Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC

14-4626
Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2014
Argued: June 17, 2015 Decided: September 10, 2015
Docket No. 14-4626
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DANIEL BERMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NEO@OGILVY LLC, WPP GROUP USA, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Before: NEWMAN, JACOBS, and CALABRESI, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from the December 8, 2014, judgment of the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Gregory H. Woods, District Judge), dismissing, for
failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, an
employee’s suit claiming that his discharge violated the
whistleblower protection provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The District
Court ruled that these provisions protect only employees
discharged for reporting violations to the Securities and
Exchange Commission and not those reporting violations only
1
internally. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-cv-523-
GHW-SN, 2014 WL 6860583 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014).
Reversed and remanded. Judge Jacobs dissents with a
separate opinion.
Alissa Pyrich, Jardim, Meisner &
Susser, P.C., Florham Park, NJ
(Bennet Susser, Richard S.
Meisner, Jardim, Meisner &
Susser, P.C., Florham Park, NJ,
on the brief), for Appellant.
Howard J. Rubin, Davis & Gilbert
LLP, New York, NY (Jennifer
Tafet Klausner, David J.
Fisher, Davis & Gilbert LLP,
New York, NY, on the brief),
for Appellees.
(William K. Shirey, Asst. Gen.
Counsel, Washington, DC (Anne
K. Small, Gen. Counsel, Michael
A. Conley, Deputy Gen. Counsel,
Stephen G. Yoder, Senior
Counsel, Washington, DC), for
amicus curiae Securities and
Exchange Commission, in support
of Appellant.)
(Kate Comerford Todd, U.S.
Chamber Litigation Center,
Inc., Washington, DC, Eugene
Scalia, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher
LLP, Washington, DC (Rachel E.
Mondel, Gabrielle Levine on the
brief) for amicus curiae The
Chamber of Commerce of the
United States of America, in
support of the Appellees.)
2
JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.
This appeal presents the recurring issue of statutory
interpretation that arises when express terms in one
provision of a statute are arguably in tension with language
in another provision of the same statute. The Supreme Court
recently encountered a similar issue when it interpreted a
provision in the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
in Burwell v. King, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015). In the pending
case, the tension occurs within the whistleblower protection
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”). Pub. L. No. 111-203, Title
IX, § 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010), which added
section 21F to the Exchange Act of 1934, codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6. The relevant administrative agency, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”),
has issued a regulation endeavoring to harmonize the
provisions that are in tension.
Plaintiff-Appellant Daniel Berman appeals from the
December 8, 2014, judgment of the District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Gregory H. Woods, District
Judge), dismissing on motion for summary judgment his suit
against Defendants-Appellees Neo@Ogilvie LLC and WPP Group
USA, Inc. See Berman v. Neo@Ogilvy LLC, No. 1:14-cv-523-GHW-
3
SN, 2014 WL 6860583 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2014). We conclude
that the pertinent provisions of Dodd-Frank create a
sufficient ambiguity to warrant our deference to the SEC’s
interpretive rule, which supports Berman’s view of the
statute. We therefore reverse and remand for further
proceedings.
Background
The statutory and regulatory provisions. Section 21F,
added to the Exchange Act by Dodd-Frank, is captioned
“Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection.” 15
U.S.C. § 78u-6. Subsection 21F(b) provides the incentives
by directing the SEC to pay awards to individuals whose
reports to the Commission about violations of the securities
laws result in successful Commission enforcement actions.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6(b). Subsection 21F(h) provides the
protection by prohibiting employers from retaliation against
employees for reporting violations. Id. § 78u-6(h).
This appeal concerns the relationship between the
definition of “whistleblower” in section 21F and one
subdivision of the provision prohibiting retaliation, which
was added by a conference committee just before final
passage. Subsection 21F(a), the definitions subsection of
section 21F, contains subsection 21F(a)(6), which defines
4
“whistleblower” to mean “any individual who provides . . .
information relating to a violation of the securities laws
to the Commission . . . .” Id. 78u-6(a)(6) (emphasis added).
Subsection 21F(h), the retaliation protection provision,
contains subsection 21F(h)(1)(A), which provides:
(A) In General
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend,
threaten, harass, directly or indirectly, or in
any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act done by the
whistleblower—
(i) in providing information to the Commission
in accordance with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or
assisting in any investigation or judicial or
administrative action of the Commission based
upon or related to such information; or
(iii) in making disclosures that are required
or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this chapter
[i.e., the Exchange Act], including section
78j-1(m) of this title [i.e., Section 10A(m)
of the Exchange Act], section 1513(e) of Title
18, and any other law, rule, or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.
Id. 78u-6(h)(1)(A).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“Sarbanes-Oxley”),
Public L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 475 (2002), which is cross-
referenced by subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A)
of Dodd-Frank, includes several provisions concerning the
5
internal reporting of securities law violations or improper
practices.
For example, section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires the
SEC to issue rules requiring an attorney to report
securities law violations to the chief legal counsel or
chief executive officer of the company. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 7245(1). Section 301 of Sarbanes-Oxley added to the
Exchange Act section 10A(m)(4), requires the SEC by rule to
direct national securities exchanges and national securities
associations to require audit committees of listed companies
to establish internal company procedures allowing employees
to submit complaints regarding auditing matters. This
section is not codified. Section 806(a) of Sarbanes-Oxley
prohibits a publicly traded company from retaliating against
an employee who provides information concerning securities
law violations to, among other, a federal regulatory or law
enforcement agency, a member of Congress, or “a person with
supervisory authority over the employee.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a)(1).
