Bond v. Connecticut Board of Nursing

15-264
Bond v. Connecticut Board of Nursing
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR
AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 19th day of November, two thousand fifteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 DENNIS JACOBS,
8 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
9 GERARD E. LYNCH,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 PAMELA BOND,
14
15 Plaintiff-Appellant,
16
17 v. 15-264
18
19 CONNECTICUT BOARD OF NURSING, et
20 al.,
21
22 Defendants-Appellees.
23 _____________________________________
24
25
26 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Pamela Bond, pro se, Fogelsville,
27 Pennsylvania.
1
1 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No Brief
2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court
3 for the District of Connecticut (Garfinkel, M.J.; Underhill,
4 J.).
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
6 DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
7 Appellant Pamela Bond, pro se, appeals the district court’s
8 sua sponte dismissal of her complaint as frivolous and for
9 failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
10 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts,
11 the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
12 We review de novo a district court’s sua sponte dismissal
13 of a complaint pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). Zaleski v. Burns, 606
14 F.3d 51, 52 (2d Cir. 2010). Upon such review, we conclude that
15 the district court correctly dismissed Bond’s complaint.
16 1. Plaintiff’s claims under the Americans with
17 Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq., and the
18 Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., are time-barred.
19 Plaintiff alleges defendants failed to renew her nursing
20 license in 2009. She further alleges that she wrote to Governor
2
1 Jodi Rell in 2010 complaining about the alleged discrimination,
2 and that Defendant Cordero responded in April 2010 on behalf
3 of the Governor. No acts by any defendant are alleged to have
4 taken place after April 2010. The complaint was not filed until
5 August 2014, more than four years later. When a federal statute
6 does not expressly supply a statute of limitations period,
7 federal courts look to similar provisions of state law. See
8 Graham Cty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States
9 ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409, 414 (2005) (“To determine the
10 applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action created
11 by a federal statute, we first ask whether the statute expressly
12 supplies a limitations period. If it does not, we generally
13 ‘borrow’ the most closely analogous state limitations
14 period.”). The district court did not err in applying
15 Connecticut’s three-year personal injury statute of
16 limitations to Bond’s ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims. See,
17 e.g., Duprey v. Conn. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 191 F.R.D. 329,
18 341 (D. Conn. 2000) (ADA); Lee v. Dep’t of Children & Families,
19 939 F. Supp. 2d 160, 171 (D. Conn. 2013) (Rehabilitation Act).
20 2. Plaintiff also seems to allege violations of the
21 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”),
3
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d et seq.1 It is doubtful that HIPAA provides
2 a private cause of action at all;2 but we need not decide the
3 issue because any private cause of action that may exist under
4 HIPAA would not have a longer statute of limitations than either
5 the ADA or Rehabilitation Act claims at issue here, which are
6 time-barred. Accordingly, Bond’s HIPAA claims are time-barred
7 as well.
8 3. The district court’s denial of leave to amend was not
9 reversible error because leave to amend would have been futile.
10 See Chavis v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010); Cuoco
11 v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000).
12
13
14
1 Plaintiff’s civil cover sheet indicates that the nature of the
action is “other civil rights” and that one of her causes of action
is under “HIPPA,” which is an apparent misspelling of the common
shorthand for HIPAA. See Civil Cover Sheet, Civ. No. 14-1155 (D.
Conn. filed on Aug. 11, 2014) [Dkt. No. 1-1].
2 The Circuits that have considered the issue agree that HIPAA
creates no private right of action. See Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563,
569 (8th Cir. 2010); Wilkerson v. Shinseki, 606 F.3d 1256, 1267 n.4
(10th Cir. 2010); United States v. Streich, 560 F.3d 926, 935 (9th
Cir. 2009); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569, 570-71 (5th Cir. 2006);
see also Warren Pearl Const. Corp. v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
639 F. Supp. 2d 371, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (collecting cases across
multiple circuits and district courts).
4
1 We have considered all of Bond’s arguments and find them
2 to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of
3 the district court.
4
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
5