United States v. Jones

15‐1518‐cr
United States v. Jones
1
2 In the
3 United States Court of Appeals
4 For the Second Circuit
5 ________
6
7 AUGUST TERM, 2015
8
9 ARGUED: APRIL 27, 2016
10 DECIDED: SEPTEMBER 11, 2017
11
12 No. 15‐1518‐cr
13
14 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
15 Appellee,
16
17 v.
18
19 COREY JONES,
20 Defendant‐Appellant.
21 ________
22
23 Appeal from the United States District Court
24 for the Eastern District of New York.
25 No. 13 Cr. 00438 – Nicholas G. Garaufis, District Judge.
26 ________
27
28 Before: WALKER, CALABRESI, and HALL, Circuit Judges.
29 ________
30
31 Defendant Corey Jones appeals from a sentence entered in the
32 United  States  District  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  New  York
33 (Garaufis, J.) following a jury‐trial conviction for assaulting a federal
2  15‐1518‐cr
1 officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111. He was sentenced as a career
2 offender principally to 180 months in prison to be followed by three
3 years  of  supervised  release.  The  primary  basis  for  Jones’  appeal  is
4 that,  in  light  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  holding  in  Johnson  v.  United
5 States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (Johnson I), New York first‐degree robbery
6 is no longer categorically a crime of violence under the force clause
7 of  the  Career  Offender  Guideline,  U.S.S.G.  §§  4B1.1  and  4B1.2,  and
8 that  the  district  court  therefore  erred  in  concluding  that  his  prior
9 conviction for first‐degree robbery would automatically serve as one
10 of the predicate offenses for a career offender designation.
11 After  oral  argument  in  this  matter,  the  Supreme  Court
12 decided Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), which held that
13 the residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline—a second basis
14 for finding a crime of violence—was not unconstitutional. The Court
15 reached  this  conclusion  notwithstanding  the  government’s
16 concession  to  the  contrary  in  cases  around  the  country  that  the
17 residual clause, like the identically worded provision of the Armed
18 Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), was void for vagueness. In light of
19 Beckles,  we  find  that  New  York  first‐degree  robbery  categorically
20 qualifies  as  a  crime  of  violence  under  the  residual  clause  and
21 therefore  need  not  address  Jones’  argument  based  on  the  force
22 clause. We also find that his sentence is substantively reasonable and
23 therefore AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.
3  15‐1518‐cr
1 Judge CALABRESI and Judge HALL concur in the opinion of the
2 Court.  Judge  CALABRESI  files  a  separate  concurring  opinion,  which
3 Judge HALL joins.
4 ________
5 BRIDGET  M.  ROHDE,  Acting  Assistant  United
6 States  Attorney  (Amy  Busa,  Assistant  United
7 States  Attorney,  on  the  brief),  for  Acting  United
8 States  Attorney  for  the  Eastern  District  of  New
9 York, for Appellee.
10
11 MATTHEW  B.  LARSEN, Assistant Federal Defender,
12 Federal  Public  Defenders  of  New  York,  New
13 York, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant.
14 ________
15 JOHN M. WALKER, JR., Circuit Judge:
16 Defendant Corey Jones appeals from a sentence entered in the
17 United  States  District  Court  for  the  Eastern  District  of  New  York
18 (Garaufis, J.) following a jury trial conviction for assaulting a federal
19 officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111. He was sentenced as a career
20 offender principally to 180 months in prison to be followed by three
21 years  of  supervised  release.  The  primary  basis  for  Jones’  appeal  is
22 that,  in  light  of  the  Supreme  Court’s  holding  in  Johnson  v.  United
23 States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (Johnson I), New York first‐degree robbery
24 is no longer categorically a crime of violence under the force clause
25 of  the  Career  Offender  Guideline,  U.S.S.G.  §§  4B1.1  and  4B1.2,  and
26 that  the  district  court  therefore  erred  in  concluding  that  his  prior
4  15‐1518‐cr
1 conviction for first‐degree robbery would automatically serve as one
2 of the predicate offenses for a career offender designation.
3 After  oral  argument  in  this  matter,  the  Supreme  Court
4 decided Beckles v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 886 (2017), which held that
5 the residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline—a second basis
6 for finding a crime of violence—was not unconstitutional. The Court
7 reached  this  conclusion  notwithstanding  the  government’s
8 concession  to  the  contrary  in  cases  around  the  country  that  the
9 residual clause, like the identically worded provision of the Armed
10 Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”), was void for vagueness. In light of
11 Beckles,  we  find  that  New  York  first‐degree  robbery  categorically
12 qualifies  as  a  crime  of  violence  under  the  residual  clause  and
13 therefore  need  not  address  Jones’  argument  based  on  the  force
14 clause. We also find that his sentence is substantively reasonable and
15 therefore AFFIRM the sentence imposed by the district court.
16 Judge CALABRESI and Judge HALL concur in the opinion of the
17 Court.  Judge  CALABRESI  files  a  separate  concurring  opinion,  which
18 Judge HALL joins.
19 BACKGROUND
20 On  June  21,  2013,  Corey  Jones  was  finishing  a  ninety‐two
21 month  federal  sentence  for  unlawful  gun  possession  in  a  halfway
22 house.  Jones  verbally  threatened  a  staff  member,  a  violation  of  the
23 rules  of  the  halfway  house,  and  thereby  was  remanded  to  the
5  15‐1518‐cr
1 custody of the Bureau of Prisons. Two Deputy U.S. Marshals arrived
2 to  take  Jones  to  prison,  but  Jones  resisted  the  Marshals’  efforts  to
3 take him into custody. During the ensuing altercation, Jones bit the
4 finger  of  one  of  the  Marshals,  who  suffered  puncture  wounds,
5 necessitating  antibiotics  and  a  tetanus  vaccine  at  a  hospital.  This
6 assault,  it  turned  out,  had  grave  consequences  for  Jones  who  was
7 now  in  all  likelihood  a  “career  offender”  subject  to  a  greatly
8 enhanced sentence.
9 A  jury  convicted  Jones  of  assaulting  a  federal  officer  in
10 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111.  In the pre‐sentence report, the probation
11 officer calculated a relatively modest base offense level of fifteen for
12 the assault. But the probation officer then determined that Jones was
13 a  career  offender  pursuant  to  the  Career  Offender  Guideline
14 because, in addition to (1) being over eighteen years of age when he
15 committed the assault and (2) the assault being a crime of violence,
16 (3) he had at least two prior felony convictions of a crime of violence.