This appeal concerns the arguable tension between the
definitional subsection, subsection 21F(a)(6), which defines
“whistleblower” to mean an individual who reports violations
to the Commission, and subdivision (iii) of subsection
6
21F(h)(1)(A), which, unlike subdivisions (i) and (ii), does
not within its own terms limit its protection to those who
report wrongdoing to the SEC. On the contrary, subdivision
(iii) expands the protections of Dodd-Frank to include the
whistleblower protection provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, and
those provisions, which contemplate an employee reporting
violations internally, do not require reporting violations
to the Commission.
In statutory terms, the issue presented is whether the
“whistleblower” definition in subsection 21F(a)(6) of Dodd-
Frank applies to subdivision (iii) of subsection
21F(h)(1)(A). In operational terms, the issue is whether an
employee who suffers retaliation because he reports
wrongdoing internally, but not to the SEC, can obtain the
retaliation remedies provided by Dodd-Frank.
The SEC believes he can. In 2011, using its authority
to issue rules implementing section 21F, see 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(j), the SEC promulgated Exchange Act Rule 21F-2, 17
C.F.R. § 240.21F-2, which provides:
(a) Definition of a whistleblower.
(1) You are a whistleblower if, alone or jointly
with others, you provide the Commission with
information pursuant to the procedures set forth
in § 240.21F–9(a) of this chapter, and the
7
information relates to a possible violation of the
Federal securities laws (including any rules or
regulations thereunder) that has occurred, is
ongoing, or is about to occur. A whistleblower
must be an individual. A company or another entity
is not eligible to be a whistleblower.
(2) To be eligible for an award, you must submit
original information to the Commission in
accordance with the procedures and conditions
described in §§ 240.21F–4, 240.21F–8, and
240.21F–9 of this chapter.
(b) Prohibition against retaliation.
(1) For purposes of the anti-retaliation protections
afforded by Section 21F(h)(1) of the Exchange Act (15
U.S.C. 78u–6(h)(1)), you are a whistleblower if:
(i) You possess a reasonable belief that the
information you are providing relates to a possible
securities law violation (or, where applicable, to a
possible violation of the provisions set forth in 18
U.S.C. 1514A(a)) that has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur, and;
(ii) You provide that information in a manner described
in Section 21F(h)(1)(A) of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C.
78u–6(h)(1)(A)).
(iii) The anti-retaliation protections apply whether or
not you satisfy the requirements, procedures and
conditions to qualify for an award.1
1
Just recently, on August 4, 2015, the SEC issued a
release “to clarify that, for purposes of the employment
retaliation protections provided by Section 21F of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), an
individuals’s status as a whistleblower does not depend on
adherence to the reporting procedures specified in Exchange
8
Echoing section 21F(a)(6) of Dodd-Frank, subsection
21F-2(a)(1) of Exchange Act Rule 21F-2 defines a
whistleblower as a person who “provide[s] the Commission”
with specific information. 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F-2(a)(1).
However, subsection 21F-2(b) of the Rule, headed “Protection
against retaliation,” provides, in subdivision 21F-2(b)(ii)
that, for purposes of the retaliation protections of Dodd-
Frank, a person is a whistleblower if the person
“provide[s]” specified information “in a manner described
in” the retaliation protection provisions of Dodd-Frank,
which includes the cross-reference in subdivision (iii) to
the reporting provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. Id. § 240.21F-
2(b)(ii). Those provisions, as explained above, protect an
employee who reports internally without reporting to the
Commission.
As the SEC explained in its release accompanying
issuance of Exchange Rule 21F–2, “the statutory anti-
retaliation protections [of Dodd-Frank] apply to three
Act Rule 21F-9(a) [specifying procedures to be followed to
qualify for a whistleblower award], but is determined solely
by the terms of Exchange Act Rule 21F2(b)(1).”
Interpretation of the SEC’s Whistleblower Rules Under
Section 21F of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC
Release No. 34-75592, 2015 WL 4624264 (F.R.) (Aug. 4, 2015).
9
different categories of whistleblowers, and the third
category [described in subdivision (iii) of subsection
21F(h)(1)(A)] includes individuals who report to persons or
governmental authorities other than the Commission.”
Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protections, Release
No. 34-64545, 76 Fed. Reg. 34300-01, at *34304, 2011 WL
2293084 (F.R.) (June 13, 2011) (emphasis added).
So the more precise issue in the pending appeal is
whether the arguable tension between the definitional
section of subsection 21F(a)(6) and subdivision (iii) of
subsection 21(F)(h)(1)(A) creates sufficient ambiguity as to
the coverage of subdivision (iii) to oblige us to give
Chevron deference to the SEC’s rule. See Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984).
The pending lawsuit. Plaintiff-Appellant Daniel Berman
was the finance director of Defendant-Appellee Neo@Ogilvy
LLC (“Neo”) from October 2010 to April 2013. He was
responsible for Neo’s financial reporting and its compliance
with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”), as
well as internal accounting procedures of Neo and its
parent, Defendant-Appellee WPP Group USA, Inc. (“WPP”). Neo
10
is a media agency that provides a range of digital and
direct media services.
In January 2014, Berman sued Neo and WPP, alleging that
he was discharged in violation of the whistleblower
protection provisions of section 21F of Dodd-Frank and in
breach of his employment contract. According to the
allegation of the complaint, while employed at Neo, he
discovered various practices that he alleged amounted to
accounting fraud. He also alleged that these practices
violated GAAP, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Dodd-Frank, and that he
had reported these violations internally. A senior officer
at Neo became angry with him, and he was terminated as a
result of his whistleblower activities in April 2013. In
August 2013 he reported his allegations to the WPP Audit
Committee.
