Adams v. Yale New Haven Hospital

12-4279
Adams v. Yale New Haven Hosp.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED
ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A
DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST
SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
4 on the 12th day of March, two thousand fourteen.
5
6 PRESENT: DENNIS JACOBS,
7 DENNY CHIN,
8 CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,
9 Circuit Judges.
10
11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
12 Clark Adams,
13 Plaintiff-Appellant,
14
15 -v.- 12-4279-cv
16
17 Yale New Haven Hospital,
18 Defendant-Appellee.
19 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -X
20
21 FOR APPELLANT: WILLIAM S. PALMIERI, Law Offices
22 of William S. Palmieri, LLC, New
23 Haven, Connecticut.
24
25 FOR APPELLEE: PATRICK M. NOONAN, Donahue,
26 Durham, & Noonan, P.C.,
27 Guilford, Connecticut.
28
1
1 Appeal from a judgment of the United States District
2 Court for the District of Connecticut (Fitzsimmons, M.J.).
3
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED
5 AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court be
6 AFFIRMED.
7
8 Plaintiff Clark Adams appeals from the final judgment
9 of the United States District Court for the District of
10 Connecticut (Fitzsimmons, M.J.), dismissing his claims of
11 race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation
12 under Title VII (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) and the Connecticut Fair
13 Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”) against Yale New Haven
14 Hospital (“Hospital”). The district court dismissed some of
15 the plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims, and all of his
16 race discrimination claims, by granting a directed verdict
17 to the defendant at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence.
18 Following the jury’s verdict in favor of the plaintiff on
19 the remaining sex discrimination claims, the district court
20 granted judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”) in favor of the
21 defendant pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b)
22 but ordered a new trial as to those claims pursuant to Rule
23 50(b)(2). The district court then permitted the defendant
24 to move for summary judgment on those sex discrimination
25 claims and ultimately granted the defendant’s motion.
26
27 The district court’s grant of summary judgment is
28 reviewed de novo. See Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728
29 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2013). “Summary judgment is
30 appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any
31 material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
32 as a matter of law.” Id. In making this determination, we
33 “resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible factual
34 inferences in favor of the party against whom summary
35 judgment is sought.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 137
36 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks and citation
37 omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “[w]here the
38 record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of
39 fact to find for the non-moving party.” Matsushita Elec.
40 Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
41 (1986).
42
43 A trial court may set aside a jury’s verdict pursuant
44 to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) only where “there
45 is such a complete absence of evidence supporting the
46 verdict that the jury’s findings could only have been the
47 result of sheer surmise or conjecture, or there is such an
2
1 overwhelming amount of evidence in favor of the movant that
2 reasonable and fair minded men could not arrive at a verdict
3 against him.” Bucalo v. Shelter Island Union Free Sch.
4 Dist., 691 F.3d 119, 127-28 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal
5 quotation marks omitted). The district court’s ruling on a
6 motion for JMOL is also reviewed de novo. Ehrlich v. Town
7 of Glastonbury, 348 F.3d 48, 52 (2d Cir. 2003). “A directed
8 verdict is granted only when, viewing the evidence in the
9 light most favorable to the non-moving party, there can be
10 but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable persons
11 could have reached.” Id. (internal quotation marks
12 omitted).
13
14 1. Discrimination Claims. Adams, an African-American man,
15 was a Physician Associate (“PA”) in the Hospital’s
16 Department of Surgery. Two women, Rita Rienzo and Heather
17 Orosco, were the other PAs in the department. In a
18 reorganization triggered by an accreditor’s adverse finding,
19 all three were notified that the Hospital planned to hire
20 twelve new PAs and that, thereafter, all PAs would have to
21 be periodically on-call. Adams decided to leave the Surgery
22 Department rather than accept on-call responsibilities and
23 transferred to the Department of Medicine.
24
25 Six weeks later, the Hospital announced the creation of
26 an administrative position, Lead PA, to deal with the staff
27 increase. No one applied for the position, which included
28 on-call responsibilities. Shortly thereafter, Orosco quit.
29 Rienzo, who then became the only experienced PA in the
30 Surgery Department, negotiated to accept the Lead PA
31 position on terms that allowed her to avoid taking call.
32
33 Adams claims that the Hospital discriminated against
34 him in (1) forcing him out of the Surgery Department while
35 allowing Rienzo and Orosco to avoid taking call; and (2)
36 declining to offer him the Lead PA position without on-call
37 responsibilities. To establish a prima facie case of
38 discrimination in violation of Title VII, “a claimant must
39 show that: 1) he belonged to a protected class; 2) he was
40 qualified for the position; 3) he suffered an adverse
41 employment action; and 4) the adverse employment action
42 occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
43 discriminatory intent.” Terry, 336 F.3d at 138. The same
44 analysis applies to the CFEPA claims. Kaytor v. Elec. Boat
45 Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 556 (2d Cir. 2010).
46
3
1 The circumstances surrounding Adams’ transfer to the
2 Department of Medicine and Rienzo’s acceptance of the Lead
3 PA position do not give rise to an inference of
4 discrimination. It is undisputed that Orosco worked in the
5 transplant service, which had different needs from the rest
6 of the Department of Surgery, and that Orosco’s supervisor
7 did not want her to take call. Once Adams transferred and
8 Orosco quit, Rienzo, as the only experienced PA left, was
9 the only candidate for the Lead PA position. There is
10 nothing here to raise an eyebrow.1
11
12 Furthermore, Adams was not “qualified” for the position
13 of Lead PA once he left the Department of Surgery. It is
14 the Hospital’s undisputed policy to offer a new position in
15 a department to employees within that department first,
16 before accepting other applications. Because Rienzo
17 accepted the Lead PA position, Adams was not entitled to an
18 opportunity to apply.
19
20 2. Retaliation Claims. To establish a prima facie case of
21 retaliation in violation of Title VII, an employee must show
22 “(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the
23 defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse
24 employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the
25 protected activity and the adverse employment action.”
26 McMenemy v. City of Rochester, 241 F.3d 279, 282–83 (2d Cir.
27 2001). The same analysis applies to the CFEPA claims.
28 Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 556.
29
30 While Adams did complain to his supervisors about the
31 new on-call requirement, he has not demonstrated a causal
32 connection between those complaints and an adverse
33 employment action. His protected activity--i.e. his
34 complaints--did not precipitate a forced transfer. To the
35 contrary, Adams voluntarily chose to transfer rather than
36 accept on-call duties.
37
1
Adams testified that another PA, Christopher Mallory,
also transferred out of the Department of Surgery to avoid
on-call duties. This does not impact the analysis, because
the different treatment allegedly accorded Orosco and Rienzo
was due to particular circumstances, and not their sex. In
any event, the fact that Mallory--a white man--transferred
to avoid taking call, undercuts Adams’ claims of race
discrimination.
4
1 For the foregoing reasons, and finding no merit in
2 Adams’ other arguments, we hereby AFFIRM the judgment of the
3 district court.
4
5
6
7 FOR THE COURT:
8 CATHERINE O’HAGAN WOLFE, CLERK
9
10
11
5