Singh v. Barr

17-2522
Singh v. Barr
BIA
Laforest, IJ
A205 586 261
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 3rd day of December, two thousand nineteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 MANPREET SINGH,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 17-2522
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,
24 NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; Jeffery R.
28 Leist, Senior Litigation Counsel;
29 Colette J. Winston, Trial
30 Attorney, Office of Immigration
1 Litigation, United States
2 Department of Justice, Washington,
3 DC.
4
5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
8 is DENIED.
9 Petitioner Manpreet Singh, a native and citizen of India,
10 seeks review of a July 25, 2017, decision of the BIA affirming
11 a November 8, 2016, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
12 denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding of
13 removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture
14 (“CAT”). In re Manpreet Singh, No. A 205 586 261 (B.I.A. July
15 25, 2017), aff’g No. A 205 586 261 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Nov.
16 8, 2016). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
17 underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
19 both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See Yun-Zui Guan v.
20 Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable
21 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C.
22 § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76
23 (2d Cir. 2018).
24 The governing REAL ID Act credibility standard provides
25 as follows:
2
1 Considering the totality of the circumstances, and
2 all relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a
3 credibility determination on the demeanor, candor,
4 or responsiveness of the applicant or witness, . .
5 . the consistency between the applicant’s or
6 witness’s written and oral statements . . . , the
7 internal consistency of each such statement, the
8 consistency of such statements with other evidence
9 of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods
10 in such statements, . . . or any other relevant
11 factor.
12
13 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
14 credibility determination unless . . . it is plain that no
15 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse
16 credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162,
17 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76.
18 Substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse
19 credibility determination.
20 The multiple inconsistencies among Singh’s statements
21 and documentary evidence provide substantial evidence for the
22 adverse credibility determination. First, Singh’s testimony
23 was internally inconsistent and inconsistent with his asylum
24 application regarding whether he or his father reported a May
25 2012 incident to the police. The IJ was not required to
26 credit Singh’s explanation that he was confused about the
27 dates. See Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir.
28 2005) (“A petitioner must do more than offer a plausible
29 explanation for his inconsistent statements to secure relief;
3
1 he must demonstrate that a reasonable fact-finder would be
2 compelled to credit his testimony.” (internal quotation marks
3 and citations omitted)).
4 Second, there were discrepancies between Singh’s
5 testimony and a letter from a clinic regarding his treatment
6 in June 2012 and how long he was hospitalized and whether he
7 had broken bones. The IJ could reasonably expect that the
8 letter would specify broken bones and not a generic “injury.”
9 See Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 78-79 (“in assessing
10 the probative value of the omission of certain facts, an IJ
11 should consider whether those facts are ones that a credible
12 petitioner would reasonably have been expected to disclose
13 under the relevant circumstances”). Singh’s response that
14 he received stiches on his finger added further
15 inconsistency.
16 Third, Singh was inconsistent about injuries following a
17 second beating because again a clinic letter did not specify
18 that Singh had broken bones and did not confirm Singh’s
19 allegation that he was hospitalized for five days. The
20 agency was not required to credit Singh’s explanation that
21 the local doctor made a mistake or that Singh’s reference to
22 a “broken” leg meant torn muscles, as Singh testified that
23 the doctor took an x-ray and saw a fracture. See Majidi, 430
4
1 F.3d at 80.
2 Fourth, Singh’s testimony was internally inconsistent
3 regarding the timeline of events. Singh testified that he
4 went to live with his aunt in May 2012. However, he also
5 testified that while he was staying with his aunt, Congress
6 Party members spotted him at a rally in March 2012. Fifth
7 and relatedly, Singh’s testimony was internally inconsistent
8 regarding the location of a rally. The agency was not
9 required to credit Singh’s explanation that he made a mistake
10 regarding the location because he was scared and confused, as
11 Singh did not explain why he was confused. See id.
12 Sixth, we defer to the IJ’s demeanor finding, which
13 bolsters the adverse credibility determination. See Jin Chen
14 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2005)
15 (deferring to demeanor finding “in recognition of the fact
16 that the IJ’s ability to observe the witness’s demeanor places
17 her in the best position to evaluate whether apparent problems
18 in the witness’s testimony suggest a lack of credibility or,
19 rather, can be attributed to an innocent cause such as
20 difficulty understanding the question.”). Moreover, the
21 record reflects that Singh gave non-responsive answers and
22 did not respond to certain questions.
23 Finally, the agency reasonably concluded that Singh’s
5
1 documentary evidence did not rehabilitate his credibility.
2 See Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007)
3 (“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his . . . testimony
4 may bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration
5 in general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate
6 testimony that has already been called into question”). As
7 discussed previously, the clinic letters were inconsistent
8 with Singh’s testimony. The IJ also reasonably gave
9 diminished weight to affidavits prepared by individuals in
10 India who were not available for cross-examination. See Y.C.
11 v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding
12 that “[w]e generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the
13 weight to be afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence”
14 and deferring to IJ’s decision not to credit letter from
15 spouse in China); Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y-Z-, 25 I. & N. Dec.
16 209, 215 (BIA 2010) (giving diminished weight to letters from
17 relatives because they were from interested witnesses not
18 subject to cross-examination), rev’d on other grounds by Hui
19 Lin Huang v. Holder, 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2012).
20 Given the demeanor finding and the inconsistencies among
21 Singh’s testimony, application, and documentary evidence,
22 substantial evidence supports the adverse credibility
23 determination. See 8 U.S.C. S 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia
6
1 Lin, 534 F.3d at 167. Because Singh’s claims were all based
2 on the same factual predicate, the adverse credibility
3 determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding of
4 removal, and CAT relief. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148,
5 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
6 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
7 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
8 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
9 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
10 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
11 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
12 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
13 34.1(b).
14 FOR THE COURT:
15 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
16 Clerk of Court
17
7