While employed at Neo and for about six months after he
was fired, Berman did not report any allegedly unlawful
activities to the SEC. In October 2013, after the
limitations period on one of his Sarbanes-Oxley claims had
ended, he provided information to the Commission.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint was
referred to Magistrate Judge Sarah Netburn. She filed a
11
Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) recommending that Berman was
entitled to be considered a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank
because of the retaliation protection of subdivision (iii)
of subsection 21F(h)(A)(1), unrestricted by the definition
of “whistleblower” in subsection 21F(a)(6). However, the
R&R also recommended that the retaliation claims be
dismissed for legal insufficiency, without prejudice to
amendment, and that the contracts claims be dismissed with
prejudice.
The District Court, disagreeing with the Magistrate
Judge, relied on the definition of “whistleblower” in
subsection 21F(a)(6) and ruled that subsection 21F(h)(1)(A),
including subdivision (iii), provided whistleblower
protection only to those discharged for reporting alleged
violations to the Commission. The District Court dismissed
the Dodd-Frank claims because Berman had been terminated
long before he reported alleged violations to the SEC. The
District Court also rejected the contract claims and
dismissed the entire complaint. See Berman, 2014 WL 6860583,
at *6. Berman’s appeal challenges only the dismissal of his
Dodd-Frank claim.
12
Discussion
The statutory interpretation issue posed by this case
is not as stark, and hence not as easily resolved, as that
encountered in somewhat similar cases.2 In Scialabba v.
Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. 2191 (2014), for example, the
express language of one clause of a subsection of a statute
was contradicted by express language in another clause of
2
We start by posing the issue as one of statutory
construction because Berman sued for violation of Dodd-
Frank. If we find the statute ambiguous, we will consider
whether the SEC’s regulation is a reasonable interpretation
of the statute warranting Chevron deference. The SEC begins
its argument by asserting that “‘[t]he interpretation of a
statute by a regulatory agency charged with its
administration is entitled to deference if it is a
permissible construction of the statute.’” Brief for SEC at
17 (citing Haekal v. Refco, Inc., 198 F.3d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1999)). Then the SEC points out that consideration of
whether an agency interpretation is permissible requires two
steps: first, considering whether there is an “unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, on
“the precise issue in question,” id. at 842, and, second, if
the statute is silent or ambiguous, considering whether the
agency’s interpretation is “based on a permissible
construction of the statute, id. at 843.
Although our approach and the SEC’s both require
initial interpretation of the statute, the reasons for that
inquiry differ. We start with the statute because that is
the basis for Berman’s claim. His complaint does not
mention the SEC’s rule. The SEC starts with the statute to
determine whether its regulation is entitled to Chevron
deference. Chevron, in which the two-step analysis was
outlined, was a suit challenging the validity of an agency
regulation.
13
the same subsection. See id. at 2207 (“[T]he two halves of
[8 U.S.C.] § 1153(h)(3) face in different directions.”). In
Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457
(1892), application of the express terms of a statute to the
facts of a case yielded a result so unlikely to have been
intended by Congress that the Supreme Court did not apply
those terms.3 See id. at 472 (declining to apply to a
church’s contract with a British pastor a prohibition on
contracting to import an alien to perform labor of any
kind).
Closer to our case is the issue the Supreme Court
recently confronted in Burwell v. King. There, four words
of one provision expressly provided that income tax
subsidies were available to those who purchased health
insurance on exchanges “established by a state,” and the
argument made to the Court was that the operation of the
entire statute would be undermined if tax subsidies were not
also available to those who purchased health insurance on
3
See also Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1079
(2015) (declining to apply literal meaning of “tangible
object” as used in Sarbanes-Oxley” to a fish); Bond v.
United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077, 2091 (2014) (declining to
apply express terms of definition of “chemical weapon” to
toxic chemicals spread by a jilted wife on property of her
husband’s lover).
14
exchanges established by the federal government. A closely
divided Court accepted that argument and interpreted the
Affordable Care Act as a whole to provide income tax
subsidies to those who purchased health insurance on federal
exchanges.
The interpretation issue facing the Supreme Court in
King was far more problematic than the issue we face here.
In King the issue was whether the statutory phrase
“established by the State” should be understood to mean
“established by the State or by the Federal Government.” In
our case, the statutory provision relied on by the Appellees
and our dissenting colleague contains the phrase “provide
. . . to the Commission,” but the issue is not whether that
phrase means something other than what it literally says.4
Instead, the issue is whether the statutory provision
applies to another provision of the statute, or, more
precisely, whether the answer to that question is
sufficiently unclear to warrant Chevron deference to the
Commission’s regulation.
4
We do not doubt that “provide . . . to the Commission”
means “provide . . . to the Commission.”
15
In our case there is no absolute conflict between the
Commission notification requirement in the definition of
“whistleblower” and the absence of such a requirement in
both subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) of Dodd-
Frank and the Sarbanes-Oxley provisions incorporated by
subdivision (iii). An employee who suffers retaliation
after reporting wrongdoing simultaneously to his employer
and to the SEC is eligible for Dodd-Frank remedies and those
provided by Sarbanes-Oxley. Subdivision (iii) assures him
the latter remedies, and his simultaneous report to the SEC
assures him that he will not have excluded himself from
Dodd-Frank remedies. Indeed, it was the possibility of
simultaneous complaints to both the employer and the
Commission that persuaded the Fifth Circuit to insist that
the Commission notification requirement be observed by all
employees who seek Dodd-Frank remedies for whistleblower
retaliation. See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), L.L.C., 720
F.3d 620, 627-28 (5th Cir. 2013).5
5
By using the Fifth Circuit’s example of “simultaneous”
reporting to an employer and to the Commission, we recognize
that a literal application of the definition of
“whistleblower” to subdivision (iii) would also benefit
those who reported to the Commission very soon after
reporting to an employer, soon enough to do so before the
employer retaliated by discharging the employee for the
internal reporting (assuming the employer terminated because
of both acts of reporting).
