United States v. Morgan

09-2235-cr (L)
USA v. Morgan
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE
32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A
PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE
(WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the
Daniel Patrick Moynihan Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 4th day
of March, two thousand eleven.
Present:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
REENA RAGGI,
RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
Circuit Judges.
________________________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellee,
v. Nos. 09-2235-cr (L),
09-2351-cr (CON)
RICHARD MORGAN and DAVID MILLER,
Defendants-Appellants,
JUSTIN FAELLO, RYAN SCHLOTT, PETER FOURNIER,
BRUCE HOSENBOLD,
Defendants.
________________________________________________
For Defendant-Appellant Morgan: STACEY RICHMAN, Law Offices of Stacey Richman,
Esq., Bronx, N.Y.
For Appellee: BONNIE S. KLAPPER, Assistant United States Attorney
(Peter A. Norling, Assistant United States Attorney, on
the brief), for Loretta E. Lynch, United States Attorney
for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York (Platt,
J.).
ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and
DECREED that the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Defendant-Appellant Richard Morgan1 appeals from a May 22, 2009 judgment of
conviction entered by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
(Platt, J.). Morgan was convicted, following his guilty plea pursuant to a cooperation agreement,
of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute oxycodone, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(b)(1)(C), and was sentenced principally to a term of 168 months’
imprisonment. On appeal, Morgan challenges the procedural and substantive reasonableness of
his sentence as well as the government’s withdrawal of its motion for a downward departure
pursuant to Section 5K1.1 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the “Guidelines”). We
assume the parties’ familiarity with the facts and procedural history of this case.
We first address Morgan’s challenges to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence.
“We review the reasonableness of a district court’s sentence under a deferential abuse of
discretion standard.” United States v. Hernandez, 604 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2010). “A district
court commits procedural error where it fails to calculate the Guidelines range . . . , makes a
1
This summary order addresses only Morgan’s appeal. The consolidated appeal by
Defendant-Appellant David Miller consists only of an Anders motion, which we decided under
separate cover.
2
mistake in its Guidelines calculation, or treats the Guidelines as mandatory.” United States v.
Cavera, 550 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc). “It also errs procedurally if it does not
consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of
fact.” Id. In addition, a district court errs “if it fails adequately to explain its chosen sentence.”
Id.
As an initial matter, Morgan asserts that the district court failed to assess or calculate the
Guidelines range. The record, however, makes clear that there was no error in this regard.
Morgan’s Guidelines calculations were set forth in his presentence report (“PSR”), to which the
parties and the district court repeatedly referred during the sentencing hearing. Moreover,
shortly before the pronouncement of the sentence, the government’s counsel expressly
referenced the Guidelines range of 168 to 210 months’ imprisonment, and the district court’s
comments evinced its awareness that the 168-month sentence it imposed was at the bottom of the
Guidelines range.
Next, Morgan advises us that “[i]t may be seen that the Court treated the Guidelines as
mandatory.” Appellant’s Br. 14. In reviewing this claim, we apply a presumption that “a district
court understands its authority to depart” from the Guidelines, and allow this presumption to be
“overcome only in the rare situation where the record provides a reviewing court with clear
evidence of a substantial risk that the judge misapprehended the scope of his departure
authority.” United States v. Sero, 520 F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, the court explicitly recognized its authority to impose a non-Guidelines
sentence. Therefore, the record makes abundantly clear that the district court was aware that the
Guidelines are advisory.
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Morgan also argues that the district court failed to give proper consideration to the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). “[W]e presume, in the absence of record
evidence suggesting otherwise, that a sentencing judge has faithfully discharged her duty to
consider the statutory factors.” United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006).
“[N]o ‘robotic incantations’ are required to prove the fact of consideration, and we will not
conclude that a district judge shirked her obligation to consider the § 3553(a) factors simply
because she did not discuss each one individually or did not expressly parse or address every
argument relating to those factors that the defendant advanced.” Id. (citations and footnote
omitted). There is nothing in this record that rebuts the district court’s statements that it
considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a).
The next aspect of Morgan’s procedural challenge involves the contention that the
district court made erroneous factual findings by failing to assess or inquire into the
circumstances of the government’s withdrawal of its 5K1.1 motion and Morgan’s violation of his
cooperation agreement. Morgan argues, in essence, that the conduct leading to his arrest was not
criminal, or alternatively, that if this conduct were criminal, it should be disregarded in light of
his extensive cooperation. For the following reasons, we are unpersuaded.
Morgan was arrested pursuant to a warrant while awaiting sentencing in this matter. The
government’s affidavit in support of the arrest warrant charged Morgan with violating 21 U.S.C.
§ 844, which in relevant part proscribes “knowingly or intentionally purchas[ing] at retail during
a 30 day period more than 9 grams of . . . pseudoephedrine base . . . in a scheduled listed
chemical product.” The affidavit detailed how Morgan, beginning in January 2008, had engaged
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in a pattern of purchasing large quantities of pseudoephedrine tablets from various pharmacies,
and indicated that in January 2009, Morgan had purchased a total of 24.48 grams of
decongestant tablets from six different CVS pharmacies. Morgan admits to this conduct, but
contends that his purchases were not criminal because Congress enacted this prohibition on
excessive retail purchases of pseudoephedrine in order to combat the use of this drug for the
purpose of manufacturing methamphetamine, whereas Morgan, who was addicted to
pseudoephedrine, personally consumed all the tablets he purchased. Regardless of the statute’s
aim, Morgan cannot dispute that his purchases fall within the ambit of the text of § 844.
