict
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courts enjoy broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before
them.” Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1997).
Although that discretion must yield to a civil litigant’s due process right to a
meaningful opportunity to be heard, Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379, 91
S. Ct. 780, 787 (1971), the district court did not abuse its discretion in closing
Lawrence’s case.
Lawrence still has access to the courts. He remains able to move the
bankruptcy court for review of the civil contempt order, and he may appeal an
adverse order of the bankruptcy court to the district court. Lawrence also may
appeal an adverse order of the district court to this Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
The district court properly dismissed Lawrence’s petition and did not abuse
its discretion when it ordered Lawrence’s case closed.
AFFIRMED.
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