DocketNumber: 28277_1
Judges: Lumbard, Waterman, Friendly
Filed Date: 1/29/1964
Status: Precedential
Modified Date: 10/19/2024
The much litigated and discussed ease of Zdanok v. Glidden Company,
What we previously had before us was a complaint of Olga Zdanok and four other former Elmhurst employees, brought in the Supreme Court of New York for New York County and removed by Glidden, on the basis of diverse citizenship, to the District Court for the Southern District of New York, where Judge Palmieri found against the plaintiffs on the merits. In an opinion by Judge Madden of the Court of Claims with Judge Waterman concurring and Chief Judge Lumbard dissenting, we held that the plaintiffs were entitled by the contract “to be employed at the defendant’s Bethlehem plant, with the seniority and reemployment rights which they had acquired at the Elmhurst plant” and to recover the damages caused by Glidden’s refusal to recognize that entitlement; we remanded the case to the District Court to determine what these damages were. The Supreme Court’s refusal to review our decision save as to the legality of participation therein by a judge of the Court of Claims, 368 U.S. 814, 82 S.Ct. 56, 7 L.Ed.2d 22 (1961), and its approval of such participation, 370 U.S. 530, 82 S. Ct. 1459, 8 L.Ed.2d 671 (1962), left our ruling in effect.
There had also been brought in the Supreme Court for New York County an action against Glidden in which Frank T. Alexander and a large number of other employees at the Elmhurst plant sought relief similar to that asked by the five plaintiffs in the Zdanok action. The Alexander action was not removed; it remained quiescent while the Zdanok case took its way up to the. Supreme Court of the United States. On June 26, 1962, the day after that Court’s decision, Alexander et al. filed in the District Court for the Southern District of New York a complaint, alleging diversity of citizenship, substantially identical with that in the Zdanok case. The state court action was discontinued by stipulation. Counsel for both sets of plaintiffs moved for consolidation of the Zda-nok and Alexander actions pursuant to F.R.Civ.Proc. 42(a), for summary judgment on the issue of liability under F.R. Civ.Proe. 56, and for an order directing assessment of damages, this to be done before a Special Master under F.R.Civ. Proc. 53. On December 28, 1962, Judge Palmieri granted the motion for consolidation and reserved decision on the remaining items.
After a pre-trial hearing where it was agreed to postpone consideration of the proof of the willingness and ability of individual plaintiffs to work at Bethlehem, of the effect on the rights of certain plaintiffs of discharge, resignation and retirement, and of the damages suffered, the parties proceeded to a trial before Judge Palmieri. Plaintiffs’ counsel called two witnesses: Katz, an attorney, presented a survey showing the length of service of the plaintiffs and the rights
Glidden then called Weeks, its vice president in charge of personnel, who testified to two matters of importance: One was that in 1956 Glidden transferred certain operations then being conducted at Elmhurst to Louisville, Ky.; that approximately 40 Elmhurst employees were laid off as a result; but that no claim was made that any employees were entitled to transfer to Louisville.
The district judge said in his opinion, 216 F.Supp. at 480, that “On the evidence that was adduced before it, this Gourt finds that the parties entertained no expectation that the employees’ rights would survive the removal of the Elm-hurst plant to another state.” Believing that “The Court of Appeals, however, has taken a different view on the basis of the contract itself and the implications to be drawn from its terms,” he concluded that he was “bound by the Court of Appeals’ interpretation notwithstanding the import of the evidence referred to.” Noting defendant’s “desire to take an immediate appeal from an adverse ruling on the question of liability,” he made the certificate specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b); we granted Glidden’s timely motion for leave to appeal.
It will be convenient to begin by discussing the Zdanok action which was previously before us, and to consider the Alexander action in the light of the conclusions reached in respect of Zdanok.
The Zdanok Action
As indicated at the outset, Glidden’s contention that we should now reach a different result as to its liability rests both on the testimony offered or sought to be offered through Weeks and Groves (as well as the inference from plaintiffs’ failure to contradict the testimony that was admitted) and on new light as to the governing rule of law.
We can dispose of the first contention rather readily — the district court had no power to consider the testimony on which Glidden relies. The Zdanok case was tried in 1960 on the issue of liability as fully as the parties wished.
Glidden’s contention as to a change in the governing law requires more discussion. Its argument can be summed up in three propositions: (1) When the case was previously here, the majority regarded the issue of the construction of the contract as one of New York law; (2) Subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court show that the construction of the contract is determinable by federal law; (3) Under federal law our previous construction was wrong.
