United States v. Lin Guang, Shi Yong Wei

05-4724-cr(L), 05-6171-cr(CON)
United States v. Lin Guang, Shi Yong W ei
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term, 2006
(Argued: March 12, 2007 Decided: December 13, 2007)
Docket Nos. 05-4724-cr(L), 05-6171-cr(CON)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
– v. –
LIN GUANG and SHI YONG W EI,
Defendants-Appellants.
Before: McLAUGHLIN and W ESLEY, Circuit Judges, and SESSIONS, District Judge.*
Appeal from judgments of convictions of conspiracy to commit extortion and substantive counts of
extortion in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 entered in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York (Berman, J.) following a jury trial. The convictions are affirmed, but because we conclude that the
district court lacked sufficient facts to find at sentencing that a victim sustained permanent bodily injury, the
sentences are vacated and the cases are remanded for further proceedings.
PAUL A. GOLDBERGER (Stacey Van Malden, of counsel on
the brief), New York, NY, for Defendant-Appellant Lin
Guang.
ALAN M. NELSON, Lake Success, NY, for Defendant-
Appellant Shi Yong Wei.
JENNIFER G. RODGERS, Assistant United States Attorney,
for MICHAEL J. GARCIA, United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York (Miriam E. Rocah, David
Raskin, Celeste L. Koeleveld, Assistant United States
*
The Honorable W illiam K. Sessions III, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of
Vermont, sitting by designation.
Attorneys, of counsel), New York, NY, for Appellee.
W ILLIAM K. SESSIONS III, District Judge:
Following a fourteen-day trial, a jury found defendants-appellants Shi Yong Wei and Lin
Guang guilty of conspiracy to commit extortion, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Shi was also
convicted of eight substantive counts of extortion, each involving a different victim, and Lin was
convicted of three of the substantive counts of extortion, counts 2, 4 and 6. The United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York (Berman, J.) entered judgment of
conviction in Lin’s case on August 17, 2005, and sentenced him to 168 months’ imprisonment,
to be followed by three years’ supervised release. The Court entered judgment of conviction in
Shi’s case on November 9, 2005, and sentenced him to 235 months’ imprisonment, to be
followed by three years’ supervised release. Both defendants were ordered to pay restitution.
Shi and Lin now appeal their judgments of conviction and the sentences imposed upon them.
Lin raises five issues on appeal. Challenging his conviction, he argues that the district
court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Lin’s uncharged bad acts, and that trial
counsel’s failure to object to the admission of tapes and transcripts amounted to ineffective
assistance of counsel.1 Challenging his sentence, Lin argues that factors which determine a
Sentencing Guidelines range must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; that due process
required an evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute over the application of Guideline
enhancements; and that the sentencing enhancements were not supported by sufficient evidence.
1
He also argues that the cumulative effect of trial errors requires retrial. Because we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of the
uncharged bad acts, and trial counsel’s stipulation to the accuracy and authenticity of the
recording was not ineffective, we do not consider this argument.
2
Shi raises four issues on appeal. Challenging his conviction, he argues that the district
court should have granted his motion for new trial based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.
Challenging his sentence, Shi argues that the district court’s determination that a victim
sustained permanent injury was unsupported by the evidence; that its determination of the
amount of loss was likewise unsupported by the evidence; and that as a result the order of
restitution lacked a factual basis.
We find no merit in Shi and Lin’s challenges to their convictions. Their challenges to
their sentences likewise fail to persuade, with one exception. We agree with the defendants that
the district court lacked sufficient facts to make a finding of permanent bodily injury to one of
the victims. Because this error could have affected both defendants’ sentences, their cases are
remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
BACKGROUND
I. The Offenses
Between 1999 and 2003, Shi Yong Wei engaged in a campaign of extortion designed to
generate business for his gift shop, which catered to Chinese tourists. The victims of the
extortion scheme were a rival gift shop owner, a restaurant owner, and tour guides who were
coerced by force and threats of force to steer business to Shi’s shop, known as the “No. 1 Gift
Shop.” Shi enlisted Lin Guang and a gang of young men known as the “little brothers” to carry
out the intimidation. Many of the gang members were younger than eighteen years old. Count
1, of which both Lin and Shi were convicted, charged them with conspiracy to commit extortion.
A. Zhang Qing Hai (Count 2)
3
Zhang Qing Hai came to the United States from China in 1997. He opened a gift shop in
midtown Manhattan in 1999 that catered mainly to Chinese tourist groups, as well as students
and workers at the United Nations and the Chinese consulate. Zhang typically paid tour guides a
commission of between five and twenty percent of sales. The store, named Xinhua, was located
on 38th Street, less than a block away from Shi’s store, which opened in May 2000. The two
stores directly competed for business.
Zhang’s store was doing well, generating profits of more than $10,000 a month during
his best months. In January 2001 Shi called Zhang and complained that his prices were too low.
