United States v. Dawkins, Code

19-3623 (L)
United States v. Dawkins, Code
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Second Circuit
August Term, 2020
Nos. 19-3623 (L) and 19-3643 (Con)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v.
CHRISTIAN DAWKINS, MERL CODE,
Defendants-Appellants,
LAMONT EVANS, EMANUEL RICHARDSON, ANTHONY BLAND,
Defendants. 1
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York
Nos. 17-cr-684-4 and 17-cr-684-5 — Edgardo Ramos, Judge
ARGUED: OCTOBER 22, 2020
DECIDED: JUNE 4, 2021
Before: RAGGI, SULLIVAN, and NARDINI, Circuit Judges.
1 The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
On appeal from conspiratorial and substantive bribery convictions in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Edgardo
Ramos, J.), see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371, 666(a)(2), the defendants argue that § 666(a)(2) does
not cover their scheme to bribe college basketball coaches and is unconstitutional
as applied to them. They maintain that § 666 requires a nexus between the “agent”
to be influenced or rewarded and the federal funds received by their organization,
and that the “business” of a federally funded organization, to which the bribery
scheme is connected, must be commercial in nature. Additionally, they argue that
various evidentiary and instructional rulings were erroneous and warrant vacatur
of their convictions. AFFIRMED.
DAVID ALLEN CHANEY, JR., Chaney Legal Services,
LLC, Greenville, SC, (Steven A. Haney, Haney
Law Group PLLC, Southfield, MI, on the brief), for
Defendants-Appellants
ROBERT L. BOONE, Assistant United States
Attorney (Eli J. Mark, Noah D. Solowiejczyk,
Thomas McKay, Assistant United States
Attorneys, on the brief), for Audrey Strauss, United
States Attorney for the Southern District of New
York, New York, NY, for Appellee
2
WILLIAM J. NARDINI, Circuit Judge:
Defendants-Appellants Christian Dawkins and Merl Code stand convicted
by a jury of conspiracy to commit bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and
666(a)(2). Dawkins also stands convicted of substantive bribery in violation of §
666(a)(2). The defendants here appeal their convictions, entered on October 22,
2019, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York
(Edgardo Ramos, J.). They argue that § 666(a)(2) does not cover their charged
scheme to bribe college basketball coaches and is unconstitutional as applied to
them. Specifically, they maintain that § 666 requires a nexus between the ”agent”
to be influenced or rewarded and the federal funds received by their organization,
and that the “business” of a federally funded organization, to which the bribery
scheme is connected, must be commercial in nature. Additionally, they argue that
various evidentiary and instructional rulings were erroneous and warrant vacatur
of their convictions. We are unpersuaded by these arguments.
In 18 U.S.C. § 666, Congress used broad terms to prohibit bribery in relation
to federally funded programs. As relevant here, the statute prohibits certain
3
actions taken “with intent to influence or reward an agent” of a designated
recipient of federal funds, “in connection with any business” of that recipient. The
defendants ask us to shorten the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), limiting the
universe of “agents” to be influenced and “businesses” involved. But it is not the
role of courts to engraft restrictive language onto statutes. Nor should we cabin a
law that Congress wrote expansively to preserve the integrity of organizations that
receive federal dollars. Today, we follow the logical course charted by
longstanding precedent to reach two conclusions with respect to 18 U.S.C.
§ 666(a)(2): first, the “agent” of a federally funded organization need not have
control over the federal funds, and the agent need not work in a specific program
within the organization that uses those federal dollars; and second, the “business”
of a federally funded organization need not be commercial in nature. With respect
to the defendants’ other challenges on appeal, we identify no reversible error.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgments of conviction.
4
I. Overview
On March 7, 2019, a grand jury returned a Superseding Indictment, charging
Dawkins and Code with conspiracy to commit bribery, 2 see 18 U.S.C. §§ 371,
666(a)(2) (Count One); substantive bribery, see id. §§ 666(a)(2), 2 (Count Two);
conspiracy to commit honest services wire fraud, see id. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349 (Count
Three); and conspiracy to commit Travel Act bribery, see id. §§ 371, 1952(a)(1) &
(a)(3) (Count Six). Dawkins was also individually charged with two substantive
counts of honest services wire fraud. See id. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349, 2 (Counts Four and
Five).
The indictment alleged a straightforward scheme: Dawkins and Code
planned to pay bribes to basketball coaches at National Collegiate Athletic
2Counts One and Two charged both bribery and gratuity theories under § 666(a)(2), alleging
intent to influence and to reward agents of a federally funded organization. See United States v.
Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404–05 (1999) (“Bribery requires intent ‘to
influence’ . . . , while illegal gratuity requires only that the gratuity be given or accepted ‘for or
because of’ an . . . act. In other words, for bribery there must be a quid pro quo—a specific intent to
give or receive something of value in exchange for an . . . act. An illegal gratuity, on the other hand,
may constitute merely a reward for some future [or past] act . . . .” (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)
and (c))). The district court instructed the jury on both theories, and the jury returned general
verdicts of guilt against both defendants on Count One and a general verdict of guilt against
Dawkins on Count Two. But because the parties phrase their arguments on appeal solely in terms
of bribery, for the sake of convenience, our opinion does so as well.
5
Association (“NCAA”) Division I universities in exchange for the coaches’
agreement to steer their student-athletes toward Dawkins’s sports management
company after leaving college and becoming professional basketball players.
The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment before trial, challenging
Counts One and Two on the ground that the Government’s allegations failed to
establish two elements of a § 666(a)(2) violation: (1) that the persons intended to
be influenced or rewarded (here basketball coaches) were “agents” of federally
funded organizations, and (2) that the scheme to influence or reward was “in
connection with any business” of these organizations. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2). Upon
consideration of the same arguments pursued by the defendants on their appeal,
the district court orally denied the motion, and the case proceeded to a two-week
trial.
On May 8, 2019, the jury found Dawkins guilty on Counts One and Two,
and Code guilty on Count One. The jury acquitted the defendants of the remaining
charges. After the verdict, the district court issued a written opinion explaining its
earlier denial of the motion to dismiss. See Doc. No. 244, Dkt. No. 17-cr-684. It then
6
sentenced Dawkins principally to a year and a day in prison, and Code to three
months in prison. Both defendants now appeal their convictions.
II. The bribery scheme
Viewed in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, 3 the trial evidence
showed the following.
Christian Dawkins formerly worked as a “runner,” a liaison who helps
sports agents develop professional relationships with athletes. In September 2015,
Dawkins became acquainted with Louis Martin Blazer, a financial and business
manager who had once worked primarily for NFL players. To develop
relationships with potential future clients, Blazer had at times paid college football
players in hopes that they would retain his services once they turned pro.
Unbeknownst to Dawkins, Blazer was cooperating with Government
investigators, who recorded the men’s conversations.
In December 2015, Dawkins proposed that Blazer give Dawkins money to
pay basketball players whom Dawkins was attempting to recruit. In exchange,
3 See United States v. Thompson, 896 F.3d 155, 159 (2d Cir. 2018).
7
Dawkins would refer the players to Blazer for financial management services.
Dawkins also proposed that Blazer take over payments Dawkins had been making
to University of South Carolina assistant basketball coach Lamont Evans, 4 who, in
return, was to steer his players to retain Dawkins’s then-employer, a sports
management agency, when they went pro. Dawkins proposed that Blazer develop
a relationship with Evans, who could refer his players to Blazer for financial advice
and management. Blazer, at the Government’s direction, agreed to take over the
payments.
Around this time, Blazer introduced Dawkins to Munish Sood, an
investment manager, who, with Blazer, took over the payments to Evans. In March
2016, Dawkins, Blazer, Sood, and Evans met and discussed recruiting and paying
players as well as the value of building relationships with assistant coaches.