We immediately accept the second proposition. Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, supra, 371 U.S. at 199-201, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246. As to the first proposition, although, for reasons indicated in the margin,
It is appellant’s third proposition that fails. Knowledge that Glidden’s contract is to be construed according to federal rather than state law does not mean that the construction previously given by the majority in this court was wrong. Federal law and New York law are alike in that a court’s job in interpreting a contract is to ascertain what the parties meant by the words they used. Indeed, “state law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301 [of the Labor-Management Relations Act], may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy,” although any state law so applied “will be absorbed as federal law and will not be an independent source of private rights.” Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). The two areas where federal law and New York law on the interpretation of labor contracts might differ would be in greater federal deference to the policy of federal labor statutes or even to “the penumbra of express statutory mandates,” ibid., and in the relative weight that courts in one system would give to decisions, not binding upon them, of other courts in the same system as compared with those of courts in the other system.
Glidden seeks to bring itself .within both possibilities. It calls attention to decisions under the National Labor Relations Act that an advance agreement to give recognition at a contemplated new location to a union representing a majority of the employees at an existing location may constitute an unfair labor practice. Chicago Freight Car & Parts Co., 83 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1949) ; N. L. R. B. v. Masters-Lake Success, Inc., 287 F.2d 35 (2 Cir. 1961), enforcing 124 N.L.R.B. 580 (1959). But these decisions, resting on the agreement’s unlawful interference in the selection of a bargaining representative, do not say that a contract whereby an employer undertook to recognize existing seniority in hiring
It is true enough that, as-said by Judge Learned Hand, “the ‘law of the case’ does not rigidly bind a court to its former decisions, but is only addressed to its good sense.” Higgins v.
The Alexander Action
Despite the difference in parties plaintiff, we would entertain no doubt that the construction of the contract announced in the appeal in the Zdanok action, to which we adhere in that action, ought be applied in the Alexander action also, if “the case” remained the same in other respects. Since the doctrine of the law of the case is addressed to the court’s “good sense,” we see no reason why it should be peremptorily excluded because of the presence of new parties when the party against whom it is invoked was fully heard on a prior appeal, any more than that it must be rigidly applied whenever the parties remain the same. The construction of a contract has long been recognized as the type of issue “that is particularly vulnerable to law of the case.” Note, Law of the Case, 5 Stanford L.Rev. 751, 759 (1953), citing Leese v. Clark, 20 Cal. 387, 418 (1862). Glidden was given the opportunity to make its arg% ment on the construction of the contract and took full advantage of it. While the Alexander plaintiffs were not parties to the Zdanok action, it is clear that everyone expected their rights to be governed by the court’s interpretation of the contract in that test case.
This brings us to Glidden’s argument that because of the additional evidence, which, it urges, was surely received with propriety in the Alexander action, the latter was not the same “case” as that on which we previously ruled.
The new testimony does not have the strong impact upon a majority of us that it did upon the district judge. The evidence with respect to the transfer of certain Elmhurst operations to Louisville in 1956 was not carried through to the point where it would be truly convincing, see fn. 2; indeed, plaintiffs argue with some force that Glidden’s failure to produce its
The reason for this lies in the principle somewhat undescriptively called “collateral estoppel”; we hold that the ruling of liability in the Zdanok case precluded Glidden from offering new evidence to contest this not only against the five original plaintiffs but against the Alexander group as well. We recognize that such a holding would have seemed impossible fifty years ago: If in the Zdanok. action the contract were construed as Glidden contends, this would not preclude the- Alexander plaintiffs from offering extrinsic evidence to support their construction of the contract, since they had not had their day in court. Because it was thought that estoppels must be “mutual,” that “Nobody can take benefit by a verdict, who had not been prejudiced by it, had it gone contrary,”
This doctrine of the need for mutuality of estoppels, criticized by Bentham over a century ago as destitute of any semblance of reason, and as “a maxim which one would suppose to have found its way from the gaming-table to the bench,” ibid. fn. 14, has been much eroded in recent years. Perhaps the leading federal decision is Judge Hastie’s in Bruszewski v. United States, 181 F.2d 419 (3 Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 865, 71 S.Ct. 87, 95 L.Ed. 632 (1950), which this court followed in Adriaanse v. United States, 184 F.2d 968 (2 Cir. 1950), cert. denied 340 U.S. 932, 71 S.Ct. 495, 95 L.Ed. 673 (1951). We see no purpose in multiplying citations since it is recognized that the widest breach in the citadel of mutuality was rammed by Justice Traynor’s . opinion in Bernhard v. Bank of America 19 Cal.2d 807, 811-813, 122 P.2d 892, 894-895 (Calif.1942).
