Chepak v. Metropolitan Hospital

13-1726
Chepak v. Metropolitan Hospital
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 13th day of February, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT:
PIERRE N. LEVAL,
GUIDO CALABRESI,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
Mary Ellen Chepak,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 13-1726
Metropolitan Hospital,
Defendant-Appellee.
_____________________________________
FOR PLAINTIFF -APPELLANT: Mary Ellen Chepak, pro se,
Mastic Beach, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE: Suzanne Colt, Assistant
Corporation Counsel (Pamela
Seider Dolgow, on the brief), for
Michael A. Cardozo, Corporation
Counsel of the City of New York,
New York, New York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Thomas P. Griesa, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings.
Appellant Mary Ellen Chepak, pro se, appeals from a final judgment dismissing
her complaint alleging violations of the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”), 29 U.S.C. § 206, et seq.,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and the New York Human
Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 296(1)(a), 296(7), pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as
necessary to explain our decision.
We review de novo a district court’s judgment dismissing an action for failure to
state a claim. Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 71 (2d Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint alleging workplace discrimination and retaliation need not allege
specific facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Boykin v. KeyCorp, 521 F.3d 202, 212-13 (2d
Cir. 2008), citing Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002). Nor must the
plaintiff allege facts sufficient to defeat summary judgment. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S.
at 511. At the pleading stage, we consider only whether the complaint includes factual
allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl.
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The standard is one of “flexible
plausibility,” Boykin, 521 F.3d at 213 (internal quotation mark omitted), sometimes
requiring a pleader to amplify her complaint with sufficient factual allegations to
“nudge[] [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible,” Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 570. In conducting this analysis, we must accept as true all plausible allegations of fact
and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Harris, 572 F.3d at 71. When
applying these standards to pro se complaints, we review such complaints with “special
solicitude,” interpreting them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest.”
Triestman v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a district court “should not dismiss [a pro se
complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the
complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated,” Cuoco v. Moritsugu,
222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted), unless such leave to
amend would be futile, id.
In light of the foregoing principles, we find that the district court erred in
dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim. Chepak’s complaint, on its face, was
sufficient to give Metropolitan Health fair notice of her claims and the grounds upon
which they rested. See Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512. “The Equal Pay Act . . . prohibits
employers from discriminating among employees on the basis of sex by paying higher
wages to employees of the opposite sex for ‘equal work . . . .’” Belfi v. Prendergast, 191
F.3d 129, 135 (2d Cir. 1999), quoting 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To prevail on an EPA
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claim, Chepak would have to demonstrate that “i) the employer pays different wages to
employees of the opposite sex; ii) the employees perform equal work on jobs requiring
equal skill, effort, and responsibility; and iii) the jobs are performed under similar
working conditions.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Chepak alleged that she was
given a different title, but required to do the same job for less pay, as her male
predecessors. In light of Chepak’s pro se status, those allegations were sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss.
We reach the same conclusion regarding Chepak’s Title VII discrimination claim.1
Chepak’s complaint alleged that she is a woman, that she sought promotion to a status
and pay level held by similarly situated males, and was denied. Especially in light of her
pro se status, those allegations were sufficient to state a claim.
The district court dismissed Chepak’s EPA and Title VII discrimination claims
based on the job descriptions submitted by Metropolitan Health. While a district court
considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) may consider documents upon which the
complaint relies, see, e.g., Leonard F. v. Isr. Discount Bank of N.Y., 199 F.3d 99, 107 (2d
Cir. 1999), we need not decide whether a complaint that alleges employment
discrimination necessarily incorporates by reference the employee’s job description.
Whether or not the job descriptions may sometimes be considered on a motion to dismiss,
1
Claims brought under New York State’s Human Rights Law are analytically identical to
claims brought under Title VII. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 629, n.1 (2d Cir. 1997). We
therefore address Chepak’s Title VII and New York State Human Rights Law claims
simultaneously.
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it is clear that the job content and not job title or description is the standard for
determining whether there was a violation of the anti-discrimination laws. See Marshall
v. Building Maint. Corp., 587 F.2d 567, 571 (2d Cir. 1978). Even if the job descriptions
were properly considered in reviewing defendant’s motion, the job descriptions at most
raise issues of fact, and do not, by themselves, provide a basis for dismissing Chepak’s
claims.
The district court correctly concluded that Chepak failed to state a retaliation
claim. However, because, as noted below, Chepak will be allowed to replead on remand,
we conclude that in light of her pro se status, Chepak should be permitted to replead if
she believes that she can cure the deficiencies noted by the district court in dismissing
that claim.
Finally, the district court correctly concluded that Metropolitan Hospital was not a
proper defendant, but erred in not granting Chepak leave to amend to name the correct
defendant, a technical change that could easily be accomplished.
Accordingly, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the
case with instructions that Chepak be permitted to file an amended complaint.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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