Dawkins later explained to Blazer and Sood that paying coaches was
advantageous, since coaches could refer still other players if an initial referral did
not work out, and they could limit other potential agents’ and advisors’ access to
4 Evans later became an assistant basketball coach at Oklahoma State University.
8
their players. In exchange for the bribes Blazer and Sood began to pay, Evans
introduced them to one player and to another player’s mother. During trial, Blazer
and Sood testified extensively about their understandings of these recorded
conversations.
In June 2017, Dawkins, Sood, and “Jeff D’Angelo,” an undercover FBI agent
posing as a wealthy businessman, formed a sports management company, LOYD,
Inc. (“LOYD”). The plan was for LOYD to develop relationships with college
basketball coaches, who would in turn refer players to LOYD for sports
management services upon turning pro.
Later in June 2017, two recorded meetings relevant to this appeal occurred
in New York. First, Sood and D’Angelo met with University of Arizona assistant
basketball coach Emanuel “Book” Richardson to discuss buying access to
Richardson’s players. At the close of the meeting, D’Angelo handed Richardson
five thousand dollars. Second, immediately after the Richardson meeting,
Dawkins, Blazer, Sood, and D’Angelo met with Merl Code—a consultant for
Adidas, a major sports apparel company—who had extensive relationships with
9
basketball coaches and players. The purpose of this meeting was to see whether
Code could help LOYD generate business by introducing the LOYD group to his
basketball contacts. At the end of this meeting, D’Angelo gave Code two thousand
dollars.
In July 2017, Dawkins, Blazer, and D’Angelo met ten college coaches in Las
Vegas and paid some of them bribes of up to $13,000. Although Code was not
present for these meetings, he helped arrange them and advised the LOYD group
on how to talk with the coaches; in particular, he warned that the coaches would
likely be wary of accepting money from people they did not yet trust. After these
meetings, some coaches began to fulfill their end of the bribery bargain by
introducing the LOYD group to players’ families. Shortly thereafter, Dawkins and
Code were arrested. 5
5In a separate trial arising from this series of events and others related to it, Dawkins and Code
were convicted of wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1343 and 1349, for “engaging in a scheme to defraud three universities by paying tens of
thousands of dollars to the families of high school basketball players to induce them to attend the
universities . . . and covering up the payments so that the recruits could certify to the universities
that they had complied with [NCAA rules] barring student-athletes and recruits from being
paid.” United States v. Gatto, 986 F.3d 104, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2021).
10
III. The defendants’ challenges under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2)
The defendants’ primary argument on appeal is that the district court
misconstrued § 666(a)(2) in recognizing the basketball coaches in this case as
“agents” of their federally funded university employers and in concluding that the
defendants’ bribery efforts were connected to the “business” of those universities.
They frame the argument primarily as a challenge to the district court’s denial of
their pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment. They also rely on it to maintain
that the district court should have applied a narrower construction of § 666(a)(2)
(presumably when instructing the jury), and that the Government failed to prove
its case under the defense’s proffered interpretation of the statute. As we have
explained, “the pleading standard for an indictment is entirely separate from the
evidentiary standard at trial,” 6 and is different yet again from the question of
whether the jury was properly instructed. We therefore address the pleading
question first, and then turn to the trial questions.
6 United States v. Wedd, 993 F.3d 104, 120 (2d Cir. 2021).
11
A. The Superseding Indictment properly alleged a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).
We find no error in the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motion to
dismiss the Superseding Indictment, which we review de novo. 7 “An indictment is
sufficient as long as it (1) ‘contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly
informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend,’ and (2) ‘enables
the defendant to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for
the same offense.’” 8 To satisfy these requirements, “an indictment need do little
more than . . . track the language of the statute charged and state the time and
place (in approximate terms) of the alleged crime.” 9 Here, Counts One and Two
used the same words as § 666(a)(2) to charge the defendants with trying to
influence an agent of a federally funded organization. Moreover, the Superseding
Indictment was a “speaking indictment” that provided significant detail about the
7 See United States v. Canori, 737 F.3d 181, 182 (2d Cir. 2013).
8Wedd, 993 F.3d at 120 (alteration omitted) (quoting United States v. Alfonso, 143 F.3d 772, 776 (2d
Cir. 1998)).
9 Id. (quoting Alfonso, 143 F.3d at 776).
12
factual nature of the charges. This was more than enough background to inform
the defendants of when and where the offense conduct took place. Therefore, the
Superseding Indictment was sufficient.
The defendants argue that the district court should have gone further and
weighed whether certain factual allegations in the Superseding Indictment—
specifically that the coaches were “agents” of the universities and that the bribery
scheme was “in connection” with the universities’ “business” of running an
athletic program—were consistent with the charged violations. The defendants
interpret § 666(a)(2) to require additional showings for someone to be an “agent,”
and for activities to be part of a university’s “business.” But “[a]t the indictment
stage, we do not evaluate the adequacy of the facts to satisfy the elements of the
charged offense. That is something we do after trial.” 10 Otherwise, we would
effectively be asking district courts to engage in summary judgment
10Id. at 121. The only exception that might apply to this general rule is when the Government has
made “a full proffer of the evidence it intends to present at trial.” Id. (quoting Alfonso, 143 F.3d at
776). The defendants do not claim that such a full proffer took place in this case.
13
proceedings—something that “does not exist in federal criminal procedure.” 11
Thus, the district court correctly denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss the
Superseding Indictment.
B. The Government proved a violation of § 666(a)(2).
The defendants also argue, in the alternative, that the district court should
have applied their proposed narrower definitions of “agent” and “business”—a
claim that we read as a challenge both to the jury instructions and to the sufficiency
of the evidence. These arguments turn largely on the same grounds: (1) that the
coaches were not in fact “agents” of the universities under § 666(a)(2) because they
did not control spending of federal funds at the universities or work in a program
within the university that used those funds, and (2) that the bribery scheme was
not “in connection” with the universities’ “business,” the meaning of which
should be limited to the universities’ commercial activities.
11 Id. (quoting United States v. Sampson, 898 F.3d 270, 282 (2d Cir. 2018)).
14
The defendants did not preserve these arguments before the district court, 12
and so their challenges would appear to be reviewable only for plain error. 13 Our
standard of review is immaterial, however, because we discern no error at all.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) does not require a nexus between the
“agent” of a federally funded organization and the federal
funds the organization receives.
Section 666(a)(2) broadly prohibits conduct designed to improperly
influence or reward the agents of certain federally funded organizations. In
relevant part, the statute provides:
12Although the defendants moved for judgments of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, they did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to either
of these points. Likewise, the defendants did not propose jury instructions that embodied their
reading of § 666(a)(2), nor did they object to the court’s jury instructions on these elements.
13See Fed. R. Crim. P. 30(d) (“A party who objects to any portion of the [jury] instructions . . . must
inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for the objection before the jury retires
to deliberate. . . . Failure to object in accordance with this rule precludes appellate review, except
[where there was plain error].”); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b) (“A plain error that affects
substantial rights may be considered even though it was not brought to the court's attention.”);
United States v. Dussard, 967 F.3d 149, 155 (2d Cir. 2020) (“The requirements for obtaining relief
on plain-error review are well established. Under Rule 52(b), before an appellate court can correct
an error not raised in the district court, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects
substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, an appellate court may then exercise its
discretion to notice a forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity,
or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)),
cert. denied, No. 20-6743 (May 17, 2021) (mem.).
15
Whoever . . . corruptly gives, offers, or agrees to give anything of
value to any person, with intent to influence or reward an agent of an
organization or of a State, local or Indian tribal government, or any
agency thereof, in connection with any business, transaction, or series
of transactions of such organization, government, or agency
involving anything of value of $5,000 or more[] shall be fined under
this title, imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both[,] . . . [provided
that] the organization, government, or agency receives, in any one
year period, benefits in excess of $10,000 under a Federal program
involving a grant, contract, subsidy, loan, guarantee, insurance, or
other form of Federal assistance.
