Swinton v. Livingston County

21-1434
Swinton v. Livingston County
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS
GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S
LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH
THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
2 held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
3 City of New York, on the 2nd day of March, two thousand twenty-three.
4
5 PRESENT:
6 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
7 RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
8 WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
9 Circuit Judges.
10 _______________________________________________________________________________________
11
12 ROBERT L. SWINTON, JR.,
13
14 Plaintiff-Appellant,
15
16 v. No. 21-1434
17
18 LIVINGSTON COUNTY, LIVINGSTON COUNTY
19 JAIL, MONROE COUNTY, MONROE COUNTY
20 JAIL, NURSE SCHINSKI, NURSE YUNKER,
21 CHIEF DEPUTY YASSO, CORPORAL SLOCUM,
22 DEPUTY FORRESTER, CORRECT CARE
23 SOLUTIONS, INC., DR. MAXMILLIAN CHUNG,
24 DR. CHARLES THOMAS, CORRECTIONAL
25 MEDICAL CARE INC.,
26
27 Defendants-Appellees.*
_______________________________________________________________________________________
* The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to amend the official case caption as set forth above.
For Plaintiff-Appellant: Robert L. Swinton, Jr., pro se,
Danbury, CT.
For Defendants-Appellees Livingston Michael P. McClaren, Vincent
County, Livingston County Jail, Nurse Thomas Parlato, Webster Szanyi
Schinski, Nurse Yunker, Chief Deputy LLP, Buffalo, NY.
Yasso, Corporal Slocum, and Deputy
Forrester:
For Defendants-Appellees Dr. Charles Paul Andrew Sanders, Barclay
Thomas and Correctional Medical Care Damon, LLP, Rochester, NY.
Inc.:
For Defendant-Appellee Dr. Maxmillian Kara M. Addelman, Addelman
Chung: Cross & Baldwin, PC, Buffalo,
NY.
1
2 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Western
3 District of New York (Richard J. Arcara, Judge).
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
5 ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is
6 AFFIRMED.
7 Robert L. Swinton, Jr., incarcerated and proceeding pro se, appeals from
8 (1) the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 19839 against Livingston County and Monroe County (collectively, the “Counties”) and
10 their respective jails (collectively, the “Jails”) at initial screening under 28 U.S.C.
2
1 §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(a); and (2) the district court’s grant of summary judgment
2 under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, dismissing his section-1983
3 and state-law claims against the remaining defendants, all in connection with the
4 conditions of his pretrial detention between 2012 and 2015. We assume the
5 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on
6 appeal.
7 We review a district court’s sua sponte dismissal under section 1915(e)(2)
8 and its grant of summary judgment under Rule 56 de novo. See Hardaway v.
9 Hartford Pub. Works Dep't, 879 F.3d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 2018); 1077 Madison St., LLC v.
10 Daniels, 954 F.3d 460, 463 (2d Cir. 2020). In determining whether a district court’s
11 sua sponte dismissal is appropriate, we accept as true all well-pleaded factual
12 allegations in the complaint, draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,
13 and assess whether the complaint “state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its
14 face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We affirm a district
15 court’s grant of summary judgment “when, construing the evidence in the light
16 most favorable to the non-movant, ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material
17 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’” Doninger v.
18 Niehoff, 642 F.3d 334, 344 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).
3
1 On appeal, Swinton argues principally that the district court erred by
2 (1) dismissing his section-1983 claims against the Counties and Jails for failing to
3 plausibly allege an official policy or custom under Monell v. Department of Social
4 Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); (2) granting summary judgment in favor of
5 Dr. Charles Thomas, Dr. Maximillian Chung, and their employer, Correctional
6 Medical Care Inc. (“CMC”), on Swinton’s claims of deliberate indifference to his
7 dental conditions at the Monroe County Jail; (3) granting summary judgment in
8 favor of Nurse Schinski and Nurse Yunker (collectively, the “Nurses”) and Chief
9 Deputy Yasso on Swinton’s claims of deliberate indifference to his dental
10 conditions at the Livingston County Jail; and (4) granting summary judgment in
11 favor of the Nurses, Chief Deputy Yasso, Corporal Slocum, and Deputy Forrester
12 (collectively, the “Officers”) on Swinton’s claims of denial of court access. We
13 discuss each of Swinton’s arguments in turn.
14 First, the district court correctly concluded that Swinton failed to plausibly
15 allege a Monell claim against the Counties and the Jails. Under Monell, a
16 municipality is subject to suit under section 1983 only if the “execution of [the]
17 government’s policy or custom . . . inflicts the [alleged] injury.” 436 U.S. at 694.
