Williams v. Dubray

13-1293-pr
Williams v. Dubray
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 26th
day of February, two thousand fourteen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
RICHARD C. WESLEY,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
______________________________________________
RONALD EDWARD WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. 13-1293-pr
KEITH DUBRAY, Acting Director,
Special Housing, JOHN CROWLEY, Senior
Investigator, Inspector General’s Office,
J. TEDFORD, Superintendent, Camp Gabriels
Correctional Facility,
Defendants-Appellees,
BRIAN FISCHER, Commissioner of Department
of Correctional Services,
Defendant.*
______________________________________________
*
The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the official
caption as noted above.
FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Ronald Edward Williams, pro
se, Terre Haute, IN.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLEE DUBRAY: Jeffrey W. Lang, Assistant
Solicitor General (Barbara D.
Underwood, Solicitor General,
Denise A. Hartman, Assistant
Solicitor General, on the
brief), for Eric T.
Schneiderman, Attorney General
of the State of New York,
Albany, NY.
Appeal from the judgment of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York (Scullin, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Ronald Edward Williams, pro se, appeals the district court’s
grant of defendant Keith Dubray’s motion for summary judgment on
Williams’s claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a prison
disciplinary proceeding violated his constitutional right to due
process because the disciplinary hearing disposition was not
supported by sufficient evidence. Williams also challenges the
court’s dismissal without prejudice of his claims under § 1983
that defendant J. Tedford violated his First Amendment rights by
opening a letter addressed to him, and that defendant John
Crowley improperly interrogated him until he made an inculpatory
statement and thereafter issued a false misbehavior report. We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the
procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.
2
We review de novo the district court’s order granting
summary judgment. See Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d
149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is appropriate if
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.In determining whether there are genuine disputes of material
fact, this Court is “required to resolve all ambiguities and draw
all permissible factual inferences in favor of the party against
whom summary judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d
128, 137 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the record taken as a
whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
Having conducted a de novo review of the record, we affirm
the district court’s order for substantially the reasons set
forth by the magistrate judge in his September 17, 2012 report
and recommendation. As to Williams’s argument that the magistrate
judge and district court improperly relied on his criminal
indictment, we note that it is evident from a full reading of the
report and recommendation that the district court did not rely on
that conviction to conclude that the evidence presented at
Williams’s disciplinary proceeding was sufficient to sustain the
misconduct charge against him.
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Williams’s arguments on appeal that he was deprived of
counsel and Miranda warnings at the prison disciplinary
proceeding were not raised below and are therefore forfeited.
See Virgilio v. City of New York, 407 F.3d 105, 116 (2d Cir.
2005). In any event, these arguments are without merit. See Sira
v. Morton, 380 F.3d 57, 69 (2d Cir. 2004) (noting that there is
no right to counsel at prison disciplinary proceedings); Chavez
v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772 (2003) (holding that the failure
to give Miranda warnings is not grounds for a § 1983 action).
We review the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of
Williams’s claims against defendants Crowley and Tedford de novo.
See Giano v. Goord, 250 F.3d 146, 149-50 (2d Cir. 2001). A
complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009). A claim will have “facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While a pro se
complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations to meet the
plausibility standard, see Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d
Cir. 2009), we afford the pro se litigant “special solicitude”
and “interpret[] the complaint to raise the strongest claims that
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it suggests,” Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 122 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quotation marks and alterations omitted).
As to the allegations against Tedford, the district court
properly concluded that in the absence of any infringement of the
inmate’s right of access to the courts, a single incident of mail
tampering is insufficient to state a constitutional violation.
See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351-52 (2d Cir. 2003).
As to the allegations against Crowley, verbal harassment,
without more, is not actionable under § 1983. See Purcell v.
Coughlin, 790 F.2d 263, 265 (2d Cir. 1986). To the extent that
Williams alleged that Crowley’s verbal harassment resulted in a
statement that was used to support the false misbehavior report
and negatively influence the disciplinary hearing officer, it is
well settled that a “prison inmate has no constitutionally
guaranteed immunity from being falsely or wrongly accused of
conduct which may result in the deprivation of a protected
liberty interest.” Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d
Cir. 1986); see also Boddie v. Schnieder, 105 F.3d 857, 862 (2d
Cir. 1997) (“[A] prison inmate has no general constitutional
right to be free from being falsely accused in a misbehavior
report.”). Instead, the inmate must show something more, such as
that he was deprived of due process during the resulting
disciplinary hearing, or that the misbehavior report was filed in
retaliation for the inmate’s exercise of his constitutional
rights. See Boddie, 105 F.3d at 862; Freeman, 808 F.2d at 951.
5
Here, Williams did not allege any retaliation and, as discussed
above, was not deprived of due process.
Finally, Williams’s allegation that Crowley violated his
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by forcing him
to become a witness against himself at his disciplinary
proceeding also fails to state a claim. While an individual may
assert his self-incrimination privilege in any proceeding, “a
violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination
occurs only if one has been compelled to be a witness against
himself in a criminal case.” Chavez, 538 U.S. at 770 (emphasis
in original); see also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556
(1974) (“Prison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a
criminal prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a
defendant in such proceedings does not apply.”).
We affirm the dismissal of Williams’s remaining claims for
substantially the reasons given by the district court, and have
considered all of Williams’s remaining arguments on appeal and
find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the
judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
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