United States v. Trimarco

21-3035-cr
United States v. Trimarco
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
on the 24th day of February, two thousand twenty-three.
PRESENT:
ROBERT D. SACK,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
United States of America,
Appellee,
v. 21-3035-cr
Vincent J. Trimarco, Jr.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
FOR APPELLEE: Lauren A. Bowman, Assistant United States
Attorney (Susan Corkery, Assistant United
States Attorney, on the brief), for Breon Peace,
United States Attorney for the Eastern District
of New York, Brooklyn, NY.
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT: Andrew M. St. Laurent, Harris St. Laurent &
Wechsler LLP, New York, NY.
Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York (Azrack, J.).
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is VACATED in part and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings only on the special condition of supervised release
imposing 2,000 hours of community service.
Defendant-appellant Vincent J. Trimarco, Jr., appeals from the district court’s judgment,
entered on December 3, 2021, following his guilty plea to one count of conspiring to commit mail
and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and 1349. Trimarco was sentenced to
fifty-seven months’ imprisonment, two years’ supervised release with a special condition requiring
Trimarco to perform 2,000 hours of community service, restitution in the amount of $1.5 million,
and forfeiture in the amount of $1.5 million. On appeal, Trimarco’s sole challenge to the district
court’s judgment is to the imposition of 2,000 hours of community service, arguing that the special
condition is procedurally unreasonable. The government concedes that the record is insufficient
to uphold the imposition of 2,000 hours of community service and agrees that the special condition
should be vacated and the case remanded to the district court. 1 The government contends,
however, that the remand should allow for plenary resentencing. Trimarco opposes plenary
resentencing and asserts that the remand should be limited to addressing the special condition of
community service. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural
history, and issues on appeal, to which we refer only as necessary to explain our decision.
1
The government initially moved to dismiss the appeal based upon a provision in the plea agreement in
which Trimarco agreed “not to file an appeal or otherwise challenge, by petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
2255 or any other provision, the conviction or sentence in the event that the Court imposes a term of
imprisonment of 57 months or below.” App’x at 43. However, after Trimarco filed his appellate brief
challenging only the special condition of supervised release, the government withdrew the motion,
explaining that Trimarco “challenge[d] only a matter outside the scope of the waiver.” Gov’t Br. at 5 n.2.
We ordinarily review the imposition of a special condition of supervised release for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Dupes, 513 F.3d 338, 342–43 (2d Cir. 2008). However, because
Trimarco did not object to the special condition at sentencing, we review for plain error. 2 United
States v. Smith, 949 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2020).
I. The Condition of Supervised Release: 2,000 Hours of Community Service
Trimarco argues that the district court plainly erred by imposing 2,000 hours of community
service because this number exceeded the amount contemplated by the Sentencing Guidelines, the
condition is not reasonably related to the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and it was
not supported in the record by a sufficient explanation from the district court. The government
concedes that vacating this special condition is required given the inadequacy of the record to
support its imposition. After conducting our own independent review of the record, see Young v.
United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258–59 (1942), we agree that the district court plainly erred by failing
to provide sufficient reasoning for its imposition of 2,000 hours of community service, and
therefore, the special condition must be vacated.
“District courts possess broad discretion in imposing conditions of supervised release.”
United States v. Betts, 886 F.3d 198, 202 (2d Cir. 2018). A district court may impose special
conditions if they are “reasonably related” to: “(A) the nature and circumstances of the offense
and the history and characteristics of the defendant; (B) the need for the sentence imposed to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (C) the need to protect the public from further crimes of
2
Under the plain error standard, Trimarco bears the burden of showing: “(1) there is an error; (2) the
error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected [his] substantial
rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4)
the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United
States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
3
the defendant; and (D) the need to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner.” U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(b)(1); accord 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a) & 3583(d)(1). “[A] condition may be imposed if it
is reasonably related to any one or more of the specified factors.” United States v. Abrar, 58 F.3d
43, 46 (2d Cir. 1995). Further, a special condition must “involve no greater deprivation of liberty
than is reasonably necessary” for these purposes, and it must be “consistent with any pertinent
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” U.S.S.G. § 5D1.3(b)(2); accord 18
U.S.C. §§ 3583(d)(2)–(3); United States v. Myers, 426 F.3d 117, 123–25 (2d Cir. 2005). A
district court’s discretion to impose special conditions is thus not unfettered, and we will “carefully
scrutinize unusual and severe conditions.” Myers, 426 F.3d at 124 (citation omitted). Moreover,
when determining whether to impose special conditions, “[a] district court is required to make an
individualized assessment . . . and . . . state on the record the reason for imposing it; the failure to
do so is error.” Betts, 886 F.3d at 202. However, even when the district court does not provide
such an explanation, the condition at issue can be upheld “if the district court’s reasoning is self-
evident in the record.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Sentencing Guidelines provide guidance as to the proper imposition of community
service as a special condition. Specifically, Application Note 1 of Section 5F1.3 states that
“[c]ommunity service generally should not be imposed in excess of 400 hours.” U.S.S.G. § 5F1.3
cmt. n.1. Therefore, the Sentencing Commission’s pertinent policy statement “must be read to
advise that courts should generally refrain from imposing more than a total of 400 hours of
community service as a condition of supervised release.” United States v. Parkins, 935 F.3d 63,
64 (2d Cir. 2019).
