Wang v. Barr

17-3647
Wang v. Barr
BIA
Hom, IJ
A205 221 760
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 16th day of December, two thousand nineteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 GERARD E. LYNCH,
9 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 RI QIU WANG,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 17-3647
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York,
24 NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant
27 Attorney General; M. Jocelyn Lopez
28 Wright, Senior Litigation Counsel;
29 Jacob A. Bashyrov, Trial Attorney,
30 Office of Immigration Litigation,
31 United States Department of
32 Justice, Washington, DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Ri Qiu Wang, a native and citizen of the
6 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an October 13,
7 2017, decision of the BIA affirming an October 17, 2016,
8 decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Wang’s
9 application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
10 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ri Qiu
11 Wang, No. A 205 221 760 (B.I.A. Oct. 13, 2017), aff’g No. A
12 205 221 760 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Oct. 17, 2016). We assume
13 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and
14 procedural history in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
16 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA. See Xue Hong Yang
17 v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005).
18 Because the BIA assumed credibility, we assume credibility as
19 to past events and Wang’s subjective fear of future harm.
20 See Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271-72 (2d Cir. 2005).
21 The applicable standards of review are well established. See
22 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d
2
1 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
2 Wang became a Christian while in the United States and
3 alleged a fear of persecution in China because she would
4 continue to practice Christianity if removed. Absent past
5 persecution, an applicant may establish eligibility for
6 asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear of future
7 persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2). The applicant must
8 “present credible testimony that [s]he subjectively fears
9 persecution and establish that h[er] fear is objectively
10 reasonable.” Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178
11 (2d Cir. 2004). To establish a well-founded fear, an
12 applicant must show either “a reasonable possibility . . .
13 she would be singled out individually for persecution” or
14 that the country of removal has a “pattern or practice” of
15 persecuting individuals “similarly situated” to her.
16 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2)(iii). Where, as here, an alien
17 expresses a fear based on activities undertaken in the United
18 States, she “must make some showing that authorities in h[er]
19 country of nationality are either aware of h[er] activities
20 or likely to become aware of h[er] activities.” Hongsheng
21 Leng v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 2008). In the
22 asylum context, the applicant has the burden of showing a
3
1 “reasonable possibility” that the authorities will become
2 aware of the activities and target her for persecution as a
3 result. Id. at 142-43.
4 Wang failed to establish a reasonable possibility that
5 she would be singled out for persecution on account of her
6 practice of Christianity. Wang alleged that the Chinese
7 government is aware of her practice of Christianity because
8 she communicated with a friend in China through the internet
9 about her evangelizing activities and the Chinese government
10 screens information on the internet. However, the agency was
11 not required to accept this assertion as Wang also testified
12 that her social media account was not suspended and that none
13 of her relatives had been visited by the Chinese government.
14 See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (“even
15 if we accept Y.C.’s suggestion that the Chinese government is
16 aware of every anti-Communist or pro-democracy piece of
17 commentary published online—which seems to us to be most
18 unlikely—her claim that the government would have discovered
19 a single article published on the Internet more than eight
20 years ago is pure speculation”).
21 Furthermore, the BIA’s conclusion that her claim was
22 speculative is reasonable because she did not provide detail
4
1 about how she would find a church that “really evangelizes”
2 in China or what her evangelical activities there would
3 entail. See Jian Xing Huang v. U.S. INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129
4 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of solid support in the record
5 . . . [an applicant’s] fear is speculative at best.”).
6 Additionally, the country conditions evidence reflects that
7 the treatment of Christians varies throughout China and does
8 not indicate that individuals are arrested and harmed for
9 evangelizing in Wang’s home province of Shandong. See Jian
10 Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138, 165–66, 174 (2d Cir. 2008)
11 (finding that the BIA does not err in requiring localized
12 evidence of persecution when the record reflected wide
13 variances in how policies are understood and enforced
14 throughout China). A 2011 State Department Report discussed
15 one village in Shandong Province, where authorities, “broke
16 up preparations for an outdoor Christmas celebration,
17 reportedly . . . injuring worshippers,” but the record does
18 not otherwise reflect arrests or persecution in Shandong
19 Province for publicly evangelizing. Furthermore, the
20 agency’s conclusion that Chinese authorities were unlikely to
21 become aware of Wang’s Christianity was reasonable because
22 according to the 2015 State Department Report, there are an
5
1 estimated 68 million Protestant Christians in China, only 23
2 million of whom are affiliated with a government-sponsored
3 church.
4 For largely the same reasons, the agency did not err in
5 determining that Wang failed to establish a pattern or
6 practice of persecution of similarly situated individuals
7 such that there was a reasonable possibility that officials
8 would become aware of her religious practice and persecute
9 her on that account. See Hongsheng Leng, 528 F.3d at 143.
10 To establish a pattern or practice of persecution of a
11 particular group, an applicant must demonstrate that the harm
12 to that group is “systemic or pervasive.” In re A-M-, 23 I.
13 & N. Dec. 737, 741 (BIA 2005); see Mufied v. Mukasey, 508
14 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir. 2007).
15 The agency reasonably concluded that the Chinese
16 government is more likely to target church leaders and, as
17 previously discussed, there is no country conditions evidence
18 of persecution of individuals who publicly evangelize in
19 Shandong Province apart from the one incident described in
20 the 2011 State Department Report. The remaining evidence
21 mainly details incidents involving church leaders, not church
22 members. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 165–66, 174. And
6
1 the descriptions of incidents involving church members,
2 including that individuals were “dispersed by force” at one
3 event, injured at an outdoor Christmas celebration, and the
4 closings of unregistered churches, were insufficient to
5 conclude that individuals were persecuted. See Mei Fun Wong
6 v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011) (“We have emphasized
7 that persecution is an extreme concept that does not include
8 every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”
9 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
10 Wang argues that the agency improperly required her to
11 demonstrate a pattern or practice of persecution in her
12 district, rather than in the province as a whole. However,
13 as set out above, considering Shandong Province generally,
14 the evidence does not demonstrate the systemic or pervasive
15 persecution of individuals participating in unregistered
16 churches. See In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 741. Given the
17 nationwide variation and the dearth of documented persecution
18 of individual members of unregistered churches in Wang’s home
19 province, the agency reasonably concluded that Wang failed to
20 establish a pattern or practice of persecution of similarly-
21 situated individuals. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 165–
22 66, 174; see also Santoso v. Holder, 580 F.3d 110, 112 & n.1
7
1 (2d Cir. 2009) (denying petition where agency considered
2 background materials and rejected pattern or practice claim);
3 In re A-M-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 741.
4 Accordingly, because Wang failed to demonstrate the well-
5 founded fear of persecution needed for asylum, the agency did
6 not err in finding that she failed to meet the higher standard
7 for withholding of removal and CAT relief. See Lecaj v.
8 Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2010).
9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
10 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and
11 stays VACATED.
12 FOR THE COURT:
13 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
14 Clerk of Court
8