To determine whether a target of corrupt “influence or reward” is an “agent” for
purposes of § 666(a)(2), we “necessarily begin[] with the plain meaning of [the]
law’s text and, absent ambiguity, will . . . end there.” 14 Section 666(d)(1) defines an
“agent” as “a person authorized to act on behalf of another person . . . and, in the
case of an organization . . . , includes a servant or employee, and a partner,
director, officer, manager, and representative.” The district court adhered to this
statutory definition in charging the jury on the agency element of a § 666 violation,
instructing:
14United States v. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d 110, 122 (2d Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 161 (2020).
16
The fourth element the government must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt is that at the time alleged in the indictment, in or about 2016
to in or about 2017, any men’s college basketball coach who received
a payment from, or as facilitated by, the defendant you are
considering was, in fact, an agent of the university that employed
him. An agent is a person who is authorized to act on behalf of his
organization. Employees are considered agents of the organizations that
employ[] them. 15
The italicized language of the jury charge closely tracked the language of the
statute, both identifying that an agent must be “authorized to act on behalf” of the
organization, and explaining that an “employee” falls within the list of statutorily
enumerated types of agents. Because the charge accurately tracked the statute, it
was not erroneous.
Dawkins and Code do not contest that a straightforward reading of the
statute leads to this conclusion. Rather, they argue that we should disregard the
plain language of § 666 and instead impose a narrowing construction to avoid
“stretch[ing the statute] well beyond its stated purpose.” 16 Otherwise, the
15 Tr. at 1615 (emphasis added).
16 Appellants’ Br. at 39.
17
defendants assert, the term “agent” would sweep so broadly as to include
employees such as “part-time janitor[s]” whose roles are not connected to
“protecting the integrity of federal funds.” 17 The defendants argue that § 666
“agents” are only those who can access or direct the spending of federal funds, or
at least are associated with a division of the university that receives federal funds.
But it is not our place to limit language enacted by Congress in order to pursue the
policy goals posited by the defendants. 18
We do not write on a blank slate in reaching this conclusion. The Supreme
Court has twice rejected similar attempts to engraft an extratextual “nexus”
requirement onto § 666. Most recently, in Sabri v. United States, the Court rejected
17 Id.
18See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1738 (2020) (“[O]nly the words on the page
constitute the law adopted by Congress and approved by the President. If judges could add to,
remodel, update, or detract from old statutory terms inspired only by extratextual sources and
our own imaginations, we would risk amending statutes outside the legislative process reserved
for the people’s representatives.”); Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 360–61 (2019) (“It is a
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation that ‘absent provisions cannot be supplied by
the courts.’” (internal alteration omitted) (quoting A. SCALIA & B. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 94 (2012))); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54
(1992) (“We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.”).
18
the related argument that the statute requires “a nexus between the bribery
proscribed . . . and federal funding” to be a valid exercise of Congress’s authority
under Article I. 19 The Court reasoned that the federal funds did not have to be
directly affected by the bribery scheme because “corruption does not have to be
that limited to affect the federal interest. Money is fungible . . . and corrupt
contractors do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value.” 20 Even if university employees
like the basketball coaches in this case might not directly spend, misuse, or
“fritter[] away” federal dollars, 21 they nevertheless “pose[] a threat to the integrity
of the [federally funded] entity, which in turn poses a threat to the federal funds
entrusted to that entity.” 22 In reaching this conclusion, Sabri built on the Court’s
earlier decision in Salinas v. United States, which held that the adjacent and nearly
19 Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d at 138 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605–06 (2004)).
20 Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606.
21 Id. at 605.
22United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also United States v. Keen, 676 F.3d 981, 990 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[E]ven if these thieves and cheats are
not specifically using their positions to defraud the entity employing them, it cannot be denied
that their fraudulent conduct poses a threat to the integrity of the entity, which in turn poses a
threat to the federal funds entrusted to that entity.”).
19
identical provision in § 666(a)(1)(B) prohibiting solicitation of bribes “does not
require the Government to prove the bribe in question had any particular
influence on federal funds.” 23 We are mindful that Sabri abrogated our holding in
United States v. Santopietro, which maintained—even after Salinas—that “at least
some connection [was required] between the bribe and a risk to the integrity of the
federal funded program.” 24 It is now clear that Santopietro was a wrong turn,
corrected by Sabri, and we will not venture down that road again.
Dawkins and Code encourage us to look not to Sabri, Salinas, and sister-
circuit cases that align with them, 25 but instead to the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in
United States v. Phillips for the proposition that an agent must have control over the
expenditure of federal funds to fall within the scope of § 666(a)(2). 26 In Phillips, the
Fifth Circuit addressed the question of whether the defendant—a corrupt tax
23 522 U.S. 52, 61 (1997).
24 166 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1999); see Sabri, 541 U.S. at 604.
25 See Fernandez, 722 F.3d at 11; Keen, 676 F.3d at 990.
26219 F.3d 404, 415 (5th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he statutory term ‘agent’ . . . should be construed . . . to tie
the agency relationship to the authority that a defendant has with respect to control and
expenditure of the funds of an entity that receives federal monies.”).
20
assessor for a Louisiana parish that received federal funds in the form of food
stamps for parish residents—qualified as an “agent” of the parish for the purposes
of § 666. The court held that he did not, because he was neither an employee nor
an officer of the parish, and because “he was not authorized to act on behalf of the
parish with respect to its funds.” 27 Here, unlike Phillips, the coaches are employees
of the universities. Additionally, to the extent Phillips required the defendant to
have authority over federal funds, it is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s later
holding in Sabri that § 666(a)(2) does not require a nexus between the bribery and
the federal funding. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit itself has since “suggested that a
broader definition of ‘agent’ is more faithful to the statutory text and purpose and
to [the Fifth Circuit’s] earlier decisions addressing § 666.” 28
27 Id. at 413.
28United States v. Shoemaker, 746 F.3d 614, 622 n.7 (5th Cir. 2014); see also id. (“Phillips added ‘extra-
textual teeth’ to the ‘agent’ definition by requiring the agent to have power over the
organization’s funds . . . .” (quoting United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 313 (5th Cir. 2002))).
21
Similarly unpersuasive is the defendants’ reliance on United States v. Sunia 29
to support their argument that the coaches are not agents of federally funded
organizations because the universities’ athletic programs—as opposed to the
universities as a whole—do not receive federal funding. In Sunia, the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia considered whether the defendants, who were
employees of the legislative branch of the American Samoa government, were
“agents” for the purposes of § 666(a)(1)(A), where it was the executive branch of
the American Samoa government that received the federal funds giving rise to the
indictment. The Government argued that § 666(a) applied to the defendants
because they were agents of the American Samoa government more generally.
Relying on Phillips, the district court rejected this argument, holding that the
statute required the defendants to be agents of the particular government agency
receiving the federal funds. 30
29 643 F. Supp. 2d 51 (D.D.C. 2009).
30 Id. at 63–64.
22
Sunia is not helpful to the defendants. First, Dawkins and Code fail to
explain why, for the purposes of § 666, we can slice up a university’s various
programs—say, distinguishing its athletic programs from its academic
programs—when what the statute requires is that the “organization” receive
federal funding, not that a particular department or program of that organization
do so. 31 In other statutes, such as Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Congress
has demonstrated its ability to differentiate more finely between whole
organizations or governments on the one hand, and a specific “program or
activity” on the other. 32 We must therefore give effect to Congress’s choice not to
delineate matters so finely in § 666 when speaking of an “organization” rather than
a subset of that organization or its activities.
Second, Sunia did not concern § 666(d)(1)’s definition of an “agent.” Rather,
the district court’s focus was on § 666(d)(2), which defines the statute’s coverage
31 See 18 U.S.C. § 666(b).
32See T.W. v. N.Y. State Bd. of L. Examiners, 996 F.3d 87, 92–95 (2d Cir. 2021) (considering the scope
of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), which provides immunity from suit to
an arm of the State unless it is a “program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance”).