4
Here, the district court did not state on the record its reason for imposing 2,000 hours of
community service, even though it is an amount that greatly exceeds the general limit set forth in
the Guidelines. 3 The only specific reference to community service by the district court during the
sentencing was the following statement to Trimarco when imposing the special condition: “And
now that I have heard about your connection to the veterans, I hope that perhaps you will perform
your community service at a veterans [sic] organization, perhaps with veterans with addiction
problems. But it sounds to me like you certainly have organizations available that are very much
in need of your assistance.” App’x at 115. That statement, even in combination with the
justifications provided for the sentence as a whole, did not adequately explain how the community
service requirement was reasonably related to the applicable Section 3553(a) factors, nor did it
explain why 2,000 hours (a substantial upward variance from the Guidelines’ recommended
maximum) would be reasonably necessary to satisfy one or more of the sentencing factors. See,
e.g., Parkins, 935 F.3d at 68 (“In light of Application Note 1’s general proscription of more than
400 hours of community service and the district court’s inadequate, individualized justification for
a higher amount, the imposition of a total of 695 hours of community service was an abuse of
discretion.”); United States v. Kim, 790 F. App’x 321, 324 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order)
(remanding where the district court failed to adequately explain the imposition of over 4,000 hours
of community service as a supervised release condition); see generally United States v. Singh, 877
F.3d 107, 117 (2d Cir. 2017) (highlighting that “a major variance” from the Sentencing Guidelines,
3
In Parkins, we noted that the text of Application Note 1 does not specify whether the general limit of
400 hours applies per year or over the full term of supervised release. 935 F.3d at 65–66. However, as in
Parkins, we need not decide this issue because remand is required regardless of how the policy statement
is interpreted. See id. at 66. Even assuming arguendo the 400-hour guidance could be construed to apply
per year, the amount imposed here (1,000 hours per year) was more than double the Guidelines’ limit and
was therefore procedurally unreasonable.
5
as opposed to a minor one, “must be supported by a more significant justification” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)). Moreover, this is not a situation where such reasoning is
self-evident from the record: there was no discussion about a special condition of community
service in the Pre-Sentence Report or between the parties before or during sentencing. In short,
the failure to provide sufficient reasoning for the special condition—a condition that varied so
dramatically from the recommended maximum—was procedural error.
On the issue of whether the error is plain, we conclude that it is. The failure to provide
an adequate explanation for the special condition was a clear and obvious error under our case law.
In addition, there is a reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome of Trimarco’s
sentence as it relates to the condition of supervised release and thereby affected his substantial
rights. Such an error goes directly to the fairness and integrity of the sentencing proceeding. See,
e.g., United States v. Bleau, 930 F.3d 35, 43 (2d Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“The District Court’s
failure to explain its rationale is plain error because it is not obvious from the record why such a
[special] condition was reasonably necessary. Thus, there is a reasonable probability that the error
affected the outcome of [the defendant’s] sentence.” (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)); United States v. Forney, 797 F. App’x 31, 34 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order) (same).
Accordingly, this error is plain, and remand is required.
II. The Scope of the Remand
Although the parties agree that remand is necessary, they disagree as to its scope: the
government argues for a plenary resentencing, while Trimarco seeks a limited remand in which
the district court will address only the special condition of community service. As set forth below,
we agree with Trimarco that plenary resentencing is unwarranted.
6
Although we generally authorize only a limited remand when we identify a sentencing
error on appeal, “a mandate may, of course, call for de novo resentencing, thereby allowing parties
to reargue issues previously waived or abandoned.” United States v. Malki, 718 F.3d 178, 182
(2d Cir. 2013) (per curiam); see also United States v. Valente, 915 F.3d 916, 924 (2d Cir. 2019)
(“In general, when we remand to a district court for resentencing, that remand is for limited, and
not de novo sentencing.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Bohn,
959 F.2d 389, 394 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Not every reduction in a component of a criminal sentence
entitles the Government to seek an increase in another component.”). For example, we ordinarily
remand for de novo resentencing “[w]hen the conviction on one or more charges is overturned on
appeal” because “the constellation of offenses of conviction has been changed and the factual
mosaic related to those offenses that the district court must consult to determine the appropriate
sentence is likely altered. For the district court to sentence the defendant accurately and
appropriately, it must confront the offenses of conviction and facts anew.” United States v.
Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1227–28 (2d Cir. 2002). We have explained that, in such situations,
undoing the “intricate knot of calculations” requires plenary resentencing. United States v.
