Poku v. Garland

21-6318
Poku v. Garland
BIA
Straus, IJ
A074 916 914
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
25th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT:
ROBERT D. SACK,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
EUNICE C. LEE,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
NANA OWUSU POKU,
Petitioner,
v. 21-6318
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: GLENN L. FORMICA, FORMICA P.C., New
Haven, CT.
FOR RESPONDENT: LINDA Y. CHENG, Trial Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation (Anthony P.
Nicastro, Assistant Director, on the
brief), for Brian M. Boynton,
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
General, Civil Division, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is DISMISSED.
Petitioner Nana Owusu Poku, a native and citizen of Ghana,
seeks review of a May 20, 2021 decision of the BIA, affirming a
June 28, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), which denied
his application to adjust to lawful permanent resident status. In
re Nana Owusu Poku, No. A074 916 914 (B.I.A. May 20, 2021), aff’g
No. A074 916 914 (Immigr. Ct. Hartford June 28, 2018). 1 We assume
the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural
history, and the issues on appeal, to which we refer only as
necessary to explain our decision.
We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions. See
Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
2006). Our jurisdiction to review a denial of discretionary
relief, including waivers of inadmissibility and adjustment to
lawful permanent resident status, is limited to colorable
constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1182(i)(2), 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Bugayong v. INS, 442 F.3d 67,
71–72 (2d Cir. 2006). “For jurisdiction to attach, the
1 Poku seeks to adjust his status under the I-130 petition of his adult
son, who is a United States citizen.
2
petitioner’s argument must be more than a ‘quarrel[ ] over the
correctness of the factual findings or justification for the
discretionary choices.’” Marquez v. Garland, 13 F.4th 108, 114
(2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 471
F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006)). Moreover, “we lack jurisdiction to
review any legal argument that is so insubstantial and frivolous
as to be inadequate to invoke federal-question jurisdiction.”
Barco-Sandoval v. Gonzales, 516 F.3d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 2007).
The adjustment of status Poku seeks is a “a two-step process,
involving, first, proof of an alien’s statutory eligibility for
the adjustment, and second, an exercise of discretion by the
Attorney General as to whether to grant such relief.” Singh v.
Gonzales, 468 F.3d 135, 138 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted). Because, as Poku acknowledges, he
previously committed multiple immigration frauds, he is
inadmissible. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). Nevertheless, the
agency has the discretion to waive that basis of inadmissibility
if the noncitizen demonstrates that “refusal of admission to the
United States . . . would result in extreme hardship” to certain
qualifying relatives. Id. § 1182(i)(1).
The agency found there was “no doubt that [Poku] . . . ha[d]
met his burden of proof to show extreme hardship” based on the
impact of his removal on his legal permanent resident spouse and
their teenage United States citizen son, who had been diagnosed
3
with autism. Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”) at 71.
However, in what the IJ described as a “very difficult decision,”
id. at 73, the agency denied Poku’s adjustment of status as a
matter of discretion because his history of immigration fraud
outweighed his positive equities. As set forth below, Poku’s
claims of constitutional and legal error are not colorable and are
therefore insufficient to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction to
review the agency’s denial of discretionary relief.
Poku argues that the agency violated his due process rights
by relying on what Poku surmised were notes from a prior bond
proceeding that were not part of the administrative record. Poku
primarily takes issue with the IJ’s reference to his “false
testimony [at the bond hearing] to the court about who [he is]
living with, despite the fact that he[] told the court today that
he’s been living with his wife since she arrived in 2001.” Id. at
83. However, “[p]arties claiming denial of due process in
immigration cases must, in order to prevail, allege some cognizable
prejudice fairly attributable to the challenged process.” Garcia-
Villeda v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, even assuming
arguendo it was error for the agency to rely on testimony from the
bond hearing, Poku “fails to demonstrate how the alleged
shortcomings have prejudiced the outcome of his case,” id., since
he admitted the same facts on the record in his removal
4
proceedings. For example, he acknowledged that he told an
immigration officer that he was living together with his wife even
though it “wasn’t true.” CAR at 148–49. Therefore, because of
the absence of any cognizable prejudice from the alleged procedural
error, this claim provides no constitutional basis for this Court’s
exercise of jurisdiction. See Carcamo v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 498
F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[Petitioner’s] talismanic invocation
of the language of due process is insufficient to confer
jurisdiction on this Court, as [petitioner] must allege at least
a colorable constitutional violation.” (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)).
Poku also argues that the agency failed to issue a fully
reasoned decision or articulate the legal standard on which the
decision was based. The agency may commit legal error if its
discretionary decision “was made without rational justification,”
Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at 329, and “we require a certain minimum
level of analysis from the IJ and BIA opinions,” Poradisova v.
Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2005). Poku’s argument finds
no support in the record. The IJ cited the adjustment statute,
noted the requirements for showing both eligibility and that a
favorable exercise of discretion was warranted, referenced the
extreme hardship requirement for a fraud waiver, and considered
the positive and negative factors relevant to the exercise of
discretion. Moreover, Poku ignores the BIA’s incorporation by
5
reference of its own precedent, including Matter of Silva-Trevino,
26 I & N Dec. 826, 836–37 (BIA 2016), which the BIA noted
“discuss[es] the framework for evaluating discretionary
determinations.” CAR at 3. In doing so, the BIA “agree[d] with
the Immigration Judge that [Poku] did not warrant adjustment of
status as a matter of discretion because his lengthy history of
immigration fraud outweighs the positive factors in his case.”
Id. The BIA, like the IJ, then specifically discussed the positive
and negative factors. 2 See id. at 3–4. In short, because it is
clear from the record that the agency both articulated and applied
the correct legal standard, Poku’s argument fails to raise a
reviewable “question of law.” See Gui Yin Liu v. INS, 508 F.3d
716, 720–21 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam). In essence, Poku merely
challenges the agency’s fact-finding and balancing of the
discretionary factors, neither of which we have jurisdiction to
review. See Patel v. Garland, 142 S. Ct. 1614, 1622–23 (2022).
2 Poku also seems to claim that the agency did not properly articulate
the standard for the fraud waiver under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i). As a
threshold matter, Poku waived this argument by not presenting it before
the BIA. See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 77–78 (2d Cir. 2004) (per
curiam). In any event, this contention is meritless. Although the IJ’s
oral ruling did not include a statutory citation, the phrase “extreme
hardship,” see CAR at 71, is a clear reference to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1),
which establishes the “extreme hardship” standard. Furthermore, such
an omission would not constitute a constitutional or legal defect
authorizing jurisdiction to review because the agency denied adjustment
not based on the absence of an extreme hardship, but rather as a matter
of discretion after balancing the positive and negative factors. See
INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (per curiam) (“As a general
rule courts and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
6
Finally, Poku contends that the IJ impermissibly re-
adjudicated his previously approved visa petition, which was filed
by his adult U.S. citizen son who serves in the military. Poku’s
argument is that the IJ was wrong to consider one of his prior
marriages fraudulent because the visa petition would not have been
approved if that were the case. This contention has no merit.
The fact that the visa petition was prima facie approvable based
on Poku’s relationship to his U.S. citizen son is not inconsistent
with a subsequent finding that he did not warrant discretionary
relief because of past immigration fraud that was not considered
as part of the visa petition.
We have considered Poku’s remaining arguments and find them
insufficient to invoke our jurisdiction. For the foregoing
reasons, the petition for review is DISMISSED for lack of
jurisdiction.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
7