Zhang paid no particular attention, and ended the call, but several minutes later he received an
anonymous phone call that first asked: “You want to live or not,” and proceeded to threaten to
break his legs if he came outside.
Zhang called Shi in an effort to resolve the problem, and they agreed to meet at a
restaurant called the Jade Palace a little after midnight. Shortly after Zhang arrived, his table and
the next table filled up with supporters of Shi, some of them teenagers. Shi identified them as
his “brothers.” This group proceeded to ridicule him and threaten to shut down his store. Shi
handed him a document and a member of the group told him that if he did not sign he would not
be safe. Zhang refused to sign without reading it and everyone at the table stood up. Zhang was
afraid that “something dangerous” was about to happen. Shi sent them out, and arranged that
Zhang could go home safely that night, but told him to call and tell Shi what he intended to do.
Zhang received several threatening phone calls from one of Shi’s gang, and about a week
later Zhang’s store was plagued by the daily presence of Shi’s gang in front of the store, taking
photographs of the tour guides’ vehicles and disparaging Zhang’s wares. Business fell off.
4
After approximately three weeks of this, Shi came to Zhang’s store and demanded $1,500 for his
little brothers. Zhang paid. The youths stopped appearing in front of his store for approximately
three months, then the youths reappeared and Shi demanded and received another $1,500 in
protection money. Lin was involved in organizing the youths to harass Zhang.
In May 2002 Zhang opened a second store several blocks away, hoping to keep his
ownership secret and escape Shi’s attention. In July a gang of the little brothers led by Lin
assaulted Zhang near his second store. Shi was present. The gang punched and kicked Zhang,
sprayed a blinding liquid in his face and left him bleeding and moaning in the street. Zhang was
taken to a hospital for treatment of his injuries. At the hospital Zhang was able to rinse out his
eyes and they felt better. Zhang testified that from that point on he found it difficult to read
newspapers because it hurt his eyes. After the assault Zhang closed his second store. He stated
that he lost $60,000 in reduced sales after Shi’s gang besieged his store, and $50,000 as a result
of the opening and closing of the second store.
B. Xiao Yung Fei (Count 3)
Xiao Yung Fei came to the United States in 1989. He heads the Chinese-American
Friendship Association, and conducted tours for delegations from China. As part of his tours
Xiao would take his groups to gift shops, for which he would receive a commission.
In spring of 2001, Xiao twice encountered Shi at the Statue of Liberty. Both times Shi
complained that Xiao was not giving him “face” by not bringing groups to Shi’s store. Shi
embarrassed and frightened Xiao in front of his tour groups. Some time later the front window
of his van was smashed. Tires were slashed on three different vehicles.
In June 2001 Xiao was giving a tour at the United Nations when Shi accosted him,
5
insulted him and threatened to beat him up. Shi bragged that he had a gang of juveniles who
wouldn’t face any penalties if they were to injure or kill someone. Shi proceeded to punch and
attempt to choke him. The next day Xiao received an anonymous phone call telling him that he
hadn’t been beaten enough and that the caller was going to break his legs. Xiao virtually stopped
giving tours.
C. Peter Yuan (Count 4)
Peter Yuan came to the United States in 1988. He worked as a tour guide from 1993 to
2001, and currently wholesales tickets to tourist destinations in the New York City area. Shi
invited Yuan to dinner at the Jade Palace in 1999 or early 2000 and told him he wanted Yuan to
find investors for a new store Shi intended to open. Shi’s wife bragged about his underworld
connections. Yuan, intimidated, said he’d think about it. He did not seek out investors, and over
the next few weeks received phone calls from Shi asking about his progress in collecting money.
Yuan tried to avoid him but eventually Shi took him again to the Jade Palace and confronted
Yuan, telling him that with a phone call he could have ten or twenty “little brothers” there. Yuan
said he would try, but did not.
After Shi opened his gift shop, he told Yuan that he must bring his tours only to his store,
and threatened to slash his tires if he refused. Yuan’s tires were slashed, and he began bringing
his groups to the No. 1 Gift Shop. After Yuan was accosted and threatened by two of Shi’s
young men, he stopped conducting tours.
Nevertheless, Shi demanded protection money if Yuan wanted to do business in New
York. For seven months Yuan paid $300 each month. Yuan attended another dinner at the Jade
Palace at Shi’s invitation, along with several other tour guides. Shi demanded that the tour
6
guides accompany him to a karaoke bar, where he introduced Lin as one of his gang. Lin
threatened to photograph the face and license plate of any tour guide who didn’t patronize Shi’s
store.
In January 2002 Shi required Yuan to attend a Chinese New Year banquet at the Jade
Palace along with about fifty other tour guides. While they were eating a group of thirty to forty
youths dressed in black paraded into the restaurant and sat down at several tables. Lin was
among the group. At one point one of the group began chanting a slogan, and all of the group
stood up and began chanting together.
