Singh Multani v. Garland

19-3846
Singh Multani v. Garland
BIA
Brennan, IJ
A202 134 258
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 24th day of September, two thousand twenty-one.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JON O. NEWMAN,
8 ROBERT D. SACK,
9 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 MALKEET SINGH MULTANI, AKA TAMIN
14 IQBAL, AKA MALKIT SINGH,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 19-3846
18 NAC
19 MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20 STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21 Respondent. *
22 _____________________________________
23
24 FOR PETITIONER: Satwant Kaur, South Richmond
25 Hill, NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Bryan Boynton, Acting Assistant
28 Attorney General; Linda S.
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General
Merrick B. Garland is automatically substituted as Respondent.
1 Wernery, Assistant Director;
2 Monica M. Twombly, Trial Attorney,
3 Office of Immigration Litigation,
4 United States Department of
5 Justice, Washington, DC.
6
7 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
8 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
9 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
10 is DENIED.
11 Petitioner Malkeet Singh Multani, a native and citizen
12 of India, seeks review of an October 17, 2019 decision of the
13 BIA affirming a January 11, 2018 decision of an Immigration
14 Judge (“IJ”) that denied Singh Multani’s application for
15 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
16 Convention Against Torture. In re Malkeet Singh Multani, No.
17 A202 134 258 (B.I.A. Oct. 17, 2019), aff’g No. A202 134 258
18 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 11, 2018). We assume the parties’
19 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.
20 Under the circumstances, we have considered the decision
21 of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen v.
22 Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). We review the
23 agency’s adverse credibility determination for substantial
24 evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v.
25 Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018).
2
1 Singh Multani argues that the IJ erred when she found
2 his testimony to be not credible. We defer to an IJ’s
3 credibility determination “unless, from the totality of the
4 circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
5 could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin
6 v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008). Substantial
7 evidence supports the agency’s determination that Singh
8 Multani was not credible as to his claim that members of the
9 Dera Sacha Sauda threatened and attacked him in India when he
10 refused to join their organization and support the Congress
11 Party.
12 The IJ did not clearly err in making her credibility
13 determination. Singh Multani’s testimony was internally
14 inconsistent and inconsistent with the documents he provided
15 to the IJ. For example, Singh Multani testified that in May
16 2014 he was attacked by a large group of people wielding
17 sticks and iron pipes for 15 to 20 minutes. But on cross
18 examination, Singh Multani stated that he was not injured in
19 that attack. When asked how he could be attacked by a large
20 group of people wielding sticks and iron pipes for 15 to 20
21 minutes and not be injured, Singh Multani changed his story
22 and said that his attackers had weapons but did not use them
3
1 and that he was able to flee from his attackers.
2 Additionally, the IJ found that, when pressed on these and
3 other inconsistencies, Singh Multani was hesitant in his
4 demeanor and that Singh Multani’s answers were vague and
5 evasive. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Majidi v.
6 Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 81 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005) (recognizing
7 that particular deference is given to the trier of fact’s
8 assessment of demeanor); Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d
9 140, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (“Where an applicant gives very spare
10 testimony, . . . the IJ . . . may fairly wonder whether the
11 testimony is fabricated.”), overruled in part on other
12 grounds by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 494 F.3d
13 296, 305 (2d Cir. 2007).
14 Given the demeanor and the inconsistency findings, the
15 IJ’s adverse credibility determination was supported by
16 substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).
17 That determination was dispositive of asylum, withholding of
18 removal, and CAT relief because all three claims were based
19 on the same factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444
20 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006).
21 We also find no error in the BIA’s determination that
22 the IJ did not exhibit bias. Although rare, remand may be
4
1 required “when an IJ’s conduct results in the appearance of
2 bias or hostility such that we cannot conduct a meaningful
3 review of the decision below.” Ali v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 478,
4 490 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Islam v. Gonzales, 469 F.3d 53,
5 55 (2d Cir. 2006)). The record reveals that, as was her
6 obligation, the IJ posed questions to probe for more details,
7 warned against leading questions while offering suggested
8 alternatives, and advised on her preferred procedures. See
9 Islam, 469 F.3d at 55 (holding that “IJ . . . has an obligation
10 to establish and develop the record”).
11 Singh Multani appears to argue that it was improper for
12 the IJ to question him about his testimony. But “[u]nlike
13 an Article III judge, an IJ is not merely the fact finder and
14 adjudicator;” she “also has an obligation to establish and
15 develop the record.” Islam, 469 F.3d at 55. Accordingly,
16 “[d]uring immigration proceedings, an IJ has the authority to
17 ‘administer oaths, receive evidence, and interrogate,
18 examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses.’”
19 Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1)). Having carefully
20 reviewed the record, we find that there was nothing improper
21 or biased about the IJ’s conduct in this matter.
5
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
2 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
3 stays VACATED.
4 FOR THE COURT:
5 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
6 Clerk of Court
6