Mohammadreza Daeisadeghi v. Equinox Great Neck, Inc.

19‐506‐cv
Mohammadreza Daeisadeghi v. Equinox Great Neck, Inc.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE
OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURTʹS LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION ʺSUMMARY ORDERʺ). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED
BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in
the City of New York, on the 16th day of December, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT: ROBERT D. SACK,
DENNY CHIN,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
MOHAMMADREZA DAEISADEGHI,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. 19‐506‐cv
EQUINOX GREAT NECK, INC.,
Defendant‐Appellee.
‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐ ‐x
FOR PLAINTIFF‐APPELLANT: THOMAS RICOTTA, Ricotta & Marks, P.C.,
Long Island City, New York.
FOR DEFENDANT‐APPELLEE: PATRICK McPARTLAND (Jared E. Blumetti,
on the brief), LaRocca Hornik Rosen &
Greenberg LLP, New York, New York.
FOR AMICI CURIAE: BARBARA L. SLOAN (James L. Lee, Jennifer S.
Goldstein, Sydney A.R. Foster, on the brief),
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Washington, D.C.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Spatt, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐appellant Mohammadreza Daeisadeghi appeals the district
courtʹs January 28, 2019 judgment dismissing his national origin discrimination claims
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (ʺTitle VIIʺ),
against defendant‐appellee Equinox Great Neck, Inc. (ʺEquinoxʺ) for hostile work
environment and wrongful termination. By memorandum and order entered January
25, 2019, the district court granted Equinoxʹs motion for summary judgment. We
assume the partiesʹ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues
on appeal.
We review de novo the district courtʹs grant of summary judgment,
ʺconstruing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non‐moving party and
drawing all reasonable inferences in [his] favor.ʺ Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux N.
Am., Inc., 715 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2013). A movant is entitled to summary judgment if
2
ʺthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.ʺ Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Daeisadeghi argues that, because of his national origin, he was
(1) wrongfully terminated, and (2) subjected to a hostile work environment, in violation
of Title VII. The district court held that Daeisadeghi failed to demonstrate a genuine
issue of fact with respect to both claims. We agree.
A. Wrongful Termination
Daeisadeghi failed to present evidence from which a jury could infer
discrimination. On this record, a reasonable jury could only conclude that Equinox
terminated Daeisadeghi for violating company policy. In an October 2014 email to all
personal training managers, Equinox reported that employees were inappropriately
using an employee discount to purchase training sessions for non‐employee Equinox
members. The email reiterated what was stated in the Equinox employee handbook ‐‐
that employees who violated the policy were subject to ʺtermination of employment.ʺ
Appʹx at 807. Daeisadeghi acknowledged that he received, read, and understood the
email. Yet, as the record unequivocally demonstrates, even after receipt of the email
Daeisadeghi knowingly permitted his personal attorney to purchase training sessions
using his employee discount. Indeed, at deposition, Daeisadeghi admitted doing so,
and that the total discount from the training sessions exceeded $10,000. Moreover, the
3
attorney testified that Daeisadeghi gave her discounted sessions in exchange for legal
work she performed on his behalf. See Appʹx at 591 (Daeisadeghiʹs attorney confirming
that Daeisadeghi purchased discounted personal training sessions for her ʺin exchange
for the legal work . . . performed on his behalfʺ); see also Appʹx at 810 (Daeisadeghiʹs
email noting that the sessions were purchased as ʺa favorʺ for a ʺcustodyʺ issue
involving his son). On this record, a reasonable jury could only conclude that
Daeisadeghi was terminated for violating company policy and not for a discriminatory
reason.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Daeisadeghi next argues that he was subjected to a hostile work
environment at Equinox because of the ʺdaily harassmentʺ he experienced regarding his
national origin. Appellantʹs Br. at 17. To establish a hostile work environment claim, ʺa
plaintiff must produce enough evidence to show that the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that is sufficiently severe or pervasive
to alter the conditions of the victimʹs employment and create an abusive working
environment.ʺ Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Regʹl Transp. Auth., 743 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir.
