Crawford v. City of New York

11-1232-cv
Crawford v. City of New York
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 26th day of April, two thousand twelve.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 Chief Judge,
8 ROSEMARY S. POOLER,
9 SUSAN L. CARNEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11
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13
14 MICHAEL CRAWFORD,
15
16 Plaintiff-Appellant,
17
18 -v.- 11-1232-cv
19
20 CITY OF NEW YORK, POLICE OFFICERS JOHN
21 AND JANE DOES 1-10, POLICE OFFICERS
22 JOHN AND JANE DOES 11-20, NEW YORK CITY
23 POLICE CHIEF RAYMOND W. KELLY, in his
24 official capacity and individually,
25 QUEENS COUNTY, QUEENS COUNTY DISTRICT
26 ATTORNEY RICHARD A. BROWN, in his
27 official capacity and individually, NEW
1
1 YORK CITY POLICE SERGEANT PETER
2 MASTROCOVI, in his individual capacity,
3 NEW YORK CITY DETECTIVE VINCENT
4 PELLIZZI, in his individual capacity,
5 NEW YORK CITY DETECTIVE ANTOINETTE
6 ESPOSITO, in her individual capacity,
7 ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS JOHN AND
8 JANE DOES 1-10, in their individual
9 capacities, JOHN AND JANE DOES 11-20,
10 JESSICA MELTON, ASSISTANT DISTRICT
11 ATTORNEY, in her individual capacity,
12
13 Defendants-Appellees.
14
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16
17 FOR APPELLANT: Mary Teague (Israel Dahan,
18 Jessica Lively, Vinny Lee, on
19 the brief), Cadwalader,
20 Wickersham & Taft LLP
21 New York, NY
22
23
24 FOR APPELLEES: Andrew S. Wellin, Proskauer Rose
25 LLP (Larry A. Sonnenshein on
26 the brief), for Michael A.
27 Cardozo, Corporation Counsel of
28 the City of New York,
29 New York, NY
30
31 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
32 Court for the Eastern District of New York (Ross, J.).
33
34 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
35 AND DECREED that the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
36
37 Michael Crawford appeals from the grant of summary
38 judgment dismissing his claims of malicious prosecution
39 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York law and failure to train
40 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We assume the parties’ familiarity
41 with the underlying facts, the procedural history, and the
42 issues presented for review.
43
2
1 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo and draw
2 all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. El Sayed v.
3 Hilton Hotels Corp., 627 F.3d 931, 933 (2d Cir. 2010) (per
4 curiam). “Summary judgment is appropriate only if the
5 movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
6 material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
7 matter of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
8 “The non-moving party may not rely on mere conclusory
9 allegations nor speculation, but instead must offer some
10 hard evidence showing that its version of the events is not
11 wholly fanciful.” D’Amico v. City of New York, 132 F.3d
12 145, 149 (2d Cir. 1998).
13
14 In support of his failure-to-train claim, Crawford
15 argues that he was arrested without probable cause, and then
16 prosecuted without probable cause. “Probable cause requires
17 an officer to have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
18 information sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable
19 caution in the belief that an offense has been committed by
20 the person to be arrested.” Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d
21 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22 An officer need not be certain that a subsequent prosecution
23 will succeed, and it is “of no consequence that a more
24 thorough or more probing investigation might have cast doubt
25 upon the situation.” Krause v. Bennett, 887 F.2d 362, 371
26 (2d Cir. 1989) (internal quotation marks omitted).
27
28 The statements made by A. and M. in their interviews
29 with Sgt. Mastrocovi established probable cause to support
30 Crawford’s arrest. The girls alleged that they were victims
31 of multiple instances of sexual abuse at the hands of
32 Crawford, and provided detailed and approximate dates of
33 such abuse. As the district court concluded, the girls’
34 stories are mutually corroborating: That two different
35 victims came forward to report similar instances of abuse
36 tends to reinforce the credibility of each. The record
37 shows that Sgt. Mastrocovi communicated the substance of the
38 girls’ allegations to the arresting officer, though probable
39 cause would have existed even if he had not.1 Because there
1
If one officer in a police department has knowledge
of facts that establish probable cause to arrest a suspect,
the suspect suffers no constitutional deprivation if he is
arrested by a different officer who lacks such knowledge.