17 According  to  the  report,  Jones’  previous  two  convictions  in  New
18 York for first‐degree robbery and second‐degree assault satisfied the
19 third  element  of  the  test.  The  probation  officer,  following  U.S.S.G.
20 § 4B1.1,  increased  the  offense  level  to  thirty‐two,  which,  when
21 combined  with  Jones’  criminal  history  category  of  VI,  resulted  in  a
22 Guidelines range of 210 to 262 months of incarceration. Because the
6  15‐1518‐cr
1 statutory  maximum  for  assault  is  twenty  years,  the  effective
2 Guidelines range was 210 to 240 months.
3 The  district  court  adopted  the  findings  of  the  pre‐sentence
4 report and sentenced Jones to 180 months, or fifteen years, in prison
5 for  the  assault,  to  be  followed  by  three years  of  supervised  release.
6 Jones now appeals his sentence, arguing, first, that the district court
7 erred  in  designating  him  a  career  offender  and,  second,  that  his
8 sentence is substantively unreasonable.
9 After  oral  argument,  we  published  an  opinion  that  resolved
10 Jones’  appeal  in  his  favor.  The  government  had  conceded  that  the
11 residual clause was void for vagueness, and we concluded that the
12 force  clause  could  not  be  applied  to  Jones  for  reasons  not  relevant
13 here. Shortly after our decision was issued, however, we vacated the
14 opinion  in  order  to  await  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Beckles.
15 See United States v. Jones, 838 F.3d 291, 291 (2d Cir. 2016) (mem.).
16 Beckles addressed the constitutionality of the Career Offender
17 Guideline’s residual clause, which was in effect at the time of Jones’
18 sentencing  but  has  since  been  removed  and  replaced  with  new
19 language.1  Following  Johnson  v.  United  States,  135  S.  Ct.  2551,  2557
After Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557 (2015) (Johnson II), the Sentencing
1
Commission  amended  the  Guidelines,  effective  August  1,  2016,  to  remove  the  residual
clause  on  the  belief  that,  contrary  to  Beckles’  later  holding,  the  residual  clause  was
unconstitutional.  See  U.S.  Sentencing  Comm’n,  Amendments  to  the  Sentencing
Guidelines  1‐3  (Jan.  21,  2016),  http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment‐
process/official‐text‐amendments/20160121_Amendments_0.pdf.
7  15‐1518‐cr
1 (2015) (Johnson II), which held that the residual clause of the ACCA
2 was  unconstitutionally  void  for  vagueness,  there  existed  a  general
3 belief  that  the  identically  worded  residual  clause  of  the  Career
4 Offender  Guideline  was  similarly  unconstitutional,  as  the
5 government  had  consistently  maintained.  In  Beckles,  however,  the
6 Court held that the residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline
7 is  immune  from  void‐for‐vagueness  challenges,  as  are  the
8 Guidelines  generally.  Beckles,  137  S.  Ct.  at  892.  After  Beckles,  we
9 invited the parties in this case to provide supplemental briefing as to
10 whether first‐degree robbery, as defined in New York, categorically
11 qualifies  as  a  crime  of  violence  under  the  previously  codified
12 residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline.2 We now address
13 that question.
14 DISCUSSION
15 As noted, prior to Beckles, Jones’ argument centered upon the
16 force  clause  of  the  Career  Offender  Guideline.  Aided  now  by  the
17 Supreme  Court’s  holding  that  the  residual  clause  of  the  Career
18 Offender  Guideline  is  not  void  for  vagueness,  we  find  that  first‐
19 degree  robbery  as  defined  in  New  York  is  categorically  a  crime  of
20 violence  under  the  residual  clause  and  thus  we  need  not  address
21 Jones’ argument based on the force clause.
The  alternative  basis  for  the  career  offender  enhancement—the  commission  of  a
2
“controlled substance offense”—is not relevant here. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).
8  15‐1518‐cr
1 In  the  district  court,  Jones  contested  his  career  offender
2 designation  solely  on  the  basis  that  his  first‐degree  robbery
3 conviction occurred when he was a juvenile. He raised no argument
4 that  robbery  in  New  York  was  not  a  crime  of  violence.  We
5 accordingly  review  his  present  challenge  on  that  ground  for  plain
6 error. See United States v. Gamez, 577 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 2009) (per
7 curiam). To meet this standard, Jones must establish the existence of
8 (1) an error; (2) “that is plain”; (3) “that affects substantial rights”; (4)
9 and  that  “seriously  affects  the  fairness,  integrity,  or  public
10 reputation  of  judicial  proceedings.”  Id.  (alterations  and  citation
11 omitted). We apply this standard less “stringently in the sentencing
12 context, where the cost of correcting an unpreserved error is not as
13 great as in the trial context.” Id. We first address point (1): whether
14 the district court committed error of any kind in designating Jones a
15 career offender.
16 I. The Legal Provisions at Issue in This Appeal
17 This  appeal  involves  the  interplay  between  substantive  state
18 criminal  law  and  the  federal  Sentencing  Guidelines  (“Guidelines”).
19 The  question  we  face  is  straightforward:  is  first‐degree  robbery  in
20 New  York,  defined  in  New  York  Penal  Law  §§  160.00  and  160.15,
21 however  it  may  be  committed,  categorically  a  crime  of  violence
22 under the Career Offender Guideline?
9  15‐1518‐cr
1 A defendant commits robbery in New York when he “forcibly
2 steals property,” which the statute defines as “a larceny” involving
3 the use or threatened “immediate use of physical force upon another
4 person.”  N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00.  The various degrees of robbery,
5 which carry different penalties, turn upon the presence of particular
6 aggravating  factors.  Compare  §  160.05  (defining  third‐degree
7 robbery),  with  §  160.10  (defining  second‐degree  robbery),  and  with
8 § 160.15 (defining first‐degree robbery). First‐degree robbery occurs
9 when  a  defendant  commits  robbery  and  during  the  course  of  the
10 crime  or  his  immediate  flight  either  “(1)  [c]auses  serious  physical
11 injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (2) [i]s
12 armed  with  a  deadly  weapon;  or  (3)  [u]ses  or  threatens  the
13 immediate  use  of  a  dangerous  instrument;  or  (4) [d]isplays  what
14 appears to be a . . . firearm.” § 160.15.
