Lee v. Barr

18-3
Lee v. Barr
BIA
Ruehle, IJ
A076 027 780
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 3rd day of December, two thousand nineteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 DENNY CHIN,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 SIEW WAI LEE,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 18-3
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: John Chang, Esq., New York, NY.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph A. Hunt, Assistant
26 Attorney General; Shelley R. Goad,
27 Assistant Director; Nancy Kwang
28 Canter, Trial Attorney, Office of
29 Immigration Litigation, United
30 States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Siew Wai Lee, a native and citizen of
6 Malaysia, seeks review of a December 22, 2017, decision of
7 the BIA affirming a June 27, 2017, decision of an Immigration
8 Judge (“IJ”) denying Lee’s motion to reopen. In re Siew Wai
9 Lee, No. A 076 027 780 (B.I.A. Dec. 22, 2017), aff’g No. A 076
10 027 780 (Immig. Ct. Buffalo Jun. 27, 2017). We assume the
11 parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
12 history in this case.
13 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
14 the IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen
15 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).
16 I. Changed Country Conditions
17 We review the agency’s denial of a motion to reopen for
18 an abuse of discretion but review any finding regarding
19 changed country conditions for substantial evidence. Jian
20 Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008).
21 An alien seeking to reopen proceedings may file only one
2
1 motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the date on which
2 the final administrative decision was rendered. 8 U.S.C.
3 § 1229a(c)(7)(A), (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). It is
4 undisputed that Lee’s 2017 motion to reopen was untimely
5 because he filed it nearly 18 years after the IJ ordered him
6 removed in 1999. However, the time limitation for filing a
7 motion to reopen does not apply if reopening is sought to
8 apply for asylum and the motion is “based on changed country
9 conditions arising in the country of nationality or the
10 country to which removal has been ordered, if such evidence
11 is material and was not available and would not have been
12 discovered or presented at the previous proceeding.” 8
13 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R.
14 § 1003.23(b)(4)(i). The agency did not abuse its discretion
15 in denying reopening on this basis.
16 As the agency determined, Lee failed to establish a
17 material change in conditions in Malaysia as needed to excuse
18 his untimely filing. Lee submitted numerous articles to
19 support his motion, but most of the articles did not discuss
20 the treatment of people of Chinese descent or Buddhists, did
21 not indicate the author and source, and/or were undated.
3
1 Beyond his own statements that he experienced discrimination,
2 he did not submit any substantive evidence of conditions
3 before his 1999 hearing as a comparison. See In re S-Y-G-,
4 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (“In determining whether
5 evidence accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a
6 material change in country conditions that would justify
7 reopening, [the agency] compare[s] the evidence of country
8 conditions submitted with the motion to those that existed at
9 the time of the merits hearing below.”). One article from
10 2009 does reference a 1969 riot between ethnic Malays and
11 ethnic Chinese that resulted in 200 deaths over three days,
12 but the article states that more recent protests have been
13 non-violent, and that “Malaysians of all ethnicities enjoy
14 increased freedom now to express themselves[.]” Certified
15 Administrative Record at 429. The 2015 State Department
16 Religious Freedom Report for Malaysia that the IJ took
17 administrative notice of did not indicate that Buddhists were
18 persecuted. The IJ also took administrative notice of the
19 2016 State Department Human Rights Report for Malaysia which
20 stated that the ethnic Chinese population faced limitations
21 in higher education, government employment, and forming
4
1 businesses, but it is unclear whether these limitations
2 existed before 1999 and, if so, whether they had worsened.
3 Based on this record, the agency did not err in determining
4 that Lee failed to establish a material change in conditions
5 in Malaysia.
6 Moreover, Lee’s argument that the IJ ignored evidence is
7 unsupported. The IJ explicitly stated that he considered
8 Lee’s articles from 2007 and 2010. See Jian Hui Shao, 546
9 F.3d at 169 (explaining that although the agency is required
10 to “consider relevant evidence of country conditions[,]” the
11 agency need not “expressly parse or refute on the record each
12 individual argument or piece of evidence” (internal quotation
13 marks omitted)). Lee also argues that the record reflects
14 that there has been “cold-blooded murder of the Chinese” in
15 Malaysia. But the article Lee relies on is an undated opinion
16 piece by an unknown author about general race relations in
17 Malaysia, and the “cold-blooded murder” line does not refer
18 to a specific murder of any person because of race or
19 ethnicity but is simply a hypothetical used by the author to
20 decry racial tension.
21 Accordingly, because Lee failed to demonstrate a material
5
1 change in country conditions, the agency did not abuse its
2 discretion in denying his motion to reopen as untimely. See
3 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C). We do not reach the agency’s
4 alternate finding that Lee did not demonstrate prima facie
5 eligibility for relief. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-
6 05 (1988) (observing that the agency may deny an untimely
7 motion to reopen for failure to demonstrate materially
8 changed country conditions or prima facie eligibility for the
9 underlying substantive relief sought); INS v. Bagamasbad, 429
10 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies
11 are not required to make findings on issues the decision of
12 which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
13 II. Sua Sponte Reopening
14 The agency also declined to exercise its authority to
15 reopen sua sponte. While we generally lack jurisdiction to
16 review the agency’s “entirely discretionary” decision
17 declining to reopen sua sponte, Ali v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d
18 515, 518 (2d Cir. 2006), we retain jurisdiction if the BIA
19 “misperceived the legal background and thought, incorrectly,
20 that a reopening would necessarily fail,”1 Mahmood v. Holder,
1 We note that the BIA’s denial of reopening predated Pereira v. Sessions, 138
S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2018), and the BIA incorrectly stated that the notice to
6
1 570 F.3d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 2009). Lee argues that the BIA
2 erred in finding that he was required to demonstrate due
3 diligence in pursuing his case in order to warrant sua sponte
4 reopening. But the BIA did not state this was a prerequisite;
5 it simply considered that Lee failed to do so as part of its
6 discretionary determination that he had not presented an
7 exceptional situation. See In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976,
8 984 (BIA 1997) (“The power to reopen on our own motion is not
9 meant to be used as a general cure for filing defects or to
10 otherwise circumvent the regulations, where enforcing them
11 might result in hardship.”).
12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
13 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
14 stays VACATED.
15 FOR THE COURT:
16 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
17 Clerk of Court
18
appear stopped Lee’s accrual of continuous presence for cancellation of removal.
But we find no basis to remand. Lee does not argue this point, and the BIA has
subsequently held that a hearing notice that provides the information omitted
from the notice to appear stops the time, and Lee personally received such a
notice shortly after his notice to appear. In re Mendoza-Hernandez, 27 I. &
N. Dec. 520 (BIA 2019) (en banc).
7