Shi continued to threaten Yuan once he began wholesaling tickets, telling him he would
send his little brothers to his home to break his legs. In the fall of 2002 Yuan essentially did not
leave his home for fear of what Shi and his gang might do to him.
At Zhang’s request Yuan made a digital recording of Shi and Lin on Xiao’s recorder.
The Government and the defense stipulated to the admission of the recordings and accuracy of
the English translation, with one exception, a phrase attributed to Lin, whose translation he
disputed.
D. Lin Ji Tiang (Count 5)
Lin Ji Tiang came to the United States from China in 1994. He opened a restaurant in
mid-town Manhattan called Sun East. Shi wanted Lin Ji Tiang to send customers to his gift
shop. In 2002 Lin Ji Tiang held a small Chinese New Year’s party for tour guides at his
restaurant. He invited Shi for the next day, but Shi showed up on the first day with six or seven
of his little brothers. Lin Ji Tiang did not dare to charge them, although they were uninvited.
Shi tried to get Lin Ji Tiang to throw a bigger party for tour guides of Shi’s selection.
7
When Lin Ji Tiang protested that he couldn’t afford this party, Shi got angry and left. On
occasion Shi would arrive at the restaurant and treat the kitchen as his own, cooking meals for
himself. One time Shi hauled Lin Ji Tiang up the stairs of his restaurant holding his arm behind
his back. Twice Lin Ji Tiang found cement in the lock of his restaurant. Once he found a pen-
knife on the floor while Shi was in his restaurant. Shi said such a knife is used on people who
don’t listen, gesturing with the knife as though he would slip it between his ribs. Shi also said
such a knife is used to slash tires. Lin Ji Tiang was scared.
Lin Ji Tiang’s restaurant displayed a sign advertising the No. 1 Gift Shop. When the
sign fell down, Shi berated him and threatened to get his gang to beat him to death. He
demanded $35 as the cost of the sign. The tour guides stopped coming to his restaurant because
Shi was constantly there and they were afraid to come. The restaurant was losing money, and
Lin Ji Tiang was scared all the time, so he decided to close the restaurant, in October 2003.
E. Xu Xin (Count 6)
Xu Xin came to the United States from China and worked as a tour guide in 1999. After
Shi opened his store, he ordered Xu to bring his tours there exclusively. When Xu failed to do
so, Shi began calling and threatening to have his little brothers beat him up. Xu was angry and
frightened. He learned from Peter Yuan that Shi and Lin knew where he lived in New Jersey.
Xu found his tires slashed and sugar poured in his gas tank. Lin left a message on his answering
machine claiming credit for the damaged car. Xu left the tour business for awhile as a result of
the threats and the harassment.
F. Wang Jun (Count 7)
Wang Jun came to the United States from China in 1996. He worked as a tour guide
8
from 1998 to 2003. When Shi’s store opened, he took his tours there a few times, but stopped
doing so after an employee of the store told him not to mess with Shi. About two weeks later the
tires on Wang’s van were slashed. His tires were slashed three more times over the summer of
2000. During that time he received repeated telephone calls from Shi threatening to do worse
than slash his tires. Wang also saw Shi at the United Nations and Statue of Liberty writing down
the license plate numbers of tour guides’ vans.
G. Zhang Liang (Count 8)
Zhang Liang came to the United States from China in 1996. He began working as a tour
guide in spring of 2000. On his first day on the job, Shi accosted him at the Statue of Liberty
and told him to bring his business to the No. 1 Gift Shop. Some time later he was approached by
two of Shi’s gang with the same message while he was at the United Nations. Zhang Liang
complied with Shi’s demands out of fear of the consequences.
H. Zhang Fuchi (David Zhang) (Count 9)
David Zhang came to the United States in 1990. He worked as a tour guide in New York
City from 1999 to 2001. After Shi opened up his store, he told Zhang to bring his tours there,
and not to any other store. David Zhang continued to bring his tours to different stores, and Shi
threatened to beat him up and break his legs. He was threatened again a few days later, in an
anonymous voicemail. He recorded the message, and gave the tape to the police. Some days
later the same individual called and threatened him again. Some time after that two individuals
jumped him, pulled his T-shirt over his head, beat him up and ran away. After this David Zhang
decided that he did not want to work as a tour guide anymore. He took a variety of much lower-
paying jobs thereafter. He returned to the tour guide business when he learned that Shi had been
9
arrested.
II. The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim and Rule 33 Motion
Following the convictions on March 16, 2005, Shi’s attorney wrote to the district court,
requesting that new counsel be appointed for Shi to pursue Shi’s claim that his trial counsel had
been constitutionally ineffective in having failed to object to the admissibility of the recorded
conversations and their transcripts. Shi obtained new counsel, who filed an ex parte request on
May 27, 2005 for an expert to make a forensic examination of the two audio recordings to
determine whether they had been altered or manipulated. Lin’s new counsel sought to join the
motion.
