United States v. Antonio Rivera

13‐2722 (L)
United States of America v. Antonio Rivera, et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
______________
August Term, 2014
(Argued: January 26, 2015          Decided: August 25, 2015)
Docket Nos. 13‐2722 (L); 13‐2723 (Con); 13‐2864 (Con)
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
‐v.‐
ANTONIO RIVERA, AKA SANTOS MORALES, AKA ANTONIO
ALMADAMO, AKA SANTOS GARCIA, JASON VILLAMAN, AKA SANTI,
JOHN WHALEY, AKA JOHN HOLLY, AKA JOHNNY,
Defendants‐Appellants.*
______________
Before:
JACOBS, CALABRESI, AND WESLEY, Circuit Judges.
______________
*  The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption of this case as set forth above.
Appellants Antonio Rivera, Jason Villaman, and John Whaley appeal from
judgments entered on June 27, 2013, in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York (Feuerstein, J.).  Appellants were convicted, after a
jury trial, of sex trafficking, forced labor, and alien harboring and transportation
charges.  We hold that the exclusion of evidence of the victims’ other sexual
behavior before they were employed at the Appellants’ bars and any other
exposure to a sexualized business did not violate the Appellants’ right to present
a complete defense and to confront witnesses.  We also hold that while the sex
trafficking charge given to the jury was error, that error was harmless.  Finally,
we hold that the Appellants’ sentences were procedurally unreasonable.  We
therefore AFFIRM Appellants’ convictions, VACATE their sentences, and
REMAND the cases for a full resentencing.  Judge JACOBS dissents in a separate
opinion.
JOHN F. CARMAN, Garden City, NY, for Defendant‐
Appellant Antonio Rivera.
JONATHAN I. EDELSTEIN, Edelstein & Grossman,
New York, NY, for Defendant‐Appellant Jason Villaman.
ELIZABETH A. LATIF (Daniel E. Wenner, on the brief),
Day Pitney LLP, Hartford, CT, for Defendant‐Appellant
John Whaley.
AMY BUSA, Assistant United States Attorney (Jo Ann
Navickas, Assistant United States Attorney, on the brief),
for Kelly T. Currie, Acting United States Attorney for
the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, NY.
______________
WESLEY, Circuit Judge:
Appellants Antonio Rivera, Jason Villaman, and John Whaley appeal from
judgments entered on June 27, 2013, in the United States District Court for the
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Eastern District of New York (Feuerstein, J.).  Appellants operated two bars on
Long Island that also functioned as illegal brothels.  They advertised a decent
salary and free transportation to and from work to recruit attractive,
undocumented aliens to work in a role they described as “waitress.”  The
“waitresses,” who became the victims in Appellants’ scheme, were told they
would be expected to dress suggestively, serve drinks, and possibly dance with
customers.  The reality was very different: Appellants threatened the victims
with violence and deportation if they spoke to the authorities or quit, forced
them to drink alcohol until they were intoxicated, required them to strip, and
compelled them to be fondled by customers, to be groped by customers, and to
have sex with customers.
Before trial, the Government moved in limine to, among other things,
preclude Appellants from inquiring or offering evidence as to “the victims’ other
sexual behavior including . . . any other employment in a sexualized business”
under Federal Rule of Evidence 412.  Gov’t Mot. in Lim., Apr. 12, 2011, Dist. Ct.
Dkt. No. 139, at 2.  Whaley, joined by Villaman,1 opposed this branch of the
1 Rivera did not object to the Government’s in limine motion to preclude cross‐
examination about the victims’ other employment in a sexualized business.  On appeal,
Rivera contends that evidence of the victims’ sexual past should have been admissible.
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motion, arguing that “[i]nformation which shows that the alleged victims
engaged in commercialized or similar sex without force, fraud or coercion goes
to the heart of the question of guilt or innocence in this case.”  Villaman App.
147.  The district court, after argument, precluded testimony about the victims’
employment in other sexualized businesses.
Whaley also objected to the Government’s proposed jury instruction on the
sex trafficking charge, arguing that the jury should not be instructed that it could
consider any aspects of the victims’ backgrounds since the defense was
precluded from questioning victims about their prior life experiences.  The
district court overruled Whaley’s objection.2
We review Rivera’s argument for plain error.  See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Jones v. United
States, 527 U.S. 373, 388 (1999).
2  The jury charge on sex trafficking ultimately read:
The  scheme,  plan  or  pattern  need  not  involve  actual  threats  of  serious
harm,  but  may  involve  any  other  means,  including  deception  or
psychological coercion, used to cause the person to reasonably believe that
she,  her  family,  or  any  other  person  would  suffer  serious  harm  if  she
refused to continue providing sex acts. . . . If you find that any of the three
prohibited means [force, fraud or coercion] I mentioned earlier was used,
you must then determine whether such use was sufficient to cause one or
more of the Jane Does . . . to engage in a commercial sex act.  In making
that determination, you may consider the cumulative effect of the conduct
of  that  defendant  and  the  Jane  Does.    You  may  also  consider  the  special
vulnerabilities, if any, of the Jane Does.  In this regard you may find that
not all persons are of the same courage or firmness.  You may consider, for
4
At trial, Appellants’ counsel elicited testimony that could suggest that the
victims consented to being prostitutes.  For example, some of the victims testified
that they had quit working at the bars but then returned after some time for
various reasons.  A few of the victims acknowledged that they knew others who
worked at the bars and had visited the bars prior to their employment there, or
had even recruited relatives or friends to work at the bars.