15 The  Career  Offender  Guideline  enhances  sentences  for
16 defendants  in  federal  court  who  satisfy  certain  criteria.  See  U.  S.
17 Sentencing  Guidelines  Manual  § 4B1.1(a)  (U.S.  Sentencing  Comm’n
18 Nov. 2014) (U.S.S.G.). A defendant is a career offender if (1) he is “at
19 least  eighteen  years  old  at  the  time  [he]  committed  the  instant
20 offense  of  conviction”;  (2)  his  “instant  offense  of  conviction  is  a
21 felony  that  is  . . .  a  crime  of  violence”;  and  (3)  he  “has  at  least  two
22 prior felony convictions of . . . a crime of violence.” Id.
10  15‐1518‐cr
1 At the time of Jones’ sentencing in 2015,3 as mentioned earlier,
2 there  were  two  separate  clauses  defining  “crime  of  violence.”  See
3 § 4B1.2(a).  The  first  definition,  the  “force  clause,”  specifies  that  a
4 crime  of  violence  is  a  felony  “that  has  as  an  element  the  use,
5 attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person
6 of  another.”  §  4B1.2(a)(1).  The  second  clause  enumerates  several
7 offenses that qualify as crimes of violence—“burglary of a dwelling,
8 arson,  []  extortion[,  or]  involves  use  of  explosives”—before  ending
9 with  the  “residual  clause,”  which  specifies  that  a  crime  of  violence
10 also  includes  any  offense  that  “otherwise  involves  conduct  that
11 presents  a  serious  potential  risk  of  physical  injury  to  another.”
12 § 4B1.2(a)(2) (2015).
13 II. The Categorical and Modified Categorical Approaches
14 The  Supreme  Court  has  set  forth  the  methodology  for
15 determining  whether  a  state  conviction  qualifies  as  a  predicate
16 offense  for  a  federal  sentence  enhancement.  There  are  two  possible
17 methods:  the  categorical  approach  and  the  modified  categorical
18 approach. See Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013).
19 The categorical approach is confined to an examination of the
20 legal  elements  of  the  state  criminal  statute  to  determine  whether
3  With only one exception not relevant here, district courts are to sentence defendants
pursuant to the version of the Guidelines in effect on the date of sentencing. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a)(4)(A); see also Beckles, 137 S. Ct. at 890 & n.1. Accordingly, all references to the
Guidelines  are  to  the  November  2014  version,  which  was  in  effect  when  Jones  was
sentenced on April 24, 2015.
11  15‐1518‐cr
1 they  are  identical  to  or  narrower  than  the  relevant  federal  statute.
2 See  id.  If  so,  a  conviction  under  the  state  statute  categorically
3 qualifies  as  a  predicate  offense.  See  id.  However,  if  the  state  statute
4 criminalizes  any  conduct  that  would  not  fall  within  the  scope  of
5 either the force clause or the residual clause, a conviction under the
6 state statute is not categorically a crime of violence and cannot serve
7 as a predicate offense. See id.
8 Under  the  categorical  approach  we  must  confine  our  inquiry
9 to  the  legal  elements  of  the  state  statute  without  at  all  considering
10 the  facts  of  the  underlying  crime.  The  Supreme  Court  has  set  forth
11 two reasons for this. First, the text of the Career Offender Guideline,
12 like  that  of  the  ACCA,  explicitly  refers  to  convictions  rather  than
13 conduct. See Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2252 (2016). The
14 Career  Offender  Guideline  directs  the  sentencing  court  to  consider
15 whether the offender “has at least two prior felony convictions of . . .
16 a  crime  of  violence,”  U.S.S.G.  § 4B1.1(a),  which  indicates  that  “the
17 sentencer  should  ask  only  about  whether  the  defendant  had  been
18 convicted  of  crimes  falling  within  certain  categories,  and  not  about
19 what  the  defendant  had  actually  done,”  Mathis,  136  S.  Ct.  at  2252
20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
21 Second,  by  focusing  upon  the  legal  elements,  rather  than  the
22 facts  of  the  offense,  the  sentencing  court  “avoids  unfairness  to
23 defendants.”  Id.  at  2253.    “Statements  of  ‘non‐elemental  fact’  in  the
12  15‐1518‐cr
1 records of prior convictions [such as the precise manner in which the
2 crime  was  committed]  are  prone  to  error  precisely  because  their
3 proof  is  unnecessary.”  Id.  (citation  omitted).  Defendants  therefore
4 may have little incentive to ensure the correctness of those details of
5 earlier  convictions  that  could  later  trigger  the  unforeseen  career
6 offender enhancement.
7 Occasionally,  however,  a  state  statute  will  criminalize
8 multiple  acts  in  the  alternative.  Where  this  occurs,  courts  may
9 employ what is known as the modified categorical approach. But the
10 Supreme  Court  has  emphasized  that  the  modified  categorical
11 approach is available only where the state statute is “divisible” into
12 separate  crimes.  Descamps,  122  S.  Ct.  at  2281‐82;  see  also  Flores  v.
13 Holder, 779 F.3d 159, 165‐66 (2d Cir. 2015). A statute is divisible if it
14 “list[s]  elements  in  the  alternative,  and  thereby  define[s]  multiple
15 crimes” but is not divisible if it instead lists “various factual means of
16 committing  a  single  element.”  Mathis,  136  S.  Ct.  at  2249  (emphases
17 added).
18 When  a  statute  is  divisible,  a  court  employing  the  modified
19 categorical  approach  can  then  peer  into  the  record  to  see  which  of
20 the  multiple  crimes  was  implicated.  But  the  court  may  discern  this
21 only  from  “a  limited  class  of  documents  (for  example,  the
22 indictment,  jury  instructions,  or  plea  agreement  and  colloquy)  to
23 determine  what  crime,  with  what  elements,  a  defendant  was
13  15‐1518‐cr
1 convicted  of.”  Id.  Once  that  determination  is  made,  the  modified
2 categorical  approach  is  at  an  end  and  the  court  must  apply  the
3 categorical  approach  to  the  legal  elements  of  the  appropriate
4 criminal offense. Id.