16
Although the simultaneous employer/Commission reporting
example avoids an absolute contradiction between the
Commission reporting requirement of the “whistleblower”
definition and subdivision (iii)'s incorporation of
Sarbanes-Oxley remedies, a significant tension within
subsection 21F nevertheless remains. Applying the
Commission reporting requirement to employees seeking
Sarbanes-Oxley remedies pursuant to subdivision (iii) would
leave that subdivision with an extremely limited scope for
several reasons.
First, although there may be some potential
whistleblowers who will report wrongdoing simultaneously to
their employer and the Commission, they are likely to be few
in number. Some will surely feel that reporting only to
their employer offers the prospect of having the wrongdoing
ended, with little chance of retaliation, whereas reporting
to a government agency creates a substantial risk of
retaliation.
Second, and more significant, there are categories of
whistleblowers who cannot report wrongdoing to the
Commission until after they have reported the wrongdoing to
their employer. Chief among these are auditors and
attorneys.
17
Auditors are subject to subsection 78j-1 of the
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1, which is one of the
provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley, expressly cross-referenced by
subdivision (iii). Subsection 78j-1(b)(1)(B) requires an
auditor of a public company, under certain circumstances, to
“inform the appropriate level of the management” of illegal
acts, unless they are inconsequential. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(b)(1)(B). Subsection 78j-1(b)(2) requires an auditor to
report to the board of directors if the company does not
take reasonable remedial action after the auditor’s report
to management. See id. § 78j-1(b)(2). Significantly to our
case, subsection 78j-1(b)(3)(B) permits an auditor to report
illegal acts to the Commission only if the board or
management fails to take appropriate remedial action. See
id. § 78j-1(b)(3)(B). Thus, if subdivision (iii) requires
reporting to the Commission, its express cross-reference to
the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley would afford an auditor
almost no Dodd-Frank protection for retaliation because the
auditor must await a company response to internal reporting
before reporting to the Commission, and any retaliation
would almost always precede Commission reporting.
Attorneys are subject to both section 307 of Sarbanes-
Oxley, 15 U.S.C. § 7245, and the SEC’s Standards of
18
Professional Conduct6 (“Attorney Standards”), 17 C.F.R.
§ 205.1-7, and subdivision (iii) cross-references “any other
law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission.” Subsection 7245(1) requires attorneys to
report material violations of the securities laws to the
chief legal counsel or chief executive officer (“CEO”) of a
public company, and subsection 7245(2) requires attorneys to
report such violations to the audit or other appropriate
committee of the board of directors if the counsel or CEO
“does not appropriately respond to the attorney’s internal
reporting. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7245(1), (2). Again significantly
to our case, the SEC’s Rule 3 of its Attorney Standards
contemplates an attorney reporting to the Commission only
after internal reporting, see 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(d)(2),
explicitly recognizing that by reporting internally first an
attorney “does not reveal client confidences or secrets or
privileged or otherwise protected information related to the
attorney’s representation of the issuer,” id. § 205.3(b)(1).
Like auditors, attorneys would gain little, if any, Dodd-
Frank protection if subdivision (iii), despite cross-
referencing Sarbanes-Oxley provisions protecting lawyers,
6
The full title is “Standards of Professional Conduct
for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission
in the Representation of an Issuer.” 17 C.F.R. § 205.1.
19
protected only against retaliation for reporting to the
Commission.
Thus, apart from the rare example of simultaneous (or
nearly simultaneous)7 reporting of wrongdoing to an employer
and to the Commission, there would be virtually no situation
where an SEC reporting requirement would leave subdivision
(iii) with any scope.
In light of these realities as to the sharply limiting
effect of a Commission reporting requirement on all
whistleblowers seeking the Sarbanes-Oxley remedies promised
by Dodd-Frank for those who report wrongdoing internally,
the question becomes whether Congress intended to add
subdivision (iii) to subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) only to achieve
such a limited result. To answer that question we would
normally look to the legislative history of subdivision
(iii) to learn what Congress, or the relevant committee, had
sought to accomplish by adding subdivision (iii). See, e.g.,
Vincent v. The Money Store, 736 F.3d 88, 101 n.10 (2d Cir.
2013).
Unfortunately that inquiry yields nothing. What became
subdivision (iii) of subsection 20F(h)(1)(A) was not in
7
See footnote 5, supra.
20
either version of Dodd-Frank that was passed by the House
and the Senate prior to a conference.8 After these versions
went to conference, the House Conferees prepared a
“conference base text” to serve as the basis for resolution
of differences by the Conference Committee.
Subdivision (iii) first saw the light of day in that
conference base text when it was added to follow
subdivisions (i) and (ii) of subsection 20F(h)(1)(A), both
of which had been in the Senate version. Unfortunately,
there is no mention of the addition of subdivision (iii),
8
As originally submitted by the Administration on July
22, 2009, the “Financial Services Oversight Council Act of
2009" proposed adding section 21F to the Exchange Act. The
Administration’s proposal included subsection 21F(g)(1)(A),
which entitled an employee to be made whole if discharged
“for providing information ” as provided elsewhere in the
bill. As passed by the House of Representative on Dec. 11,
2009, the “Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2009" also proposed adding section 21F to the Exchange Act.
The House version of section 21F included subsection
21F(g)(1)(A), which prohibited retaliation against an
employee for “providing information to the Commission” as
provided elsewhere in the bill, and subsection 21F(g)(4),
which defined “whistleblower” as one or more individuals
“who submit information to the Commission” as provided in
section 21F. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., 1st Sess. (2009).
As passed by the Senate on May 20, 2010, the “Restoring
American Financial Stability Act of 2010" also proposed
adding section 21F to the Exchange Act. The Senate version
of section 21F included subsection 21F(a)(7), which copied
the definition of “whistleblower” from H.R. 4173, and
included in subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) the language that would
become subdivisions (i) and (ii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A)
of Dodd-Frank. See H.R. 4173, 111th Cong., 2d Sess. (2010).
