DocketNumber: 14-2870-cv
Filed Date: 4/20/2015
Status: Non-Precedential
Modified Date: 4/20/2015
14‐2870‐cv Henvill v. Metro. Transp. Auth. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007 IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 2 Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley 3 Square, in the City of New York, on the 20th day of April, two thousand fifteen. 4 5 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS, 6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR., 7 Circuit Judges, 8 FRANK P. GERACI, JR.,* 9 District Judge. 10 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 11 12 WINSTON HENVILL, 13 14 Plaintiff‐Appellant, 15 16 v. No. 14‐2870‐cv 17 18 METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION 19 AUTHORITY, JOHN D’AGOSTINO, 20 KATHLEEN FINNERAN, JOSEPH PUGLIESE, 21 STEVE GUARDINO, RICKY SMITH, KEVIN 22 KIERAN, ALEXANDER LINDSAY, Chief Judge Frank P. Geraci, Jr., of the United States District Court for the * Western District of New York, sitting by designation. 1 CHRISOPHER NUTTER, and MICHAEL YASSO, 2 3 Defendants‐Appellees. 4 5 ‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐‐ 6 7 FOR APPELLANT: ALAN E. WOLIN, Wolin & Wolin, Jericho, NY. 8 9 FOR APPELLEES: GREGORY B. GILMORE, Gonzalez Saggio & Harlan 10 LLP, New York, NY. 11 12 Appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the 13 Southern District of New York (George B. Daniels, Judge). 14 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, 15 AND DECREED that the July 14, 2014 judgment of the District Court is 16 AFFIRMED and the October 10, 2014 judgment of the District Court is 17 AFFIRMED IN PART and VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART. 18 Winston Henvill appeals from the District Court’s July 14, 2014 judgment 19 granting the motion of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (“MTA”) and 20 nine MTA employees to dismiss his employment discrimination complaint, and 21 from the District Court’s October 10, 2014 judgment denying Henvill’s request 22 for leave to amend the complaint. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the 23 facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to 24 explain our decision to affirm in part and vacate and remand in part. 25 On appeal, Henvill makes no arguments regarding the District Court’s 26 grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Accordingly, he has abandoned any 27 challenge to that ruling. See Jackler v. Byrne,658 F.3d 225
, 233 (2d Cir. 2011). 28 As for Henvill’s request for leave to amend, which the District Court 29 denied on the ground that the proposed amended complaint (“PAC”) would not 30 survive a motion to dismiss, we affirm the ruling as to most of Henvill’s Title VII 2 1 claims. Henvill’s claims based on incidents that occurred between 2008 and 2 October 2010 are time‐barred, and the PAC fails plausibly to allege a “continuous 3 practice and policy of discrimination.” Washington v. Cnty. of Rockland, 3734 F.3d 310
, 317 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted). We also affirm the denial 5 of Henvill’s motion to amend his hostile work environment claims. See Nat’l 6 R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan,536 U.S. 101
, 116 (2002). In addition, we agree 7 that the PAC fails to allege any facts making it plausible that the MTA’s denial of 8 training, the January 2012 notice of intent to discipline, or the threat of discipline 9 against Henvill created a “materially adverse change in the terms and conditions 10 of employment.” Galabya v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ.,202 F.3d 636
, 640 (2d Cir. 2000) 11 (quotation marks omitted); see PAC ¶¶ 47, 53‐54. Nor does the PAC plausibly 12 claim that the MTA, by verbally counseling Henvill and requiring him to go to 13 Internal Affairs and write two memoranda, acted in a way that “well might have 14 dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of 15 discrimination.” Rivera v. Rochester Genesee Reg’l Transp. Auth.,743 F.3d 11
, 16 25 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted); see PAC ¶¶ 48‐51. Finally, the PAC 17 fails to allege sufficient facts giving rise to a plausible claim that the command 18 discipline issued by Sergeant Steve Guardino, the letter of instruction issued by 19 Captain Kevin Kieran, and the March 2012 disciplinary action prohibiting 20 Henvill from issuing summonses were because of Henvill’s race and color. See 21 E.E.O.C. v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J.,768 F.3d 247
, 254 (2d Cir. 2014); Brown v. 22 Daikin Am. Inc.,756 F.3d 219
, 229 (2d Cir. 2014); PAC ¶¶ 44, 52. 23 However, the District Court erred in denying Henvill’s request for leave to 24 amend as it pertained to the race‐based discrimination claim regarding the 25 command discipline issued by Lieutenant Lee Dittrich and the retaliation claim 26 regarding the removal of Henvill’s summons‐issuing responsibilities. See PAC 3 1 ¶¶ 45‐46, 52. The alleged effects of the command discipline plausibly constitute 2 a “material loss of benefits,” Demoret v. Zegarelli,451 F.3d 140
, 151 (2d Cir. 2006) 3 (quotation marks omitted), and, allegedly, specific white officers who committed 4 overtime violations comparable to Henvill’s were not disciplined. And the PAC 5 plausibly claims that shortly after Henvill filed his first charge with the EEOC, 6 the MTA stripped Henvill of a “material part of [his] duties and responsibilities” 7 as a transit police officer by prohibiting him from issuing summonses, PAC ¶ 52, 8 a change in duties that may well have been “materially adverse to a reasonable 9 employee,” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White,548 U.S. 53
, 57 (2006). 10 We have considered all remaining arguments and conclude that they are 11 without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the District Court’s July 12 14, 2014 judgment, AFFIRM in part and VACATE in part the District Court’s 13 October 10, 2014 judgment, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent 14 with this order. 15 16 FOR THE COURT: 17 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court 4