Weng v. Yates

15-2771
Weng v. Yates
BIA
Poczter, IJ
A205 628 473
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
CORRECTED SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY
OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
2 the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
3 Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
4 25th day of January, two thousand seventeen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 REENA RAGGI,
8 GERARD E. LYNCH,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 JIANQUAN WENG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 15-2771
17 NAC
18 SALLY Q. YATES, UNITED STATES
19 ACTING ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent. 1
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: G. Victoria Calle, New York, N.Y.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
26 Assistant Attorney General; Anthony
27 P. Nicastro, Assistant Director;
28 Drew Brinkman, Trial Attorney,
29 Office of Immigration Litigation,
1 - Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Acting Attorney General Sally Q.
Yates is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as Respondent.
1 United States Department of Justice,
2 Washington, D.C.
3 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
4 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
5 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
6 DENIED.
7 Petitioner Jianquan Weng, a native and citizen of the
8 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 11, 2015,
9 decision of the BIA, affirming a March 6, 2014, decision of an
10 Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Weng’s application for asylum,
11 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
12 Torture (“CAT”). In re Jianquan Weng, No. A205 628 473 (B.I.A.
13 Aug. 11, 2015), aff’g No. A205 628 473 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
14 A.K. Marsh. 6, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
15 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
16 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both
17 the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432
18 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of
19 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
20 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008).
21 For asylum applications like Weng’s, governed by the REAL
22 ID Act, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of the
23 circumstances,” base a credibility finding on the plausibility
2
1 of an applicant’s account and inconsistencies and omissions in
2 the applicant’s statements and his witness’s statements and
3 evidence, “without regard to whether” those inconsistencies go
4 “to the heart of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C.
5 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 163-64. “We
6 defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from
7 the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no
8 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility
9 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The adverse
10 credibility determination rests on substantial evidence.
11 The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies among
12 Weng’s testimony, statements, and evidence concerning his
13 practice of Christianity in China. 8 U.S.C.
14 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. On direct
15 examination, Weng testified that he began attending an
16 underground church as an adult in June 2009; on cross
17 examination, however, Weng said that he had attended church when
18 he was five or six years old and did so for two years. Weng
19 sought to explain the inconsistency by asserting that he “was
20 just a child” who went there to play, that he understood the
21 question to mean when he began attending regularly, and that
22 the attorney for the Department of Homeland Security asked when
3
1 he was introduced to Christianity, not when he began attending
2 an underground church. The agency reasonably rejected Weng’s
3 explanations. “A petitioner must do more than offer a
4 plausible explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure
5 relief; he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would
6 be compelled to credit his testimony.” Majidi v. Gonzales, 430
7 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS, 386
8 F.3d 77, 76 (2d Cir. 2004)). Moreover, Weng could not state
9 unequivocally whether his siblings attended church. The IJ
10 reasonably concluded that this called into question whether
11 Weng actually came from a devout family, as he claimed, and
12 suggested that Weng embellished his testimony. See Majidi, 430
13 F.3d at 80.
14 In addition, the agency reasonably rested the adverse
15 credibility determination on inconsistencies in Weng’s
16 description of his purported arrest in China, the only alleged
17 incident of persecution. See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland
18 Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006). Although Weng testified
19 that, on the day of his arrest, his parents had “some other
20 business” and did not attend church with him, his mother’s
21 letter states that she was out of town on that day.
22 Finally, additional inconsistencies concerning Weng’s
4
1 past practice and his family’s practice of Christianity support
2 the adverse credibility determination. See Xiu Xia Lin, 534
3 F.3d at 167. First, the letter submitted by Weng’s mother did
4 not corroborate Weng’s testimony that his parents attended an
5 underground church until his 2012 arrest, when they began
6 attending a government church. Moreover, a 2011 official
7 household register listed Weng’s parents’ religion as
8 Christianity, which conflicts with his claim that they
9 practiced Christianity in secret. Second, Weng’s testimony
10 and evidence regarding his brother was inconsistent. The
11 household register listed Christianity as Weng’s brother’s
12 religion, but Weng testified that only he and his parents
13 practiced Christianity. Third, the agency also reasonably
14 found Weng not credible regarding his practice of Christianity
15 in the United States. Weng and his witness provided
16 inconsistent testimony on this point. 8 U.S.C.
17 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Weng testified that he and his
18 childhood friend attend church together in the United States,
19 although they had not recently because his friend was working
20 in Los Angeles. But the witness testified that he never
21 attended church services with Weng and was working in San Jose.
22 Weng’s explanations for these inconsistencies are not
5
1 compelling. See Majidi, 430 F.3d at 80.
2 Having questioned Weng’s credibility, the agency did not
3 err in concluding that Weng’s lack of corroborating evidence
4 further undermined his credibility. See Biao Yang v. Gonzales,
5 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007). Weng has not challenged that
6 finding.
7 Given the multiple inconsistencies identified going both
8 to past events and to Weng’s continuing practice of
9 Christianity, as well as the lack of corroboration, we conclude
10 that a “reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
11 credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. The
12 adverse credibility ruling is dispositive of asylum,
13 withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all three forms
14 of relief are based on the same factual predicate. Paul v.
15 Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
16 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
17 DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
18 for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
19 FOR THE COURT:
20 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
6