United States v. Singer

16-2664
United States v. Singer
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 12th day of July, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 REENA RAGGI,
9 Circuit Judges,
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12 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
13 Appellee,
14
15 -v.- 16-2664
16
17 JASON SINGER,
18 Defendant-Appellant.
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22
23 FOR APPELLANT: EDWARD S. ZAS, Federal
24 Defenders of New York, Inc.
25
26 FOR APPELLEE: DAVID C. JAMES (Lindsay K.
27 Gerdes, on the brief), for
28 Bridget M. Rohde, Acting
1
1 United States Attorney for
2 the Eastern District of New
3 York.
4
5 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
6 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Hall, J.).
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
8 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
9 VACATED and REMANDED.
10 Jason Singer appeals from the judgment of the United
11 States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
12 (Hall, J.) imposing various conditions of supervised
13 release. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
14 underlying facts, the procedural history, and the issues
15 presented for review. We vacate and remand because the
16 parties agree that vacatur is warranted.
17 In 2015, Singer pleaded guilty to child pornography
18 charges and was sentenced primarily to supervised release.
19 He admitted to violating the conditions of that supervised
20 release and was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment and
21 five years of supervised release, with various special and
22 standard conditions. Singer challenges the imposition of
23 those conditions of supervised release, and the government
24 largely does not oppose his challenge.
25 First, Singer takes issue with two of the district
26 court’s special conditions of supervised release: that he
2
1 refrain from electronically accessing pornography of any
2 kind (including of adults), and that he refrain from
3 electronically accessing any “images of naked children,”
4 even if non-pornographic. App’x at 148. Courts may impose
5 special conditions of supervised release when they are
6 “reasonably related” to sentencing objectives, United
7 States v. Reeves, 591 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2010), but they
8 must explain why they are doing so on the record unless the
9 connection is “self-evident.” United States v. Balon, 384
10 F.3d 38, 41 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004). The failure to explicitly
11 articulate a nexus between the same special conditions and
12 the sentencing objectives can be plain error. See United
13 States v. Brown, 653 F. App'x 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary
14 order). While Brown is non-binding, the government concedes
15 that this case is indistinguishable from Brown and that we
16 should vacate the special conditions.
17 Second, Singer challenges nine of the standard
18 conditions of supervised release because the district court
19 failed to explain why it was imposing them and because he
20 argues that they are vague and unnecessary. While we do not
21 necessarily agree that Singer’s challenges have merit–-and
22 indeed, a district court need not explain its reasoning when
23 imposing standard conditions, United States v. Truscello,
24 168 F.3d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1999)–-new, clarifying amendments
3
1 to the relevant Sentencing Guidelines were released after
2 Singer was sentenced. Because we are already remanding the
3 case to the district court over the two special conditions,
4 the government accedes to our allowing the district court on
5 remand to reconsider these provisions in light of subsequent
6 amendments to the Guidelines. We therefore authorize the
7 district court to reconsider the standard conditions upon
8 reimposition of the sentence.
9 Third, Singer objects to the special condition
10 prohibiting him from associating with minors without prior
11 approval by the Probation Department. No explanation of
12 that condition was offered. The government took no position
13 on that condition, so–-again without deciding whether his
14 objection has merit–-we vacate that condition as well.
15 For the foregoing reasons, we hereby VACATE the
16 judgment of the district court and REMAND for further
17 proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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21
22 FOR THE COURT:
23 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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