5 New  York’s  first‐degree  robbery  statute  is  divisible  and
6 therefore  subject  to  the  modified  categorical  approach.  New  York
7 defines robbery as “forcibly stea[ling] property.” N.Y. Penal Law §§
8 160.00–.15.  There  are  four  categories  of  first‐degree  robbery,
9 depending on whether: the perpetrator “(1) [c]auses serious physical
10 injury to any person who is not a participant in the crime; or (2) [i]s
11 armed  with  a  deadly  weapon;  or  (3)  [u]ses  or  threatens  the
12 immediate  use  of  a  dangerous  instrument;  or  (4) [d]isplays  what
13 appears to be a . . . firearm.” § 160.15; see also Flores, 779 F.3d at 166
14 (analyzing  the  divisibility  of  New  York’s  first‐degree  sexual  abuse
15 statute).
16 In  the  typical  case  under  the  modified  categorical  approach
17 we  would  examine  certain  documents  in  the  record  to  ascertain
18 which of the four crimes Jones committed. In this instance, however,
19 we  are  stymied  and  unable  to  employ  the  modified  categorical
20 approach  because  no  one  has  produced  the  record.  Where  this
21 occurs,  however,  we  are  not  at  a  complete  loss.  We  instead  look  to
22 “the least of [the] acts” proscribed by the statute to see if it qualifies
23 as  a  predicate  offense  for  the  career  offender  enhancement.  See
14  15‐1518‐cr
1 Johnson  I,  559  U.S.  at  137.  If  so,  Jones’s  first‐degree  robbery
2 conviction  can  serve  as  a  predicate  offense  for  the  enhancement
3 regardless of which first‐degree robbery subpart provided the basis
4 for his conviction. See id.
5 Jones  identifies  the  act  of  “forcibly  stealing  property”  while
6 “armed with a deadly weapon” as being the “least of the acts” in the
7 statute, and we agree. See N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15(2). The question
8 we must answer, therefore, is whether a defendant who perpetrates
9 such  an  act  commits  a  crime  of  violence  within  the  meaning  of  the
10 residual clause of the Career Offender Guideline.
11   In the opinion we issued and then withdrew, prior to Beckles,
12 we  addressed  only  the  force  clause.  We  did  not  concern  ourselves
13 with  whether  Jones’  first‐degree  robbery  conviction  qualified  as  a
14 crime  of  violence  under  the  Career  Offender  Guideline’s  residual
15 clause because, consistent with the government’s concession on that
16 point,  we  had  previously  held  that  the  residual  clause  was
17 unconstitutional in light of Johnson II. See United States v. Welch, 641
18 F.  App’x  37,  42‐43  (2d  Cir.  2016)  (summary  order).  Now  that  the
19 Supreme Court has held in Beckles that the Guidelines, regardless of
20 whatever  other  defects  they  may  have,  cannot  be  void  for
21 vagueness, 137 S. Ct. at 890, we are free to assess whether New York
22 first‐degree  robbery  categorically  qualifies  as  a  crime  of  violence
23 under the residual clause.
15  15‐1518‐cr
1 III. Whether  Jones’  Conviction  Qualifies  as  a  Crime  of
2 Violence Under the Residual Clause
3 We have little difficulty concluding that the “least of the acts”
4 of  first‐degree  robbery  satisfies  the  definition  of  the  Guidelines’
5 residual  clause.  The  least  of  the  acts,  both  sides  agree,  is  “forcibly
6 stealing  property”  while  “armed  with  a  deadly  weapon.”  The
7 residual  clause  provides  that  a  crime  of  violence  includes  any
8 offense that “ involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk
9 of  physical  injury  to  another.”  U.S.S.G.  §  4B1.2(a)(2).  Plainly,  a
10 robber  who  forcibly  steals  property  from  a  person  or  from  his
11 immediate vicinity, while armed with a deadly weapon, engages in
12 “conduct  that  presents  a  serious  potential  risk  of  physical  injury  to
13 another.” See id.
14 If there were any misgiving on this score, it is removed by the
15 commentary  provision  to  the  Guidelines  in  effect  at  the  time  of
16 Jones’ sentencing, which specifically enumerated robbery as a crime
17 of violence.4 § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1.
4  The relevant commentary provision specified in full:
“Crime of violence” includes murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, aggravated assault,
forcible  sex  offenses,  robbery,  arson,  extortion,  extortionate  extension  of  credit,  and
burglary of a dwelling. Other offenses are included as ‘crimes of violence’ if (A) that
offense has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force
against the person of another, or (B) the conduct set forth (i.e., expressly charged) in
the  count  of  which  the  defendant  was  convicted  involved  use  of  explosives
16  15‐1518‐cr
1 Commentary  provisions  must  be  given  “controlling  weight”
2 unless  they:  (1) conflict  with  a  federal  statute,  (2)  violate  the
3 Constitution,  or  (3) are  plainly  erroneous  or  inconsistent  with  the
4 Guidelines  provisions  they  purport  to  interpret.  Stinson  v.  United
5 States, 508 U.S. 36, 45 (1993). Jones has not identified any such flaws
6 nor  do  we  discern  any.  Where  the  basis  for  categorizing  a  prior
7 conviction  as  a  crime  of  violence  is  that  the  offense  is  specifically
8 enumerated  as  such  in  the  Career  Offender  Guideline  or  its
9 commentary,  we  undertake  the  categorical  approach  by  comparing
10 the  state  statute  to  the  generic  definition  of  the  offense.  See  United
11 States v. Walker, 595 F.3d 441, 445‐46 (2d Cir. 2010).
12 That  there  is  consensus  in  the  criminal  law  as  to  what
13 constitutes  robbery  thus  further  convinces  us  that  the  least  of  the
14 acts  constituting  New  York  first‐degree  robbery,  i.e.,  “forcibly
15 stealing property” while “armed with a deadly weapon,” is a crime
16 of  violence  under  the  residual  clause.  As  we  have  noted,  “all  fifty
17 states  define  robbery,  essentially,  as  the  taking  of  property  from
18 another  person  or  from  the  immediate  presence  of  another  person
19 by  force  or  by  intimidation.”  Id.  (emphasis  in  original).  Indeed,  it
20 would seem that, pursuant to the commentary to the former residual
(including any explosive material or destructive device) or, by its nature, presented a
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2 cmt. n.1 (2015).