21
much less its meaning or intended purpose, in any
legislative materials – not in the conference report nor the
final passage debates on Dodd-Frank in either the House or
the Senate. The “Joint Explanatory Statement of the
Committee of Conference” explains only that “[t]he subtitle
[Subtitle B of Title IX] further enhances incentives and
protections for whistleblowers providing information leading
to successful SEC enforcement actions.” H. Rep. No. 111-517,
at 870 (2009-10) (Conf. Rep.). Subdivision (iii) is, like
Judge Friendly’s felicitous characterization of the Alien
Tort Act, “a kind of legal Lohengrin; . . . no one seems to
know whence it came.” ITT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001,
1015 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison
v. National Australia Bank, 561 U.S. 247 (2010) .
Other courts confronting the issue of whether the
arguable tension between subsection 21F(a)(6) and
subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) warrants
Chevron deference to Exchange Rule 21F-2 have reached
conflicting results. The Fifth Circuit in Asadi, 720 F.3d
at 620, and the District Court decision that Asadi affirmed,
Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, Civ. Action No. 4:12-345,
2012 WL 2522599 (S.D. Tex. Jun. 28, 2012), both ruled the
subsection 21F(a)(6) definition of “whistleblower”
22
controlling. Three other district courts have followed
Asadi. See Verfuerth v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc., 65 F.
Supp. 640, 643-46 (E.D. Wis. 2014); Banko v. Apple Inc., 20
F. Supp. 3d 749, 756-57 (N.D. Cal. 2013); Wagner v. Bank of
America Corp., No. 12-cv-00381-RBJ, 2013 WL 3786643, at *4-
*6 (D. Colo. July 19, 2013).
On the other hand, a far larger number of district
courts have deemed the statute ambiguous and deferred to the
SEC’s Rule. See Somers v. Digital Realty Trust, Inc., No. C-
14-5180 EMC, 2015 WL 2354807, at *4-*12 (N.D. Cal. May 15,
2015); Yang v. Navigators Group, Inc., 18 F. Supp. 3d 519,
533-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); Khazin v. TD Ameritrade Holding
Corp. No. 13-4149 (SDWQ)(MCA), 2014 WL 940703, at *3-*6
(D.N.J. Mar. 11, 2014); Azim v. Tortoise Capital Advisors,
LLC, No. 13-2267-KHV, 2014 WL 707235, at *2-3 (D. Kan. Feb.
24, 2014); Ahmad v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 2 F. Supp. 3d 491,
495-97 n.5 (S.D.N.Y 2014); Rosenblum v. Thomson Reuters
(Mkts.) LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 141, 146-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2013);
Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC, No. 12-5914, 2013 WL 2190084,
at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2013); Ellington v. Giacoumakis, 977
F. Supp. 2d 42, 44-46 (D. Mass. 2013); Genberg v. Porter,
935 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1106-07 (D. Colo. 2013); Nollner v.
Southern Baptist Convention, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 986, 995
23
(M.D. Tenn. 2012); Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp., No. 3:11CV1424
SRU, 2012 WL 4444820, at *4 (D. Conn. Sept. 25, 2012); Egan
v. Tradingscreen, Inc., No. 10 Civ. 8202, 2011 WL 1672066,
at *4-7 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011). Thus, although our decision
creates a circuit split, it does so against a landscape of
existing disagreement among a large number of district
courts.
Like all these courts, we confront both the definition
of “whistleblower” in subsection 21F(a)(6), which extends
whistleblower protection only to employees who report
violations to the Commission, and the language of
subdivision (iii), which purports to protect employees9 from
retaliation for making reports required or protected by
Sarbanes-Oxley, reports that are made internally, without
notification to the Commission. We recognize that the terms
of a definitional subsection are usually to be taken
literally, see Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, “Reading
9
The dissent chides us for stating that subdivision
(iii) protects “employees” from retaliation for reporting
violations, pointing out correctly that this subdivision
does not use the word “employees.” Dissenting op. [5-6].
However, subsection 21F(h)(1)(A), of which subdivision (iii)
is a component, prohibits an “employer” from taking adverse
action or discriminating against a whistleblower “in the
terms or conditions of employment.” Who but “employees”
could be discriminated against by an “employer” in the terms
and conditions of “employment?”
24
Law,” 227 (2012) (“Ordinarily, judges apply text-specific
definitions with rigor.”), and, pertinent to this case,
usually applied to all subdivisions literally covered by the
definition, but we have also recognized that “mechanical use
of a statutory definition” is not always warranted. See In
re Air Cargo Shipping Services Antitrust Litigation, 697
F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2012). Scalia and Garner too have
stated, “Definitions are, after all, just one indication of
meaning – a very strong indication, to be sure, but
nonetheless one that can be contradicted by other
indications.” Scalia and Garner 228. The issue here,
however, is not whether to read the words of the
definitional section literally, but the different issue of
whether the definition should apply to a late-added
subdivision of a subsection that uses the defined term.
In deciding whether sufficient ambiguity exists in
Dodd-Frank to warrant deference to the SEC’s Rule, we note,
but are not persuaded by, the arguments that any reading
would render some language of Dodd-Frank superfluous.
Berman contends that if subdivision (iii) is subject to the
Commission reporting requirement by virtue of subsection
21F(a)(6), then most of subdivision (iii) would be
superfluous because the Sarbanes-Oxley protections
25
purportedly incorporated would have no effect. The SEC
argues that if the definition of “whistleblower” applies to
all three subdivisions of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A), then the
Commission reporting requirement, expressly stated in
subdivisions (i) and (ii), would be superfluous. Neo
contends that if subdivision (iii) does not require an
employee to report violations to the Commission, then the
SEC reporting requirement in subsection 21F(a)(6) would be
superfluous.