3
1 were no “circumstances that raise[d] doubts as to the
2 victim[s]’ veracity,” their statements provided probable
3 cause to arrest Crawford. Singer v. Fulton Cnty. Sheriff,
4 63 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1995).
5
6 The existence (or absence) of probable cause to
7 prosecute bears upon the merits of the district court’s
8 award of summary judgment both as to Crawford’s failure-to-
9 train and his malicious prosecution claims. “The elements
10 of . . . malicious prosecution under § 1983 are
11 substantially the same as the elements under New York law.
12 Therefore, the analysis of the state and the federal claims
13 is identical.” Boyd v. City of New York, 336 F.3d 72, 75
14 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). To
15 establish malicious prosecution, “the plaintiff must show
16 that a prosecution was initiated against him, that it was
17 brought with malice but without probable cause to believe
18 that it could succeed and that the prosecution terminated in
19 favor of the accused plaintiff.” Id. at 76. Indictment by
20 a grand jury creates a rebuttable presumption of probable
21 cause. See id.; Colon v. City of New York, 60 N.Y.2d 78, 82
22 (1983). That presumption “may only be rebutted by evidence
23 that the indictment was procured by fraud, perjury, the
24 suppression of evidence or other police conduct undertaken
25 in bad faith.” Savino v. City of New York, 331 F.3d 63, 72
26 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted; emphasis
27 in original).
28
29 Crawford failed to raise a triable issue of fact that
30 might rebut the presumption of probable of cause that
31 attaches to his indictment. The supposed inconsistencies in
32 some of the girls’ statements as to the details and precise
33 dates of the assaults are minor discrepancies that do not
34 negate probable cause, much less establish bad faith on the
35 part of authorities. Crawford also points to alleged
36 inadequacies in the police investigation, including the
37 supposed failure of police to investigate his purported
38 alibi. However, “an officer’s failure to investigate an
See United States v. Valez, 796 F.2d 24, 28 (2d Cir. 1986)
(discussing “[t]he rule that permits courts to assess
probable cause to arrest by looking at the collective
knowledge of the police force--instead of simply looking at
the knowledge of the arresting officer”).
4
1 arrestee’s protestations of innocence generally does not
2 vitiate probable cause.” Panetta, 460 F.3d at 395-96. And
3 since he was living with the girls who accused him, there is
4 no reason to believe that Crawford’s claimed alibi, that he
5 worked the night shift, would foreclose his opportunity to
6 molest them.
7
8 The officers’ failure to request a report on the
9 Crawford family from the Administration for Children’s
10 Services also does not assist Crawford’s malicious
11 prosecution claims. That report would not have seriously
12 undermined the girls’ allegations of abuse, particularly in
13 light of the additional corroborating evidence that came to
14 light after Crawford’s arrest, including the statement of
15 A.’s brother, T., who claimed to have witnessed Crawford
16 remove A. from her bedroom on multiple occasions.
17
18 Finally, Crawford suggests that Det. Pellizzi
19 fabricated his account about visiting Crawford’s home and
20 seeing A.’s diary. However, Det. Pellizzi’s account is
21 corroborated by A.’s grand jury testimony, which affirmed
22 the existence of a diary documenting Crawford’s abuse.
23 Crawford offers nothing beyond speculation to suggest that
24 Det. Pellizzi fabricated a story. Conclusory allegations
25 are insufficient to withstand summary judgment.
26
27 Crawford thus failed to establish a triable issue of
28 fact with regard to whether probable cause supported his
29 arrest or his prosecution, leaving no basis for finding a
30 possible constitutional deprivation necessary to support a
31 failure-to-train claim. See Young v. Cnty. of Fulton, 160
32 F.3d 899, 904 (2d Cir. 1998). The district court thus
33 properly awarded summary judgment to defendants on
34 Crawford’s failure-to-train claim and on his claim for
35 malicious prosecution.
36
37 We have considered Crawford’s remaining arguments and
38 find them to be without merit. For the foregoing reasons,
39 the judgment of the district court is hereby AFFIRMED.
40
41 FOR THE COURT:
42 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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