23
as extending to government “subdivisions” in holding that “agents” of a
“government agency” must work for the particular governmental subdivision that
receives federal funds to trigger application of § 666. 33 Even assuming that Sunia
was correct that § 666(d)(2) requires tying federal funding to a specific
“government agency,” that holding does not pertain to § 666(d)(1) or call into
question that the relevant “organization” under that subsection is the university—
including all of its component parts.
In § 666(a)(2), Congress has defined the scope of its efforts to preserve the
integrity of federal programs broadly and, as courts, it is not our role to second-
guess that legislative judgment and to invent additional requirements that we
think might better address the problem. 34 We therefore hold that, in order to prove
a violation of § 666(a)(2), the Government need not prove a nexus between the
agent to be influenced or rewarded and the federal funding that the relevant
33 643 F. Supp. 2d at 62–63.
34Indeed, the Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of § 666 is to “protect the integrity
of the vast sums of money distributed through Federal programs from theft, fraud, and undue
influence by bribery,” Sabri, 541 U.S. at 606 (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 370 (1983), as reprinted
in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3511), and § 666(a)(2) “addresses the problem at the source of bribes,”
id. at 605.
24
organization receives. Specifically, the Government need not prove that the agent
had any control over the federal funding received by the organization, or that the
agent worked in a specific program within the organization that used those federal
dollars. Accordingly, the district court’s jury instruction, which did not so limit the
definition of “agent,” was not erroneous.
Having confirmed the legal meaning of “agent,” we can quickly dispatch
the defendants’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence on this point. The
undisputed trial evidence showed that the bribed coaches were employees of their
universities throughout the course of the charged § 666 scheme. Employees are
agents under § 666(d)(1). Accordingly, we hold that there was sufficient evidence
for a rational jury to conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that these coaches were
agents of their universities. 35
35See United States v. McCoy, 995 F.3d 32, 61 (2d Cir. 2021) (“In considering a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we view the evidence, whether direct or
circumstantial, in the light most favorable to the government, crediting every inference that could
have been drawn in the government’s favor, and deferring to the jury’s assessments of witness
credibility and the weight of the evidence.”); id. (“[A] conviction will be upheld so long as, ‘any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.’” (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979))).
25
2. The bribes paid by the defendants to the university
basketball coaches in exchange for influence exerted over
student-athletes were “in connection” with a university’s
“business.”
The district court instructed the jury that “the phrase ‘business or
transaction’ is not limited to transactions or to commercial business of the
universities, but includes intangible aspects of the business of the organization,”
and that the “business or transaction” involved in this case was “the operation and
administration of the university’s men’s basketball program.” 36 The defendants
make two related arguments on this point, one essentially legal and the other
essentially factual.
36 Tr. at 1610–11. The full instruction on this element read:
The business or transaction that the defendant you are considering sought to
influence does not have to relate to federal funding. In other words, while you
must find that the university that employed the relevant men’s basketball coach
received more than $10,000 in federal benefits, the defendants need not have paid,
offered, or agreed to offer bribes as to any business or transaction having to do
with the federal funding. Further, the phrase “business or transaction” is not
limited to transactions or to commercial business of the universities, but includes
intangible aspects of the business of the organization. . . . Here, the government
argues that the defendants offered or agreed to give something of value corruptly
with the intent that the men’s college basketball coach be influenced or rewarded
in connection with some business or transaction of that coach’s university, namely,
the operation and administration of the university’s men’s basketball program.
26
First, they argue that the term “business” in § 666(a)(2) must be construed
narrowly to include only commercial activity. They contend that defining
“business” more broadly to include the running of a university athletic program,
as the district court did, would render this element of the law a nullity, because
anything could then be a business of a federally funded organization. According
to Dawkins and Code, the term “business” must be interpreted to mean
commercial activity to ensure that § 666(a)(2) is “consistent[ly] and predictabl[y]”
applied. 37 But that construction is at odds with the statute itself.
The Seventh Circuit considered and rejected the same argument in United
States v. Robinson, holding that the term “business” did not need to be understood
in the commercial sense, 38 and we agree with the Robinson court’s analysis. At issue
in that case was whether bribing a police officer to shield the defendant’s drug
trafficking operations from police scrutiny was in connection with the “business”
of law enforcement for the purposes of § 666(a)(2). The defendant argued it was
37 Appellants’ Br. at 48.
38 663 F.3d 265, 275 (7th Cir. 2011).
27
not, because such business is not commercial in nature. The Seventh Circuit
disagreed for several reasons.
To begin, it concluded that the surrounding language of § 666(a)(2) supports
an “expansi[ve]” interpretation of the word “business.” 39 The court noted that
while the many dictionary definitions of “business” range from narrow to broad,
this surrounding language reveals that “the term ‘business’ has a broader
[statutory] meaning.” 40 Further, the court recognized that it would contradict the
express statutory text for “business” to be limited to commercial activities, because
such a limiting interpretation “would have the effect of excluding bribes paid to
influence agents of state and local governments,” which are explicitly included
39Id. at 273 (“The statute targets bribes solicited or offered . . . ‘in connection with any business . . .
[of a federally funded organization] involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.’ . . . ‘Any’ and
‘anything’ are terms of expansion.” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2))).
40Id. at 274 & n.4. Indeed, this range of meanings is on display in President Coolidge’s oft-quoted
(or misquoted) remark: “[T]he chief business of the American people is business.” See Robert
Sobel, Coolidge and American Business, Calvin Coolidge Presidential Foundation,
https://www.coolidgefoundation.org/resources/essays-papers-addresses-35/ (last visited March
30, 2021). Coolidge’s pithy statement captures two common meanings of “business”—the first
being a particular field of endeavor, and the second being commercial activity.
28
within the scope of § 666(a)(2). 41 Finally, the court looked to the purpose of the
statute and determined that it supported a broad reading of the term “business,”
as “[b]ribes paid to influence the intangible, noncommercial business of a federally
funded organization threaten to undermine the integrity of those organizations no
less than bribes paid to influence . . . commercial-like transaction[s].” 42
Section 666 is indeed written in expansive terms, and in Ng Lap Seng we
recognized that the statute “[n]owhere . . . place[s] any definitional limits on the
business or transactions to be influenced—beyond requiring them to be ‘of’ the
organization receiving more than $10,000 in federal funding and to have a ‘value
of $5,000 or more.’” 43 This capacious understanding of the “business” element
does not render it a nullity; it allows the statute to do its intended work. It is the
defendants’ exclusion of noncommercial business from the scope of the statute that
would render the statute inoperative in a vast swath of cases. Accordingly, we
41 Robinson, 663 F.3d at 274.
42 Id. at 275.
43Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d at 133 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) and contrasting its language with
“official act” bribery proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(A)).
29
hold that the district court correctly instructed the jury that, for purposes of
§ 666(a)(2), “the phrase ‘business or transaction’ is not limited to transactions or to
commercial business of the universities, but includes intangible aspects of the
business of the organization.” 44
Second, in what amounts to a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
the defendants challenge the characterization of the “business” affected by the
scheme to bribe coaches. They argue that, at most, the payments related to
recommending financial advisors to basketball players, or to running an NCAA-
compliant athletic program—and that neither of those constitutes the “business”
of a university under any definition of the term. But that is not how the jury was
charged, or how the government presented its case. The court instructed that the
business at issue here was “the operation and administration of the university’s
44Tr. at 1610. Because we conclude that § 666 prohibits bribes in connection with the business of
a federally funded organization regardless of its commercial or noncommercial character, we
need not consider whether a university athletic program constitutes commercial activity. Cf.
Gatto, 986 F.3d at 110 (“We have no doubt that a successful men’s basketball program is a major
source of revenue at certain major universities, but we need not be drawn into the debate over
the extent to which college sports is a business.”).
