Jin v. Sessions

15-3533
Jin v. Sessions
BIA
Cheng, IJ
A200 163 801
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
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RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
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BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States
Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the
16th day of March, two thousand seventeen.
PRESENT:
ROBERT D. SACK,
REENA RAGGI,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
HONGLAN JIN,
Petitioner,
v. No. 15-3533
NAC
JEFFERSON B. SESSIONS, III,
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.*
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Thomas D. Barra, Esq., New York,
New York.
FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy
Assistant Attorney General; Shelley
R. Goad, Assistant Director; Russell
* Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2),
Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III is automatically
substituted for former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as
Respondent.
J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration
Litigation, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is
DENIED.
Petitioner Honglan Jin, a native and citizen of the
People’s Republic of China, seeks review of the BIA’s affirmance
of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of asylum,
withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”). See In re Honglan Jin, No. A200 163 801
(B.I.A. Oct. 20, 2015), aff’g No. A200 163 801 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C.
May 22, 2014).
Under the circumstances of this case, we review both the
IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of completeness,”
Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.
2006), applying well established standards of review. See
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d 193,
196 (2d Cir. 2009). In so doing, we assume the parties’
familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
of this case, which we reference only as necessary to explain
our decision to deny the petition for review.
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The agency did not err in finding that Jin failed to satisfy
her burden of proof because she did not submit corroborating
statements from fellow Falun Gong practitioners or evidence
that Chinese officials are aware or likely to become aware of
her practice of Falun Gong.
“The testimony of the applicant may be sufficient to
sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but only
if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the
applicant’s testimony is credible, is persuasive, and refers
to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that the applicant
is a refugee.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii); see also Chuilu
Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d at 196-97.
Here, the agency reasonably required corroboration because
Jin’s testimony about her practice of Falun Gong lacked detail.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii) (“Where the trier of fact
determines that the applicant should provide evidence that
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must
be provided unless the applicant does not have the evidence and
cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.”); see also Chuilu Liu
v. Holder, 575 F.3d at 196-97. Specifically, the agency
properly identified the missing evidence, noting that Jin had
not proffered testimony or written statements from any Falun
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Gong practitioners with whom she has practiced or protested.
Moreover, even if such witnesses were unavailable to attend a
hearing as Jin contended, she failed to compellingly explain
why they could not submit affidavits. See Chuilu Liu v. Holder,
575 F.3d at 198 (“[T]he alien bears the ultimate burden of
introducing such evidence without prompting from the IJ.”).
Alternatively, even assuming Jin established her practice
of Falun Gong, the agency reasonably concluded that she failed
to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on that basis.
“[T]o establish a well-founded fear of persecution in the
absence of any evidence of past persecution, an alien must make
some showing that authorities in h[er] country of nationality
are either aware of h[er] activities or likely to become aware
of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135,
143 (2d Cir. 2008).
No evidence compelled the conclusion that Chinese
officials are likely to become aware of (or take an interest
in) Jin’s protest activities in the United States based solely
on the publication of her picture and name in 2011 and 2012 print
and online publications, some of which she admitted were not
circulated in China. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334,
336-37 (2d Cir. 2013). Indeed, we have rejected as “most
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unlikely” the suggestion “that the Chinese government is aware
of every anti-Communist or pro-democracy piece of commentary
published online” and found speculative claims that the Chinese
government may discover a few articles published on the internet
years earlier. Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d at 334 (citing Jian
Xing Huang v. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the
absence of solid support in the record . . . , [an applicant’s]
fear is speculative at best”)).
Because Jin failed to satisfy her burden of proof that she
practices Falun Gong or, alternatively, that authorities are
aware, or likely to become aware, of her practice, the agency
did not err in concluding that she failed to establish a
well-founded fear of persecution. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(i); see also Chuilu Liu v. Holder, 575 F.3d at
197-98; Hongsheng Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d at 142. That
finding was dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and
CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same
factual predicate. Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d
Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
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