The district court ordered the government to respond to the request, finding no basis for
an ex parte discovery application post-trial. The government opposed Shi’s request for leave to
hire an expert to analyze the recordings, pointing out first that Shi’s allegations of tampering
with the recordings would have gone to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence,
and second that any error in failing to object to the recordings would not have been prejudicial,
given the testimony of eight victims of Shi’s extortion scheme and corroborating testimony of
former members of Shi and Lin’s gang.
The district court denied the motion for a new trial on October 6, 2005. It found that the
decision not to hire an expert was a strategic choice, that the defense had vigorously cross-
examined Peter Yuan who made the recordings, that it found Yuan’s testimony credible, and that
the evidence against the defendants was overwhelming despite the recordings. The district court
concluded that defense counsel’s performance was not objectively unreasonable.
10
III. The Presentence Investigation Reports and the Sentencing Hearings
The United States Probation Office prepared presentence investigation reports for Lin
and Shi, and calculated Guideline sentencing ranges for both according to the advisory United
States Sentencing Guidelines.
For each conviction of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1951, the base offense level was 18,
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2B3.2(a) (2005). Two levels were added for
the use of express or implied threats of death or bodily injury, pursuant to § 2B3.2(b)(1). With
the exception of Count 7, the district court found that the extortions involved the use of minors,
and added two levels pursuant to § 3B1.4.
For Count 2, the extortion involving Zhang Qing Hai, the district court concluded that
Shi and Lin caused a loss of more than $50,000, and added two levels pursuant to § 2B3.2(b)(2)
and § 2B3.1(b)(7). The district court also concluded that Zhang sustained permanent bodily
injury from his beating, and added six levels pursuant to § 2B3.2(b)(4)(C).
A. Lin’s Sentencing
According to the Guidelines analysis, Lin’s adjusted offense level was 33, based on the
upward adjustments for use of threats, minors, the loss and permanent injury suffered by Zhang
Qing Hai, and an additional three-level increase for his role as a manager or supervisor of
criminal activity involving five or more participants. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b). Application of
the grouping rules added two levels for a total combined offense level of 35. At Criminal
History category I, Lin’s Guideline range was 168 to 210 months.
At Lin’s sentencing on August 17, 2005, the district court acknowledged the advisory
nature of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, and that it was bound to consider the factors
11
set forth at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) in determining a reasonable and appropriate sentence. The
district court decided that a Fatico hearing to resolve disputed sentencing issues was
unnecessary, given the extensive trial testimony and the parties’ submissions. See United States
v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1978).
The district court concluded that a sentence at the low end of the Guideline range was
reasonable, in light of the § 3553(a) factors. Lin received a sentence of 168 months, plus three
years of supervised release. The court ordered restitution to four victims: $113,000 to Zhang
Qing Hai, $50,000 to Xiao Yung Fei, $2,000 to Peter Yuan, and $10,000 to David Zhang.2
B. Shi’s Sentencing
According to the Guidelines, Shi’s adjusted offense level was 34, based on the upward
adjustments for use of threats, minors, the loss and permanent injury suffered by Zhang Qing
Hai, and an additional four level increase for his role as an organizer or leader of criminal
activity that involved five or more participants. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Application of the
grouping rules to Shi’s convictions added four levels for a total combined offense level of 38. At
Criminal History category I, Shi’s Guideline range was 235 to 293 months.
At Shi’s sentencing on November 9, 2005 the district court followed a similar analysis to
that performed in Lin’s case. The district court considered the Guideline determination, along
with the sentencing factors listed at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and concluded that a sentence at the
low end of the Guideline range was reasonable and appropriate. Accordingly, the district court
sentenced Shi to 235 months’ imprisonment, plus three years of supervised release. Restitution
2
Although Lin was not charged with or convicted of Count 9 involving David Zhang,
the district court ordered Lin to make restitution based on Lin’s conviction on Count 1, the
conspiracy count.
12
was ordered in the amount of $175,100, $113,000 to Zhang Qing Hai, $50,000 to Xiao Yung Fei,
$2,100 to Peter Yuan, and $10,000 to David Zhang.
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Motion for New Trial
Both Shi and Lin argue that the district court erred in denying motions for a new trial on
the ground that trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective representation by failing to
challenge the admissibility of recordings made by one of the victims, and the transcripts of those
recordings. Shi also argues that the district court erred in denying his post-trial ex parte request
for funds to hire an expert to determine whether the recordings had been altered, and in
forwarding the defense’s request to the government for a response.
Rule 33(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a trial court “may
vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires.” “The test is
whether ‘it would be a manifest injustice to let the guilty verdict stand.’” United States v.