30
men’s basketball program.” 45 At trial, there was evidence of what that business
entailed, including that: the coaches were employed to run those programs; they
were expected to advise student-athletes about off-court decisions like selecting
agents; they were expected to ensure compliance with NCAA rules; and their
employment contracts prohibited them from accepting money from outside
advisors to influence student-athletes. The evidence showed that the bribes were
in connection with those aspects of the universities’ business. That is, Dawkins and
Code conspired to bribe (and Dawkins did bribe) coaches to exercise influence
over student-athletes—influence they had by virtue of their employment at the
universities and positions in the universities’ athletic departments—to steer those
student-athletes toward particular financial advisors.
The defendants argue that this conclusion means that § 666(a)(2)
criminalizes the breaking of private rules, such as those governing NCAA
programs. But the district court was careful to instruct the jury that the defendants
were not charged with violating NCAA rules. Evidence that NCAA rules were
45 Tr. at 1611.
31
broken illustrated how the bribery scheme related to university business, and it
was also probative of the defendants’ corrupt intent. Perhaps the starkest
demonstration of the connection between the bribes and the university athletic
programs was that the coaches’ misconduct put the universities at risk of suffering
financial and other penalties imposed by the NCAA, of which the universities
were members. But the offense itself remained the bribery—that is, corruptly
giving or agreeing to give money to the coaches to influence their actions in
connection with university business. Viewed in the light most favorable to the
jury’s verdict, this evidence established a clear connection between the bribery
scheme and the business of the universities, and thus was sufficient to support the
bribery convictions.
IV. The statute is constitutional as applied to Dawkins and Code.
We review de novo, 46 and find no error in, the district court’s legal conclusion
that § 666(a)(2) is not unconstitutionally vague as interpreted and applied to
Dawkins and Code. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that “a penal statute
46 See New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Cuomo, 804 F.3d 242, 252 (2d Cir. 2015).
32
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.” 47 “Statutes carrying criminal penalties
or implicating the exercise of constitutional rights . . . are subject to a more
stringent vagueness standard than are civil or economic regulations.” 48 However,
the statute “need not achieve meticulous specificity, which would come at the cost
of flexibility and reasonable breadth.” 49
The defendants argue that § 666 is unconstitutional as applied to them
because (1) ordinary people reading its terms would not understand the statute to
prohibit paying college coaches to steer their student-athletes to retain certain
business advisors; and (2) such a broad prohibition would enable the Government
to engage in discriminatory enforcement. We disagree.
47 Id. at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
49United States v. Rosen, 716 F.3d 691, 699 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Mannix v. Phillips, 619 F.3d 187,
197 (2d Cir. 2010)).
33
As we have already discussed, the district court’s interpretation of “agent”
and “business” was not impermissibly broad or divorced from the anti-bribery
statute’s intended purpose, which is to safeguard federal funds and the integrity
of the institutions that receive them. Section 666(d)(1) expressly defines agents to
include employees (like the coaches here), and § 666(a)(2) nowhere suggests that
bribes must relate only to particular programs or divisions, within an
organization, that benefit from federal funds. Likewise, we have just explained
that the term “business” naturally includes both commercial and noncommercial
activity. Accordingly, we conclude that ordinary people would understand
§ 666(a)(2) to proscribe corrupt payments to an employee of a university, which
receives federal funds, in order to influence the employee to take action favorable
to the bribe-payor in a matter that is connected to the university’s business—here,
the administration and operation of its athletic program. Dawkins and Code’s
efforts to construct a wall between the universities and their athletic programs fail
to convince us otherwise. And because § 666 specifically prohibits bribery aimed
at agents of federally funded organizations, its language “is adequate . . . to avoid
34
arbitrary enforcement” against Dawkins and Code. 50 We therefore hold that the
statute as applied is constitutionally sound.
V. The district court did not abuse its discretion when making the
challenged evidentiary rulings.
We now turn to the defendants’ numerous evidentiary challenges, which
we find uniformly without merit. Judges are entrusted with considerable
discretion when deciding which evidence to admit or exclude at trial. 51 We will
reverse for an abuse of discretion only when an evidentiary ruling is “manifestly
erroneous” 52 or “arbitrary and irrational.” 53 “Either an error of law or a clear error
of fact may constitute an abuse of discretion.” 54
As an initial matter, we reject the defendants’ request for a heightened
standard of de novo review as to their evidentiary challenges. While the Fifth and
50 Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d at 135.
51 See United States v. Skelos, 988 F.3d 645, 662 (2d Cir. 2021).
52 Id.
53 Gatto, 986 F.3d at 117 (quoting United States v. White, 692 F.3d 235, 244 (2d Cir. 2012)).
54Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Grp., Inc., 464 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Schering Corp. v.
Pfizer, Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 224 (2d Cir. 1999)).
35
Sixth Amendments guarantee the right to present a defense, 55 the defendants
nevertheless must, “[i]n the exercise of this right, . . . comply with established rules
of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the
ascertainment of guilt and innocence.” 56 “Restrictions on presenting evidence do
not offend the Constitution if they serve ‘legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process’ and are not ‘arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are
designed to serve.’” 57 Thus, when a district court restricts evidence based on a
legitimate application of the Federal Rules of Evidence, abuse of discretion
remains the proper standard for our review, and we will afford the district court
the customary “wide latitude to exclude irrelevant, repetitive, or cumulative
evidence.” 58
55 See United States v. Stewart, 433 F.3d 273, 310 (2d Cir. 2006).
56Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973); see also Stewart, 433 F.3d at 311 (“It is . . . well-
settled that the right is subject to the application of procedural and evidentiary rules.”).
57 Stewart, 433 F.3d at 311 (quoting Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55–56 (1987)).
58United States v. Holmes, 44 F.3d 1150, 1157 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S.
673, 679 (1986)).
36
A. The district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
testimony about Code’s order, “Do not accept money from these
people.”
Code sought to call Blondell Tutwiler and Warren Broughton as defense
witnesses to testify to overhearing Code, on separate occasions, speaking on the
telephone and telling his interlocutor: “Do not accept money from these people.”59
He now faults the district court for excluding this testimony on hearsay and
relevancy grounds.
The hearsay ruling was error. Hearsay is an “out-of-court ‘assertion’ that is
‘offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement.’” 60 The
statement “[d]o not accept money from these people” was an order, i.e., an
imperative rather than a declarative statement, and it was offered not for its truth,
but for the fact that it was said. It was therefore not hearsay. 61
59 Doc. 226 at 1, Dkt. No. 17-684.
60United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 84 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Fed.
R. Evid. 801(a), (c)).
61 See United States v. Bellomo, 176 F.3d 580, 586 (1999) (“Statements offered as evidence of
commands . . . rather than for the truth of the matter asserted therein, are not hearsay.”).
37
However, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the
statement on relevancy grounds. Rule 402 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
provides, as a foundational matter, that evidence is admissible only if it is relevant.
Rule 104(b) further provides: “When the relevance of evidence depends on
whether a fact exists, proof must be introduced sufficient to support a finding that
the fact does exist. The court may admit the proposed evidence on the condition
that the proof be introduced later.” “In determining whether [a party] has
introduced sufficient evidence to meet Rule 104(b), . . . [t]he court simply examines
all the evidence in the case and decides whether the jury could reasonably find the
conditional fact . . . by a preponderance of the evidence.” 62
The relevance of Code’s statement, “[d]o not accept money from these
people,” is conditioned on other facts, namely to whom Code was speaking and
whom he meant by “these people.” According to Code, he was talking to the
coaches he sent to Las Vegas to meet with members of LOYD, and he was ordering
them not to take money at the meetings. To prove this, Code sought to introduce
62 Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 690 (1988).