17  15‐1518‐cr
1 clause,  robbery  of  any  degree  in  New  York  qualifies  as  a  crime  of
2 violence.
3 Jones contends nonetheless that New York’s robbery statute is
4 broader than the generic definition. He argues, specifically, that the
5 generic definition of robbery requires the use or threat of force in the
6 process of asserting dominion over the property that is the subject of
7 the  offense,  whereas  the  New  York  statute  would  be  violated  by  a
8 robber  who  uses  or  threatens force  after  assuming  dominion  of  the
9 property. We disagree.
10 The  specific  language  of  the  New  York  robbery  statute  that
11 Jones points to is that “forcible stealing” consists of (1) the “use[] or
12 threat[]  [of]  immediate  use  of  physical  force  upon  another  person”
13 (2)  “in  the  course  of  committing  a  larceny”  (3)  for  the  purpose  of
14 either  “preventing  or  overcoming  resistance  to  the  taking  of  the
15 property  or  to  the  retention  thereof  immediately  after  the  taking”  or
16 “[c]ompelling  the  owner  of  such  property  or  another  person  to
17 deliver up the property or to engage in other conduct which aids in
18 the commission of the larceny.” N.Y. Penal Law § 160.00 (emphasis
19 added).
20 The  generic  definition  of  robbery,  however,  is  broader  than
21 Jones  acknowledges.  It  is  true  that  the  common  law  definition
22 confines robbery to the use or threat of force before, or simultaneous
23 to, the assertion of dominion over property and therefore comports
18  15‐1518‐cr
1 with Jones’ argument. See, e.g., Wayne LaFave, 3 Substantive Criminal
2 Law  § 20.3(e)  (2d  ed.  Supp.  2016);  Charles  E.  Torcia,  4  Wharton’s
3 Criminal  Law  §  463  (15th  ed.  Supp.  2016).  But  a  majority  of  states
4 have  departed  from  the  common  law  definition  of  robbery,
5 broadening  it,  either  statutorily  or  by  judicial  fiat,  to  also  prohibit
6 the peaceful assertion of dominion followed by the use or threat of
7 force. See, e.g., LaFave § 20.3(e); Torcia § 463; State v. Moore, 274 S.C.
8 468, 480‐81 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (collecting state statutes and judicial
9 decisions  that  have  departed  from  the  common  law  definition  of
10 robbery).  Indeed,  the  Model  Penal  Code,  which  we  relied  upon  in
11 United States v. Walker, 595 F.3d at 446, is often cited as the authority
12 for  expanding  the  definition  of  robbery  in  this  manner,  see  LaFave
13 § 20.3(e),  because  it  specifies  that  robbery  includes  conduct  where
14 the initial use or threat of force occurs “in flight after the attempt or
15 commission  [of  the  theft],”  Model  Penal  Code  § 222.1.  As  a  result,
16 this broader definition has supplanted the common law meaning as
17 the generic definition of robbery. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
18 575, 598 (1990) (specifying that the “generic” definition of a crime is
19 the  “sense  in  which  the  term  is  now  used  in  the  criminal  codes  of
20 most states”).
21 Moreover,  New  York  places  two  restrictions  on  the  temporal
22 relationship  between  the  underlying  theft  and  the  use  or  threat  of
23 force  that  buttress  the  conclusion  that  its  definition  of  robbery  falls
19  15‐1518‐cr
1 within the generic definition of the offense: (1) force must be “in the
2 course of committing a larceny,” i.e., a theft, and (2) force must occur
3 during “immediate flight” after the taking for purposes of retaining
4 the  property.  See  N.Y.  Penal  Law  § 160.00.  Jones  does  not  provide,
5 and  we  are  not  aware  of,  any  authority  that  the  New  York  statute
6 criminalizes the use of force after the robber has successfully carried
7 the property away and reached a place of temporary safety.
8 For all of the foregoing reasons, we easily conclude that New
9 York’s  definition  of  robbery  necessarily  falls  within  the  scope  of
10 generic robbery as set forth in the commentary to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a).
11 Because Jones’ argument that first‐degree robbery is not necessarily
12 a crime of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a) under
13 the  categorical  approach  is  without  merit,  the  district  court did  not
14 commit error, much less plain error, in sentencing Jones as a career
15 offender.
16 IV. The Substantive Reasonableness of Jones’ Sentence
17 Finally,  we  reject  Jones’  argument  that  his  sentence  of  180
18 months  is  substantively  unreasonable.  In  assessing  the  substantive
19 reasonableness  of  a  sentence  for  abuse  of  discretion,  we  review
20 questions of law de novo and questions of fact for clear error. United
21 States  v.  Bonilla,  618  F.3d  102,  108  (2d  Cir.  2010)  (citation  omitted).
22 We  may  not  substitute  our  own  judgment  for  that  of  the  district
23 court and can find substantively unreasonable only those sentences
20  15‐1518‐cr
1 that  are  so  “shockingly  high,  shockingly  low,  or  otherwise
2 unsupportable  as  a  matter  of  law”  that  affirming  them  would
3 “damage  the  administration  of  justice.”  United  States  v.  Rigas,  583
4 F.3d  108,  123  (2d  Cir.  2009).  In  the  “overwhelming  majority  of
5 cases,” a sentence within the Guidelines range will “fall comfortably
6 within  the  broad  range  of  sentences  that  would  be  reasonable.”
7 United  States  v.  Perez‐Frias,  636  F.3d  39,  43  (2d  Cir.  2011)  (citation
8 omitted).
9 Jones’  Guidelines  range  was  210  months  to  262  months,  the
10 top of which was lowered to 240 months, the statutory maximum for
11 assault  of  a  federal  officer.  The  court  imposed  a  sentence  of  180
12 months, or fifteen years, which, while substantial, was considerably
13 below the Guidelines range.