“In determining the validity of a ■ plea of res judicata three questions are pertinent: 'Was the issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one presented in the action in question ? Was there a final judgment on the merits ? Was the party against whom the plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication?”
The statement of the second of these criteria suggests an obstacle to the Alexander plaintiffs’ invoking the ruling as to liability in Zdanok, namely, that there has yet been no final judgment on the merits in that case. But we see no reason why in an appropriate case a ruling that is final on the issue of liability should not preclude the party against whom the decision ran from presenting further evidence on the issue there finally determined. Dealing with this very question of the kind of finality of judgment necessary to create an estoppel, we pointed out, quite recently, that collateral estoppel does not require a judgment “which ends the litigation * * * and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment,” Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945), but includes many dispositions which, though not final in that sense, have nevertheless been fully litigated. Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2 Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 986, 82 S.Ct. 601, 7 L.Ed.2d 524 (1962), and eases cited. As we there said, “ ‘Finality’ in the context here relevant may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again.” We meant our previous ruling to be final on the hotly contested issue of liability under Glid-den’s contract with its employees, the Supreme Court affirmed this, and we have now affirmed it again. The mere fact that the damages of the Zdanok plaintiffs have not yet been assessed should not deprive that ruling of any effect as collateral estoppel it would otherwise have. It was simply a matter of procedural convenience that caused the district court to consolidate the Zdanok and Alexander actions, rather than allow the Zdanok action to go first to the final judgment to which, in the absence of Supreme Court review, it now shortly must.
A more serious question is whether the Bernhard criteria should be applied so generally in favor of persons not parties or privies to the earlier judgment as that opinion stated. A penetrating article by Professor Brainerd Currie, cited in fn. 14, while heartily approving what had been decided in Bernhard and most of what was said there, suggested the opinion had stated the principle too broadly. He distinguishes between a stranger’s “defensive” use of a prior judgment, which he thinks proper regardless of mutuality, and “offensive” use, which he thinks generally improper in the absence of mutuality. The evils of such “offensive” use are illustrated by the case of a railroad accident injuring 50 people who bring separate successive actions. The railroad can achieve no benefit in future actions from succesful defense of the first 20. Yet, under the letter of the Bernhard opinion, a loss in the 21st round, perhaps resulting from a jury compromise out of sympathy for an appealing plaintiff, would bind the railroad for the remaining 29. Currie’s understandable belief that something was wrong in that picture proved persuasive to a district court of appeal in California which, citing his article, refused to allow other persons injured in an automobile collision to avail themselves of a prior plaintiff’s judgment, Nevarov v. Caldwell, 161 Cal.App.2d 762, 327 P.2d 111 (1958), and the California Supreme Court denied hearing, Justice Carter alone dissenting, 327 P.2d at 122.
We find the instant case to be fairly distinguishable from the California and New York decisions just cited and to warrant application of the Bern-hard principle. Professor Currie recognizes that his “offensive-defensive” distinction is simply a rule of thumb that will usually achieve the right result, and concludes, supra, 9 Stan.L.Rev. at 308, that the abandonment of the mutuality requirement is sound except (1) “where the result would be to create an anomaly such as would occur in the railroad type of situation, where the party against whom the plea is asserted faces moré than two successive actions,” or (2) where “by reason of his former adversary’s possession of the initiative,” he has not “had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue effectively.” Here Glidden’s opportunity to litigate the Zdanok case was both full and fair. New York was an entirely reasonable forum for litigation of a contract made in New York with respect to residents of New York working in a New York plant; as between state and federal courts in New York, Glidden, in the Zdanok case, had the forum of its choice. Although the plaintiffs are numerous, and could conceivably, by careful timing of their complaints, have subjected Glidden to such a series of actions as posed in Professor Currie’s railroad case, such a course offers little advantage where the matter in issue is not a factual question of negligence subject to the varying appraisals of the facts by different juries, but the construction of a written contract by a judge. Needless to say,' nothing in the result of Zdanok turned on personal sympathy or any other consideration relating specifically to those five plaintiffs as distinguished from the other employees. And Glidden cannot reasonably argue that it was unfairly surprised by the entry of the Alexander plaintiffs into the lists after judgment in Zdanok or that it would have defended more diligently if the two actions hacj been combined from the outset. The Zdanok litigation was prosecuted by Glidden with the utmost vigor, up to tl^e Supreme Court of the United States. The Alexander action in the state court was known by everyone to be lurking in the wings; it was mentioned in Glidden’s brief in this court, p. 2, in its petition for rehearing, p. 3, and in its petition for certiorari, p. 4. Since both the Zda-nok and Alexander actions present questions of federal law, we are free to follow our own conceptions as to the effect of the judgment in the foi-mer on the latter,, see Currie, supra, 9 Stan.L.Rev. at 301, fn. 40, and need not decide whether this would also be true if federal jurisdiction in either or both actions rested on diversity alone. Cf. Kern v. Hettinger, 303 F.2d 333, 340 (2 Cir. 1962).