Sanchez, 969 F.2d 1409, 1414 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Reed, 875 F.2d 107, 114
(7th Cir. 1989)). For a trial judge to grant a Rule 33 motion, he must harbor “‘a real concern that
an innocent person may have been convicted.’” United States v. Parkes, 497 F.3d 220, 232 (2d
Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 246 F.3d 129, 134 (2d Cir. 2001)). Denial of a
Rule 33 motion is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id.The trial judge refused to grant Shi and Lin a new trial, stating that he had no concern
that an innocent party had been convicted, and that the defendants had not met either prong of
the Strickland v. Washington standard. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
We review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. United States v. Finley,
13
245 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir. 2001). Under Strickland, a “defendant must demonstrate ‘(1) that
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, . . . and (2) that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for the deficiency, the outcome . . . would have been
different.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting McKee v. United States, 167 F.3d 103, 106 (2d
Cir. 1999)).
A “‘strong presumption’” exists “‘that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance,’” given that “‘[t]here are countless ways to provide effective
assistance in any given case’ and that ‘[e]ven the best criminal defense attorneys would not
defend a particular client in the same way.’” United States v. Aguirre, 912 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir.
1990) (alterations in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Defense counsel have “a
duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular
investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; accord Gersten v. Senkowski, 426 F.3d
588, 607 (2d Cir. 2005).
In this case, however, even were Shi and Lin to establish that their counsel unreasonably
failed to employ an expert to challenge the authenticity of the tapes, and unreasonably failed to
object to the admission of the recordings and transcripts, they have failed to establish prejudice.
As the district court accurately pointed out, the evidence against the defendants “was
overwhelming.” The district court also found that Peter Yuan’s testimony, as the authenticating
witness, was sufficient to support the admission of the recordings under Rule 901 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, and that disputes over the reliability of the recordings or the accuracy of the
translation went to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence. Moreover, Lin’s
counsel vigorously cross-examined Yuan on his identification of Lin as the speaker on portions
14
of the tape. He presented an alternative translation for a particular portion of the recording
attributed to Lin that was alleged to be a threat.
Given that the jury had more than sufficient evidence from which to find both
defendants’ guilt without the admission of the recordings and transcripts, counsels’ failure to
secure the services of an expert to investigate whether the tapes showed signs of tampering did
not prejudice Lin or Shi. Their decision to stipulate to the admission of the recordings and
translations was a strategic choice that could not have prejudiced them, given Yuan’s availability
to authenticate the recordings, the translators’ testimony as to the accuracy of the translations,
and the defense’s cross-examination of both Yuan and the government translator concerning
disputed portions of the recordings and transcripts. Because the defendants cannot show
prejudice, “this court need not consider the objective reasonableness of counsel’s actions.”
United States v. Birkin, 366 F.3d 95, 101 (2d Cir. 2004); accord Greiner v. Wells, 417 F.3d 305,
319 (2d Cir. 2005) (“‘[T]here is no reason for a court deciding an ineffective assistance claim . . .
to address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on
one.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697)).
As we do not find the stipulation to the admission of the recordings and translations or
the failure to obtain the services of a forensic audio expert to have caused prejudice to the
defendants, the district court’s denial of their motions for a new trial was not an abuse of
discretion. The failure to grant a post-verdict application for funds to hire such an expert
likewise did not constitute an abuse of discretion, and there was no error in the district court’s
refusal to consider ex parte the post-verdict request for funds.
II. Admission of Uncharged Bad Acts Against Lin
15
Lin argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of four incidents of prior bad
acts involving Lin. Specifically, the government offered evidence that one of the extortion
victims observed Lin confront unruly customers at a massage parlor controlled by Shi with his
hand inside his jacket as if he concealed a gun; that Lin and others assaulted a former
confederate who had betrayed Lin; that Lin ran a gambling house owned by Shi; and that Lin
became the leader of the gang because he reputedly beat up the leader of a Taiwanese gang. For
three of the incidents the trial court gave a limiting instruction that the evidence was admissible
to show a relationship of mutual trust between Shi and Lin.3 With regard to Lin’s reputation for
having beaten up the Taiwanese gang leader, no limiting instruction was requested and none
given. The trial court excluded several other incidents proffered by the government.
A district court’s decision “to admit ‘other crimes’ evidence under Rule 404(b) . . . will
not be overturned on appeal absent abuse of discretion.” United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315,
333-34 (2d Cir. 1993). In a conspiracy case, “other acts” evidence is admissible as background
information, to demonstrate the existence of a relationship of mutual trust, or to “enable the jury
to understand how the illegal relationship between the co-conspirators developed.” United
States v. Pipola, 83 F.3d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1996).
The Second Circuit’s “inclusionary approach” to the admission of other act evidence
“allows such evidence to be admitted for any purpose other than to demonstrate criminal
propensity.” United States v. LaFlam, 369 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).
3
The district court ruled pre-trial and prior to the testimony that the evidence that one of
the extortion victims witnessed Lin intimidate unruly massage parlor customers was admissible
to show the state of mind of the victim. In giving the limiting instruction, the district court
mistakenly told the jury that the evidence was admitted to show Lin’s state of mind. When
asked if the instruction was “agreeable to the lawyers,” however, Lin’s attorney answered “yes.”