14 The  primary  thrust  of  Jonesʹ  argument  is  that  a  fifteen‐year
15 sentence  is  substantively  unreasonable  for  an  assault  of  a  federal
16 officer that consists solely of biting the victimʹs finger and in which
17 the injury was not permanent. Jonesʹ argument, however, misses the
18 mark.  The  district  court  specified  a  combination  of  reasons  for  the
19 fifteen‐year  sentence,  including:  (1)  the  need  to  encourage  respect
20 for the law and cooperation with law enforcement officials who are
21 attempting  to  carry  out  their  lawful  duties;  (2)  Jonesʹ  substantial
22 prior  criminal  history,  consisting  of  seven  prior  convictions,  two  of
23 which, in addition to the assault of the officer, resulted in him being
21  15‐1518‐cr
1 designated  a  career  offender;  and  (3) Jonesʹ  substantial  history  of
2 misconduct  while  incarcerated,  including  twenty‐seven  occasions
3 upon which he was disciplined.
4 Jones  attempts  to  compare  his  case  to  instances  where
5 defendants  were  convicted  of  violating  the  same  statute,  received
6 lower  sentences,  and  arguably  committed  more  egregious  conduct.
7 That  defendants  convicted  of  similar  or  even  more  serious  conduct
8 received lower sentences, however, does not render Jonesʹ sentence
9 substantively  unreasonable.  Plainly,  the  district  court  also  relied
10 upon  Jones’  criminal  and  prison  history,  including  his  career
11 offender status, which distinguishes this case from those to which he
12 refers.  Under  these  circumstances,  we  cannot  say  that  Jones’
13 sentence was substantively unreasonable.
14 CONCLUSION
15 For  the  reasons  stated  above,  we  AFFIRM  the  sentence
16 imposed by the district court.
1 GUIDO
O CALABR
RESI, Circuit Judge, with
w whom
m Peter W. H
Hall, Circu
uit Judge, jo
oins,
2 concurrring:
3 I believe Judge Walkeer’s opinio
on states th
he law corrrectly, and
d I concur iin
4 its reaso
oning and in its resu
ult. I write separately
y because tthat result,, while
5 mandatted by the law, seem
ms to me to be highly unjust, an
nd little sho
ort of absu
urd.
6 To expllain why I think so, let me givee the facts aand proced
dural histo
ory of this case
7 y that is slightly diffferent from
in a way m the majorrity opinio
on—which
h, howeverr, is
8 also corrrect, and in
i which, as
a noted ab
bove, I join
n, fully.
9 A. Backgroun
B nd
10 Corey
C Jones is a now--39-year-old man wiith an I.Q. of 69.1 Wh
hile at a
11 residential reentry
y center (“
“RRC”), fin
nishing a n
nearly eigh
ht-year sen
ntence for
12 felony possession
p n of a firearrm, (he wa
as five mon
nths’ shy o
of his sched
duled
13 release)), Jones alleegedly gru
umbled a threat
t and was insoleent to a staaff membeer.
14 The stafff memberrs called th
he federal marshals
m tto take custody of Jon
nes, who
15 resisted he marshalls conceded that, durring his reesistance, Jo
d arrest. Th ones neverr
16 stepped
d towards, kicked, orr punched them. Non
netheless, as they were trying to
17 lower his
h head to the groun
nd, the han
nd of the m
marshal wh
ho was app
prehending
18 Jones sllipped dow
wn Jones’ face,
f and Jo
ones bit hiim, causing
g the fingeer to bleed
d.
19 Shortly thereafterr, Jones saiid, “I give,” and wass arrested aand taken away. Thee
20 marshal provided
d a sworn affidavit
a in
ndicating tthat he sufffered no lo
oss becausse of
21 the inju
ury and tha
at he did not
n requestt damages.. At trial, th
he bite waas describeed
22 by the prosecutor
p r as “not th
he most serrious woun
nd you’ll eever see.”
1  This I.Q. sscore is con
nsidered too be in thee “mentally
y deficientt” range off
intellecttual functiioning, bellow the gennerally acccepted ran
nge for “inttellectual
disability,” which h is an I.Q. score of approximattely 70‐75. See Dist. CCt. Dkt. 466–1
at 5, Jon
nes Sentencing Mem morandum, Exhibit A A, “Sentenccing Memo o Letter of Dr.
Sanford d L. Drob”,, at 5.
1
1 Pursuant to a single-count indictment for assaulting a federal officer, Jones
2 was found guilty in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1)–(b). Under the Guidelines
3 as they were then calculated, and as described in Judge Walker’s opinion, Jones
4 faced a sentence of between 210–240 months, (seventeen-and-one-half to twenty
5 years), with the high end being the statutory maximum. This calculation was
6 based on Jones’ designation as a career offender, a status that was triggered by
7 two earlier convictions: (i) an assault in which the then twenty-year-old Jones
8 shot a man in the leg, which later needed to be amputated, and (ii) a conviction
9 for first-degree robbery in New York, a crime Jones committed when he was
10 sixteen years old.2
11 The district court, applying what it believed was the law of this circuit as it
12 stood at that time, found that Jones’ robbery conviction constituted a “crime of
13 violence” under the categorical approach to the Sentencing Guidelines. See
14 United States v. Spencer, 955 F.2d 814, 820 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that, under the
15 law of New York, the crime of attempted third-degree robbery constitutes a
16 “crime of violence” for the purposes of the “force clause” of the Sentencing
17 Guidelines), abrogated by Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133 (2010) (Johnson I);
18 see also United States v. Reyes, 691 F.3d 453 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).3 Given this
2 A defendant’s youthful offender adjudications are, for the purposes of the
relevant Guidelines calculations, deemed “‘adult convictions’ [where the
defendant] (1) pleaded guilty to both felony offenses in an adult forum and (2)
received and served a sentence of over one year in an adult prison for each
offense.” See United States v. Jones, 415 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 2005).
3 A crime of violence, along with other factors, serves as a predicate
requiring a district court to sentence a defendant as a “career offender” subject to
an increased sentencing spectrum. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 4B1.1(a) (U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Nov. 2014) (U.S.S.G.) (defining “career
offender” as a defendant who is (1) “at least eighteen years old at the time [he]
committed the instant offense of conviction;” (2) his “instant offense of
2
1 holding, and because Jones’ prior conviction for assault certainly constituted a
2 crime of violence, the district court determined that the career offender status
3 applied. Absent Jones’ designation as a career offender, his Guidelines sentence
conviction is a felony that is . . . a crime of violence;” and (3) he “has at least two
prior felony convictions of . . . a crime of violence.”) .
