Mei Xiang Weng v. Sessions

16-3378
Weng v. Sessions
BIA
Hom, IJ
A205 145 106
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 12th day of January, two thousand eighteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
8 Chief Judge,
9 PETER W. HALL,
10 DENNY CHIN,
11 Circuit Judges.
12 _____________________________________
13
14 MEI XIANG WENG, AKA, MEI CHUN
15 LI, AKA, WENG XIANG,
16 Petitioner,
17
18 v. 16-3378
19 NAC
20 JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III,
21 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
22 Respondent.
23 _____________________________________
24
25 FOR PETITIONER: Gerald Karikari, New York, NY.
26
27 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
28 Attorney General; Julie M.
29 Iversen, Senior Litigation
1 Counsel; Lynda A. Do, Attorney,
2 Office of Immigration Litigation,
3 United States Department of
4 Justice, Washington, DC.
5
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
9 is DENIED.
10 Petitioner Mei Xiang Weng, a native and citizen of the
11 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a September 8,
12 2016, decision of the BIA affirming a May 19, 2015, decision
13 of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Weng’s application for
14 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
15 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Mei Xiang Weng,
16 No. A 205 145 106 (B.I.A. Sept. 8, 2016), aff’g No. A 205 145
17 106 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 19, 2015). We assume the
18 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
19 history in this case.
20 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
21 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. Xue Hong Yang v.
22 U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The
23 applicable standards of review are well established. See 8
2
1 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,
2 165 (2d Cir. 2008)(per curiam); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562
3 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
4 I. Past Persecution
5 Weng alleged that a police officer chased her out of an
6 underground church gathering and threw a baton at her, hitting
7 her in the back as she fled. The agency was on sound footing
8 in concluding that this single episode did not amount to
9 persecution. See Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822
10 (2d Cir. 2011) (upholding agency’s conclusion that “minor
11 bruising from [a pre-arrest] altercation with family planning
12 officials, which required no formal medical attention and had
13 no lasting physical effect,” did not amount to persecution);
14 Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011)
15 (persecution “does not include every sort of treatment our
16 society regards as offensive” (internal quotation marks and
17 citation omitted)).
18
19
20 II. Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
21 Because Weng did not suffer past harm rising to the level
3
1 of persecution, she had the burden to establish an objectively
2 reasonable fear of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
3 § 1208.13(b)(1), (2); Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d
4 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004); Dong Zhong Zheng v. Mukasey, 552
5 F.3d 277, 284 (2d Cir. 2009). To meet this standard, an
6 applicant must demonstrate that “she would be singled out
7 individually for persecution,” or that there is “a pattern or
8 practice” of persecution of persons similarly situated to
9 her. Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 142 (2d Cir.
10 2008)(citation omitted); see 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii).
11 Weng’s evidence that she would be singled out for
12 persecution was based on her claim of past harm. As the
13 agency concluded, Weng failed to meet her burden of proof on
14 this point because her allegation of past harm was not
15 credible. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). “We defer . . . to
16 an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality
17 of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-
18 finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu
19 Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
20 Weng’s submission of her Chinese birth certificate and
21 translations and certificates showing that she both obtained
4
1 and had the birth certificate translated into English in July
2 2011 — before she was discovered at the underground church -
3 undermined her allegation that she fled China because of that
4 incident. The document confirming that the English
5 translation conformed to the Chinese version is notarized in
6 China and dated July 2011. Certified Administrative Record
7 (“CAR”) at 213-14. As the IJ found, this discrepancy is
8 significant because Weng claimed that she did not consider
9 leaving China until October 2011, after her encounter with
10 the police. The IJ was not required to credit Weng’s
11 explanation—that she was attempting to reregister her
12 Household Register in Fuzhou City in July 2011—because it did
13 not explain the English translation. See Majidi v. Gonzales,
14 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must do more
15 than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent
16 statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a
17 reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his
18 testimony.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Although
19 Weng further explained that the translation was done in the
20 United States, that statement is contradicted by the
21 certificate of translation dated July 2011 and notarized in
5
1 China. CAR at 213 (Chinese version), 214 (English version).
2 Although there is another certificate of translation from an
3 individual in New York, id. at 205, that certificate does not
4 negate the presence of the first. This evidence wholly
5 undermined Weng’s claim. See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d
6 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (reasoning that “a single false
7 document or a single instance of false testimony may (if
8 attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the
9 alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence”).
10 The adverse credibility determination is bolstered by
11 Weng’s testimony that she was able to travel through and
12 depart China using her own national identification card and
13 passport given her competing testimony that she was a fugitive
14 and authorities were actively seeking her out. See Ying Li
15 v. BCIS, 529 F.3d 79, 82-83 (2d Cir. 2008). Given that the
16 finding was linked to Weng’s assertion that she was a
17 fugitive, it was not unduly speculative. See Siewe, 480 F.3d
18 at 168-69 (reasoning that although “bald” speculation is an
19 impermissible basis for an adverse credibility finding,
20 “[t]he speculation that inheres in inference is not ‘bald’ if
21 the inference is made available to the factfinder by record
6
1 facts, or even a single fact, viewed in the light of common
2 sense and ordinary experience”).
3 The agency reasonably determined that, even crediting
4 Weng’s practice of Christianity in the United States, her
5 practice did not provide a basis for relief because she did
6 not establish a pattern or practice of persecution. Weng did
7 not submit evidence of conditions in China. And State
8 Department reports, of which the IJ took administrative
9 notice, reflect that Chinese authorities harass and detain
10 some Christian practitioners, but the reports do not reflect
11 a nationwide pattern or practice of persecution of Christians
12 or any incidents of persecution of Christians in Weng’s home
13 province of Fujian. U.S. Dep’t of State, Int’l Religious
14 Freedom Report for 2013, at 8-17, available at
15 https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/222335.pdf; see
16 also Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 142-43, 149,
17 169-70 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no error in the agency’s
18 requirement that an applicant demonstrate a well-founded fear
19 of persecution specific to her local area when persecutory
20 acts vary according to locality).
21 As the agency reasonably found that Weng failed to
7
1 establish the past persecution or objectively reasonable fear
2 of future persecution needed for asylum, it did not err in
3 denying withholding of removal or CAT relief, which carry
4 heavier burdens. See Gomez v. INS, 947 F.2d 660, 665 (2d
5 Cir. 1991).
6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
7 DENIED. The pending motion for a stay of removal is DENIED
8 as moot.
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
8