Appellants’ counsel made use of this testimony at closing.  For example,
Rivera’s counsel argued that the victims “had the chance to see the[] bars for
what they were before they started working,” including viewing “non‐stop
debauchery.”  Villaman App. 765.  He also contended that the victims chose to be
prostitutes at the bars because they “would make a lot [more] money . . . than
example,  the  Jane  Doe’s  background,  physical  and  mental  condition,
experience, education, socioeconomic status, and any inequalities between
them  and  the  defendant  under  consideration  with  respect  to  these
considerations including their relative stations in life among other things.
Simply put, you may ask whether the particular Jane Doe was vulnerable
in  some  way  so  that  the  actions  of  the  defendant  under  consideration,
even if not sufficient to compel another person to engage in a commercial
sex act, were enough to compel that particular Jane Doe. . . .
If  a  particular  Jane  Doe  was  threatened  with  or  suffered  certain
consequences  in  connection  with  the  services  that  she  purportedly
rendered  that  overcame  her  will  and  compelled  her  service,  that  is
sufficient to establish the third element of the offense of sex trafficking.
Villaman App. 796.
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they could make in a factory, or in a nail salon, or in any of the other places that
they worked at illegally prior to working at [the bars].”  Id.  Rivera’s counsel
asked the jury “what woman would come for a job interview, observe this, and
then work there unless she knew what she was getting into and how much
money she was going to make to do it?”  Id.
Appellants were convicted of sex trafficking, forced labor, and alien
harboring and transportation charges.  We address Appellants’ arguments that
the district court erred: (1) in granting the Government’s motion in limine to
exclude cross‐examination regarding the victims’ other employment in a
sexualized business with respect to Appellants’ sex trafficking and forced labor
charges; (2) in giving the sex trafficking jury charge; and (3) in imposing
unreasonable sentences upon them.  We hold first that the exclusion of evidence
of the victims’ other sexual behavior did not violate the Appellants’ right to
present a complete defense and to confront witnesses.  We next hold that while
the sex trafficking jury charge was error, that error, given the evidence in this
case, was harmless.  Finally, we hold that the sentences imposed were
procedurally unreasonable, and a full resentencing is warranted.
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DISCUSSION
Although we generally review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion,
Manley v. AmBase Corp., 337 F.3d 237, 247 (2d Cir. 2003), we review
interpretations of law de novo, including whether an evidentiary ruling violates a
defendant’s constitutional rights, see United States v. Tropeano, 252 F.3d 653, 657
(2d Cir. 2001).
Federal Rule of Evidence 412(a)(1) provides that in a case involving
allegations of sexual misconduct, “evidence offered to prove that a victim
engaged in other sexual behavior” is inadmissible.  The Rule “aims to safeguard
the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential embarrassment and
sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure of intimate sexual
details.”  Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee’s note.  The exclusion, however, is
not absolute.  The Rule wisely makes explicit that “evidence whose exclusion
would violate the defendant’s constitutional rights” should be admitted.  Fed. R.
Evid. 412(b)(1)(C).  The constitutional rights contemplated by this exception
include the accused’s right under the Sixth Amendment to confront a witness.
See, e.g., Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231 (1988).  This includes “a meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense” at trial, Holmes v. South Carolina, 547
7
U.S. 319, 324 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted), and to confront
witnesses, including by “impeach[ing] the credibility of a prosecution witness by
cross‐examination,” Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 309 (1974).
Appellants contend that they were improperly precluded from cross‐
examining the victims about their prior work in the sex industry.  Because the
sex trafficking and forced labor statutes both require an analysis of “all the
surrounding circumstances,” see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589(c)(2), 1591(e)(4), Appellants
argue that a victim’s “experience in the sex industry, and knowledge of its
practices, is . . . relevant to whether she was coerced or whether, on the other
hand, she knew precisely what she was getting into and accepted it as part of a
money‐making endeavor.”  Villaman Br. 27 (emphasis added).3  Appellants
contend that, by excluding inquiry on this subject, the district court prevented
them from conducting a full cross‐examination, thereby violating their rights
under the Confrontation Clause.   We disagree.
3 Villaman also argues that Rule 412 is inapplicable to the forced labor counts.  But the
“labor” the victims were forced to provide was, in part, prostitution, and some of the
means by which Appellants compelled the victims’ forced labor was through sexual
assault and the threat of sexual assault.  Thus, this was a “criminal proceeding
involving alleged sexual misconduct.”  Fed. R. Evid. 412(a).
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Evidence of victims’ prior acts of commercial sex is irrelevant to whether
those victims were coerced into working as prostitutes.  Appellants wanted to
cross‐examine the testifying victims about prior work as prostitutes before
Appellants hired them to work in their bars.  Appellants hoped to suggest that
having already worked as prostitutes, the victims would not have been deceived
by Appellants and that they “knew . . . what [they were] getting into.”  Villaman
Br. 27.  But knowing that suggestive behavior or even sexual acts might become a
part of the job does not mean that the victims therefore consented to being
threatened or coerced into performing sexual acts they did not wish to perform.