2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). ʺThis standard has both objective and
subjective components: the conduct complained of must be severe or pervasive enough
that a reasonable person would find it hostile or abusive, and the victim must
subjectively perceive the work environment to be abusive.ʺ Littlejohn v. City of New
4
York, 795 F.3d 297, 321 (2d Cir. 2015) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23,
(1993)). In conducting this analysis, this Court considers: ʺ(1) the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; (2) its severity; (3) whether the conduct was physically
threatening or humiliating, or a ʹmere offensive utteranceʹ; (4) whether the conduct
unreasonably interfered with plaintiffʹs work; and (5) what psychological harm, if any,
resulted.ʺ Aulicino v. New York City Depʹt of Homeless Servs., 580 F.3d 73, 82 (2d Cir.
2009).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Equinox after
concluding that the harassment Daeisadeghi experienced was not sufficiently frequent
or severe to constitute a hostile environment.1 While Daeisadeghi does point to
evidence that he was subjected to frequent harassment in the form of jokes about his
accent and national origin, the harassment, while inappropriate and offensive, does not
rise to the level of creating a hostile work environment in the circumstances here.
Daeisadeghi failed to present evidence that the conduct was physically threatening or
humiliating, or that the conduct interfered with his work (he testified that he was a
ʺhigh performance employee,ʺ Appʹx at 280), or that he suffered any psychological
1 The district court also found that Daeisadeghi ʺparticipated in similar anticsʺ when he told an
employee he would ʺkick [his] assʺ or ʺkick [him] in the head.ʺ S. Appʹx at 22‐23. Daeisadeghiʹs
participation in ʺsimilar anticsʺ at Equinox, however, does not undermine his discrimination claim at the
summary judgment stage. As this Court has stated before, ʺtwo wrongs do not make a right.ʺ United
States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108, 121 n.5 (2d Cir. 2008). Daeisadeghiʹs alleged threatening statements do not
cancel or nullify any discrimination he might have experienced from his supervisors. Nonetheless, for
the reasons discussed, Daeisadeghiʹs hostile work environment claim still fails.
5
harm as a result. Indeed, he admitted that he suffered no emotional distress from any
of the harassment he experienced while working at Equinox. See Appʹx at 392. While
the absence of emotional harm is not dispositive, it is ʺrelevant [to] whether the plaintiff
actually found the environment abusive.ʺ Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
In the end, Daeisadeghi alleges only ʺmere offensive utterance[s].ʺ
Aulicino, 580 F.3d at 82. As we have observed, however, ʺTitle VII does not set forth ʹa
general civility code for the American workplace,ʹʺ Redd v. New York Div. of Parole, 678
F.3d 166, 176 (2d Cir. 2012), and ʺ[s]imple teasing [or] offhand comments . . . will not
amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment,ʺ Holtz v.
Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 75 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 788 (1998)). While there is some evidence that Daeisadeghi was subject to
teasing and requested a transfer, in part, due to the teasing, on this record no reasonable
jury could conclude that the workplace was ʺpermeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult,ʺ Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, or that the environment
ʺalter[ed] the conditionsʺ of Daeisadeghiʹs employment, id.; see Petrosino v. Bell Atl., 385
F.3d 210, 223 (2d Cir. 2004); Woroski v. Nashua Corp., 31 F.3d 105, 109‐10 (2d Cir. 1994)
(ʺSome evidence is not sufficient to withstand a properly supported motion for
summary judgment; a plaintiff opposing such a motion must produce sufficient
evidence to support a rational findingʺ in his favor); cf. Rivera, 743 F.3d at 23 (vacating
summary judgment after plaintiff offered evidence of ethnic slurs, bullying, and
6
physical harassment); Raniola v. Bratton, 243 F.3d 610, 618‐23 (2d Cir. 2001) (vacating
summary judgment after plaintiff offered evidence of specific derogatory remarks,
sexually demeaning posters, and specific incidents of workplace sabotage).
* * *
We have considered Daeisadeghiʹs remaining arguments and conclude
they are without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine OʹHagan Wolfe, Clerk
7