16
To determine whether a district court properly admitted other act evidence, the
reviewing court considers whether (1) it was offered for a proper purpose; (2) it
was relevant to a material issue in dispute; (3) its probative value is substantially
outweighed by its prejudicial effect; and (4) the trial court gave an appropriate
limiting instruction to the jury if so requested by the defendant.
Id. Evidence of the four uncharged incidents was properly admitted. The evidence was not
offered to show Lin’s criminal propensity, but to show the existence of the illegal relationship
between Shi and Lin and how it developed. The trial court found that the evidence was not
unfairly prejudicial, and gave limiting instructions as requested by the defendants. We find no
abuse of discretion.
III. Sentencing Issues
Lin and Shi challenged the application of sentencing enhancements for their role in the
offense, use of minors to commit the offenses, permanent injury to one victim, and the loss
amounts. In addition, Lin argued that the enhancements could not be applied unless they were
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and both defendants argued that a Fatico hearing was
necessary to determine challenged facts. See United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.
1978).
Lin’s argument that the facts upon which a sentencing court calculates the applicable
Guideline range must either be admitted or found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt perished
with this Circuit’s confirmation in United States v. Salazar that “the statutory requirement to
determine a Guidelines range, and do so in the same manner as before Booker, necessarily means
that facts relevant to sentencing must be found by a preponderance of the evidence.” 489 F.3d
555, 557 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
Lin and Shi’s contention that the sentencing court was required to give them a Fatico
17
hearing likewise lacks merit. “‘The district court is not required, by either the Due Process
Clause or the federal Sentencing Guidelines, to hold a full-blown evidentiary hearing in
resolving sentencing disputes. All that is required is that the court afford the defendant some
opportunity to rebut the Government’s allegations.’” United States v. Phillips, 431 F.3d 86, 93
(2d Cir. 2005) (quoting United States v. Slevin, 106 F.3d 1086, 1091 (2d Cir. 1996)). Lin and
Shi submitted letter briefs opposing the Probation Department’s calculation of their Guideline
ranges in its presentence reports. At sentencing their attorneys argued against the enhancements
that they currently challenge.
The district court stressed that it had heard extensive trial testimony, had observed the
demeanor of the witnesses and assessed their credibility over a two-week trial. It had reviewed
the submissions of all parties, as well as the presentence investigation report, and concluded that
the challenged enhancements were warranted. Lin and Shi had notice of the proposed
enhancements, including the evidence upon which the enhancements were based, and had an
opportunity to dispute the evidence. The only issue is whether the challenged enhancements
were based upon sufficient facts.
In reviewing a district court’s application of the Guidelines to the specific facts of a case,
we accord de novo review to issues of law, and accept its findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous. United States v. Gotti, 459 F.3d 296, 349 (2d Cir. 2006). “‘A finding is clearly
erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire
evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’”
United States v. Cuevas, 496 F.3d 256, 267 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Hazut, 140
F.3d 187, 190 (2d Cir. 1998)). “[F]actual findings based on the testimony of witnesses [are]
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entitled to special deference,” because “assessing the credibility of witnesses is distinctly the
province of the district court.” United States v. Beverly, 5 F.3d 633, 642 (2d Cir. 1993); accord
Cuevas, 496 F.3d at 267.
A. Use of Minors
Section 3B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a two-level increase “[i]f the
defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit the
offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4. The Application Notes indicate that “‘[u]sed or attempted to use’
includes directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, counseling, training, procuring,
recruiting, or soliciting.” Id. cmt. n.1. Lin argues that there is no record evidence that the “little
brothers” were younger than eighteen years of age. The record demonstrates the contrary, as the
district court noted in citing the government’s August 1, 2005 submission. Among the numerous
witnesses who testified about Shi’s gang of “little brothers,” describing them as “kids,” was
Steven Han, a member of the gang, who testified that the membership ranged in age “[f]rom 15-
year-old until the 20s.” Shi himself told one of his extortion victims, Xiao Yung Fei, that the
members of his gang were all juveniles because “in America, when a juvenile injures or kills
someone, they don’t face any penalty.” Extortion victim Zhang Qing Hai testified that the kids
sent to loiter in front of his gift shop were “kids, around 14, 15, 16, teenager kids.” There was
no error in adjusting Lin’s Guidelines offense level upward by two levels for use of a minor.
B. Loss Amount
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 2B3.2(b)(2) and 2B3.1(b)(7)(C), the district court imposed a
two-level enhancement for a loss greater than $50,000 but less than $250,000 sustained by
Zhang Qing Hai. Loss to a victim in an extortion case “means any demand paid plus any
19
additional consequential loss from the offense.” Id. § 2B3.2 cmt. n.5. The district court based
its determination of loss on Zhang’s testimony that he suffered $60,000 in lost sales, $50,000 in
loss associated with the opening of a second store and paid $3,000 in protection money. The
defendants argue that a district court may not rely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a victim
as to amount of loss when that amount is disputed, and that the victim’s own testimony indicated
that his estimate was unreliable.