The very purpose of the Rule is to preclude defendants from arguing that
because the victim previously consented to have sex—for love or money—her
claims of coercion should not be believed.
The Government did not assert that the victims had not been engaged in
sexualized business before they worked at the bars.  The focus of the
Government’s case was that the victims were forced to perform sex acts against
their will.  Prior sexual conduct for money or pleasure was irrelevant to whether
the victims’ sexual activities at the bars were the result of coercion.  See United
States v. Roy, 781 F.3d 416, 420 (8th Cir. 2015) (excluding evidence of victim’s
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prior prostitution as irrelevant to defendant’s charged conduct of sex trafficking);
United States v. Valenzuela, 495 F. App’x 817, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Appellants
cannot show the relevance of questions about prior prostitution to either
Appellants’ knowledge of the use of force, fraud, or coercion, or the victims’
consent to work in prostitution.”); United States v. Cephus, 684 F.3d 703, 708 (7th
Cir. 2012) (“[Defendants] wanted to suggest that having already been a prostitute
she would not have been deceived by [Defendant] and therefore her testimony
that she was coerced into working for him—an element of one of the charged
offenses when the prostitute is not a minor, 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)—should be
disbelieved.  But the testimony sought to be elicited by the cross‐examination
would have been irrelevant.  Even if no promises were made to [the victim], this
would not be evidence that she consented to be beaten and to receive no share of
the fees paid by the johns she serviced.”).  That some of the victims may have
been prostitutes before working at the bars does not suggest that Appellants did
not later threaten them with violence or deportation in order to coerce them into
commercial sex.  Thus, there was no relevant use of the cross‐examination
testimony sought by Appellants and the district court did not err in precluding
it.4
4  Unlike in Olden, 488 U.S. at 232–33, and Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223, 230 (2d Cir.
10
Even without pursuing the precluded line of inquiry, Appellants
effectively cross‐examined the victims and argued that they engaged in
prostitution for pecuniary reasons—not because they were forced.  The
testimony that some of the victims quit working and subsequently returned or
chose to work at the bars because they earned more money than they would at
their next‐best employment option could have been received by the jury as
suggesting consent.  Thus, the testimony elicited by Appellants’ counsel, as
emphasized by Rivera’s counsel in closing, allowed Appellants to contend that
the victims freely consented to engage in prostitution.  See United States v. Zayac,
765 F.3d 112, 118–19 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 83 U.S.L.W. 3727 (U.S. June 22,
2015) (No. 14‐1069) (any error precluding evidence defendant claimed would
bolster his defense of fearing co‐conspirator was harmless since defendant’s fear
was admitted through other testimony).  Because Appellants were able to argue
that the victims voluntarily engaged in prostitution, the court’s exclusion of any
evidence concerning the victims’ prior engagement in a sexualized business did
2014), the district court here did not curtail all cross‐examination as to issues of the
victims’ credibility or whether they knowingly agreed to engage in prostitution.
Rather, Judge Feuerstein imposed a reasonable limitation on a limited aspect of cross‐
examination.  See Watson v. Greene, 640 F.3d 501, 510–12 (2d Cir. 2011).
11
not prejudice Appellants with respect to their sex trafficking or forced labor
charges.
Appellants also argue that the district court erred in instructing the jury on
the sex trafficking charges because the court’s definition of “coercion” incorrectly
eliminated reference to whether a “reasonable person” in the victims’
circumstances would also feel coerced.  We review challenges to jury instructions
de novo but “will reverse only where the charge, viewed as a whole, demonstrates
prejudicial error.”  United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 247 (2d Cir. 2012).
“Where jury instructions omit an element of the charged crime, we review the
error for harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. at 248.  An error in the
charge is harmless if the verdict “would surely not have been different absent the
constitutional error.”  Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993) (emphasis
omitted).
The district court’s instruction did provide that the coercion must make
the victim “reasonably believe that she . . . would suffer serious harm if she refused
to continue providing sex acts.”  Villaman App. 796 (emphasis added).
However, the instruction then focused on “the particular Jane Doe” and did not
charge that the Government must prove that a reasonable person of the same
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background and circumstances would have also felt coerced.  The correct
standard is a hybrid: it permits the jury to consider the particular vulnerabilities
of a person in the victim’s position but also requires that her acquiescence be
objectively reasonable under the circumstances.  See 2‐47A Modern Federal Jury
Instructions—Criminal P 47A.03, Instruction 47A‐21.  We find that this error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; the threats of harm to the victims were
sufficiently serious to cause both the victims and reasonable people of the same
background and in the same circumstances to feel coerced.5  Victims testified that
Appellants threatened that they would report the victims to the immigration
authorities and that they were threatened with or subjected to physical violence
if they did not comply with Appellants’ instructions.  There was significant
evidence at trial that several victims were either forcibly raped by Appellants or
rendered so inebriated—often by force or threat of force—as to be functionally
unconscious.  In light of this evidence, a reasonable person with the same
background and circumstances as the victims would have felt coerced and the
5 Although the district court erred in instructing the jury on the sex trafficking counts, it
properly instructed the jury on the reasonable person standard in its instructions on the
forced labor charges.
