Nwoye v. Obama

22-1253-cv
Nwoye v. Obama
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
3 New York, on the 25th day of January, two thousand twenty-three.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 GUIDO CALABRESI,
7 MYRNA PÉREZ,
8 ALISON J. NATHAN,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _____________________________________
11
12 Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 v. 22-1253
17
18 Barack Hussein Obama, Former President
19 of the United States of America/Senior
20 Citizen, Michelle LaVaughn Robinson
21 Obama, Former First Lady of the United
22 States of America/Senior Citizen,
23
24 Defendants-Appellees.
25 _____________________________________
26
27 FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye, pro se,
28 Philadelphia, PA.
29
30 FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: No appearance.
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of
2 New York (Caproni, J.).
3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
4 DECREED that the judgment of the District Court is VACATED and the case is REMANDED
5 for further proceedings consistent with this order.
6 Appellant Ikemefuna Stephen Nwoye, who is proceeding pro se, sued Barack and Michelle
7 Obama for breach of contract, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment. Nwoye’s complaint alleged
8 that by discussing two programs (the 2015 Global Entrepreneurship Summit and Power Africa
9 Initiative) with a partner at Sidley Austin LLP, he entered into an implied consultancy contract
10 with the Obamas, and he was never compensated under the contract. He also alleged that the
11 Obamas were unjustly enriched by his work in Sidley Austin’s Africa-Asia Agricultural Enterprise
12 Pro Bono Program. Without providing prior notice or warning, the district court dismissed the
13 complaint sua sponte, reasoning that the Obamas were likely absolutely immune from suit. The
14 district court also concluded that even if absolute immunity did not apply to Michelle Obama,
15 Nwoye failed to state a claim against her because he did not establish a link between his claims
16 and her conduct.
17 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the
18 case, and the issues on appeal, which we discuss only as necessary to explain our decision.
19 I. Recusal
20 As a threshold matter, Nwoye argues that the district court judge should have recused
21 herself because she was appointed by President Obama.
22 This Court has rejected the claim that “a judge is not impartial solely because an attorney
23 is embroiled in a controversy with the administration that appointed the judge.” MacDraw, Inc. v.
2
1 CIT Grp. Equip. Fin., Inc., 138 F.3d 33, 38 (2d Cir. 1998). “Judges generally have political
2 backgrounds to one degree or another but must be presumed, absent more, to be impartial.” Id.3 “Neither 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) nor Canon 2A of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
4 requires recusal,” because a judge hearing a case involving the conduct of the president who
5 appointed them does not “create in reasonable minds” a perception of partiality in the judiciary.
6 In re Exec. Off. of the President, 215 F.3d 25, 25–26 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (published single-judge
7 order).
8 The district court judge need not have recused herself because she was appointed by
9 President Obama. See id. (explaining that judge’s lifetime appointment and duty to impartially
10 discharge duties dispelled any doubt that judge was partial to appointing president). Moreover,
11 the record does not reflect any actions by the district court that would warrant recusal. The fact
12 that the district court dismissed Nwoye’s complaint is not evidence of bias. See Liteky v. United
13 States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (holding that an adverse ruling is “almost never” evidence of
14 bias).
15 II. Notice and an Opportunity to Be Heard
16 Although a court may sua sponte dismiss a complaint as frivolous or for failure to state a
17 claim, it generally should not do so without providing notice and an opportunity to be heard. See
18 Wachtler v. Cnty. of Herkimer, 35 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1994); Catzin v. Thank You & Good Luck
19 Corp., 899 F.3d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 2018); Ethridge v. Bell, 49 F.4th 674, 682 (2d Cir. 2022). We have
20 recognized narrow exceptions to this rule “in cases involving frivolous in forma pauperis
21 complaints . . . or frivolous habeas petitions,” Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793, 797 (2d Cir. 1988)
22 (citation omitted), or “in the context of sua sponte dismissals without notice for lack of subject
23 matter jurisdiction,” Catzin, 899 F.3d at 82. But even then, it must be “unmistakably clear that
3
1 the court lacks jurisdiction, or that the complaint lacks merit or is otherwise defective.” Snider v.
2 Melindez, 199 F.3d 108, 113 (2d Cir. 1999). “A hasty dismissal without notice can backfire by
3 leading to appeals and remands in cases where, had notice been provided, we otherwise might
4 affirm.” Moroshkin v. Dietsche, No. 22-487-cv, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 30262, at *2 (2d Cir. Nov.
5 1, 2022) (cleaned up). The issuance, for example, of an order to show cause why a complaint
6 should not be dismissed sua sponte for a stated reason, will typically suffice to provide notice and
7 an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Catzin, 899 F.3d at 83 (“Hearing from the parties either in
8 person or on the papers . . . goes a long way towards reasoned decisionmaking and enhances the
9 fairness of the proceedings.”); Andrews v. Hall, No. 22-1298(L), 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 1262, at
10 *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 19, 2023) (“[T]he district court satisfied this requirement by warning [plaintiff]
11 that his claims were vulnerable to dismissal on [a stated] basis . . . and inviting his response.”).
12 Following these cases, we conclude that the district court should have given Nwoye notice
13 and an opportunity to be heard before dismissing his complaint.
14 For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND
15 for further proceedings consistent with this order.
16 FOR THE COURT:
17 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
4