“Statutory construction begins with the plain text and, if that text is unambiguous, it usually ends
there as well.” United States v. Gayle, 342 F.3d 89, 92 (2d Cir. 2003). The terms of § 844
provide no exemption for personal use. Indeed, the fact that a separate provision of Title 21
proscribes the possession of pseudoephedrine for the purpose of manufacturing
methamphetamine, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(c)(2), belies the extratextual exemption that Morgan
urges us to read into § 844. Thus, to the extent the district court based its sentence on the
understanding that Morgan’s pseudoephedrine purchases were in violation of § 844, we detect no
error.
Even apart from the issue of whether Morgan’s pseudoephedrine purchases were
criminal, we see nothing improper in the district court’s references to Morgan’s violation of the
cooperation agreement, as Morgan’s conduct leading to his arrest was relevant to the district
court’s sentencing determination. For one thing, the revelation of Morgan’s pseudoephedrine
addiction contradicted the assertion in his prior sentencing letter that he had attained sobriety by
the time of his arrest in 2007. What is more, the warrant affidavit asserted that Morgan’s pattern
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of pseudoephedrine purchases was consistent with the act of “smurfing” or structuring these
transactions so as to avoid detection by law enforcement. In sum, Morgan’s dependence on and
transactions involving a controlled substance while released on bail and awaiting sentencing on a
drug offense cast doubt on Morgan’s rehabilitation and suggested the need to craft a sentence to
afford deterrence. We therefore decline to conclude that there was anything improper about the
district court’s consideration of Morgan’s violation of the cooperation agreement or the
government’s withdrawal of the 5K1.1 motion.
In his final assertion of procedural error, Morgan claims that the district court failed to
provide an adequate explanation for the sentence it imposed. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c),
the district court is required to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular
sentence.” This provision does not require the district court to issue “a full opinion in every
case”; rather, “[t]he appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write,
what to say, depends upon circumstances.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).
“When the district court imposes a Guidelines sentence, it may not need to offer a lengthy
explanation, particularly where the parties have not argued meaningfully against a Guidelines
sentence under § 3553(a) or for a departure.” United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 210 (2d
Cir. 2007); see also id. at 211-12 (“The district court imposed a sentence at the bottom of the
Guidelines range, and such sentences often will not require lengthy explanation.”). While the
district court’s explanation here was no doubt terse, we conclude that it was sufficient in the
context of this case. In imposing the sentence, the district court acknowledged the difficulty of
sentencing defendants in drug cases, its consideration of the statutory factors and the parties’
sentencing submissions, Morgan’s occupation as a physician, and his violation of the
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cooperation agreement. This discussion followed the court’s rulings on a number of exceptions
to the PSR and argument from counsel as to whether a below-Guidelines sentence was
warranted. Against this background, we conclude that the district court’s explanation, albeit
brief, was sufficient to satisfy us that the court “considered the parties’ arguments and ha[d] a
reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” Rita, 551 U.S. at 356.
Morgan also claims that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. “We will . . . set
aside a district court’s substantive determination only in exceptional cases where the trial court’s
decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189(emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Review for substantive reasonableness
“provide[s] a backstop for those few cases that, although procedurally correct, would nonetheless
damage the administration of justice because the sentence imposed was shockingly high,
shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law.” United States v. Rigas, 583
F.3d 108, 123 (2d Cir. 2009). While this circuit has not adopted a presumption that sentences
within the Guidelines range are reasonable, “[w]e recognize that in the overwhelming majority
of cases, a Guidelines sentence will fall comfortably within the broad range of sentences that
would be reasonable in the particular circumstances.” Fernandez, 443 F.3d at 27. This is not
one of those exceptional cases in which the imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence is
substantively unreasonable. In light of Morgan’s role in selling hundreds of oxycodone
prescriptions — thus facilitating the illegal distribution of tens of thousands of oxycodone pills
— as well as his conduct while released on bail, the district court’s choice of a sentence at the
bottom of the Guidelines range was not “shockingly high” or “otherwise unsupportable as a
matter of law.” Rigas, 583 F.3d at 123.
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Finally, we turn to Morgan’s claim that the government acted in bad faith by
withdrawing its 5K1.1 motion. We note that Morgan’s cooperation agreement released the
government from any obligation to file such a motion in the event that the government
determined that Morgan had “committed or attempted to commit any further crimes.” App. 20-
21. While the decision of the prosecutor to revoke a cooperation agreement may not be premised
on bad faith or unconstitutional motives, we have held that the government has a good faith basis
to revoke such an agreement where, as here, the defendant is arrested pursuant to a warrant
supported by affidavits detailing new alleged criminal activity. See United States v. Gregory,
245 F.3d 160, 164 (2d Cir. 2001). In any event, Morgan has failed to meet his burden of making
a showing of bad faith that rebuts the government’s explanation of its reasons for withdrawing
the motion. See United States v. Imtiaz, 81 F.3d 262, 264 (2d Cir. 1996) (per curiam).
We have considered Morgan’s remaining arguments and find them to be without merit.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
FOR THE COURT:
CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
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