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verdict “would surely not have been different absent the” district court’s error in
the sex trafficking instruction.  See Sullivan, 508 U.S. at 280 (emphasis omitted).
Finally, Appellants challenge the sentences imposed for both procedural
and substantive unreasonableness.  We review such challenges applying a
“deferential abuse‐of‐discretion standard.”  United States v. DeSilva, 613 F.3d 352,
356 (2d Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To satisfy
procedural review, a trial court may not impose a sentence greater than the
statutory maximum, must “begin all sentencing proceedings by correctly
calculating the applicable Guidelines range,” United States v. Dorvee, 616 F.3d 174,
180 (2d Cir. 2010), and should make clear the basis for any enhancements
imposed, United States v. Ahders, 622 F.3d 115, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).  If we determine
that a sentence is procedurally unsound, we need not consider whether it was
also substantively reasonable.  United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366, 377 (2d Cir.
2013).
The Government concedes that certain of the sentences imposed exceeded
the statutory maximum and thus constitute procedural error warranting remand
as to those sentences.  Gov’t Br. 162.  However, there were additional procedural
errors in the sentencing proceeding, including an incorrectly imposed mandatory
14
minimum, and a full resentencing is warranted.  Cf. United States v. Maldonado,
996 F.2d 598, 599 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a sentence has been
vacated, the defendant is placed in the same position as if he had never been
sentenced.”).
First, the district court erred in imposing a two‐level “serious injury”
enhancement for every victim under U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(4).  The Presentence
Report explicitly premised this enhancement on evidence that the victims were
raped, and the Government relied on this evidence in defending the application
of the enhancement over Appellants’ objection.  Rivera App. 714–15.  However,
the application notes to the Guideline advise that “for purposes of this guideline,
‘serious bodily injury’ means conduct other than criminal sexual abuse, which
already is taken into account in the base offense level.”  U.S.S.G. § 2A3.1(b)(4)
application note 1 (emphasis added).  Serious bodily injury is otherwise defined
as “injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a
function of a bodily member, organ or mental faculty; or requiring medical
intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation.”  Id.
§ 1B1.1 application note 1(L).  On remand, the district court should consider
whether the record supports application of this enhancement as to any victim.
15
Next, the district court erred in applying an across‐the‐board four‐level
enhancement for an offense that involved aggravated sexual abuse as defined by
18 U.S.C. § 2241.6  The Government concedes that the district court “did not
describe in detail the facts of aggravated sexual abuse involving each and every
victim” but argues that “there was significant evidence at the trial that several
victims were either forcibly raped by defendants or rendered so inebriated—
often by force or threat of force—as to be functionally ‘unconscious.’”  Gov’t Br.
155–56.  However, the district court was required to “fully state[] the reasons for
the sentence imposed,” United States v. Bonilla, 618 F.3d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 2010),
and to make clear the basis for imposing the enhancement, Ahders, 622 F.3d at
123 (remanding for “further consideration and explanation of the sentence,”
including a four‐level enhancement).  Its failure to do so requires remand.
Because we vacate Appellants’ sentences and remand for a full resentencing, we
6 That statute criminalizes “knowingly caus[ing] another person to engage in a sexual
act” by (1) using force or (2) threatening or placing that person in fear that any person
will be subjected to death, serious bodily injury, or kidnapping.  18 U.S.C. § 2241(a).  It
also criminalizes acts of sexual abuse committed by: (1) rendering another person
unconscious, (2) “administer[ing] to another person by force or threat of force, or
without the knowledge or permission of that person, a drug, intoxicant, or other similar
substance and thereby (A) substantially impair[ing] the ability of that other person to
appraise or control conduct; and (B) engag[ing] in a sexual act with that other person.”
Id. § 2241(b).
16
decline to reach their arguments that the sentences imposed were substantively
unreasonable.  See Corsey, 723 F.3d at 377–78.
We close with a few words about the views of our dissenting colleague.
The dissent presses for reversal of Appellants’ convictions based on the district
court’s Rule 412 in limine decision.7  The evidence the district court excluded was
that prior to their involvement with Appellants, the “victims engaged in
commercialized or similar sex without force, fraud or coercion.”  Villaman App.
147.  But the dissenter’s concern seems to be that Rivera and his co‐defendants
were denied their constitutional right to present a defense because evidence that
a victim worked in a “sexualized environment”—defined broadly by the
dissenter to include such nonsexual activities as “bartending, pole‐dancing, and
bouncing”—could be used to infer that the victims knew that their “waitress” job
descriptions included prostitution.  Dissenting Op., post, at 3.  Appellants never
argued this.  But Rivera’s brief does lay out the core of his concern: “The central
issue in the case was coercion: whether the women voluntarily engaged in
commercial sexual acts, or whether they were forced to do so by the Defendants.”
Rivera Br. 47.   As discussed above, that evidence was not relevant under Rule
7  Our colleague fails to point out that Rivera never objected to the government’s motion.
17
412 to whether those victims were later coerced into working as prostitutes.