38
evidence that the dates of the phone calls coincided with the dates of the Las Vegas
meetings where Dawkins bribed certain coaches. Code also proffered that the
witnesses overheard him discussing meeting times and room numbers during one
call. However, the proffered testimony was hazy about timing, indicating only that
the phone calls occurred “in the weeks immediately preceding” the Las Vegas
meeting. Further, Code did not proffer that these witnesses could have testified
about who was on the other end of these phone calls, or to whom Code was
referring when he said “these people.” Faced with such a meager proffer, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding testimony about these calls
as irrelevant.
B. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit
testimony regarding Code’s explanation of his agreement with
LOYD.
Code also sought to offer Broughton’s testimony that, sometime after
overhearing Code on the phone, Code told Broughton that LOYD was paying him
a consulting fee to arrange meetings with various coaches. Code argued that this
testimony was admissible pursuant to the “state of mind” exception to the rule
39
against hearsay 63 because he was offering it to demonstrate his understanding of
his relationship with LOYD; he was not offering the statement as evidence of the
actual nature of his relationship with LOYD. The district court was not persuaded,
nor are we.
Rule 803(3) provides a hearsay exception for “[a] statement of the
declarant’s then-existing state of mind (such as motive, intent, or plan).” This
exception specifically excludes “a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact
remembered or believed.” 64 That exclusion “is necessary to prevent the exception
from swallowing the hearsay rule. This would be the result of allowing one’s state
of mind, proved by a hearsay statement, to provide an inference of the happening
of an event that produced the state of mind.” 65
Broughton’s proffered testimony did not reflect Code’s state of mind within
the meaning of Rule 803(3). Rather, Code’s statement regarding his relationship
63 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).
64 Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).
65 United States v. Cardascia, 951 F.2d 474, 487 (2d Cir. 1991).
40
with LOYD was an assertion of fact—that is, an archetypal hearsay statement—
not a statement of motive or intent. In sum, the district court acted well within its
discretion in excluding this testimony.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit
portions of Code’s recorded phone call with Munish Sood.
Code also sought to introduce a portion of a recorded August 8, 2017, phone
call between Code and Munish Sood. On the recording, Code recounted a previous
conversation with Dawkins; he told Sood: “[I] said, Christian, look . . . You’re not
paying my guys.” 66 The district court granted the Government’s motion to
preclude the recording as hearsay, finding that these statements also did not fall
into the state of mind exception because “Mr. Code is recalling a past statement
that he made and offering the fact that he made the statement for its truth.” 67 The
district court was correct.
66 Tr. at 1087.
67 Tr. at 809–10.
41
1. The district court properly excluded this phone call as
hearsay.
“[A]n expression of state of mind on one occasion may be relevant to state
of mind at a later time where the statement reflects ‘a continuous mental
process,’” 68 but “[w]hether a statement is part of a continuous mental process and
therefore admissible under the present state of mind exception is necessarily a
question for the trial court.” 69 We agree with the district court that Code’s August
8, 2017, statement was not admissible to show his state of mind as of the time of
the Las Vegas meetings. To the contrary, it was simply hearsay layered on
hearsay—that is, an assertion of fact regarding an earlier assertion of fact. The most
recent layer was the recorded call, when Code asserted that he had previously
made a particular statement to Dawkins; the older layer was Code’s earlier
assertion of a purportedly true fact (that Dawkins was not paying Code’s
68United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 172 (2d Cir. 2011) (Raggi, J., concurring) (quoting Cardascia,
951 F.2d at 488).
69 Cardascia, 951 F.2d at 488.
42
“guys”). 70 The district court correctly concluded that these layered statements did
not demonstrate a state of mind and, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to admit the phone call.
2. The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
admit the phone call under Rule 807.
Insofar as the district court also rejected Code’s subsequent request to admit
the phone call under the residual hearsay exception found in Rule 807, we identify
no abuse of discretion.
Rule 807 permits a hearsay statement to be admitted into evidence if it is (1)
“supported by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness—after considering the
totality of circumstances under which it was made and evidence, if any,
corroborating the statement,” and (2) “more probative on the point for which it is
70Even if we were to construe Code’s remembered statement to Dawkins as an order to Dawkins
not to pay Code’s “guys,” that does not change the analysis of Code’s statement on the recorded
call; that assertion of fact cannot be read as a statement of Code’s then-existing state of mind
regardless of whether it was layered on top of another assertion of fact or an order. Code offered
the statement in the recorded call “to prove the fact remembered or believed,” which is hearsay.
Fed. R. Evid. 803(3). Whether the fact remembered or believed was that Dawkins was not paying
Code’s guys or that Code ordered Dawkins not to pay his guys, Code’s statement on the call was
inadmissible.
43
offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable
efforts.” 71 In United States v. Bryce, we explained:
[Rule 807] permits admission of hearsay if (i) it is particularly
trustworthy; (ii) it bears on a material fact; (iii) it is the most probative
evidence addressing that fact; (iv) its admission is consistent with the
rules of evidence and advances the interests of justice; and (v) its
proffer follows adequate notice to the adverse party. 72
As to the first prong, we found in Bryce that the defendant’s statements were
sufficiently trustworthy when obtained via covert wiretap and against the
declarant’s penal interest. 73 Code’s statement was obtained by wiretap, but it was
not against his penal interest—in fact, it was self-serving. A few weeks before the
call, Code and Sood entered a consulting agreement with Sood agreeing to pay
Code a fee for referring professional basketball players to Sood’s financial
advisory business. Code, therefore, had an incentive to convince Sood of his ability
to refer business to Sood without relying on bribing coaches. Code’s statements on
71 Fed. R. Evid. 807(a).
72 208 F.3d 346, 350–51 (2d Cir. 1999).
73 See id. at 351.
44
the call are thus not accompanied by sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness as
required by Rule 807.
As to the third prong, the phone call was not “the most probative evidence
addressing” 74 the fact at issue because Dawkins testified at trial that Code had
instructed him not to introduce one of their partners to any coaches who would
accept bribes. Code, therefore, had a factual basis to argue that he instructed
Dawkins not to bribe coaches, even without admitting the phone call. Because the
recorded phone call did not meet the first or third prong of the Bryce test, the
district court acted within its discretion in excluding it.
D. The district court properly excluded evidence of Dawkins’s prior
good acts.
Dawkins sought to call then-University of Arizona head basketball coach
Sean Miller and Louisiana State University head basketball coach Will Wade as
witnesses to prove that Dawkins had “relationships with much more powerful
coaches than the assistant coaches he was charged with bribing, and that he made
74 Bryce, 208 F.3d at 350.
45
no attempt whatsoever to bribe the more influential coaches.” 75 Dawkins argues
that this evidence tends show that he lacked specific intent to commit the charged
offenses.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow testimony
regarding Dawkins’s relationships with coaches whom he did not bribe. Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) provides that, with certain exceptions not relevant here,
“[e]vidence of any . . . crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove a person’s
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” More to the point here, “[a] defendant may not
seek to establish his innocence . . . through proof of the absence of criminal acts on
specific occasions.” 76 No less than evidence of a defendant’s prior “bad acts” used
to show that he committed the crime charged, such “good acts” evidence is only
relevant if we assume that a defendant acted in conformity with those prior good
75 Appellants’ Br. at 72.
76 United States v. Scarpa, 897 F.2d 63, 70 (2d Cir. 1990).
46
acts—i.e., if we make the exact propensity inference Rule 404(b)(1) is designed to
prohibit. 77
In urging otherwise, Dawkins offers three unconvincing theories. First, he
argues that it would not have made sense for him to bribe assistant coaches,
because “the head coach would have been the logically more influential person to
bribe.” 78 But that is just a variant of “good acts” evidence—like arguing that
someone must not have robbed a small bank because he once passed up an
opportunity to rob a bigger bank. And in any event, Dawkins himself explained
(in a recorded call) why it made perfect sense to bribe only assistant coaches: head
coaches are already “making too much money, and it’s too risky.” 79
77See United States v. Bendetto, 571 F.2d 1246, 1249–50 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[C]haracter evidence has
long been admissible only in the form of reputation and not in the form of a recitation of good or
bad acts.” (citing Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948)); see also United States v.
