Morton v. County of Erie

18‐3085
Morton v. County of Erie
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A
SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION ASUMMARY ORDER@). A PARTY CITING TO A
SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
City of New York, on the 19th day of December, two thousand nineteen.
PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
Circuit Judges.
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TED MORTON,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v. No. 18‐3085‐cv
COUNTY OF ERIE,
Defendant‐Appellee.
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The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.
FOR APPELLANT: JEREMY A. COLBY, Lancaster, NY.
FOR APPELLEE: DANIEL A. SPITZER (Jessica L.
Copeland, on the brief), Hodgson Russ
LLP, Buffalo, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York (Elizabeth A. Wolford, Judge).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff‐Appellant Ted Morton – a former Erie County legislator who was
fined $500 by the Erie County Board of Ethics for filing a false financial disclosure
form – appeals from a judgment of the district court (Wolford, J.) granting
summary judgment to the County on Morton’s federal due process claims and
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his remaining state law
claims.
We review a district court’s summary judgment ruling de novo, Darnell v.
Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 2017), and its decision to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for abuse of discretion, Klein & Co.
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Futures, Inc. v. Bd. of Trade of the City of N.Y., 464 F.3d 255, 262 (2d Cir. 2006). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and
issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision to
affirm.
I. Notice and Hearing
Morton contends that the Board violated his federal due process rights by
failing to provide him with “notice of the charges against him or an opportunity
to be heard after receiving such charges.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 11.
“An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or
property be preceded by notice and [an] opportunity for [a] hearing appropriate
to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542
(1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Though “due process does
not require actual notice, actual notice satisfies due process – so long as that notice
‘apprises [a party] of the pendency of the action and affords [it] an opportunity to
respond.’” Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Madison County, 665 F.3d 408, 429 (2d
Cir. 2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Baker v. Latham Sparrowbush Assocs., 72
F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 1995)).
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Here, the record demonstrates that Morton had actual knowledge of the
pendency of the Board’s action and investigation into his potential Code of Ethics
violation and the consequences that could follow from such a violation. Indeed,
even before the Board contacted him, Morton knew that there were problems with
his initial disclosure form. He admitted to a local newspaper that he had
incorrectly disclosed his debts on the form and wrote an unprompted letter to the
Board on October 13, 2015, admitting to the same. The Board informed Morton’s
legislative assistant in November 2015 that it was “look[ing] into” Morton’s
incorrect financial disclosure form. Supplemental App’x at 23. Finally, Morton
received a letter from the Board on December 7, 2015, referencing Morton’s
“attempt[]” to submit a revised disclosure, requesting additional documentation
for the relevant debts and an explanation of when and how Morton learned of his
mistake, and explicitly taking “no position at this time with respect to accepting
any revised form and whether any violations of the Code of Ethics exist[].” App’x
at 8.1. This evidence demonstrates that Morton had actual notice of the charge
asserted against him and the evidence supporting it, thereby satisfying the due
process notice requirement.
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Morton resists this conclusion, asserting that he was entitled to a formal
charging instrument akin to an indictment setting forth the precise charges
brought. But such formalism is not required so long as the Board’s procedures
provided “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
[Morton] of the pendency of the action.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co.,
339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). Because we conclude that the Board did in fact provide
such notice, Morton’s contentions to the contrary fail.
In addition to challenging the notice provided, Morton also asserts that he
was denied a hearing on the charges once they were brought. In determining the
sufficiency of pre‐deprivation hearing procedures, Mathews v. Eldridge requires
courts to weigh (1) “the private interest that will be affected,” (2) “the risk of an
erroneous deprivation . . . and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Here, Morton was provided with an opportunity to make a written
submission to the Board in which he was free to raise all relevant issues of fact and
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law concerning his filing of a false financial disclosure form. Morton also had the
post‐deprivation opportunity to file a request with the Board for reconsideration
and to challenge the Board’s decision through an Article 78 proceeding. Morton
did seek reconsideration, raising his objections to the specific charges and findings
of the Board – which the Board considered and denied – but chose not to pursue a
remedy under Article 78. Morton nevertheless argues that the language of the
Board’s letter (requesting “information,” App’x at 20) lulled him into believing
that he did not need to present his case. We disagree. Although the Board’s
December 7, 2015 letter advised Morton that the Board was not taking a position
at that time as to whether he had violated the Code of Ethics, it did invite him to
make a submission explaining, among other things, “precisely when, from whom
you learned of the error, and how you first learned that your form was in error.”