Thus, it would seem that the dissenter’s concerns are grounded in neither the
evidence defendants sought to offer nor the arguments they have made.
The dissent expresses a concern that “precluding cross‐examination of the
victims about work as prostitutes prior to their employ by defendants prevented
defendants from advancing their main defense: that the victims were not
defrauded into engaging in a commercial sex act, an element of the offense.”
Dissenting Op., post, at 6.  The district court’s ruling on Rule 412 did not prevent
Appellants from using this defense.  In fact, as discussed above, Rivera’s counsel
made reference in his closing to the victims’ testimony that they had quit
working at the bars but later returned, that they had visited the bars prior to their
employment, or had recruited relatives or friends to work at the bars.
Lastly, we agree with our dissenting colleague that the sex trafficking
charge was in error but clearly that error was harmless.  The dissenter counters
that “[a] properly instructed jury might find it implausible that the operator of
such a[n illegal] business would contact the authorities for any reason: a chop
shop does not call the police to report a supplier as a car thief.”  Dissenting Op.,
post, at 15.  The analogy takes the perspective of the person in the power position.
18
It ignores the victim’s view of the world; the consequences of discovery to the
out‐of‐status individual may be so grave that any risk of discovery by
immigration officials justified co‐operation.
The dissent’s harmless error analysis also ignores the plain facts of this
case.  Defendants knew of the immigration status of the victims and used that
knowledge to craft their threats to coerce the victims to perform sexual acts
against their will.  Knowledge of “objective conditions that make the victim
especially vulnerable (such as youth or immigration status) bear on whether the
employee’s labor was obtained by forbidden means.”  United States v. Bradley, 390
F.3d 145, 153 (1st Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted),
vacated on other grounds, 545 U.S. 1101 (2005) (Booker remand).  Moreover, the
dissent ignores the substantial evidence of coercion through force as noted
above.  The threatened and actual abuse, in toto, was serious enough to cause
reasonable people of the same background and in the same circumstances to feel
coerced.
CONCLUSION
We have considered the remaining arguments presented by Appellants
and find them to be without merit.  For the reasons stated above, the judgments
19
of conviction are AFFIRMED, the Appellants’ sentences are VACATED, and the
cases are REMANDED for a full resentencing.
20
JACOBS, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
Defendants Antonio Rivera, Jason Villaman, and John Whaley (along with
Rivera’s sister, Jasmin, who cooperated and testified for the government)
recruited young, poor, undocumented women to work in two bars owned by
Rivera, where they had sex with customers who got them dangerously
inebriated. Defendants transported these women to and from the bars, abused,
and sexually assaulted them. The government argued that defendants ensnared
the victims of their sex-trafficking, alien-harboring, and alien-transporting
scheme by deceiving them about the nature of their employment, withholding
their pay, threatening them with deportation, telling them that the police worked
for Rivera and would not assist them, and, generally, creating a climate of fear.
Defendants were convicted of (variously) multiple counts of committing
conspiracies to commit sex-trafficking by means of force, fraud or coercion;
forced labor conspiracy; and transporting and harboring aliens; and substantive
counts of these offenses.
Such conduct would violate a host of state laws; but the federal offense of
sex-trafficking requires the government to show that the acts were accomplished
by certain means, and the means relied on at trial were fraud and threats. The
prosecution’s case was that the women were recruited on the false pretense that
they would work as respectable waitresses--well paid, and well taken care of;
and that they instead were mistreated, exploited, and made to feel that they were
not free to leave Rivera’s employ. There was enough evidence to convict
defendants of these despicable offenses in a fair trial, and I would vote to affirm
if they had gotten one.
The district court granted the government’s in limine motion to “preclude
evidence of the victims’ other sexual behavior both pre- and post-employment at
the bars, and any other employment in a sexualized business, outside of the
occasions pertaining to this case where the defendants forced the victims to
engage in prostitution and other forced sexual contact.” D. Ct. Dkt. No. 231 at 2.
The government argued, and the majority agrees, that this evidence was
“inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 412, which protects victims of sex crimes, and
is irrelevant under Fed. R. Evid. 401, 402 and 403.” Id.
There were two trial errors; neither of them was harmless, and each
reinforced the tendency of the other to prevent a fair trial on the critical issue of
whether the women were defrauded and coerced.
First, the court excluded evidence that the victims worked as prostitutes
2
prior to their employment by defendants as well as evidence of prior
employment in a sexualized business. Evidence of work in a sexualized business
was excluded on no ground I can think of: there are many jobs in a sexualized
environment–-such as bartending, pole-dancing, bouncing, etc.--that are
categorically not sexual behavior. Exclusion of prior work in prostitution does
implicate Rule 412; but the outer boundary of Rule 412 stops short of violating
the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses. Because the central issues at
defendants’ trial were fraud and coercion, the blanket exclusion of relevant
evidence under Rule 412 deprived defendants of their constitutional rights to
confront witnesses and to a fair trial. See infra Points I and II.
Second, the court’s sex-trafficking charge allowed the jury to decide guilt
solely on the basis of the subjective feelings of the women, whereas a proper
instruction would have required consideration as well of whether a reasonable
person in their position would have felt coerced or been misled and defrauded.