Atehortva, 69 F.3d 679, 685 (2d Cir. 1995); accord Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1228. That knot of
calculations may include, in addition to the term of imprisonment, other components of the
sentence such as a term of supervised release or a fine. See United States v. Versaglio, 85 F.3d
943, 948–49 (2d Cir. 1996) (“In some circumstances, we have upheld the authority of a sentencing
court to revise upward one component of a sentence after another component was held to have
been invalidly imposed.”).
The government contends that plenary resentencing is warranted here, urging that the
district court “should ‘have the option of considering whether to make an upward adjustment’ in
7
any other components of Trimarco’s sentence in order to achieve the desired intended ‘aggregate
punitive effect’ of the sentence.” Gov’t Br. at 13–14 (quoting Versaglio, 85 F.3d at 949).
Specifically, the government notes that (1) only two years of supervised release were imposed,
which is less than the three-year statutory maximum, and (2) the district court adopted the lower
Guidelines offense level contained in the plea agreement, as opposed to the higher offense level
calculated by the Probation Department, in determining Trimarco’s sentence. The government
suggests that the district court, in adding the special condition of community service at sentencing,
may have lowered some other component of the sentence and therefore should be able to make
other adjustments to Trimarco’s sentence on remand. We find the government’s argument
unpersuasive.
As an initial matter, supervised release cannot be imposed as “punishment” during
sentencing. Unlike a fine, which may contribute to the aggregate punitive portion of a sentence,
see U.S.S.G. § 5E.2(d)(1); Versaglio, 85 F.3d at 948–49, the Supreme Court has made clear that
“a court may not take account of retribution . . . when imposing a term of supervised release,”
Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 326 (2011); see also United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S.
39, 50 (1994) (“Supervised release, in contrast to probation, is not a punishment in lieu of
incarceration.”); United States v. Williams, 998 F.3d 538, 541 (2d Cir. 2021) (per curiam)
(“[R]etribution is a proper justification for a term of imprisonment but not for supervised
release . . . .”). We have no reason to believe that the district court improperly considered
retribution in imposing the special condition of community service on Trimarco’s supervised
release. Therefore, on remand, any adjustment to the special condition would not require
adjustment to any other component of the sentence to achieve the same aggregate punishment.
8
As to the Section 3553(a) factors that could have properly supported the district court’s
reasoning for imposing the community service requirement (such as, for example, deterrence),
there is no basis in the record to conclude that the special condition was linked or intertwined in
some way to the other components of the sentence, such as the term of imprisonment or the length
of the term of supervised release. Indeed, with respect to the length of imprisonment, the district
court imposed a term of fifty-seven months, which was at the highest end of the advisory
Guidelines range as calculated in the plea agreement. Moreover, the district court gave no
indication that it was imposing a term of supervised release of two years (rather than three years)
because of the additional special condition requiring community service.
The decisions relied upon by the government to support its position, including Kim and
Bohn, are inapposite. For example, in Kim, the defendant explicitly “asked, in lieu of
incarceration, for ‘an enormous amount of community service,’ suggesting ‘another thousand
hours of work’ because ‘[t]hat’s the kind of thing that would make an enormous impact on [the
defendant].’” 790 F. App’x at 324 (quoting the record). After considering that argument, the
district court “imposed a custodial sentence of one year and a day, well below the guidelines range
of 30–37 months, coupled with a term of supervised release that included substantial community
service.” Id. Under those circumstances, we concluded that plenary resentencing was warranted
because “[t]he district court’s decisions as to the term of imprisonment and the extent of
community service may very well have been intertwined.” Id. Similarly, in Bohn, the district
judge imposed a sentence of five years’ probation and a $500,000 fine, and “specifically stated
that he was going to impose a fine ‘in light of the fact that [he was] not going to sentence [the
defendant] to jail.’” 959 F.2d at 391 (quoting the record).
9
Here, unlike in Kim and Bohn, neither the district court nor the parties made any link
between the special condition imposed and any other component of Trimarco’s sentence. Instead,
the instant situation falls among the overwhelming majority of cases where, if the district court
failed to provide sufficient reasoning in connection with a special condition, we remand to the
district court to address only that condition of supervised release, and not for a plenary
resentencing. See, e.g., Bleau, 930 F.3d at 43 (remanding for further consideration of only the
special condition of supervised release that was the subject of the procedural error); United States
v. Bishop, 2022 WL 1787717, at *2 (2d Cir. June 2, 2022) (summary order) (same); Forney, 797
F. App’x at 34 (same); United States v. Wolfe, 791 F. App’x 196, 200 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary
order) (same); United States v. Donohue, 726 F. App’x 3, 7 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (same).
* * *
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is VACATED as to the special condition
imposing 2,000 hours of community service and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings
only as it pertains to that special condition. We instruct the district court to determine whether
the imposition of the special condition is reasonably related to the factors set forth in U.S.S.G.
§ 5D1.3(b)(1) and, if it is, to explain the reasons for imposing the condition and to determine a
number of hours that “involve[s] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary for
th[ose] purposes,” id. § 5D1.3(b)(2).
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
10