A “district court need not establish the loss with precision but rather ‘need only make a
reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available information.’” United States v. Carboni, 204
F.3d 39, 46 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 117 F.3d 82, 95 (2d Cir. 1997)).
Zhang testified that in good months he made more than $10,000 in profits, but in his
worst months, for example after September 11, 2001, he lost money. He testified that the
extortion began in early 2001, and he continued to feel the effects of the intimidation campaign
in lost profits up to the trial. This was because many tour guides who used to frequent his shop
stopped bringing their tours to his shop in spring of 2001, and never returned. Shi was arrested
in November 2002. Zhang estimated that overall, as a result of the three-week intimidation
campaign in spring of 2001, he lost at least $60,000. Zhang also estimated that he lost $50,000
as a result of closing his second store after Shi’s gang assaulted him.
The district court found Zhang’s testimony “entirely credible.” We give strong deference
to findings based on credibility determinations. United States v. Johnson, 378 F.3d 230, 239 (2d
Cir. 2004). Zhang’s estimate of $60,000 in lost sales at his first shop is not unreasonable, given
the length of time that his business continued to suffer the effects of Shi and Lin’s intimidation
campaign. The district court’s conclusion that the evidence at trial established that the extortion
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of Zhang caused a loss of more than $50,000 was likewise not unreasonable, given the added
losses associated with closing the second store after six months of operation, and the protection
money payments.
“[V]iew[ing] the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government,” id. at 238, the
district court’s reliance on Zhang’s estimate of his losses was not clearly erroneous.
C. Permanent Injury
Section 2B3.2(b)(4) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for an increase in offense
level if any victim sustained bodily injury, according to the seriousness of the injury. “Bodily
injury,” defined as “any significant injury; e.g., an injury that is painful and obvious, or is of a
type for which medical attention ordinarily would be sought,” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n. 1(B),
receives a two-level increase. Id. § 2B3.2(b)(4)(A). “Serious bodily injury,” defined as “injury
involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member,
organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or
physical rehabilitation,” id. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(L), receives a four-level increase. Id. §
2B3.2(b)(4)(B). “Permanent or life-threatening bodily injury,” defined as “injury involving a
substantial risk of death; loss or substantial impairment of the function of a bodily member,
organ, or mental faculty that is likely to be permanent; or an obvious disfigurement that is likely
to be permanent,” id. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(J), receives a six-level increase. Id. § 2B3.2(b)(4)(C).
An injury whose degree of seriousness falls between the specified degrees may receive a three or
five-level increase. Id. § 2B3.2(b)(4)(D), (E).
The district court imposed a six-level increase on Shi’s and Lin’s base offense level,
concluding that Zhang Qing Hai had sustained permanent injury to his eyes during the assault on
21
him by members of Shi’s gang. The court reached this conclusion by applying the Guidelines
definition of permanent injury to the facts as stated by Zhang in his trial testimony. Zhang
described that he was accosted by a few people who began beating him. As he struggled,
something went into his eyes that hurt tremendously. He could not open his eyes and he could
not see. He described the substance as watery.4 He lost consciousness for a time, and was taken
to a hospital. He received stitches for his wounds, but no medical treatment for his eyes. Zhang
went to the lavatory and washed out his eyes with water, after which his eyes felt a little better.
Zhang left the hospital after that. Zhang’s testimony concerning the permanency of his injury
was as follows:
Q. Mr. Zhang, did the beating that you received that evening affect your
eyesight?
A. Yes. Whomever knows me knew that I liked to read newspaper a lot in
the past. After that occasion, it’s difficult for me to read newspapers. And
so from that point on, I don’t even buy newspapers and I don’t even read
newspapers.
Q. Why is it difficult for you to read newspapers now?
A. If I spend more time in reading, you know, it hurts my eyes.
Shi and Lin argue that these facts are insufficient evidence of permanent injury. We
believe that the district court’s application of the permanent bodily injury enhancement to these
facts presents a predominantly factual issue, which we review for clear error. See Gotti, 459
F.3d at 349 (citing United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 118-19 (2d Cir. 2005)); see also
United States v. Baggett, 342 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2003) (reviewing finding of permanent or
life-threatening bodily injury under clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Pandiello, 184
F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1999) (conclusion that assailants inflicted bodily injury reviewed for
4
A Government witness who participated in the assault, Henry Shen, testified that
another gang member sprayed Zhang with pepper spray.
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clear error); United States v. Jacobs, 167 F.3d 792, 798 (3d Cir. 1999) (findings regarding
permanent or life threatening injury reviewed for clear error); United States v. Price, 149 F.3d
352, 353 (5th Cir. 1998) (“severity of a victim’s injuries is a factual determination and thus
reviewed for clear error,” construing permanent bodily injury). But see Pandiello, 184 F.3d at
685 (applying de novo review to question whether welts fell within Guidelines’ definition of
bodily injury).