O’Connor, 580 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming district court’s exclusion of testimony that the
defendant had not accepted bribes on previous occasions “because such testimony would in effect
be an attempt to demonstrate [the defendant’s] good character by proof of specific good acts”).
78 Appellants’ Br. at 74.
79 Tr. at 1473.
47
Second, Dawkins argues that because he had pre-existing relationships with
head coaches, he already had access to players and, therefore, lacked a motive to
bribe lower-level coaches for access he already possessed. Dawkins forfeited this
argument by failing to raise it before the district court, but in any event it is
unpersuasive. There was no evidence that Dawkins had ever obtained any clients
of his own, much less through head coaches.
Third, Dawkins contends that he needed to call Miller to rebut evidence
suggesting that Dawkins wanted to bribe Miller. This final argument is both
forfeited (because it was not presented to the district court) and meritless (because
Miller could not have refuted the proposition that Dawkins had an unexecuted
intention to bribe him).
Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
allow Dawkins to call those witnesses. 80
80Dawkins and Code also challenge the district court’s denial of their request to call the
undercover FBI agent to testify about potential misconduct by another agent during the
investigation. We agree with the district court that this proffered testimony would not have
related in any way to their guilt or innocence, nor would it have been probative of the
trustworthiness of any witnesses called at trial.
48
E. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting
testimony of witnesses’ understandings of conversations with
Dawkins and Code.
Throughout trial, the Government played audio and video recordings of
conversations among Dawkins, Code, Blazer, and Sood. The defendants now fault
the district court for permitting Blazer and Sood to testify, over objection,
regarding their understanding of the conversations with Dawkins and Code in
which they took part.
A lay witness’s testimony must be “rationally based on the witness’s
perception,” “helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
determining a fact in issue,” and “not based on scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge.” 81 The rational-basis requirement “is the familiar
requirement of first-hand knowledge or observation.” 82 The helpfulness
81 Fed. R. Evid. 701.
United States v. Rea, 958 F.2d 1206, 1215 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 701 Advisory
82
Committee Note on 1972 Proposed Rules).
49
requirement “is designed to provide ‘assurance[] against the admission of
opinions which would merely tell the jury what result to reach.’” 83
The district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting Blazer and Sood
to testify regarding their understanding of conversations with Dawkins and Code.
Blazer’s and Sood’s testimony was “rationally based on [their] perception[s].” 84
They were participants in these conversations and therefore possessed the
required first-hand knowledge of their context—knowledge that would not have
been readily available to jurors on their own. 85 As the district court noted, the
conversations included jargon that was “not so well known to folks outside of that
industry,” 86 an industry in which Blazer had worked for over a decade, and
83Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 704 Advisory Committee Note on 1972 Proposed Rules (alteration in
original)).
84 Fed. R. Evid. 701.
85See United States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Rule 701 affords the jury an insight
into an event that was uniquely available to an eyewitness. In this respect, the rule recognizes the
common sense behind the saying that, sometimes, ‘you had to be there.’”).
86 Tr. at 384.
50
therefore the testimony was “helpful to clearly understanding” 87 the often-
confusing recorded conversations.
VI. The district court made no reversible errors in providing the
challenged jury instructions.
Dawkins and Code raise a number of challenges to the district court’s jury
instructions, claiming there was error in providing “false exculpatory” and
“conscious avoidance” instructions and in failing to provide “adverse inference”
and “multiple conspiracy” instructions. We review each of these challenges de
novo, applying a harmless error standard. 88
A. Providing a false exculpatory instruction was harmless error.
Providing the false exculpatory instruction was error, but harmless. At trial,
the Government questioned Dawkins about two recorded phone conversations. In
the first call, Code was heard telling Dawkins: “We’re just gonna take these fools’
87 Fed. R. Evid. 701.
88See United States v. Botti, 711 F.3d 299, 308 (2d Cir. 2013) (“If the defendant objected to an
erroneous jury instruction at trial and raises the same claim of error on appeal, a harmless error
standard of review applies.”); Fed R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance
that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”).
51
money.” 89 Dawkins testified that he understood that statement to mean that
Dawkins and Code would not introduce D’Angelo to coaches who were willing to
accept money. In the second call, Dawkins was heard telling D’Angelo, “I don’t
want you to go down that path.” 90 Dawkins testified that this statement was made
to convince D’Angelo not to pursue paying coaches.
Prior to Dawkins’s testimony, the Government advised the district court
that it was not planning to request a false exculpatory charge. After Dawkins
testified, however, the Government sought such an instruction, and, over defense
objection, the court charged the jury:
Now, you’ve heard testimony that a defendant made a statement in
which he claimed that his conduct was consistent with innocence and
not with guilt. The government claims that these statements in which
the defendant attempted to exculpate himself are false. If you find that
the defendant gave a false statement in order to divert suspicion from
himself, you may infer that the defendant believed that he was guilty.
You may not, however, infer on the basis of this alone that the
defendant is, in fact, guilty of the crimes for which he is charged.
Whether or not the evidence as to a defendant’s statements shows that
the defendant believed he was guilty and significance, if any, to be
89 Tr. at 1294.
90 Tr. at 1278.
52
attached to any such evidence, are matters for you, the jury, to
decide. 91
Instructing the jury that false exculpatory statements can evidence
consciousness of guilt is appropriate when the Government presents a substantial
factual predicate at trial showing that the defendant made false statements in an
effort to appear innocent. 92 The instruction is most often (though not only) given
when a defendant made false pretrial statements to law enforcement officers, 93 and
in any event it is typically limited to a defendant’s pretrial statements. 94
But here, Dawkins’s recorded calls were not exculpatory at all. To the
contrary, they were entirely consistent with the Government’s theory of the case,
which was that the defendants wanted to be strategic about which coaches to pay.
91 Tr. at 1672.
92 See, e.g., United States. v. Strother, 49 F.3d 869, 876–77 (2d Cir. 1995).
93See, e.g., id. (approving instruction where defendant made false exculpatory statements to “bank
officials and federal authorities”); United States. v. Durrani, 835 F.2d 410, 424 (2d Cir. 1987) (“False
exculpatory statements made to law enforcement officials are circumstantial evidence and have
independent probative force.”); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 438 (2d Cir. 1974)
(considering false exculpatory statements before grand jury as “circumstantial evidence of guilty
consciousness [that] have independent probative force”).
94 See 1 L. SAND, ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 6.05 (2007).
53
Moreover, Dawkins was talking with his co-conspirators (and an undercover
agent he thought was on board). The Government offers no reason to think that,
during these particular calls while the conspiracy was allegedly in full swing,
Dawkins was trying to lead his co-conspirators astray. Moreover, because
Dawkins was unaware the calls were being recorded, there is no reason to think
Dawkins was trying to deceive any third parties who might have been listening
in.
The Government’s quarrel is not with Dawkins’s recorded statements so
much as his interpretation of them during his trial testimony. But we have never
held that a defendant’s trial testimony can prompt a false exculpatory instruction.
When defendants testify, it is for the jury to decide whether to accept or reject their
testimony, in whole or in part. In these circumstances, there was no reason to give
the jury a special false exculpatory instruction merely because, at trial, the
54
defendant offered an innocent explanation of his own prior statements that the
Government disputed.
This error, however, did not affect Dawkins’s and Code’s substantial rights.
The Government presented ample evidence of their guilt beyond Dawkins’s
testimony explaining the two phone calls, such as the recorded phone calls
between Dawkins, Code, Blazer, and Sood, and the testimony of Blazer and Sood.
Further, the district court instructed the jury that Dawkins’s testimony should be
“examine[d] and evaluate[d] . . . just as you would the testimony of any witness” 95
and that guilt could not be inferred solely from a false exculpatory statement.