All these arguments ignore the realities of the
legislative process. When conferees are hastily trying to
reconcile House and Senate bills, each of which number
hundreds of pages, and someone succeeds in inserting a new
provision like subdivision (iii) into subsection
21F(h)(1)(A), it is not at all surprising that no one
noticed that the new subdivision and the definition of
“whistleblower” do not fit together neatly.10 The definition
speaks of reporting to the Commission, but subdivision (iii)
incorporates Sarbanes-Oxley provisions, which contemplate
internal reporting, without reporting to the Commission.
Subdivisions (i) and (ii), which were included in the Senate
10
“True ambiguity is almost always the result of
carelessness or inattention.” Scalia and Garner 33.
26
version of Dodd-Frank before the conferees met, fit
precisely with the “whistleblower” definition. Subdivision
(i) explicitly requires reporting “to the Commission,” and
subdivision (ii) concerns assisting action “of the
Commission,” whereas the terms of subdivision (iii) do
neither.11
When the conferees, at the last minute, inserted
subdivision (iii) within subsection 21F(h)(1)(A), did they
expect subdivision (iii) to be limited by the statutory
definition of “whistleblower” in subsection 21F(a)(6), or
did they expect employees to be protected by subdivision
(iii) whenever they report violations internally, without
reporting to the Commission?12 The texts leave the matter
unclear, and no legislative history even hints at an answer.
11
Subdivision (iii) mentions the Commission only to
provide that the protection of (iii) extends to Sarbanes-
Oxley disclosures required by any “law, rule, or regulation
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii).
12
Or, to put the matter another way, did the conferees
deliberately decide to insert subdivision (iii) in
subsection 21F(h)(1)(A), knowing it would arguably be
subject to the subsection 21F(a)(6) definition of
“whistleblower,” rather than add the text of subdivision
(iii) elsewhere so that it would not even arguably be
subject to that definition?
27
Ultimately, we think it doubtful that the conferees who
accepted the last-minute insertion of subdivision (iii)
would have expected it to have the extremely limited scope
it would have if it were restricted by the Commission
reporting requirement in the “whistleblower” definition in
subsection 21F(a)(6). If we had to choose between reading
the statute literally or broadly to carry out its apparent
purpose, we might well favor the latter course. However, we
need not definitively construe the statute, because, at a
minimum, the tension between the definition in subsection
21F(a)(6) and the limited protection provided by subdivision
(iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A) if it is subject to that
definition renders section 21F as a whole sufficiently
ambiguous to oblige us to give Chevron deference to the
reasonable interpretation of the agency charged with
administering the statute. Unlike the situation confronting
the Supreme Court in King, where the agency administering
the disputed provision, the Internal Revenue Service, was
deemed to lack relevant expertise, King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489,
obliging the Court itself to resolve the ambiguity, see id.,
the SEC is clearly the agency to resolve the ambiguity we
face. Therefore, also unlike King, we need not resolve the
28
ambiguity ourselves, but will defer to the reasonable
interpretive rule adopted by the appropriate agency.
Under SEC Rule 21F-2(b)(1), Berman is entitled to
pursue Dodd-Frank remedies for alleged retaliation after his
report of wrongdoing to his employer, despite not having
reported to the Commission before his termination. We
therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings. On
remand, the District Court will have an opportunity to
consider the R&R’s recommendation to dismiss, without
prejudice to amendment, for lack of a sufficient allegation
of a termination entitled to Dodd-Frank protection, and any
other arguments made by the Defendants in support of their
motion to dismiss.
Reversed and remanded.
29
DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
The majority and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) have
altered a federal statute by deleting three words (“to the Commission”) from the
definition of “whistleblower” in the Dodd‐Frank Act.  No doubt, my colleagues
in the majority, assisted by the SEC or not, could improve many federal statutes
by tightening them or loosening them, or recasting or rewriting them.  I could try
my hand at it.  But our obligation is to apply congressional statutes as written.  In
this instance, the alteration creates a circuit split, and places us firmly on the
wrong side of it.  See Asadi v. G.E. Energy (USA), LLC, 720 F.3d 620 (5th Cir.
2013).  I respectfully dissent.
I
Persons who report certain violations of the securities laws are protected
from retaliation under (at least) two federal statutes.  Sarbanes‐Oxley protects
employees who blow a whistle to management or to regulatory agencies; Dodd‐
Frank protects “whistleblowers,” defined as persons who report violations “to
the Commission.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(a)(6).  Dodd‐Frank has a longer statute of
limitations, doubles the collectible back‐pay, and requires no administrative
1
exhaustion.  The plaintiff in this case reported the violation to his employer, and
did not report it “to the [Securities and Exchange] Commission,” id., and he is
therefore protected from retaliation under Sarbanes‐Oxley only.  But the SEC and
the majority perceive a hole in coverage, or an insufficiency of remedy, and are
patching.
The statutory provisions relevant to this case are few.  The Dodd‐Frank Act
defines the word “whistleblower” in one sentence, and provides that this
definition “shall apply” anywhere else “[i]n this section”:
(a) Definitions
In this section the following definitions shall apply:
[...]
(6) Whistleblower
The term “whistleblower” means any individual who provides, or 2
or more individuals acting jointly who provide, information relating
to a violation of the securities laws to the [Securities and Exchange]
Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the
Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(a)(6).  “This definition, standing alone, expressly and
unambiguously requires that an individual provide information to the SEC to
qualify as a ‘whistleblower’ for purposes of § 78u‐6.”  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 623.  A
2
definition is one of the “prominent manner[s]” for limiting the meaning of
statutory text.  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2495 (2015); see also United States
v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92, 99 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Groman v. IRS, 302 U.S. 82,
86 (1937) (“When an exclusive definition is intended the words ‘means’ is
employed.”)).