See infra Point III.
The instructional error compounds the evidentiary error, and the two leave
me with real questions about the fairness of this trial. See United States v.
Haynes, 729 F.3d 178, 197 (2d Cir. 2013) (vacating judgment of conviction and
3
remanding because multiple errors, considered together, “call into serious doubt
whether the defendant received the due process guarantee of fundamental
fairness to which she and all criminal defendants are entitled”). See infra Point
IV.
Because the Confrontation Clause violation and the instructional error
rendered defendants’ trial fundamentally unfair, a new trial as to all counts is
warranted. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 563-64 (1967) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause guarantees the fundamental elements of fairness in a criminal trial.”); cf.
United States v. Bruno, 383 F.3d 65, 91 (2d Cir. 2004) (recognizing spillover effect
that warranted vacatur of counts other than those primarily infected with error).
See infra Point V.
I
The Constitution guarantees “a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense” at trial. Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006).
“Whether the exclusion of [evidence] violate[s] [a defendant’s] right to present a
defense depends upon whether ‘the omitted evidence[,] evaluated in the context
of the entire record[,] creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.’”
4
Justice v. Hoke, 90 F.3d 43, 47 (2d Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 112 (1976)).
Federal Rule of Evidence 412 bars the introduction of evidence of a victim’s
“sexual behavior” and “sexual predisposition.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(a)(1), (2). In a
criminal case, however, the rule yields if the exclusion of evidence would violate
the defendant’s constitutional rights. Id. at (b)(1)(C). Rule 412 is intended to
“safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, potential
embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with public disclosure
of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual innuendo into the factfinding
process.” Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee note to 1994 amendment. In that
way, the rule “encourage[s] victims of sexual misconduct to institute and to
participate in legal proceedings against alleged offenders.” Id.
“Restrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse
witnesses and to present evidence may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the
purposes they are designed to serve.” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted). To that end, the Supreme Court limited a
state rape-shield law when it impinged upon a defendant’s Confrontation Clause
right. Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 231-32 (1988) (finding constitutional
5
violation in a case where the central issue was consent and the court excluded
evidence “from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to
the reliability of the witnesses” and from which “a reasonable jury might have
received a significantly different impression of the witness’ credibility” (internal
alterations and quotation marks omitted)).
In this commercial sex-trafficking case, Rule 412 furnishes no basis for
precluding evidence of exposure to a sexualized business; as defendants put it,
“[f]raud in the inducement was a running theme” of the prosecution. Defs.’ Ltr.,
dated Feb. 3, 2015, at 3. Moreover, precluding cross-examination of the victims
about work as prostitutes prior to their employ by defendants prevented
defendants from advancing their main defense: that the victims were not
defrauded into engaging in a commercial sex act, an element of the offense under
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). Cf. Alvarez v. Ercole, 763 F.3d 223, 232 (2d Cir. 2014)
(affirming grant of habeas relief when trial court’s rulings “precluded [the
defendant] from fleshing out his main defense theory”).
Rule 412 does not bar the introduction of evidence in “circumstances in
which the probative value . . . significantly outweighs possible harm to the
victim.” Fed. R. Evid. 412 advisory committee notes to 1994 amendment. Here,
6
in light of the charges and the government’s theory of its case, the excluded
evidence was highly probative: if credited, it would have been a full defense to
the sex-trafficking theories advanced by the prosecution. Cf. United States v.
Elbert, 561 F.3d 771, 777 (8th Cir. 2009) (rejecting defendant’s Rule 412 argument
in a commercial sex-trafficking case “[b]ecause the victims were minors and
could not legally consent” and therefore “the government did not need to prove
the elements of fraud, force, or coercion, which are required for adult victims”).
II
At the pre-trial conference in which the court heard the in limine motion,
the judge asked the government a telling question: “[do] you think that if
someone went from one situation into an identical situation, that might be
relevant”? VA 155. The government argued that it was not: “Our theory is that
work in a sexualized business is not relevant to this trial unless it’s . . . working in
the bars Antonio Rivera owned. . . . It is just as likely that the victim . . . was
abused by another bar owner.” Id. The court initially recognized that this case
was distinguishable from one involving a “personal one-on-one [i.e., intimate]
relationship,” id. at 156, and indicated that it would “take [the evidence] as it
7
comes”; but the court later granted the government’s in limine motion by a
simple endorsement of the government’s motion. Id. at 152.
On appeal, the government maintains (and the majority accepts) that the
excluded evidence is irrelevant to whether the victims were coerced into working
as prostitutes by Rivera, Villaman and Whaley. Maj. Op. at 9. If the evidence
were truly irrelevant, the protections of Rule 412 would not even be implicated;
the evidence would simply be inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 401.
And it is of course “intolerable to suggest that because [a] victim [was] a
prostitute, she automatically is assumed to have consented with anyone at any
time.” United States v. Saunders, 943 F.3d 388, 392 (4th Cir. 1991). But
defendants did not seek to cross-examine the victims about their prior
employments in order to suggest consent to specific sexual encounters. Rather,
the excluded evidence was relevant to whether their employment in the
commercial sex trade was procured by fraud or coercion, as the government was
required to show under 18 U.S.C. § 1591. A reasonable juror could conclude that
prior, voluntary work in the industry suggested that the employment
arrangement here was consensual and not entered into by fraud.