These instructions rendered harmless any error in the false exculpatory
instruction. 96
95 Tr. at 1661.
96See United States v. Clark, 45 F.3d 1247, 1251 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he court instructed the jury that
[the defendant’s] trial testimony should be judged in the same fashion as that of other witnesses,
so there was at most harmless error.”).
55
B. The district court did not err in providing a conscious avoidance
instruction.
Over Code’s objection, the district court provided a standard conscious
avoidance charge to the jury, based in part on Code’s statements during a recorded
conversation. As the defendants’ joint brief challenges this instruction only as to
Code, we consider any error solely with respect to him.
“The doctrine of conscious avoidance (i.e., ‘willful blindness’) prevents
defendants from avoiding criminal liability by ‘deliberately shielding themselves
from clear evidence of critical facts that are strongly suggested by the
circumstances’ and that, if known, would render them guilty of a crime.” 97 A
conscious avoidance instruction is appropriate when a defendant claims to lack
the knowledge necessary for a conviction, and the evidence presented at trial
would permit a reasonable jury to conclude that the defendant was “aware of a
97 Gatto, 986 F.3d at 122 (quoting Glob. Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 563 U.S. 754, 766 (2011)).
56
high probability [of the fact in dispute] and consciously avoided confirming that
fact.” 98
A conscious avoidance instruction was warranted in this case. Code placed
his knowledge squarely in dispute by asserting that he was unaware that Dawkins
was paying bribes to coaches. Moreover, the Government provided an ample
factual predicate for the conscious avoidance charge. Specifically, it introduced
evidence of a phone call between Dawkins and Code where the two discussed a
meeting wherein Dawkins believed a coach received a $5,000 bribe. Code told
Dawkins that he had spoken to the coach shortly after that meeting, but “we didn’t
discuss numbers, because I’m not even sure if he wanted me to know. . . . But he
would have told me if I’d have asked, but I didn’t ask.” 99 This suggested that Code
deliberately avoided learning the truth from the coach. Further, the Government
introduced evidence that Code told Dawkins they should protect themselves by
being paid only in cash. These “red flags” serve as evidence that Code wanted to
98United States v. Ferrarini, 219 F.3d 145, 154 (2d Cir. 2000) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Rodriguez, 983 F.2d 455, 458 (2d Cir. 1993)).
99 Government’s Suppl. App’x at 42–43.
57
conduct their activities so as to avoid detection, and that he was aware his dealings
with Dawkins and other co-conspirators were illegitimate. 100
C. The district court did not err in refusing to provide an adverse
inference instruction.
Dawkins and Code requested an adverse inference instruction on the basis
that one of the Government’s “key witnesses,” undercover agent D’Angelo, was
unavailable to them. Initially, Dawkins and Code sought to call D’Angelo to testify
regarding alleged FBI misconduct, but after the district court precluded this
testimony as irrelevant, they sought an instruction permitting the jury to infer
from the Government’s failure to call D’Angelo that the agent’s testimony would
have been adverse to the Government’s case. The district court declined to provide
an adverse inference instruction and instead instructed the jury:
There are several persons whose names you may have heard during
the course of the trial but did not appear to testify. I instruct you that
each party has an equal opportunity, or lack of opportunity, to call
any of these witnesses. Therefore, you should not draw any inferences
or reach any conclusions as to what they would have testified to had
they been called. Their absence should not affect your judgment in
100See United States v. Ferguson, 676 F.3d 260, 278 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Red flags about the legitimacy
of a transaction can be used to show both actual knowledge and conscious avoidance.”).
58
any way. You should, however, remember my instruction that the law
does not impose on a defendant in a criminal case, the burden or duty
of calling any witness or producing any testimony. 101
The district court did not err in giving the quoted instruction or in refusing
to provide an adverse inference instruction. An adverse inference instruction is
appropriate “[w]hen ‘a party has it peculiarly within his power to produce
witnesses whose testimony would elucidate the transaction’ and fails to produce
such witnesses.” 102 In such a case, “the jury may infer that ‘the testimony, if
produced, would be unfavorable’ to that party.” 103 Here, the district court
correctly denied the defendants’ request to call D’Angelo to testify about potential
misconduct by another agent during the investigation. 104 But if the defendants had
wanted to call D’Angelo to testify about his meetings with the defendants, or for
some other permissible purpose, they clearly could have done so. This case,
101 Tr. at 1661.
United States v. Torres, 845 F.2d 1165, 1169 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Graves v. United States, 150
102
U.S. 118, 121 (1893)).
103 Id. (quoting Graves, 150 U.S. at 121).
104 See supra note 80 (holding that testimony about misconduct was properly excluded).
59
therefore, falls within the situation we described in United States v. Caccia: “where
a witness is equally available to both sides, but is not called by either side . . . the
court has discretion to (1) give no instruction and leave the entire subject to
summations, (2) instruct the jury that no unfavorable inference may be drawn
against either side, or (3) instruct the jury that an adverse inference may be drawn
against either or both sides.” 105 The district court’s choice of the second option fell
within its broad discretion.
D. The district court did not err in refusing to provide a multiple
conspiracy instruction.
Code requested a multiple conspiracy instruction, arguing that the evidence
“seem[ed] to demonstrate different agreements with different sort[s] of goals of
working together.” 106 The district court refused to provide this instruction and,
instead, charged the jury that the object of the single conspiracy at issue was
“paying bribes or illegal gratuities to men’s college basketball coaches intending
105 United States v. Caccia, 122 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted).
106 Tr. at 1407.
60
to influence and reward those coaches in connection with the business of their
respective universities.” 107
The district court did not err in refusing to give a multiple conspiracy
instruction. Such a charge is appropriate when “the evidence shows separate
networks operating independently of each other,” 108 but it is not warranted when
the evidence shows “that each alleged member agreed to participate in what he
knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal.” 109 Though the
jury heard evidence of several conversations among differing groups of people,
those conversations did not constitute “separate networks operating
independently of each other” 110 and could not be considered distinct conspiracies.
Therefore, the district court did not err in refusing to instruct the jury on multiple
conspiracies.
107 Tr. at 1618.
108 United States v. Barlin, 686 F.2d 81, 89 (2d Cir. 1982).
United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 963 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting United States v.
109
Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 876 (2d Cir. 1981)).
110 Barlin, 686 F.2d at 89.
61
VII. Conclusion
In sum, we hold as follows:
1. The district court properly denied the motion to dismiss. The indictment
was sufficient on its face, and the district court properly declined to
consider, before trial, whether the Government would be able to prove
the defendants’ guilt based on the factual allegations in the indictment.
2. To prove a violation of § 666(a)(2), the Government need not prove a
nexus between the agent to be influenced or rewarded and the federal
funding that the organization receives. Specifically, the Government
need not prove that the agent had any control over the federal funding
received by the organization, or that the agent worked in a program,
within the organization, that used those federal dollars. Accordingly:
a. The district court’s jury instruction, which did not so limit the
definition of “agent,” was not erroneous.
b. The Government presented sufficient evidence that the coaches, as
university employees, were “agents” of their universities.
62
3. For purposes of § 666(a)(2), the phrase “business or transaction” is not
limited to commercial activities of the federally funded organization but
includes noncommercial activities as well. Accordingly:
a. The district court’s jury instruction that the “business” involved in
this case was “the operation and administration of the university’s
men’s basketball program” was not erroneous.
b. The Government presented sufficient evidence that the bribery
scheme was in connection with the business of the universities.
4. Section 666(a)(2) was constitutional as interpreted and applied to the
defendants.
5. The district court did not abuse its discretion in making any of the
challenged evidentiary rulings.
6. Although the district court erred in providing a false exculpatory
instruction to the jury, the error was harmless. The defendants’
remaining challenges to the jury instructions lack merit.
63
We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s October 22, 2019, judgments of
conviction.
64