Singh v. Garland

20-1761
Singh v. Garland
BIA
Navarro, IJ
A208 614 139
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
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At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on th2 28th day of February, two thousand twenty-
three.
PRESENT:
JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
BETH ROBINSON,
MYRNA PÉREZ,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
PARJEET SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 20-1761
NAC
MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Deepti Vithal, Esq., Richmond
Hill, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; Anna E. Juarez,
Senior Litigation Counsel; Lindsay
Marshall, Trial Attorney, Office
of Immigration Litigation, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Parjeet Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a May 21, 2020 decision of the BIA affirming
an April 19, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”),
which denied Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
(“CAT”). In re Parjeet Singh, No. A208 614 139 (B.I.A. May
21, 2020), aff’g No. A208 614 139 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. April
19, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history.
We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as supplemented by
the BIA. See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d
Cir. 2005). We review an adverse credibility determination
under a substantial evidence standard, Hong Fei Gao v.
Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018), and “the
administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any
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reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the
contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).
“Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all
relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility
determination on . . . the inherent plausibility of the
applicant’s or witness’s account, the consistency between the
applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . . ,
[and] the consistency of such statements with other evidence
of record . . . without regard to whether an inconsistency,
inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s
claim, or any other relevant factor.” Id.§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility
determination unless, from the totality of the circumstances,
it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder could make such an
adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534
F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d
at 76. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s
determination that Singh was not credible as to his claim
that members of the Akali Dal Badal party (the “Badal Party”)
attacked and threatened to kill him if he did not leave the
Shiromani Akali Dal Amritsar party (the “Mann Party”).
The agency reasonably relied on inconsistencies between
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Singh’s statements at his credible fear interview and his
hearing testimony.1 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh
made inconsistent statements regarding Khalistan, which is a
proposed Sikh state that the Mann Party supports. At the
credible fear interview, Singh stated that he had never heard
of Khalistan, but he testified at his hearing that he was
persecuted by the Badal Party for advocating for Khalistan.
The agency was not required to accept Singh’s explanations—
that he initially was afraid to mention Khalistan because the
Badal Party considers people who mention Khalistan to be
terrorists and people in India cannot talk about Khalistan
openly—because Singh also testified that Khalistan posters
were hung openly at Mann Party events. See Majidi v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005). Singh’s argument
that the IJ stated there were “several inconsistencies,” but
then only identified one, ignores the fact that his
explanations during the hearing were inconsistent with other
testimony.
1 Singh does not challenge the reliability of the credible fear
interview record, and, even if he had, the record was sufficiently
reliable as it included a list of questions by the immigration
officer relating to Singh’s asylum claim and Singh’s responses to
those questions, and there is no indication that Singh had
difficulty with the interpreter. See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585
F.3d 715, 723–25 (2d Cir. 2009).
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The agency also reasonably relied on Singh’s inability
to recall the name of any other Mann Party member. The agency
may consider “the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s
. . . account.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). We defer to
an implausibility finding so long as it “is tethered to record
evidence, and there is nothing else in the record from which
a firm conviction of error could properly be derived.”
Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2007). The
IJ’s conclusion that it was implausible that Singh could not
recall the names of any Mann Party members is tethered to the
record because Singh testified that he attended approximately
20 party meetings and volunteered at weddings, advocated
against drug use, provided books to schoolchildren, provided
medicine to farmers, and collected donations for the party.
Finally, Singh testified that his father was threatened
by members of the Badal Party who were looking for Singh after
he fled to New Delhi. However, Singh’s father’s letter did
not mention any such threats. Although omissions “are less
probative of credibility than inconsistencies created by
direct contradictions in evidence and testimony,” Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted), the
IJ did not err in relying on this omission in light of the
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“totality of the circumstance,” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167(quoting § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii)). Singh’s father’s failure to
mention the alleged threats undercuts Singh’s credibility
because he has no corroboration of the threats. See Biao
Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An
applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may
bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in
general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony
that has already been called into question.”).
In sum, the inconsistent statement and explanation
regarding Khalistan, the implausibility related to Singh’s
political activities, and the omission and lack of reliable
corroboration of continuing threats constitute substantial
evidence for the adverse credibility determination. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of
asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief because all
three forms of relief are based on the same discredited
factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–
57 (2d Cir. 2006).
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For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
stays VACATED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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