Relevance, however, is not the decisive issue here. In order to warrant
8
relief, the exclusion of the evidence must have “violate[d] the defendant[s’]
constitutional rights.” Fed. R. Evid. 412(b)(1)(C). I conclude that it did. See
Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315 (1974) (“Confrontation means more than being
allowed to confront the witness physically.”).
It is hard to see how defendants could have put on a “complete defense,”
Holmes v. S. Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006), without evidence of the victims’
prior employment in a sexualized business. That is because (under the
government’s theory and the court’s charge) the jury was invited and directed to
decide the critical issues of fraud and coercion from the wholly subjective point
of view of the victims, and in light of their backgrounds and special
vulnerabilities.1 Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 601 F. App’x 16, 19 (2d Cir. 2015)
(summary order) (“Here, the district court admitted evidence of the victims’
history of prostitution prior to their meeting Alvarez. In that way, Alvarez was
1
The majority considers that defense counsels’ effort to marshal arguments in
closing mitigated the erroneous grant of the motion in limine. See Maj. Op. at 18.
But the Confrontation Clause is “designed to prevent improper restrictions on
the types of questions that defense counsel may ask during cross-examination,”
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 52 (1987), and here “the reliability of the
evidence against [defendants was not] subject[ed] . . . to rigorous testing,” Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1999). And of course, as the jury was instructed,
the arguments of counsel are not evidence. See United States v. Suarez, 588 F.2d
352, 355 (2d Cir. 1978).
9
able to present a complete defense and to impeach the government’s witnesses
using the admitted evidence of the victims’ earlier prostitution. The excluded
evidence of the victims’ later prostitution was not critical to protect Alvarez’s
constitutional rights.”).
Everything turned on the government’s ability to convince the jury that the
victims were deceived, and “a reasonable jury might have received a significantly
different impression of the witness’ credibility” if defendants had been permitted
to establish that the victims previously worked in sexualized environments.
Olden, 488 U.S. at 231-32 (internal alterations and quotation marks omitted); cf.
United States v. Shellef, 507 F.3d 82, 107 (2d Cir. 2007) (“Where a jury is
presented with multiple theories of conviction, one of which was invalid, the
jury’s verdict must be overturned if it is impossible to tell which theory formed
the basis for conviction.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As defendants
argued here and before the district court, see VA 147, evidence of prior work in a
sexualized environment goes to the heart of their defense. See United States v.
Forrester, 60 F.3d 52, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Error going to the heart of a critical
issue is less likely to be harmless.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Here, the government emphasized to the jury that the victims expected to
10
work as respectable, well looked after waitresses. See VA 755 (arguing in
summation that defendants “all agreed to tell the girls that they would just be
waitresses to entice them”); id. at 756 (“[Defendants] . . . decided to lie to the girls
about what the job was, because if they knew the truth of the sex act they would
never agree in the first place. They lied about the work, they lied about the
money. They lied about the girls’ safety. And that is fraud.”); see also Defs.’ Ltr.
at 3. In other words, the government’s theory was that the victims accepted
employment with defendants and then “engage[d] in [the] commercial sex act[s]”
that formed the basis for defendants’ prosecution only because of defendants
“fraud.” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a). But the precluded line of inquiry--the victims’ prior
places of employment and exposure to sexualized environments (as well as prior
work as prostitutes)--bears directly on whether they were defrauded within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); that is, whether they understood the terms and
circumstances of their employment. Cf. United States v. Valenzuela, 2008 WL
2824958, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 21, 2008) (recognizing that if the government
introduced evidence “tending to show that the victims . . . did not expect to
engage in prostitution . . . it will have put those victims’ sexual histories at issue”
and, “[u]nder those circumstances, it is possible that . . . evidence rebutting the
11
government’s allegations might be admissible under the constitutional
exception”).
The government argues that notwithstanding the grant of its in limine
motion, the defense “had ample evidence in the record to argue, as it did, that the
testifying waitresses consented to engaging in prostitution.” Gov’t Br. at 107. In
rejecting defendants’ Confrontation Clause argument, the majority rehearses
some of this evidence. See Maj. Op. at 5-6. True, defense counsel endeavored to
show the jury that the waitresses’ employment was consensual and that they were
not deceived, but “[w]e cannot speculate as to whether the jury, as sole judge of
the credibility of a witness, would have accepted this line of reasoning had
counsel been permitted to fully present it.” Davis, 415 U.S. at 317.
III
As the majority concludes, the district court erred by delivering a wholly
subjective sex-trafficking charge instead of a charge that reflected the proper
hybrid standard. See Maj. Op. at 12-13. I part company with the majority because
I am not at all persuaded that omission of the objective aspect of the statutory
consideration was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
12
The jury charge greatly lightened the government’s burden. It is one thing
(and hard) to convince a jury that a reasonable person, with the same background
as the victim and in the same circumstances as the victim, would have felt coerced
or defrauded. Cf. United States v. Campbell, 764 F.3d 880, 888 (8th Cir. 2014)
(“The jury could find his actions amounted to coercion if the assaults were part of
a pattern intended to cause a person to believe that failure to perform an act [of
prostitution] would result in serious harm. In doing so, the jury was required to
assess how a reasonable person . . . in the same circumstances . . . would perceive [the
defendant’s] conduct.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted and
emphasis added)); United States v. Fields, 2013 WL 5278499, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept.
