United States v. Sampson

14-3357-cr(L)
United States v. Sampson
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007
IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING
A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A
PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”).
A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON
ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at
2 the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
3 York, on the 6th day of April, two thousand sixteen.
4 PRESENT: ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
5 Chief Judge,
6 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
7 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
8 Circuit Judges.
9 ------------------------------------------------------------------
10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
11 Appellee,
12 v. Nos. 14-3357-cr(L),
13 14-3361-cr(CON),
14 RODNEY ZECHARIAH SAMPSON, JOHN 14-4584-cr(CON)
15 GILBERT JUNCAL, JAMES ANDERSON
16 CAMPBELL, JR.,
17 Defendants-Appellants.*
18 ------------------------------------------------------------------
19
20 FOR APPELLANT
21 SAMPSON: RICHARD HALEY, Haley Weinblatt & Calcagni, LLP,
22 Islandia, NY.
23
*
The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption of this case as set forth above.
1
1 FOR APPELLANT
2 JUNCAL: JOHN S. WALLENSTEIN, Garden City, NY.
3
4 FOR APPELLANT
5 CAMPBELL: Richard A. Miller, Miller & Skubik, LLP, Commack,
6 NY.
7
8 FOR APPELLEE: CHRISTOPHER C. CAFFARONE, Assistant United States
9 Attorney (Amy Busa, Assistant United States Attorney,
10 on the brief) for Robert L. Capers, United States
11 Attorney for the Eastern District of New York,
12 Brooklyn, NY.
13
14 Appeal from judgments of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
15 of New York (Sandra J. Feuerstein, Judge).
16 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED,
17 AND DECREED that the judgments of the District Court are AFFIRMED.
18 Defendants-appellants John Juncal, James Campbell, and Rodney Sampson appeal
19 from judgments resentencing them in connection with their earlier convictions for
20 conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, and
21 1349. The Defendants’ initial sentences were previously vacated by this Court due to
22 procedural error. See United States v. Corsey, 723 F.3d 366 (2d Cir. 2013). On remand,
23 the District Court sentenced Juncal, Campbell, and Sampson to terms of imprisonment
24 lasting twenty, sixteen, and fifteen years, respectively. Juncal challenges his sentence as
25 both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. Campbell and Sampson challenge
26 their sentences as substantively unreasonable only. We assume the parties’ familiarity
27 with the facts and record of the prior proceedings, to which we refer only as necessary to
28 explain our decision to affirm.
29 1. Procedural Unreasonableness
30 “We review a sentence for procedural and substantive reasonableness under a
31 deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v. Thavaraja, 740 F.3d 253, 258
2
1 (2d Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). “Procedural reasonableness focuses on whether
2 a district court ‘fails to calculate the [Sentencing] Guidelines range, makes a mistake in its
3 Guidelines calculation, treats the Guidelines as mandatory, does not consider the § 3553(a)
4 factors, or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.’” United States v.
5 Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 2015) (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v.
6 Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008)). Juncal argues that his sentence was
7 procedurally flawed because the District Court (1) refused to consider his arguments, (2)
8 failed to provide reasons for imposing a 20-year sentence, and (3) did not order an updated
9 presentence investigation report (“PSR”) before resentencing him.
10 We reject each of these arguments. The District Court reviewed Juncal’s
11 resentencing memorandum and considered Juncal’s argument that his age and
12 post-conviction rehabilitation counseled in favor of a shorter sentence. In rejecting those
13 arguments, the District Court adequately explained its reasoning: it based Juncal’s sentence
14 on his continued efforts to deceive the Probation Department following his conviction, his
15 long history of fraudulent conduct, his role as the mastermind of the fraudulent scheme for
16 which the Defendants were convicted, and reports by prison authorities that he was a
17 “problem inmate.” Juncal App’x 52-54. Nor are we persuaded that the District Court
18 erred in not ordering an updated PSR. First, Juncal never formally requested one, and
19 second, district courts are not required to obtain an updated PSR upon resentencing when,
20 as in this case, “a hearing on resentencing was held at which the parties had a full
21 opportunity to be heard and to supplement the PSR as needed.” United States v. Conhaim,
22 160 F.3d 893, 896 (2d Cir. 1998). Here, Juncal had the opportunity to supplement the
23 initial PSR in his resentencing memorandum describing for the District Court his
24 post-conviction disciplinary record and his medical condition. We therefore conclude
25 that the District Court did not procedurally err in resentencing Juncal.
26
3
1 2. Substantive Unreasonableness
2 Substantive reasonableness “focuses on a district court’s explanation of its sentence
3 in light of the factors contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. Gonzalez, 529
4 F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2008). We will vacate a sentence for substantive unreasonableness
5 only if it “cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” United States v.
6 Watkins, 667 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (2d Cir.
7 2008)). All three Defendants argue that their sentences are substantively unreasonable
8 largely because the fraudulent scheme for which they were convicted – an attempt to obtain
9 three billion dollars, purportedly to finance a pipeline in Siberia – was so entirely
10 implausible as to be doomed to fail. The Defendants acknowledge that the District Court,
11 after determining that the applicable Guidelines range for each Defendant was the statutory
12 maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment based on the intended loss of three billion
13 dollars, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343; U.S.S.G. §§ 2B1.1(b)(P), 5G1.1(a) (2013), eventually
14 settled on sentences either at or below the applicable Guidelines range. Nevertheless, they
15 argue, basing their offense level on an intended loss without initial regard for the
16 implausibility of the scheme resulted in sentences that were unreasonably high.
17 We might have been persuaded by the Defendants’ arguments had the District Court
18 relied exclusively on the seriousness of their offense. But the District Court also based the
19 sentences on the Defendants’ history of fraudulent behavior. The District Court noted, for
20 example, that Juncal, who was 68 years old at the time of resentencing, had engaged in
21 criminal acts of fraud since the age of 25 and previously had been arrested eight times and
22 convicted four times for fraudulent conduct. Campbell had also previously engaged in
23 several frauds, resulting in several felony fraud convictions. Worse yet, he committed one
24 of those frauds while incarcerated in 1997, and committed the pipeline fraud at issue in this
25 case while on parole for three prior fraud convictions. It is true that Sampson had not been
26 convicted of fraud before this case, and his claim of substantive reasonableness therefore
4
1 presents a closer call. Nevertheless, as the District Court observed, Sampson successfully
2 defrauded a company’s chief executive officer of $75,000 while on pretrial release and
3 supervision awaiting trial for the pipeline fraud.1 Particularly because of the Defendants’
4 previous criminal conduct, and the strong deference afforded to district courts in
5 sentencing defendants, we conclude that this is not one of the “exceptional cases where the
6 trial court’s decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.”
7 Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (quotation marks omitted).
8 We have considered all of the Defendants’ remaining arguments and conclude that
9 they are without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the District Court are
10 AFFIRMED.
11 FOR THE COURT:
12 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
13
1
The District Court initially resentenced Sampson to seventeen years’ imprisonment but
later reconsidered its decision and decreased the sentence by two years based on a
statement Sampson made at his resentencing hearing that acknowledged the seriousness of
the crime he committed and that the District Court viewed as a sign of remorse.
5