Later, within the same statutory section, in a provision titled “Protection of
whistleblowers,” Dodd‐Frank creates a private cause of action for
“whistleblowers”:
(h) Protection of whistleblowers
(1) Prohibition against retaliation
(A) In general
No employer may discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass,
directly or indirectly, or in any other manner discriminate against, a
whistleblower in the terms and conditions of employment because of
any lawful act done by the whistleblower‐‐
(i) in providing information to the Commission in accordance
with this section;
(ii) in initiating, testifying in, or assisting in any investigation
or judicial or administrative action of the Commission based
upon or related to such information; or
3
(iii) in making disclosures that are required or protected under
the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (15 U.S.C. 7201 et seq.), this
chapter, including section 78j‐1(m) of this title, section 1513(e)
of Title 18, and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission.
15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(h)(1)(A)(emphases added).
Reading the definition and the substantive provision together “clearly
answers two questions: (1) who is protected; and (2) what actions by protected
individuals constitute protected activity.”  Asadi, 720 F.3d at 625.  As the Fifth
Circuit put it, “the answer to the first question is ‘a whistleblower.’”  Id. (quoting
15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(h)(1)(A) (“No employer may discharge . . . a whistleblower . . . .”
(emphasis added))).  And, just as easy, “the answer to the latter question is ‘any
lawful act done by the whistleblower’ that falls within one of the three categories
of action described in the statute.”  Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(h)(1)(A)).
Berman alleges that he made “disclosures that are required or protected
under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002,” 15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(h)(1)(A)‐‐in particular,
he alleges that he reported a securities law violation to his employer.  But he does
not allege facts that make him a “whistleblower” as that term is defined in Dodd‐
Frank.  Nor could he‐‐he concedes that before his termination, he never reported
anything “to the [Securities and Exchange] Commission.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(a)(6).
4
II
The majority hardly disputes that my reading (and the reading given in
Asadi) is the more natural reading of the statute.  But the majority extends
deference to an SEC regulation that alters the unambiguous definition of
“whistleblower” to include anyone who reports a securities law violation “in a
manner described in . . . 15 U.S.C. 78u‐6(h)(1)(A),” 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F‐2(b)(1),
including those who report a securities violation to their employer only.
According to the majority, there is “arguable tension,” Maj. Op. at 7, between the
definition and the substantive whistleblower‐protection provisions, and that is
deemed enough for the SEC’s interpretation to survive under Chevron.  I would
apply the unambiguous statutory text.
A.  The majority assumes its own conclusion, claiming that “subdivision
(iii) [of 15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(h)(1)(A)] . . . purports to protect employees from
retaliation for making reports required or protected by Sarbanes‐Oxley”.  Maj.
Op. at 25 (emphasis added).  That is a bad misreading, tantamount to a
misquotation.  Dodd‐Frank’s whistleblower‐protection provisions do not
mention this (generic) employee.  Instead, the statute lists three ways that “a
whistleblower” may take protected activity (in one case, by making disclosures
5
protected under Sarbanes‐Oxley, see 15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(h)(1)(A)(iii)).  And
“whistleblower” is a defined term.  So subdivision (iii) only protects someone
who (1) makes a protected disclosure under Sarbanes‐Oxley, and (2) also satisfies
Dodd‐Frank’s definition of “whistleblower.”  If the statute used the word
“employee[],” Maj. Op. at 25, Berman might have a claim.  He does not because
the phrasing is a coinage of the majority.
The majority asks: “Who but ‘employees’ could be discriminated against
by an ‘employer’ in the terms and conditions of ‘employment?’”  Maj. Op. at 25
n.9.  My answer?  A whistleblower.  (Congress apparently agrees.  See 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u‐6(h)(1)(A) (“No employer may . . . discriminate against[] a whistleblower in
the terms and conditions of employment . . . .”).)
The (generic) “employee” is nevertheless protected: in the Sarbanes‐Oxley
whistleblower‐protection provision.  See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (a publicly‐traded
company may not “discriminate against an employee” because of lawful
whistleblowing activity) (emphasis added).  The majority ignores the distinction
Congress drew in the two statutes.
B.  The majority claims repeatedly that “the issue presented is whether the
‘whistleblower’ definition in subsection 21F(a)(6) of Dodd‐Frank applies to
6
subdivision (iii) of subsection 21F(h)(1)(A).”  Maj. Op. at 7; see also id. at 15‐16.
To answer that question, the majority looks here, there and everywhere‐‐except
to the statutory text.  But the definitions section is unambiguous: “In this section
the following definitions shall apply.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(a) (emphasis added).
And all of the relevant statutory provisions in this case appear “[i]n this
section”‐‐that is, section 78u‐6 of title 15 of the U.S. Code.  Accordingly, when
Congress used the word “whistleblower” in 15 U.S.C. 78u‐6(h)(1)(A), it “mean[t]
any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the
securities laws to the Commission.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u‐6(a)(6).
The thing about a definition is that it is, well, definitional.
C.  What appears to animate the majority’s finding of “arguable tension” is
that the natural reading of the statutory text would leave 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u‐6(h)(1)(A)(iii) with “extremely limited scope,” Maj. Op. at 17, affording
incremental protection only for individuals who suffer retaliation for reporting to
their employer after having already made a report to the SEC.  But the majority
simply assumes that this would be a “rare example,” Maj. Op. at 20, because the
two reports would have to be “simultaneous,” Maj. Op. at 16, or at least “nearly
simultaneous,” Maj. Op. at 20, and that, because simultaneity would be so rare,
7
Congress could not have bothered its head over it.  The majority does not explain
why simultaneous reporting is required.  I cannot see why it would be.