For the injury to Zhang’s eyes to qualify as permanent or life-threatening bodily injury
under the Guidelines’ definition, it must constitute “substantial impairment of the function of a
bodily . . . organ . . . that is likely to be permanent.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, cmt. n.1(J). The district
court clearly erred in finding that Zhang had sustained a permanent injury that would trigger a
six-level enhancement. Where substantial impairment is not obvious, something more than the
generalized and subjective impression of the victim is required in the way of proof. Here
Zhang’s testimony that it hurts his eyes to spend more time reading did not afford a sufficient
basis for the district court to find that he had sustained substantial impairment of his eyesight.
There is no question that Zhang suffered substantial impairment of his eyesight at the
time of the assault. That Zhang currently has difficulty reading may constitute an impairment.
There is, however, insufficient record evidence to warrant a finding that the assault resulted in
substantial impairment that was likely to be permanent. The district court could not reasonably
conclude on the state of the evidence that the impairment was both substantial and likely to be
permanent.
Because the district court’s factual findings are insufficient to establish substantial
impairment of Zhang’s eyesight that is likely to be permanent, we remand for consideration of
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the nature, severity and likely duration of Zhang’s impaired eyesight. See United States v.
Spinelli, 352 F.3d 48, 60 (2d Cir. 2003).
D. On Remand
At their sentencing hearings, both Lin and Shi objected to the Guideline range adopted by
the district court. Lin argued that he should receive a non-Guidelines sentence. The district
court calculated an offense level of 35 and Criminal History category I, for a range of 168 to 210
months, and imposed a sentence of imprisonment at the low end of the range, 168 months,
stating: “I am sentencing, however, in light of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553(a),
and believe that the sentence of 168 months and the other aspects of the sentence that I have
described is appropriate, reflecting the seriousness of the offense and the need for punishment,
deterrence and rehabilitation.”
Shi argued that his Guideline offense level should be 36, Criminal History category I, for
a sentencing range of 188 to 235 months. He also argued for a non-Guidelines sentence. The
district court rejected Shi’s Guidelines calculation, and his argument for a non-Guidelines
sentence, and determined that Shi’s offense level was 38, Criminal History category I, for a
sentencing range of 235 to 293 months. The district court indicated that it intended to impose a
Guideline sentence, and imposed the low end of the Guideline range:
in part based on the arguments of defense counsel. I was going to sentence at the
high end of the guideline range because of the other factors that are pertinent here
under 3553(a). But I will sentence at 235 months, which is the low end, which
also has some overlapping with the sentencing guideline range computed by
defense counsel.
The district court reasoned:
I think the sentence is appropriate given the seriousness of the offenses, the need
for punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation. I have considered all of the factors
24
at 3553(a), including the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history
and characteristics of the defendant. I think this sentence does reflect the
seriousness of those offenses. It would promote respect for the law, provide a just
punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect the public, and provide
appropriate correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
An error in determining the applicable Guideline range may render a sentence
unreasonable. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d at 118. A reduction in the enhancement for degree of bodily
injury would reduce the offense levels for both Shi and Lin, although Shi’s Guideline range
might not be reduced below the range for which he argued, and there is of course overlap in the
sentencing ranges. Because we do not know whether the district court would have imposed the
same sentences of imprisonment had it calculated lower Guideline ranges based on facts
supplying proof of a lesser degree of bodily injury, we remand for re-calculation of Lin’s and
Shi’s Guideline ranges. Of course, the district court has discretion, on remand, to resentence at
the low end of a re-calculated Guideline range based on evidence of the degree of Zhang’s
bodily injury or anywhere within that re-calculated range, or to impose a non-Guideline
sentence.
E. Restitution
Pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1, the district court ordered that Shi pay restitution to four
victims: $113,000 to Zhang Qing Hai; $50,000 to Xiao Yung Fei; $2,100 to Peter Yuan; and
$10,000 to David Zhang, for a total of $175,100. Although Shi asserts that the district court
erred in determining these amounts with respect to all four victims, his sole remaining argument5
concerns the loss to Zhang Qing Hai, and thus we address only that portion of the restitution
5
Shi also argued that he should have been afforded a Fatico hearing to contest the loss
amounts, an issue that we have already addressed.
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order.
“[W]e review restitution orders deferentially,” United States v. Porter, 90 F.3d 64, 68 (2d
Cir. 1996), and will not disturb a sentencing court’s determination absent abuse of discretion.
United States v. Ismail, 219 F.3d 76, 78 (2d Cir. 2000). As discussed above, we do not find clear
error in the district court’s determination of the amount of loss suffered by Zhang Qing Hai. The
court did not abuse its discretion in ordering restitution in the amounts named.
CONCLUSION
The judgments of conviction are affirmed. The sentences imposed against Lin Guang on
August 17, 2005 and against Shi Yong Wei on November 9, 2005 are vacated, and the cases
remanded for resentencing.
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