Susan Waczewski v. Leigh R. Meininger

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
FILED
No. 08-11122 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar October 30, 2008
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket Nos.
07-00214-CV-ORL-19 & 06-00620-BK-KSJ
IN RE: SUSAN WACZEWSKI,
Debtor.
_____________________________________________________
SUSAN WACZEWSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LEIGH R. MEININGER,
Defendant-Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(October 30, 2008)
Before ANDERSON, HULL and COX, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
The relevant facts are adequately summarized in the district court’s order from
which this appeal is taken. (R.5-42 at 1-5.) Susan Waczewski appeals the district
court’s order affirming the bankruptcy court’s allocation of the Second Compromise
and denial of sanctions against Leigh Meininger, Waczewski’s former Chapter 7
Trustee.1 We affirm.
I. Discussion
A. There was no error in the approval of the Second Compromise nor in the
allocation of its funds.
Waczewski argues on appeal that the bankruptcy court erred in its allocation
of the funds from the Second Compromise. Despite her protestations to the contrary,
however, we construe her argument to be that the bankruptcy court erred in not
setting aside the Order Approving the Second Compromise.2 Waczewski does not
argue that the allocation of 13% to Mr. Waczewski’s estate was improper because
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Waczewski also argues that the district court improperly limited the scope of her appeal to
only one final order of the bankruptcy court. Waczewski’s brief does not demonstrate error in the
district court’s order dismissing those appeals from orders for which Waczewski paid no filing fee.
(R.3-22 at 5-6.)
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Even if we generously construe Waczewski’s brief as truly asking for a different allocation
of the Second Compromise, we would affirm the allocation made by the bankruptcy court and
affirmed by the district court. Waczewksi told the bankruptcy court that she “would not object to
a distribution between the relevant Estates that applies the same ratio of apportionment as was agreed
in the First Compromise.” (R.4-36 at 244-245.) The bankruptcy court apportioned the Second
Compromise according to Waczewski’s wishes; we discern no error.
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some other allocation is called for under the Second Compromise; she argues that the
Second Compromise lacks an allocation provision, is consequently incomplete, and
therefore should be set aside. Waczewski states multiple times in her brief,
“Appellant sees no option for the Bankruptcy Court other than to set aside the Order
Approving the Second Compromise.” (Appellant Br. at 21, 25.)
This is the third time Waczewski has appealed to this court asking us to set
aside the bankruptcy court’s approval of the Second Compromise. In re Waczewski,
241 F. App’x 647, 648 (11th Cir. 2007). When Waczewski was before us last year
making the same argument she makes today, we held that “the propriety of approving
the second compromise became the ‘law of the case’ . . . . Therefore, the bankruptcy
court did not err in denying Waczewski’s motion to set aside the second
compromise.” Id. at 652. We repeat this holding today.
B. The bankruptcy court did not err in denying sanctions against Waczewski’s
former Chapter 7 Trustee, Meininger.
Waczewski appeals the bankruptcy court’s denial of her motion for sanctions
against her former Chapter 7 Trustee, Meininger. In support of her argument, she
reargues the factual bases for her motion. We have reviewed the bankruptcy court’s
order on this motion (R.3-8 at 80-81), and the district court’s affirmance of that order
(R.5-42 at 7-11). Like the district court, we conclude that the bankruptcy court’s
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findings regarding Mr. Meininger’s motivations and intentions were not clearly
erroneous, and we conclude that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the motion. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of sanctions against
Meininger.
II. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s order.
AFFIRMED.
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