United States v. Calix

18‐1991‐cr
United States v. Calix
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ).
A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 12th day of September, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT: RICHARD C. WESLEY,
DENNY CHIN,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges.
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Appellee,
v. 18‐1991‐cr
ANDRE CALIX, AKA John Doe 1, AKA Greg
Bernard,
Defendant‐Appellant.
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FOR APPELLEE: NATHAN REHN, Assistant United
States Attorney (Timothy V. Capozzi,
Karl Metzner, Assistant United States
Attorneys, on the brief), for Geoffrey S.
Berman, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, New
York, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLANT: DARRELL FIELDS, Federal Defenders
of New York, Inc., New York, New
York.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York (Preska, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant‐appellant Andre Calix appeals the judgment of the district
court entered June 21, 2018, convicting him of three counts of bank robbery in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). Calix claims three errors in the district court below that warrant
vacatur of his conviction: (1) his statutory right to a speedy trial afforded by the
Speedy Trial Act (the ʺActʺ) was twice violated when, prior to trial, more than 70 days
elapsed and the time was not automatically excludable or otherwise justified, (2) his
Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated when the district court failed to
order a fourth competency evaluation on the eve of trial, and (3) his Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury was violated when the district court denied his request for a
new venire panel after the existing panel heard him making noises in a nearby room.
We assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of
the case, and the issues on appeal.
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I. Speedy Trial Act
We ʺreview the district courtʹs findings of fact as they pertain to a speedy
trial challenge for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.ʺ United States v. Lucky,
569 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 2009).
First claim. On August 28, 2014, on request of counsel, the district court
(Patterson, J.) ordered that Calix undergo a competency evaluation. Over a year later,
on January 19, 2016, following a judicial reassignment, replacement of defense counsel,
and three successive competency evaluations, the district court (Preska, J.) concluded,
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241, that Calix was competent to stand trial. This entire delay
was automatically excludable from the speedy trial clock because the Act excludes from
its calculations ʺ[a]ny period of delayʺ resulting from ʺany proceeding, including any
examinations, to determine the mental competency . . . of the defendant.ʺ 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Indeed, we have held that § 3161(h)(1)(A) requires
that delays associated with competency proceedings ʺmust be excluded from the
calculation of the speedy trial clock whether or not they are reasonable.ʺ United States
v. Vasquez, 918 F.2d 329, 333 (2d Cir. 1990) (emphasis added). Calix argues that because
he made a motion for a second competency proceeding on November 12, 2014,
§ 3161(h)(1)(D), which excludes time for motions generally, applies. This argument is
without merit, as the more specific mental competency exception controls. See Bloate v.
United States, 559 U.S. 196, 207 (2010); see also United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d 387,
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416 (2d Cir. 2008). Thus, there was no speedy trial violation because the entire period
between August 28, 2014 and January 19, 2016 was properly excluded.
Second claim. On February 7, 2017, the government sought an
adjournment of trial from March 27, 2017 to September 11, 2017 ʺto permit continuity of
counsel for the defendant, and to permit defense counsel sufficient additional time to
confer with the defendant to prepare for trial.ʺ App. at 131. The district court granted
the adjournment. The Act provides that district courts may exclude any time due to
ʺdelay resulting from a continuanceʺ so long as the ʺends of justice served by [ordering
the continuance] outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy
trial.ʺ 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Here, the governmentʹs adjournment request
mentioned that the district court was no longer available for the previously scheduled
trial date. It is undisputed that the Act does not allow for delay ʺbecause of general
congestion of the courtʹs calendar.ʺ 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(C). Nevertheless, it is also
undisputed that Calixʹs continued refusal to work with counsel had disrupted counselʹs
ability to prepare a defense, which resulted in two unopposed motions for adjournment
on June 2, 2016 and October 31, 2016. Neither defense counsel nor Calix objected to the
governmentʹs motion for a third adjournment, and the court found that failure to grant
the adjournment would deny defense counsel the reasonable time necessary for
effective preparation. See id. § 3161(h)(7)(A), (B)(iv). Moreover, the court found that,
given defense counselʹs unavailability during certain subsequent months, a more
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significant delay was necessary to promote continuity of counsel. We cannot say, on
this record, that these findings were clearly erroneous. Thus, there was no speedy trial
violation.
II. Competency to Stand Trial
We review a district courtʹs factual determination that a defendant is
competent to stand trial for clear error. United States v. Morrison, 153 F.3d 34, 46 (2d
Cir. 1998). We review a district courtʹs decision not to order a competency hearing for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Arenburg, 605 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 2010) (per
curiam).
Calix argues that a fourth competency evaluation was required to ensure
he was fit to stand trial. At the September 6, 2017 pre‐trial conference, defense counsel
raised the issue of Calixʹs competency to stand trial. The district court concluded that
because ʺMr. Calixʹs behavior . . . is always the sameʺ and there has been ʺno difference
in his attitude, demeanor, and conduct,ʺ the three prior competency evaluations and the
courtʹs January 19, 2016 conclusion that Calix was competent to stand trial remained
applicable. App. at 154‐55. This was not an abuse of discretion. The court
determined on the basis of multiple competency evaluations and the courtʹs own
observations of the defendant that no reasonable cause existed to order a competency
hearing or yet another evaluation. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241; United States v. Zhou, 428 F.3d
361, 380‐81 (2d Cir. 2005).
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III. Jury Venire
ʺThere are few aspects of a jury trial where we would be less inclined to
disturb a trial judgeʹs exercise of discretion, absent clear abuse,ʺ than in ʺempaneling of
a jury.ʺ United States v. Ploof, 464 F.2d 116, 118‐19 n.4 (2d Cir. 1972). Thus, a ʺtrial
courtʹs findings of juror impartiality may be overturned only for manifest error.ʺ
Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 396 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Calix argues that his right to an impartial jury was compromised because
the venire panel in the courtroom heard Calix ʺbanging and screamingʺ in a nearby
room ʺeven though two doors [were] shut betweenʺ them. App. at 206, 208. We
disagree. The court excused two venire members who remarked on the noises,
provided a curative instruction, and ultimately excused an additional two jurors who
came forward after the curative instruction. Jury selection then resumed without
further reference to Calixʹs conduct. Under these circumstances, the district courtʹs
assessment that replacing the entire venire would be ʺmuch too extreme a remedy
which is not requiredʺ was borne out. App. at 236. All of the potential jurors who
indicated any sensitivity to the noises were ultimately excused from the venire. Thus,
the court took suitable steps to safeguard the juryʹs impartiality. Moreover, the court
acted appropriately in refusing to allow Calix to manufacture a need for a new venire.
See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (ʺTo allow the
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disruptive activities of a defendant . . . to prevent his trial is to allow him to profit from
his own wrong.ʺ). Accordingly, there was no error, and certainly no manifest error.
* * *
We have considered all of Calixʹs remaining arguments and find them to
be without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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