All that remains is Glidden’s contention that the plaintiffs made no objection to the receipt of the evidence as to the refinery shut-down or the 1957 discussions and objected to the evidence of the negotiations, so far as concerned the Alexander case, only on the' ground of materiality. Whatever importance this might have if the party that had failed to object were complaining of the decision, F.R.Civ.Proc. 46, it has none when the attack is by the other party. “In the review of judicial proceedings the rule is settled that if the decision below is correct, it must be affirmed, although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or gave a wrong reason.” Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245, 58 S.Ct. 154, 82 L.Ed. 224 (1937); see 7 Moore, Federal Practice § 72.05 (1955). Beyond that, plaintiffs’' motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability had already made “known to the court” their position that further evidence on that issue could not properly be taken; in that sense defend
The interlocutory judgment denying defendant’s motion to dismiss the complaint, granting plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the issue of liability, and directing the ascertainment of damages is affirmed.
. For the history, see opinion dismissing complaint, 185 F.Supp. 441 (S.D.N.X. 1960), reversed by a divided court, 288 F.2d 99 (2 Cir. 1961), petitions for rehearing and rebearing in tone unanimously denied, cert. granted on the limited issue of the participation of a judge of the Court of Claims, 368 U.S. 814, 82 S.Ct.
. Plaintiffs sought to lessen the force of this by bringing out that some 30 of the 40 employees had enough seniority to transfer to other Elmhurst operations. Glidden countered that 10 of the 40 employees did lose their jobs and that the transfer of the 30 affected the jobs of others who were also covered by the instant contract. No records were produced.
. Glidden emphasizes the contrast between the assertion as to “legal rights” to insist on negotiations for severance pay, as to which the contract was altogether silent, and the mere request for seniority. Plaintiffs’ brief seeks to account for this on the basis that “In light of defendant’s refusal to recognize those [seniority] rights, the demand for severance pay, in a form to be agreed upon, represented in actuality a proposal to settle their claim for damages.”
. Plaintiffs placed in evidence the Union’s notice of intention to arbitrate, dated October 23, 1957, in which seniority rights at Bethlehem were formally claimed; they did not call Crotty, Hopp-man or Makowski.
. At the outset of the first trial plaintiffs’ counsel announced that “in accordance with the suggestion made when this case first appeared on the calendar, we are prepared today to go forward with the reading of a statement which was made by the defendant and received by the plaintiffs in lieu of a deposition before trial, and at the conclusion of the reading of that deposition, to rest except for proof of damages, and at that time it was my understanding that there would Efe-a... motion to dismiss; that your Honor would rule on the question as to whether there was liability on the part of the defendant; that if your Honor held there was liability, we would then go forward before a jury with proof on the question of damage. On the other hand, if your Honor ruled that there was no liability on the part of the defendant, there would be a dismissal of the complaint.” Counsel for defendant pronounced this satisfactory, Plaintiffs’ counsel proceeded to read a portion of the statement (including a reference to the discontinuance of various operations at Mmhurst and their transfer to Louisville in 1956, of which the District Court’s first opinion took
. No different conclusion follows from the consolidation of the Zdanok with the Alexander action. Consolidation “does not merge the suits into a single cause, or change the rights of the parties, or make those who are parties in one suit parties in another.” Johnson v. Manhattan Ry., 289 U.S. 479, 496-497, 58 S.Ct. 721, 77 L.Ed. 1331 (1933). If the situation were otherwise, the consolidation order would have to be disregarded as in violation of the mandate.