As described in Judge Walker’s opinion, there were, at the time of Jones’
sentencing, two clauses in the Sentencing Guidelines, either of which could
define a “crime of violence.” These two clauses are referred to as the “force
clause,” and the “residual clause.” The “force clause” specifies that a crime of
violence is a felony that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). The
“residual clause” comes at the end of a second set of enumerated offenses, and
provides that a crime of violence also includes any offense that “otherwise
involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to
another.” Id. § 4B1.2(a)(2).
In Spencer, we had held that, under the force clause, third‐degree robbery,
as defined by New York law, was a crime of violence. After the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the force clause in Johnson I, however, we held that battery, as defined
by the state of Florida, was not a crime of violence. Reyes, 691 F.3d 453. In Reyes,
we noted Johnson I’s dictate that, to constitute a “crime of violence” under the
categorical approach, a crime must involve the “use of physical force,” and
found that battery did not meet that definition. Id. at 460. Even after Spencer, it
was an open question whether first‐degree robbery was a crime of violence. After
Reyes, that question depended on whether the use of physical force was, indeed,
present in the New York definition of that crime.
Judge Garaufis held that the reasoning of Spencer meant that first degree
robbery was a crime of violence. In our former, withdrawn opinion, we held, for
reasons similar to those given in Reyes, that first‐degree robbery was not. Cf.,
United States v. Yates, No. 16‐3997, 2017 WL 3402084 (6thCir. Aug 9, 2017)
(finding in analogous circumstances that the force clause does not apply). All of
that analysis, however, was with respect to the force clause, not the co‐extant –
and here essential – residual clause.
3
1 range would
w havee been betw
ween 36 an
nd 48 mon
nths (or thrree to fourr years),
2 instead of the ran
nge of 210-2
240 month
hs, or the seeventeen-aand-one-h
half years to
o
3 twenty years thatt the court deemed ap
pplicable.
4 Departing
D downward significa
antly from
m the Guidelines, Ju
udge Garaaufis
5 sentencced Jones to
o fifteen yeears.
6 B. Doctrinal D
D ments and IImpact on Sentencin
Developm ng
7 Ju
udge Gara
aufis’ opiniion rested on his inteerpretation
n of the ap
pplication o
of
8 the forcce clause to
o New Yorrk State’s definition
d o
of robbery
y. Because JJudge
9 Garaufiis was of th
he view th
hat first-deg
gree robbeery was a ccrime of viiolence un
nder
10 the forcce clause ev
ven after Johnson
J I, Ju
udge Garaaufis did n
not addresss the
11 addition
nal possible determiinant of a crime
c of viiolence now
w at issue before us:: the
12 “residu
ual clause.”
”
13 After
A Jones’ initial sen
ntencing, but
b before we heard Jones’ app
peal, the
14 Suprem
me Court fo
ound langu
uage in thee Armed C minal Act (“ACCA”))
Career Crim
15 which was
w identiccal to the language
l used
u in thee residual cclause of th
he
16 Guideliines—the lynchpin
l clause undeergirding tthe authorrity of Jonees’ currentt
17 sentencce—to be unconstitut
u tionally va
ague. Johnsson v. Uniteed States, 1135 S. Ct. 22551,
18 2557 (20
015) (Johnsson II). Sub
bsequent to
o Johnson III, most fed
deral courts of appeaals
19 to decid
de the issue found th
hat, given the
t Suprem
me Court’ss decision, the residu
ual
20 clause was
w also un
nconstitutionally vag
gue. See U
United Statees v. Pawlakk, 822 F.3d
d
21 902, 907
7-11 (6th Cir.
C 2016); United
U Stattes v. Hurlbburt, 835 F..3d 715, 7225 (7th Cir..
22 2016); United
U Statees v. Calabrretta, 831 F.3d
F 128, 1337 (3d Cir.. 2016); Un
nited States v.
23 Madrid,, 805 F.3d 1204,
1 1210 (10th Cir. 2015); but see Unitedd States v. M
Matchett, 8002
24 F.3d 118
85, 1193-96
6 (11th Cirr. 2015).
25 As
A a result—
—with thee applicatio
on of the fo
orce clausee to Jones iin doubt aas a
26 result of
o Johnson I,
I and with
h the residu
ual clause struck dow
wn across several
4
1 circuits as a resultt of Johnson
n II—any number
n off defendan
nts were fo
ound not to
o
2 have co
ommitted crimes
c of violence,
v eiither as a m
matter of ffirst instance, or on
3 appeal, for purpo
oses of deteermining their
t careerr offender status und
der the
4 Guideliines. Accorrdingly, th
hey were reesentenced
d (or senteenced in th
he first
5 instancee) to lowerr sentencess. We are told
t the go
overnmentt is not chaallenging th
hese
6 lower seentences.
7 C. Removal o
R f the Resid
dual Clausse from th
he Guideliines
8 The
T Sentencing Comm
mission, in
n light of th
he decision
ns of severral courts o
of
9 appealss grounded
d on the Su
upreme Co
ourt’s deciision in Johhnson II, rev
vised the
10 Guideliines and reemoved th
he residual clause as a basis forr future sen
ntencing. ((See
11 Majority Opinion
n, n.1).
12 D. Procedural
P l History in
n this Cou
urt
13 We
W heard Jones’ appeeal after Johnson II, an
nd we held
d: (i) that, under John
nson
14 I, the fo
orce clause was not applicable
a to
t him; (ii)) (like seveeral of our sister circu
uits)
15 that thee other posssible grou
und for Jon
nes’ career offender sstatus, the residual
16 clause, was uncon
nstitutiona
al, pursuan
nt to Johnsoon II; and, (iii) that, aas a result,
17 Jones’ robbery
r con
nviction did not qua
alify as a predicate viiolent offeense underr the
18 Guideliines. We th
herefore orrdered Jon
nes’ sentencce vacated
d and sent the case baack
19 for reseentencing. We
W expresssly instruccted the diistrict courrt that, in rresentencin
ng
20 Jones, itt should no
ot treat him
m as a careeer offendeer.