Moreover, someone might well fire off complaints of illegal activity more or less
at once to one or more of everyone and anyone who might listen: corporate
officers or directors, the SEC, the newspaper, a prosecutor, members of Congress,
and so on.
In any event, the majority has no support for the proposition that when a
plain reading of a statutory provision gives it an “extremely limited” effect, the
statutory provision is impaired or ambiguous.  The U.S. Code is full of statutory
provisions with “extremely limited” effect; there is no canon that counsels
reinforcement of any sub‐sub‐sub‐subsection that lacks a paradigm‐shift.1  The
majority is thrown back on what it calls euphemistically “the realities of the
legislative process.”  Maj. Op. at 27.  By that, it is suggested that Congress is too
1 The majority properly disclaims reliance on the absurdity canon, see Maj.
Op. at 14, presumably recognizing that there is nothing absurd about a plain
reading of the whistleblower definition in Dodd‐Frank.  Compare Church of the
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 460 (1892) (“If a literal construction of
the words of a statute be absurd, the act must be so construed as to avoid the
absurdity.”).
8
busy or confused to draft wording that achieves goals consistent with the intent
of the SEC.2
D.  The majority observes that the statutory text as written gives “little, if
any” protection to lawyers who report violations to employers only, or do so
first‐‐and who may be required to do so.  Maj. Op. at 20.  As the majority
explains, lawyers and auditors are subject to a web of statutory, contractual, and
ethical obligations that impact the timing and manner in which they report
violations, whether to employers or to regulatory agencies or to prosecutors.
Sometimes these obligations require disclosure; sometimes they require
confidentiality.  Congress may well have considered that additional incentives
should not be offered to get lawyers and auditors to fulfill existing professional
duties, for the same reason reward posters often specify that the police are
ineligible.
2 The regulation at issue reflects the SEC’s territorial interests, not its own
reading.  Until only yesterday or so, a separate SEC regulation specified the
procedures by which a Dodd‐Frank whistleblower “must” report a violation‐‐
either by mail or fax “to the SEC Office of the Whistleblower” in Washington,
D.C., or online through the SEC’s website.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.21F‐9(a).  After oral
argument, the SEC issued an “interpretive rule” amending its regulations to
conform to the error it has (successfully) argued here.  See SEC Release No.
34‐75592, 80 Fed. Reg. 47,829 (Aug. 10, 2015).
9
III
The majority relies almost wholly on King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480
(2015).  That case does not do the work the majority needs done.
A.  King v. Burwell is not a wholesale revision of the Supreme Court’s
statutory interpretation jurisprudence, which for decades past has consistently
honored plain text over opportunistic inferences about legislative history and
purpose.  Had the Supreme Court intended an avulsive change, it would not
have done so sub silentio.  Just ten days before King v. Burwell came down, the
Court reinforced and applied the principle that a judge’s “job is to follow the text
even if doing so will supposedly undercut a basic objective of the statute.”  Baker
Botts LLP v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (“Given the clarity of the statutory language, it would be improper to
allow policy considerations to undermine the American Rule in this case.”).
Nothing in King v. Burwell suggests that, in the fortnight that intervened after
ASARCO, the Court repented of that holding‐‐let alone the scores of cases
preceding ASARCO that say the same thing.  See, e.g., Pavelic & LeFlore v.
10
Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989) (“Our task is to apply the text, not to
improve upon it.”).
B.  To the extent the Supreme Court departed from the plain statutory text
in King v. Burwell, it expressly relied on most unusual circumstances.  The Court
adapted wording to avoid what it considered the upending of a ramified, hugely
consequential enactment: “Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve
health insurance markets, not to destroy them.”  135 S. Ct. at 2496.
Here, the sole consequence of applying the statute as written is that those
who report securities violations only to their employer will receive statutory
protection that in the SEC’s view is sub‐optimal.  They will be protected under
Sarbanes‐Oxley, but not Dodd‐Frank‐‐that is, they will enjoy the same protection
every securities whistleblower had before the passage of Dodd‐Frank in 2010,
and more protection than any securities whistleblower had before the passage of
Sarbanes‐Oxley in 2002.  No markets collapse, no castles fall.  A shorter statute of
limitations may be inconvenient for some plaintiffs, but it does not threaten the
entire statutory scheme.  The only palpable danger lurking here is that
bureaucrats and federal judges assume and exercise power to redraft a statute to
give it a more respectable reach.
11
King v. Burwell was not animated by a perceived need to afford greater
impact to a small phrase; to the contrary, the Court rejected the idea that
“Congress made the viability of the entire Affordable Care Act turn on the
ultimate ancillary provision: a sub‐sub‐sub section of the Tax Code.”  135 S. Ct. at
2495.  In rejecting that approach, the Court emphasized that categorical guidance
as to congressional intent should better be looked for in a more predictable
location‐‐like a definitions section:
Had Congress meant to limit tax credits to State Exchanges, it likely
would have done so in the definition of ‘applicable taxpayer,’ or in
some other prominent manner.  It would not have used such a
winding path of connect‐the‐dots provisions about the amount of the
credit.
Id.
For the purpose of the provision at issue here, Congress expressed its
meaning in a “prominent manner”‐‐in the definitions section.  That is exactly
where the Court said one should look, and where the Court said that Congress
should have inserted its limiting language about Affordable Care Act subsidies if it
wanted the language interpreted strictly.  In our case the majority follows the sort
of “winding path of connect‐the‐dots provisions” that the Supreme Court
ridiculed.
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*  *  *
I vote to affirm.  “If the statutory language is plain, we must enforce it
according to its terms.”  King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.  The Court did not
mean in King v. Burwell to revisit the era when judges could cast aside plain
statutory text just because they harbor “doubt[s]” about what was going on in the
heads of individual “conferees” during the legislative process.  See Maj. Op. at
28.
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