. The only explicit statement was by Chief Judge Lumbard who said, in dissent, that “the contract should be construed in light of federal substantive law pursuant to § SOI of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185.” The majority’s disagreement with Chief Judge Lumbard on the meaning of the contract did not necessarily involve disagreement as to the source of governing law. The briefs cited federal and New York decisions interchangeably; although the majority devoted some discussion to a New York decision, Parker v. Borock, 5 N.Y.2d 156, 182 N.Y.S.2d 577, 156 N.E.2d 297 (1959), that was because it had been heavily relied on by Glidden; and it was not germane to the central issue in any event. Glidden’s petition for certiorari (pp. 10-18) claimed that the issue was one of federal law on which this Court’s decision was in conflict with those of other circuits, but did not contend that we had
. The statement was not material to the Question before the Supreme Court; the issue as to the legality of Judge Madden’s participation would have been precisely the same if his opinion had plainly said that the construction of the contract was to be determined by federal law.
. The reason, as. stated in White v. Higgins, 116 F.2d 312, 317 (1 Cir. 1940), is that “Our [a court of appeals’] law of the case is not the Supreme Court’s law of the case. Our judgment on the second appeal stands or falls on its merits and has no improved standing before the Supreme Court from the fact that it resulted from an application of our law of the case.” The latter statement finds support in Panama R.R. v. Napier Shipping Co., 166 U.S. 280, 283-284, 17 S.Ct. 572, 41 L.Ed. 1004 (1897); Messinger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436, 444, 32 S.Ct. 739, 56 L.Ed. 1152 (1912); and Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 87, 76 S.Ct. 167, 100 L.Ed. 77 (1955). See also Peterson v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 F.2d 148 (8 Cir. 1940).
. The Supreme Court’s expressed belief that our ruling rested on state law deprives the denial of certiorari in Oddie of whatever small significance it might otherwise have had. Supreme Court Rule 19, subd. 1(b).
. The following is a partial listing of these comments, some favorable and others unfavorable:
Articles:
Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 1532 (1962);
Blumrosen, Seniority Rights and Industrial Change: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 47 Minn.L.Rev. 505 (1962);
Burstein, Subcontracting and Plant Removals, 13 Lab.L.J. 405 (1962) ;
Daykin, Runaway Shops: The Problem and Treatment, 12 Lab.L.J. 1025 (1961) ;
Peinberg, Do Contract Rights Vest? Proceedings of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting, National Acad, of Arbitrators 192 (1963);
Lowden, Jr., Survival of Seniority-Rights Under Collective Agreements: Zdanok v. Glidden Co., 48 Va.L.Rev. 291 (1962) ;
Turner, Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 Lab.L.J. 907 (1962).
Notes:
Seniority Rights Held to Survive Termination of Collective Bargaining Agreement and Relocation of Plant, 61 Colum.L.Rev. 1363 (1961);
Plant Removal and the Survival of Seniority Rights: The Glidden Case, 37 Ind.L.J. 380 (1962);
Industrial Mobility and Survival of Seniority — What Price Security?, 36 So.Cal.L.Rev. 269 (1963);
Seniority Rights Survive the Termination of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 40 Texas L.Rev. 721 (1962);
Seniority Survival: A New Doctrine-of Uncertain Prospects, 9 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 469 (1962) ;
Seniority Rights Held to Survive Termination of Contract and to be Transferable to Employer’s New Plant, 110 U.Pa.L.Rev. 458 (1962);
Seniority — Whether Rights Survive-the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 1962 Wis.L.Rev. 520.
Panel Discussions:
Plant Removals and Related Problems, 13 Lab.L.J. 914 (1962);
Employer’s Right to Relocate vis-avis Labor, 19 N.Y.County Bar Bull. 145 (1962);
Plant Removals and Subcontracting: of Work, 14 Lab.L.J. 366 (1963).
. See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 158-60 (1921 ed.); 1A Moore, Federal Practice 10.404[2] (1961).
. At the close of the trial before Judge Palmieri in May, 1960, plaintiffs’ counsel remarked, “I think this ease is indeed an important one. * * * This case is a test ease affecting five employees but actually affecting 160-odd employees of this plant.”
. Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, in 7 Works of Jeremy Bentham 171 (Bowring ed. 1843), quoted in Cur-rie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 Stan. L.Rev. 281, 284 fn. 6 (1957).
. On its facts the Bernjiard case would seem to have come within a long recognized exception to the requirement of privity — namely, that a judgment in favor of an indemnitor precludes a later action against an indemnitee. American Law Institute, Restatement of Judgments, § 96(a); Good Health Dairy v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758, 112 A.L.R. 401 (1937); Currie, supra, 9 Stan.L.Rev. 290 fn. 22.