Id. at 8.1. This invitation presented Morton with the opportunity to raise all
relevant issues of fact and law concerning his filing of a false financial disclosure
form.
On balance, the Eldridge factors demonstrate that the process accorded to
Morton was sufficient, especially given the available post‐deprivation
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opportunities. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545–46 (explaining that the pre‐
deprivation procedures can vary based on the nature of post‐deprivation
proceedings). This conclusion is consistent with our decision in Interboro Institute,
Inc. v. Foley, 985 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1993), in which we held that the opportunity to
make written submissions on disputed issues of law and fact in conjunction with
post‐deprivation Article 78 review satisfied due process. Id. at 93. Accordingly,
we find that Morton was afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard that
satisfied the requirements of constitutional due process.
II. State Law Violations and Supplemental Jurisdiction
Morton maintains that “[t]he Board’s failure to comply with its Rules and
Regulations constitutes a separate and independent violation of” federal due
process. Appellant’s Opening Br. at 25. Specifically, he asserts that the Board did
not docket its investigation into his potential Code of Ethics violation, assign it a
case number, or provide him with a copy of the County’s Code of Ethics and the
Board’s rules and regulations. He also contends that “Erie County Local Law 10‐
1989 is ultra vires, invalid, and unenforceable because it deviates from state law,
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including General Municipal Law Section 812.” Id. at 8, 41–45. He suggests that
this, as well, is a violation of federal due process. Id. at 41.
A violation of state law procedure does not by itself give rise to a federal
due process violation. Tallman v. County of Chautauqua, 335 F. App’x 92, 94 (2d Cir.
2009) (citing Island Park, LLC v. CSX Transp., 559 F.3d 96, 109–10 (2d Cir. 2009)).
Nevertheless, a violation of state procedure will give rise to a federal due process
claim when “an individual [is] ‘denied a fair forum for protecting his state rights.’”
McDarby v. Dinkins, 907 F.2d 1334, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990) (quoting Atencio v. Bd. of
Educ. of Penasco Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 658 F.2d 774, 779–80 (10th Cir. 1981)).
Here, any purported deviations from the Board’s rules and the dictates of
General Municipal Law Section 812 did not rise to the level of a violation of federal
constitutional due process because those deviations did not deprive Morton of
notice and an opportunity to be heard. As the district court properly noted, “once
the constitutional minima have been satisfied . . . a state agency’s non‐compliance
with promised, yet gratuitous procedural protections does not constitute a due
process violation.” App’x at 108 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Accordingly, because Morton was not denied a fair forum for protecting his state
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rights and because the procedures afforded to Morton satisfied the constitutional
minima of notice and an opportunity to be heard, any purported deviations by the
Board from its own rules or from General Municipal Law Section 812 did not
constitute a distinct violation of federal due process.
After granting summary judgment to the County on Morton’s federal due
process claims, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Morton’s state law due process and declaratory judgment claims. To the
extent that Morton challenges that ruling, we see no error in the court’s decision
to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
Federal courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims
in civil cases in which they have original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. A “district
court may, at its discretion, exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims even where it has dismissed all claims over which it had original
jurisdiction.” Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir.
1996). However, after dismissing all original jurisdiction claims, a district court
must reassess its jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims by considering
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“judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.” Motorola Credit Corp. v.
Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, the district court properly considered these factors in declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction. No discovery has yet occurred, so the court’s
refusal to hear Morton’s state law claims will not engender substantial duplication
of litigation efforts. Furthermore, properly allowing the state courts to consider
Morton’s state law claims – particularly his claim that County Law 10‐1989 is “ultra
vires, invalid, and unenforceable,” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 8 – would serve the
interest of comity since the determination of complex state law claims in the first
instance is better left to those courts. Finally, Morton fails to proffer any reason
why the district court’s refusing to hear his state law claims would lead to a
substantial inconvenience or unfairness. Accordingly, the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Morton’s state law claims.
* * *
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We have considered Morton’s remaining contentions and conclude that
they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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