18 To satisfy this requirement, “general and conclusory allegation[s]” of an
4
1 unconstitutional policy or custom are insufficient. Littlejohn v. City of New York,
2 795 F.3d 297, 315 (2d Cir. 2015). Rather, a plaintiff must identify either an
3 “express rule or regulation,” a practice that “was so persistent or widespread as to
4 [carry] the force of law,” or misconduct of “subordinate employees” that “was so
5 manifest as to imply the constructive acquiescence of senior policy-making
6 officials.” Id. Swinton’s complaint asserts in a conclusory fashion that the
7 Counties and the Jails are liable under section 1983 because the Counties were
8 “responsible for [the] polic[ies]” and “supervision of the [Jails],” and he
9 experienced “toothaches and abscesses” while the Jails were “responsible for [his]
10 care.” Suppl. App’x at 10–11. But aside from these assertions, Swinton alleges
11 no facts to suggest that his purported injuries were inflicted by the Counties’ or
12 the Jails’ “express rule,” “widespread” practice, or “manifest” misconduct.
13 Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 315. Because Swinton’s “general and conclusory”
14 allegations of constitutional violations are insufficient to satisfy the
15 policy-or-custom requirement under Monell, we affirm the district court’s sua
16 sponte dismissal of Swinton’s claims against the Counties and the Jails. 1 Id.1 Although a district court has ample discretion to grant a pro se defendant leave to amend his
complaint before dismissal, it need not do so when such relief would be futile – i.e., when the
complaint does not give “any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Pangburn v.
5
1 Second, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of
2 Dr. Thomas, Dr. Chung, and their employer, CMC, on Swinton’s claims of
3 deliberate indifference to his dental conditions at the Monroe County Jail.
4 Because Swinton was at all relevant times a pretrial detainee, his
5 deliberate-indifference claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment’s
6 Due Process Clause. See Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 29–30 (2d Cir. 2017).
7 Under the Fourteenth Amendment, “mere medical malpractice is not tantamount
8 to deliberate indifference.” Charles v. Orange County, 925 F.3d 73, 87 (2d Cir. 2019)
9 (quoting Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 22 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2000)). Instead, a plaintiff
10 must demonstrate, “at a minimum,” that the defendant provided deficient medical
11 treatment with “culpable recklessness . . . that evinces a conscious disregard of a
12 substantial risk of serious harm” to his health. Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124,
13 128 (2d Cir. 2021).
14 Here, Swinton argues that Dr. Thomas and Dr. Chung were deliberately
15 indifferent to his dental conditions because they “appl[ied] a less efficacious
16 treatment” than what Swinton requested. Swinton’s Br. at 6. We disagree.
Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999). Because even a liberal construction of Swinton’s
complaint gives no indication that he could plausibly allege a Monell claim against the Counties
and the Jails, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Swinton leave to amend
his complaint when it dismissed Swinton’s Monell claims at initial screening.
6
1 When Dr. Thomas first treated Swinton at the Monroe County Jail, Dr. Thomas
2 observed that Swinton’s “abscess did not constitute an emergent, life-threatening
3 condition” and therefore prescribed him antibiotics “to control the bacteria that
4 caused the abscess.” Dist. Ct. Doc. No. 259, Ex. 9, ¶¶ 16, 21. After Swinton
5 came under Dr. Chung’s care a few months later, Dr. Chung conducted multiple
6 examinations on Swinton’s tooth, all of which revealed “[n]o soft tissue
7 pathology.” Suppl. App’x at 498. Nevertheless, because Swinton complained
8 of a “pressure feeling” around his tooth, Dr. Chung inserted “a new temporary
9 filling,” “prescribed antibiotics,” and “recommended evaluation for future
10 extraction if the issue did not resolve.” Id. When Swinton returned for a
11 follow-up examination, Dr. Chung again observed “no soft tissue pathology.” Id.12 at 499. Swinton now contends that Dr. Thomas and Dr. Chung should have
13 provided him with “a root-canal” or “an extraction” to remedy his “repeated
14 abscessing,” Swinton’s Br. at 6, but a mere disagreement over the proper course of
15 treatment, without more, does not “evince[] a conscious disregard of a substantial
16 risk of serious harm” to Swinton’s health, Darby, 14 F.4th at 128; see also Chance v.
17 Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 703 (2d Cir. 1998) (“It is well-established that mere
18 disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim.”).
7
1 On this record, we cannot say that Dr. Thomas, Dr. Chung, or their employer,
2 CMC, were deliberately indifferent to Swinton’s dental conditions. See Darby, 14
3 F.4th at 128.
4 Third, the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of the
5 Nurses and Chief Deputy Yasso on Swinton’s deliberate-indifference claims
6 related to his dental conditions at the Livingston County Jail. As to the Nurses,
7 the district court found that they were entitled to qualified immunity, which
8 shields government officials from suits for monetary damages “unless their
9 actions violate clearly[ ]established rights of which an objectively reasonable
10 official would have known.” Jones v. Parmley, 465 F.3d 46, 55 (2d Cir. 2006)
11 (quoting Thomas v. Roach, 165 F.3d 137, 142 (2d Cir. 1999)). As the district court
12 reasoned, when Swinton was under the Nurses’ care, medical indifference would
13 constitute a constitutional violation only if the prison official had a “subjective
14 awareness of the harmfulness associated with” his act or omission but nevertheless
15 “disregarded [the] excessive risks” he posed “to the [detainee]’s health and
16 safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 27, 35 (emphasis added). Not until 2017 did we
17 announce “that deliberate indifference for due process purposes should be
18 [instead] measured by an objective standard,” id. at 35 (emphasis added)—namely,
8
1 by determining whether the prison official reasonably “should have known that
2 failing to provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to
3 the detainee’s health,” Darby, 14 F.4th at 128 (quoting Charles, 925 F.3d at 87).