18, 2013) (finding harm “sufficiently serious, under all the surrounding
circumstances, to compel a reasonable person of the same background and in the
same circumstances to perform or to continue performing commercial sexual
activity in order to avoid incurring that harm” (internal quotation marks omitted
and emphasis added)); United States v. Jaensch, 678 F. Supp. 2d 421, 432 & n.6
(E.D. Va. 2010) (referencing use of “reasonable person” standard in “defining
13
critical elements” of the forced labor statute).2
It is of course much easier to establish coercion or fraud subjectively, based
on the victims’ own testimony. The jury was instructed by the district court that it
could convict if the specific Jane Does testified that they felt coerced regardless of
whether a reasonable person in similar circumstances with a similar background
would have felt coerced. The question posed was whether the actions of
defendants, “even if not sufficient to compel another person to engage in a
commercial sex act, were enough to compel that particular Jane Doe.” The jury was
further instructed: “If a particular Jane Doe was threatened with or suffered certain
consequences in connection with the services she . . . rendered that overcame her
will and compelled her service, that is sufficient.” RA 522-25 (emphasis added).
Pressing its advantage, the government stressed the “specific vulnerabilities” of
the victims, and argued that defendants “tailored their coercive scheme to [the]
witness[es]’ specific vulnerabilities.” VA 756.
2
Other courts have invoked this objective aspect of the standard in evaluating
challenges to sex-trafficking convictions. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 761 F.3d
900, 908 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Bell coerced these women into performing commercial
sex acts. He threatened both their physical and psychological well-being should
they leave or implicate him to police. A reasonable person in this situation likely
would have found his threats of harm credible . . . .” (emphasis added)); United
States v. Mack, 298 F.R.D. 349, 354 n.5 (N.D. Ohio 2014).
14
The reduced burden of proving such subjective coercion or fraud becomes
lighter than air if the defense cannot elicit evidence that the victims’ employment
and experiences let them know in advance what they were getting into.
It therefore matters whether a reasonable person would have found the
threats of harm credible. The main threat was that defendants would inform
immigration authorities that the victims were present illegally, and arrange to
have them deported. A properly instructed jury might find it implausible that the
operator of such a business would contact the authorities for any reason: a chop
shop does not call the police to report a supplier as a car thief. And a properly
instructed jury might have concluded that the threat of deportation to one’s home
country would be nothing compared to a form of prostitution tantamount to serial
rape. In any event, the objective reasonableness of the victims’ perception of the
consequences of going to the police is a question that should not have been taken
from the jury.
We are advisedly reluctant to find harmlessness when we cannot be
assured of the impact of the instructional error. See United States v. Kaiser, 609
F.3d 556, 567 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[T]here is a reasonable probability that the jury
convicted Kaiser on a conscious avoidance theory and that the jury would not
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have done so but for the instructional error.”); United States v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.,
426 F.2d 32, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1970) (“The charge not only did not focus the jury’s
attention on [a necessary aspect of the government’s case] but may well have led
to a contrary view on their part” and “there can be no assurance that the jury was
not misled to defendants’ serious prejudice.”). I cannot conclude with any degree
of assurance that the erroneous instruction given here was harmless.
IV
The Rule 412 and instructional errors reinforced and compounded each
other. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) (concluding
“exclusion of . . . critical evidence, coupled with the State’s refusal to permit [the
defendant] to cross-examine [a key witness], denied [the defendant] a trial in
accord with traditional and fundamental standards of due process”). The
government emphasized the specific vulnerabilities of the victims while the court
precluded defendants from cross-examining the victims about their specific
backgrounds. These errors, considered together, “call into serious doubt whether
the defendant received the due process guarantee of fundamental fairness to
which . . . all criminal defendants are entitled.” Haynes, 729 F.3d at 197.
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V
The limitation on defendants’ ability to cross-examine the testifying
victims, and the erroneous jury charge on sex-trafficking, had ramifications for
the entire trial and cast doubt on the fairness of the verdicts rendered as to all
charges. The evidentiary error undermined defendants’ ability to subject the
government’s theory of the case to “rigorous testing in the context of an
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.” Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 123-
24 (1999). The jury instruction given allowed for a conviction if the jury credited
the victims’ testimony that they subjectively believed they were coerced and
defrauded. A new trial is therefore warranted as to all counts of conviction. See
United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 178 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding
cumulative effect of trial court’s errors denied defendants due process of law and
fundamentally fair trial (citing cases)); cf. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 295 (“[D]enial or
significant diminution [of the confrontation right] calls into question the ultimate
integrity of the fact-finding process . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
* * *
Defendants’ convictions should be vacated, and the case remanded for a
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new trial free from the evidentiary and instructional errors that undermined the
fairness of this trial. I respectfully dissent.
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