21 Before
B the district
d cou
urt resenteenced Jonees, howeveer, the Suprreme Courrt
22 granted
d certiorari in Beckles v.
v United States,
S 137 SS. Ct. 886 ((2017), to cconsider
23 whether the langu
uage that, in Johnson II it had d
deemed un
nconstitutio
onally vag
gue
24 in a statute, was allso void fo
or vagueneess when th
he identicaal languag
ge was
25 employ
yed in the Guidelines
G s. In view of
o the Supreme Courrt’s action,, we withd
drew
26 our opin
nion, and suspended
d resenten
ncing pend
ding the Becckles decision.
5
1 Interestingly, at least one district court, in an independent case, had already
2 granted a motion for resentencing in light of our now-recalled decision. Miles v.
3 United States, No. 11-cr-581, 2016 WL 4367958 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 15, 2016).
4 In Beckles, the Supreme Court held the relevant clause of the Guidelines not
5 to be unconstitutionally vague.4 Hence, the clause remained applicable to cases
6 like the one before us.
7 As a result, we are bound to consider Jones’ earlier convictions on the basis
8 of the revived (but no longer extant, since it has been removed by the Sentencing
9 Commission) residual clause. Under that clause, we today correctly find that
10 Jones’ robbery conviction constituted a crime of violence and, as such, served as
11 a predicate offense which—together with his assault convictions—categorically
12 renders Jones a career offender. He was, therefore, correctly subject to the
13 sentencing guidelines of 210–240 months on the basis of which the district
14 court—albeit, perhaps incorrectly relying on the force clause rather than the
15 residual clause— had imposed his original sentence of fifteen years.
16 Because that sentence was correctly based on the Guidelines as we now
17 hold they stood when the district court sentenced Jones, we now affirm that
18 sentence. We also hold that, given the applicable Guidelines, the sentence
4  The Supreme Court held as it did based on the history of discretion in
sentencing before the Guidelines and the discretionary nature of the Guidelines
themselves. My concern with our holding today does not dispute the correctness
of the Court’s decision. That the Court’s decision was unexpected, however,
cannot be doubted. Between Johnson II and Beckles, courts of appeals, prosecutors,
and the Sentencing Commission took actions which assumed a different result.
Indeed, the Justice Department had taken the position that Johnson II governed
Beckles, and the Supreme Court had to appoint special counsel to present the
opposite view. It is that unexpectedness and what happened between Johnson II
and Beckles that is, in significant part, responsible for making today’s result so
troubling to me.
6
1 imposed—which departed significanttly downw
ward from these appllicable
2 Guideliines—was not substa
antively un
nreasonable.
3 E. DISCUSSI
D ION
4 I agree thatt the senten
nce is not substantiv
s vely unreassonable; bu
ut I believee
5 the resu
ult to be clo
ose to absu
urd.
6 Jo
ones was about
a to bee released when he ccommitted
d a crime w
whose full
7 nature and
a signifiicance the district co
ourt is betteer able to eevaluate th
han we. Th
he
8 district court deciided on a fifteen-yea
f ar sentencee. Perhaps this senten
nce was baased
9 on its view of Jones’ prior crriminal activity, and
d on Jones’’ dangerou
usness.
10 Perhapss the senteence, deparrting down
nward nottably from
m the Guideelines, wass,
11 howeveer, imposed
d because the districct court bellieved thatt, given those
12 Guideliines, it had
d gone dow
wn as much as it felt it reasonaably could..
13 The
T fact is that
t we do
o not know
w what sen
ntence the d
district cou
urt would
14 have deeemed app
propriate iff Jones had
d been sub
bject to diffferent Guidelines. H
Had
15 our opin
nion comee down slig
ghtly earlieer, as did tthose of m
most other ccircuits
16 dealing
g with simiilar issues, Jones wou
uld have b
been resenttenced purrsuant to a
17 substan
ntively low
wer Guideliines rangee. We woulld, then, kn
now whatt sentence
18 would have
h seem
med approp
priate to th
he district ccourt in th
hose circum
mstances. H
Had
19 that sen
ntence been as it apparrently was in any number of otther cases in
n lower—a
20 other ciircuits—th
he Governm
ment apparently wou
uld not haave objected to it. Haad
21 Jones co
ommitted his crime under
u the currently eexisting G
Guidelines, (i.e., in wh
hich
22 the residual clausse has been
n removed
d by the Sen
ntencing C
Commissio
on), and
23 assumin
ng that wee would ha
ave read th
he force claause not to
o apply (ass we did in
n
24 our earllier, now-rretracted opinion),
o th
he district court wou
uld have haad, again, the
25 opportu
unity to ga
auge Jones’ degree off dangerou
usness und
der a very different sset
26 of Guid
delines than
n those wee, today, fiinally concclude it corrrectly app
plied at
27 sentenccing.
7
1 Because we (advisedly) withdrew our earlier opinion in light of the
2 Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Beckles, and because of the Supreme Court’s
3 ultimate decision in Beckles, I agree that we now are bound to affirm Jones’
4 original sentence. This means that, as a result of timing quirks (his appeal to us
5 was slightly too late, leading to our decision to pull our earlier opinion; his
6 crimes too early so that the now-removed, but no longer unconstitutional,
7 residual clause was in effect when he committed them), Jones receives a very,
8 very high sentence in contrast with almost every similarly situated defendant.
9 What is more—and this may be the true source of my sense of absurdity—
10 there appears to be no way in which we can ask the district court to reconsider
11 the sentence it ordered in view of the happenstances that have worked against
12 Jones, and in view of its assessment of Jones’ crimes and of its downward
13 departure.
14 Were this a civil case, there would be any number of ways of letting the
15 lower court revisit matters.5 But, as far as I have been able to discern, there is no
16 way for us to send this back to the district court and ask it to tell us what I
17 believe should determine Jones’ sentence:
18 In the light of sentences that other similarly guilty defendants have
19 received, and in the light of Jones’ own situation, both of which you, as
20 a district judge, are best suited to determine, what is the sentence that
21 you deem appropriate in this case?
5  For example: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6) provides a court
with the power to entertain a motion to relieve a party from a final judgment for
“any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). To similar effect,
Rule 60(d) states that a court has the power to “entertain an independent action
to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding.” Id. 60(d)(1).
8
1 I find our inability to learn this to be both absurd and deeply troubling. I
2 believe our affirmance is correct, and that we can do no other. I hope, however,
3 that somewhere, somehow, there exists a means of determining what would, in
4 fact, be an appropriate sentence for Jones.
9