4 In this case, the district court correctly found that there was insufficient
5 evidence to suggest that the Nurses “acted with deliberate indifference in a
6 subjective sense” by knowingly “disregard[ing] excessive risks to [Swinton]’s
7 health and safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 27. Instead, as the district court noted,
8 “the record establishes that whenever [Swinton] complained of dental pain, he
9 received medical attention, including pain relief medication, antibiotics, and the
10 hydrogen peroxide mouth rinse, which [Swinton] repeatedly reported helped
11 relieve the pain.” Swinton v. Livingston County, No. 15-cv-53A(F), 2018
12 WL 4637376, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2018), report and recommendation adopted sub
13 nom. Swinton v. Schinski, No. 15-cv-53-A, 2019 WL 5694314 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
14 2019). In the absence of any evidence of the Nurses’ subjective indifference to
15 Swinton’s dental conditions, we cannot conclude that the Nurses “violate[d]
16 clearly[ ]established rights of which an objectively reasonable official would have
17 known.” Jones, 465 F.3d at 55 (quoting Thomas, 165 F.3d at 142).
9
1 As to Chief Deputy Yasso, we agree with the district court that there was no
2 evidence that he was personally involved in Swinton’s dental treatment. We
3 have long held “that personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional
4 deprivations is a prerequisite to an award of damages under [section] 1983,” and
5 that a prison official cannot “be held personally responsible simply because he was
6 in a high position of authority in the prison system.” Wright v. Smith, 21 F.3d 496,
7 501 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Yasso’s only
8 involvement in Swinton’s dental treatment was his investigation into Swinton’s
9 grievance petition about the treatment, see Suppl. App’x at 108–09; his inquiry
10 regarding the status of Swinton’s root canal request, see id. at 109; and his
11 arrangement to postpone Swinton’s transfer to another facility so that Swinton
12 could receive a root canal prior to the transfer, see id. at 111. On this record, we
13 see no evidence suggesting that Yasso was “personally involved in depriving”
14 Swinton of proper dental treatment. Wright, 21 F.3d at 502.
15 Fourth, the district court correctly granted summary judgment dismissing
16 Swinton’s denial-of-court-access claims. Swinton contends that he could not
17 effectively challenge a prior Florida state-court conviction because the Livingston
18 County Jail’s law library and legal-assistance program were inadequate. The
10
1 Supreme Court has held that “the fundamental constitutional right of access to the
2 courts requires prison authorities to . . . provid[e] prisoners with adequate law
3 libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Lewis v. Casey,
4 518 U.S. 343, 346 (1996) (quoting Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977)). But to
5 assert a deprivation of that right, a plaintiff must show that “the alleged
6 inadequacies of a prison’s library facilities or legal[-]assistance program caused
7 him actual injury,” id. at 348 (internal quotation marks omitted), by “frustrat[ing]”
8 or “imped[ing]” his “nonfrivolous legal claim[s],” id. at 353.
9 Here, Swinton has not “point[ed] to any actual denial of legal
10 rights . . . based on the asserted constitutionally deficient legal resources at [the
11 Livingston County Jail].” Swinton, 2018 WL 4637376, at *9. To the contrary, the
12 record shows that Swinton mounted multiple challenges to his Florida conviction
13 while he was detained at the Livingston County Jail. For instance, in June 2014,
14 a court-appointed criminal defense attorney sought to vacate Swinton’s Florida
15 conviction, “but because th[at] conviction was never appealed, . . . the motion was
16 denied as untimely.” Id. at *8. Moreover, in April 2015, Swinton raised a related
17 challenge to the same conviction “in his pro se coram nobis petition, which was
18 considered and denied by both the Florida District Court of Appeal and the Florida
11
1 Supreme Court.” 2 Id. (capitalization standardized). Because Swinton cannot
2 point to any deficiency of the Livingston County Jail’s legal resources that
3 “frustrated” or “impeded” a “nonfrivolous” challenge to his Florida conviction,
4 he has failed to demonstrate any actual injury required under Lewis. 3 518 U.S.
5 at 348, 353.
6 We have considered all of Swinton’s remaining arguments and find them to
7 be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
8 FOR THE COURT:
9 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court
2 Swinton also argues that he was denied the right to court access because he could not effectively
appeal the Livingston County Jail’s resolution of his grievance petitions. The record, however,
is devoid of any evidence that he had any “nonfrivolous legal claim[s]” that were “frustrated” or
“impeded” during the grievance process. Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353. We therefore affirm the
district court’s grant of summary judgment as to Swinton’s denial-of-access claims in connection
with his prison grievances.
3 Because we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Swinton’s section-1983 claims,
we also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. See Boyd v. J.E. Robert Co., 765 F.3d 123, 126
(2d Cir. 2014) (holding that “after properly granting summary judgment on the [federal] claims,
the [d]istrict [c]ourt had discretion not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state[-]law
claims”).
12